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This  thesis  is  a  study  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  (ligne  de  fuite),  as  it  
appears   in   the  work   of  Gilles  Deleuze   and  Félix  Guattari.   By  mapping   the  
individuation  of  this  concept  within  a  number  of  different  works,  authored  either  
by  one  of  these  thinkers  or  by  the  two  of  them  together,  I  show  how  and  why  
the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight   was   created,   how   it   functions   within   the  
conceptual   domain   of   Deleuzoguattarian   writing,   and   what   kind   of  
philosophical  and  political  work  it  can  do.  
  
The  first  two  chapters  of  the  thesis  examine  the  work  completed  by  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  before  their  collaborations,  especially  Deleuze’s  Difference  and  
Repetition   (1968)   and  Guattari’s  Psychoanalysis   and  Transversality   (1972).  
Here  I  pay  close  attention  to  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  reinterpretations  of  basic  
philosophical   questions   concerning   the   nature   of   space,   time,   and   human  
agency   and   show   how   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   anti-­capitalist   politics   is  
connected  to  their  anti-­representational  metaphysics.  
  
In   the   latter  sections  of   the   thesis   I  argue  for  a  more  vigilant   reading  of   the  
politics  contained   in  Anti-­Oedipus   (1972)  and  A  Thousand  Plateaus   (1980).  
Chapters  3  and  4  examine  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  creation  of  the  concept  of  
the  line  of  flight  in  Anti-­Oedipus,  where  it  plays  a  central  role  in  their  analysis  
of  both  desiring-­machines  and  social-­machines.  Chapters  5  and  6,  on  the  other  
hand,  examine  the  development  of  the  concept  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  where  
it   is  a  key  component   in  both  their  creation  of   rhizomatics  and  their  political  
pragmatism.  
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i)  Introduction  
  
This  thesis  is  a  study  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  (ligne  de  fuite),  as  it  
appears   in   the  work   of  Gilles  Deleuze   and  Félix  Guattari.   By  mapping   the  
emergence  of  this  concept  within  a  number  of  different  works,  authored  either  
by  one  of  these  thinkers  or  by  the  two  of  them  together,  my  analysis  will  show  
how  and  why  this  concept  was  created,  how  it  functions  within  the  conceptual  
domain   of   Deleuzoguattarian   writing,   and   what   kind   of   philosophical   and  
political  work  it  can  do.    
  
This  introduction  includes  four  sections.  First,  I  will  offer  a  brief  overview  of  the  
concept   of   the   line   of   flight.   I  will   explain  where   it   appears   in  Deleuze  and  
Guattari’s  work  and  make  some  preliminary  comments  concerning  the  role  it  
plays  within  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  project.  Second,  I  will  offer  an  overview  of  
the   reception   and   interpretation   of   this   concept   in   the   secondary   literature.  
Here  I  will  explain  why  the  concept  has  been  overlooked  by  a  number  of  major  
commentators  and  why  it  has  been  misunderstood  and  ill-­used  by  others.  In  
the  third  section  of  this  introduction,  I  will  explain  my  methodology  and  offer  a  
brief   defence   of   why   it   will   be   productive   to   map   the   individuation   of   this  
concept  within   the  work  of  both  Deleuze  and  Guattari.  Finally,   in   the   fourth  
section,  I  will  give  a  brief  synopsis  of  the  content  of  each  of  the  six  chapters  
that  make  up  the  substantive  work  of  the  thesis.    
  
ii)  The  line  of  flight  in  context  
  
By   the   time   Deleuze   and   Guattari   met   in   June   of   1969,1   the   former   had  
published  eight  monographs,  each  offering  a  novel   reading  of  an   influential  
figure   in   the   history   of   western   thought:   first   Hume,   then   Nietzsche,   Kant,  
Proust,   Nietzsche   again,   Bergson,   Sacher-­Masoch,   and   Spinoza.   The  
controversial   young   philosopher   had   also   recently   published   two   other  
prodigious  works,  Difference  and  Repetition  (1968)  and  Logic  of  Sense  (1969),  
in  which  he  put   forward  his  own  metaphysical  system.   In   these   two  books,  
Deleuze  built  on  the  criticisms  and  reinterpretations  he  had  made  of  the  history  
                                                                                                                
1  Dosse,  2010,  3  
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of  philosophy  to  produce  a  new  form  of  metaphysics.  He  set  out  to  understand  
the  world  as  an  inherently  dynamic  process,  rather  than  one  governed  by  static  
principles  of  identity.2  He  argued  that  the  mode  of  thought  that  had  dominated  
the  western  mind  since  Plato  had  made  the  recurring  mistake  of  assuming  that  
the  basis  for  thought  must  be  something  unchanging  and  unified.  For  Deleuze,  
philosophy   has   consistently   directed   itself   towards   the   goal   of   attaining  
unchanging   knowledge   of   that   which   does   not   change:   Platonic   ‘Forms’,  
Aristotelian   ‘essences’,   Cartesian   ‘clear   and   distinct   ideas’,   and   Kantian  
‘categories’  or  ‘pure  concepts  of  the  understanding’  are  all  taken  as  examples  
of   this   tendency.  According   to   this   tradition,  our  understanding  of   the  world  
must   be   based   on   identity,   with   any   differences   only   being   thought   as  
secondary  relations  between  things.  Similarly,  change  itself  must  be  thought  
as  a  kind  of  deviation  from  the  otherwise  essentially  static  nature  of  truth.3  In  
an  attempt  to  reverse  this  tendency  within  philosophy,  which  Deleuze  dubbed  
the   ‘image   of   thought’,   he   produced   a   new   metaphysical   system,   centred  
around  the  concept  of  difference.4  We  will  see  later  on  in  this  thesis,  especially  
in  the  first  main  chapter,  how  influential  this  metaphysics  was  for  Deleuze  and  
Guattari’s  shared  project.    
  
Guattari  was  not  a  philosopher  in  the  traditional  sense,  but  a  psychoanalyst  
and  self-­styled  political  militant.  As  well  as  being  well  known  for  his  numerous  
positions  in  student  assemblies  and  communist  groups,  especially  those  of  a  
Trotskyist   bent,   Guattari   was   a   psychoanalyst   who   had   been   analysed   by  
Jacques   Lacan,   by   far   the  most   influential   figure   in   French   psychoanalytic  
circles  at  the  time  and  one  of  the  most  influential  living  European  intellectuals.  
                                                                                                                
2  To  say  that  Deleuze’s  metaphysics  was  posed  as  a  challenge  to  the  history  of  philosophy  
does  not  mean  that  his  work  had  no  precursors.  Deleuze  attempted  to  realize  a  hidden  or  
‘minor’  history  of  philosophy,  via  the  Stoics,  Spinoza,  Nietzsche,  and  Bergson,  that  had  
previously  been  covered  over  by  the  ‘major’  history  of  western  thought,  running  from  Plato,  
through  Descartes,  to  Kant  and  beyond.    
3  These  themes  will  all  be  discussed  in  more  depth  in  later  chapters.  Here  I  can  only  offer  
direction  on  where  to  find  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  direct  comments  on  the  history  of  
philosophy:  DR  164;;  LS  86,  111,  291,  AO  26,  83,  85,  116;;  ATP  17-­18,  415.  
4  Deleuze  is  not  the  only  20th  century  French  thinker  to  suggest  the  priority  of  the  concept  of  
difference;;  Derrida’s  use  of  différance  plays  a  similar  conceptual  role  (1982,  3-­27).  Deleuze  
is  unique,  however,  in  developing  a  positive  and  productive  conception  of  difference  that  he  
could  use  to  tackle  some  of  the  major  problems  that  have  arisen  in  the  history  of  western  
metaphysics.      
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Guattari  was  an  intimidating  and  forthright  character,  who  had  helped  set  up  
one   of   the  most   forward-­thinking   psychotherapeutic   centres   in   France,   the  
psychiatric  clinic  at  La  Borde,  where  he  worked  until  his  death.  Until  Jacques  
Alain-­Miller’s   rise   to   prominence,  Guattari  was  also   recognised  as   the   heir-­
apparent  to  Lacan’s  throne  as  the  head  of  the  École  Freudienne  de  Paris.  As  
a  therapist,  Guattari  was  intent  on  developing  a  method  for  the  treatment  of  
psychotics,   a   group   Freud   famously   thought   to   be   immune   to   the  
psychoanalytic  method,  due  to  their  inability  to  maintain  the  analytic  ‘contract’.  
Despite  having  written  his  doctoral  thesis  on  psychosis,  Lacan  also  tended  to  
eschew  the  treatment  of  psychotics  due  to  his  understanding  of  psychosis  as  
a  result  of  psychic   ‘foreclosure’.  Guattari’s  major   theoretical  revision   to  both  
traditional  Freudian  and  Lacanian  methods,  was  his  attempt  to  think  psychosis  
as  a  social  and  cultural  occurrence,  rather  than  simply  as  an  individual  ailment.  
He   recognised   that   psychotics   were   affected   by,   and   embedded   in,   an  
historical,   cultural   and   political   situation,   and   that   in   order   to   treat   these  
individuals  it  was  necessary  to  take  therapy  out  of  the  consulting  room,  away  
from  the  couch,  and  to  put  it  in  conversation  with  a  broader  political  critique.  
Drawing  on  the  practices  developed  at  St  Alban  by  figures  such  as  François  
Tosquelles  and  Lucien  Bonnafé,  Guattari  and  his  colleague  at  La  Borde,  Jean  
Oury,  set  out  to  create  a  form  of  group  therapy  that  could  treat  psychosis  by  
opening  up  the  psychoanalytic  encounter  to  the  dynamics  of  the  surrounding  
context.  The  result  of  this  effort  was  ‘Institutional  Psychotherapy’,  which,  unlike  
traditional   psychoanalytic   methods,   rejected   both   the   unity   of   the   subject,  
either  as  a  reality  or  a  goal  of  analysis,  and  the  unity  of  the  symptom.    
  
We  will  look  more  closely  at  Guattari’s  work  in  chapter  two  of  this  thesis,  but  I  
have   given   this   brief   overview   here   in   order   to   provide   the   necessary  
background   for   an   introduction   to   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   joint   project.  
Specifically,  I  hope  this  précis  will  show  that  what  Deleuze  and  Guattari  had  in  
common  before   their   collaboration  was  an   aversion   to   the   centrality   of   the  
individual.  For  Deleuze,  this  was  manifest  in  his  philosophical  critique  of  the  
concept  of  identity,  while  for  Guattari  it  revealed  itself  in  his  attempts  to  develop  
a  therapeutic  practice,  and  a  psychoanalytic  theory,  that  did  not  foreground  the  
individual  subject.    
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Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   first   collaborative   work,   Anti-­Oedipus   (1972),   is   a  
philosophical  and  political  critique  of  the  traditional  psychoanalytic  institution,  
its   interaction   with   the   history   of   capitalism,   and   their   shared   basis   in   a  
philosophy   of   identity   and   a   conception   of   desire   as   lack.   It   analyses   the  
relationship   between   reality   and  desire   and  puts   forward   a   new,  materialist  
psychiatry.   This   book,   which  made   up   the   first   half   of   the  Capitalism   and  
Schizophrenia  series,  sets  out  a  revolutionary  project  and  it  is  no  coincidence  
that  it  was  produced  in  the  wake  of  the  student  and  worker  riots  that  erupted  
in  France  in  May  of  1968.  The  second  part  of  the  Capitalism  and  Schizophrenia  
series,  published  as  A  Thousand  Plateaus  (1980),  is  more  diverse  in  its  aims  
and  notably  less  militant  in  its  revolutionary  demands.  It  is  a  kind  of  field  guide  
for   a   reinterpretation   of   the   universe,   covering   a   huge   range   of   registers,  
including   the   cosmic,   geological,   evolutionary,   ethological,   mythological,  
anthropological,  historical,  economic,  political,  literary,  and  musical.  While  the  
differences  between  these  two  books  are  striking,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  never  
let  go  of  their  critique  of  the  concept  of  identity.  In  the  third,  fourth,  fifth,  and  
sixth  chapters  of  this  thesis  we  will  look  closely  at  the  intricacies  of  these  two  
books,  but  here  I  just  want  to  highlight  one  effect  of  this  consistent  critique  of  
identity,  which  will  allow  us  to  give  a  brief  definition  of  the  line  of  flight.  What  
Deleuze   and   Guattari   are   constantly   fighting   against   in   their   collaborative  
works  is  the  image  of  the  world  as  an  object,  which  is  in  turn  made  up  of  other  
objects.  They  want  to  avoid  the  kind  of  thinking  that  assumes  the  universe  is  
a  closed  totality,  the  truth  of  which  is  essentially  static  and  unitary,  and  replace  
it  with  an  understanding  of  the  world  as  an  open-­ended  dynamic  process,  the  
constituent  parts  of  which  are  also  not  objects  of  identity,  but  further  processes.  
For  this  reason,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  do  not  try  to  analyse  the  ‘things’  they  
find  around  them,  but  instead  try  to  explain  the  genetic  processes  that  give  rise  
to  these  apparently  unified  things.    
  
In  a  discussion  with  Claire  Parnet,  Deleuze  explains  that  his  work  with  Guattari  
is   not   interested   in   offering   an   analysis   of   “things,   but   of   a   multiplicity   of  
dimensions,  of  lines  and  directions”,  a  collection  of  dynamic  elements  that  they  
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will  name  an  “assemblage”.5  An  assemblage  is  a  set  of  connections  that  come  
together   for   a   period   of   time   and   which,   when   taken   together,   produce   a  
recognisable   behaviour   or   effect.   Each   assemblage   is   a   constellation   of  
heterogeneous  elements,  however  these  constituent  elements  are  not   to  be  
taken  as  entities  in  themselves,  but  are  also  to  be  understood  as  processes  or  
connections.   Throughout   their   work,   Deleuze   and   Guattari   will   refer   to   the  
connections   that   constitute   an   assemblage   as   ‘lines’.6   In   the   same   essay,  
Deleuze   states   that   according   to   their   mode   of   thought:   “Whether   we   are  
individuals  or  groups,  we  are  made  up  of  lines  and  these  lines  are  very  varied  
in  nature.”7  If  the  world  is  made  up  of  assemblages,  and  these  assemblages  
are   constituted   by   lines,   then   in   order   to   give   an   account   of   phenomena  
encountered  in  the  world,  it  will  be  necessary  to  develop  a  theory  of  what  these  
lines  are,  how  they  function,  and  how  they  interact.  Subsequently,  the  whole  
of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  philosophical  project  becomes  an  attempt  to  do  just  
that:   “What   we   call   by   different   names   –   schizoanalysis,   micro-­politics,  
pragmatics,  diagrammatism,  rhizomatics,  cartography  –  has  no  other  object  
than   the  study  of   these   lines.”8  As  an  assemblage   is  not  a  static  entity,  but  
something  dynamic,   it   is  not  always  useful,  or  even  possible,   to  answer   the  
question   ‘what   is   it?’   but   only   ‘how   does   it   function?’   or   ‘what   can   it   do?’.  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  will  also  aim  to  answer  the  more  fundamental,  ‘how  was  
it  produced?’  and  ‘how  is  it  reproduced  in  such  a  way  that  it  appears  to  have  a  
duration  in  time?’  
  
As  part  of   this  project,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  will  differentiate  between  three  
different  kinds  of  lines,  and  it  is  in  this  context  that  the  line  of  flight  first  emerges  
as  a  concept.  For  any  assemblage  to  exist,  it  must  be  the  case  that  some  of  
the   lines,  or  connections,   that  make  up   the  assemblage  serve   to  uphold   its  
structure.  These  lines,  which  hold  the  assemblage  together,  are  referred  to  as  
lines   of   rigid   segmentarity,   or   molar   lines.   On   the   other   hand,   for   the  
                                                                                                                
5  DII  100  
6  The  concept  of  the  ‘line’  goes  through  a  number  of  transformations  in  Deleuze  and  
Guattari’s  work.  See  Deleuze’s  comments  on  the  ‘line’  and  the  ‘vector’  (DR  290;;  LS  65,  125);;  
and  on  the  ‘line’  as  an  ‘arrow’  (DR  xiii;;  N  viii).  
7  DII  93  
8  DII  94  
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assemblage  to  reproduce  itself  in  such  a  way  that  it  survives  over  time,  it  must  
also  be  able  to  adapt  or  change.  The  lines  which  bring  about  these  revisions  
are  referred  to  as  lines  of  supple  segmentarity,  or  molecular  lines.  Finally,  there  
are   those   lines   that   reach   outside   of   the   assemblage,   those   parts   of   the  
assemblage  that  escape  the  structure  of  which  they  are  a  part  and  serve  to  
connect  such  an  assemblage  to   that  which   is  outside   itself.  These   lines  are  
referred  to  as  lines  of  flight  and  it  is  these  lines  that  are  the  object  of  study  for  
this   thesis.9   Over   the   course   of   the   next   six   chapters   I   will   aim   to   give   a  
comprehensive  and  technical  account  of  the  concept  of  the  ‘line  of  flight’.  I  will  
show  how  it  draws  on  previous  ideas  developed  by  the  two  authors  and  how  it  
fits   into   the  many  different  philosophical  and  political  projects  conducted  by  
Deleuze  and  Guattari.  In  order  to  do  this,  I  will  also  explore  a  much  broader  
repertoire  of  Deleuzoguattarian  concepts,  and  will  draw  on  far  more  sources  
than  I  am  able  to  include  in  this  introduction.  By  way  of  compensation,  I  will  
include   one   example   here   of   an   assemblage   that   Deleuze   and   Guattari  
describe  in  order  to  illustrate  how  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  might  function  
elsewhere.    
  
In  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  explain  how  the  evolutionary  
development   of   two   biological   species   can   affect   each   other   by   taking   the  
example  of  the  wasp  and  the  orchid.  For  the  wasp  species  to  exist  over  time  it  
must   have   some   means   of   reproducing   itself:   there   is   the   chemical  
reproduction  of  genetic  code  which  ensures   that   the  species  can  exist   from  
one  generation  to  the  next,  and  there  are  also  behavioural  functions,  such  as  
the   division   of   labour   between   the   egg-­producing   queen   and   the   pollen  
collecting  workers   that  ensure   the  survival  of   the  colony.  These  processes,  
which  serve  to  maintain  the  structure  of  the  life  of  the  species  over  time,  can  
be  understood  as  lines  of  rigid  segmentarity,  or  molar  lines.  However,  in  order  
for   the  wasp   to  survive  changes   in   its  environment   it  must  also  have  some  
methods  for  adaptation:  the  reproduction  of  genetic  code  must  include  the  right  
number  of  mutations  to  allow  for  slight  alterations  in  the  chemical  make-­up  of  
the  wasp,  and  similarly  there  must  be  an  element  of  contest  within  the  social  
                                                                                                                
9  ATP  225-­228  
   13  
structure  of  the  colony  so  that  a  weak  queen  can  be  replaced  when  necessary.  
These  tendencies  of  alteration  and  revision,  which  are  equally  necessary  for  
the   existence   of   the   wasp   species,   can   be   understood   as   lines   of   supple  
segmentarity,  or  as  molecular   lines.  However,   in  A  Thousand  Plateaus,   the  
tendency  of  the  wasp  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  most  interested  in  is  the  
mutual  dependence  it  develops  with  the  orchid.    
  
There  are  particular  species  of  orchid  whose  flowers  reproduce  the  colour  and  
patterned  effect  of  the  female  wasp  in  order  to  attract  the  pollinator.  However,  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  see  this  as  something  other  than  a  simple  imitation  of  
form.  Under  their   interpretation,  the  wasp  “becomes  a  liberated  piece  of  the  
orchid's   reproductive   system”,   while   the   orchid   “becomes   the   object   of   an  
orgasm  in  the  wasp,  also  liberated  from  its  own  reproduction”.10  The  important  
point  here  is  that  there  is  a  particular  set,  or  series,  of  functions  that  define  the  
development   and   survival   of   the  wasp,   and   there   is   a   separate   series   that  
defines  the  development  and  survival  of  the  orchid,  however,  in  this  interaction  
a  line  is  formed  that  connects  these  two  series.  The  two  series  resonate  with  
each  other,  affecting  both  the  wasp  and  the  orchid.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write  
that   in   this   example:   “There   is   neither   imitation   nor   resemblance,   only   an  
exploding  of   two  heterogeneous   series  on   the   line  of   flight.”11   The   line   that  
connects  the  wasp  and  the  orchid  is  a  line  of  flight.  It  produces  a  “coexistence  
of  two  asymmetrical  movements”  and  is  thus  referred  to  as  “a  line  of  flight  that  
sweeps  away  selective  pressures”.12  
  
To  clarify,   for  Deleuze  and  Guattari,   lines  of   flight  are  not  secondary   to   the  
assemblages  that  they  escape.  It  may  seem  as  if  wasps  and  orchids  exist  as  
species  prior  to  their  interaction,  and  that  the  line  connecting  them  is  only  of  
ancillary   or   supplementary   interest.   In   direct   opposition   to   this   intuition,  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  claim  that  lines  of  flight  are  constitutive  and  substantive.  
Assemblages  can  only  come  into  existence  through  the  creative  capacities  that  
                                                                                                                
10  ATP  324  
11  ATP  11  
12  ATP  324  
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lines  of   flight  expose.13  This   is  a  complex  and  counterintuitive  philosophical  
position  to  maintain  –  and  it  is  one  that  will  be  explored  throughout  the  thesis  
–  but  it  is  not  uncharacteristic  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  philosophical  style.  In  
Difference  and  Repetition,  Deleuze  argues   that   difference   is   the   necessary  
precondition   for   the   genesis   of   identity,   and   in   Psychoanalysis   and  
Transversality,   Guattari   argues   that   group   phenomena   of   desire   logically  
precede  individual  desires.  Once  we  have  had  a  chance  to  explore  these  texts  
more  closely,  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  claims  in  Anti-­Oedipus  and  A  Thousand  
Plateaus   that   lines   of   flight   constitute   the   necessary   preconditions   for   the  
genesis  of  assemblages  will  be  much  easier  to  swallow.  
  
As  well  as  taking  examples  from  evolutionary  biology,  the  concept  of  the  line  
of  flight  is  worked  out  in  a  number  of  alternative  case  studies  from  a  range  of  
disciplines   including   psychoanalysis,   semiotics,   ethnography,   and   political  
economy.   It   is   particularly   influential   in   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   analysis   of  
social  structures,  where  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  is  linked  with  nomadic  
social  groups  and  a  nomadic  mode  of  thought.  The  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  
allows  Deleuze  and  Guattari  to  offer  a  reinterpretation  of  a  classical  Marxist  
perspective  by  claiming  that  social  formations  are  defined  not  by  their  internal  
contradictions,  but  by  what  escapes  them.14  They  are  clear  that  their  political  
philosophy  is  based  on  an  analysis  of  the  lines  of  flight  operative  in  a  society.  
In  an  interview  with  Negri  in  1990,  Deleuze  states  that  one  of  the  three  central  
objectives  of  A  Thousand  Plateaus  was  to  show  that  “any  society  is  defined  
not  so  much  by  its  contradictions  as  by  its  lines  of  flight”  and  that  one  task  of  
the  book  was  “to  try  and  follow  the  lines  of  flight  taking  shape  at  some  particular  
moment  or  other.”15  Across  all  of  these  cases,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  constantly  
warn  that  lines  of  flight  have  both  a  creative  and  a  destructive  capacity.  The  
lines   that   escape   the   apparatus   of   the   assemblage   can   open   it   onto   new  
possibilities,  as   in   the  case  of   the  wasp  and  the  orchid,  or   they  can  pull   the  
assemblage  apart  from  the  inside.  This  double-­edged  nature  of  lines  of  flight  
                                                                                                                
13  ATP  585;;  May,  2005,  137  
14  See  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  analysis  of  the  role  of  mercantilism  in  the  downfall  of  
feudalism  and  the  advent  of  capitalism  (ATP  452-­458).  See  also  Massumi  (1992,  204).  
15  N  171  
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is  something  that  is  often  disregarded  in  the  secondary  literature.  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  take  great  pains  to  point  out  that  lines  of  flight  “always  risk  abandoning  
their  creative  potentialities  and  turning  into…  a  line  of  destruction.”16  It  is  one  
of   the  aims  of   this   thesis   to  explore  how  Deleuze  and  Guattari  differentiate  
productive   and   creative   lines   of   flight   from   those   that   are   negative   and  
destructive.  
  
Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   shared   commitment   to   overturning   the   traditional  
‘image   of   thought’,   and   its   reliance   on   the   concept   of   identity,   not   only  
determines  the  content  of  their  work  but  also  their  methodology  and  their  style.  
In  an  attempt  to  produce  a  philosophical  method  that  is  capable  of  thinking  the  
dynamism   of   the   world,   it   is   necessary   that   Deleuze   and   Guattari   do   not  
produce  a  unified  system  of   thought,  which  coheres   into  a  complete  whole.  
Instead,   these   two   thinkers   develop   a   philosophical   methodology   that   is  
actively   incomplete.17   It   is   a   method   of   thinking   and   of   writing   that   opens  
thought   onto   novel   problems   by   developing   an   ever-­new   conceptual  
apparatus,  which  evolves  and  mutates  depending  on  the  work  being  done.  In  
short,  their  work  is  an  assemblage.  It  is  a  dynamic  process  that  changes  over  
time  and   cannot  be  understood  as   something   separate   from   the   function   it  
performs.  This  means  that  when  we  try  to  single  out  a  concept  from  their  work,  
we  will  not  find  something  with  a  coherent  and  static  identity.  The  line  of  flight  
is  a  concept  that  runs  through  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  work.  While  not  present  
in   either   of   their  writings   before   1972,   there  are   precursors   of   this   concept  
running   back   through   both   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   earlier   writing.   First  
emerging  as  a  defined  concept   in  Anti-­Oedipus   (1972),   it   then  morphs  as   it  
passes   though  Kafka:  Towards   a  Minor   Literature   (1975)   and  A  Thousand  
Plateaus  (1980).  It  has  slightly  different  uses  again  in  later  works  by  Guattari  
and  in  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  final  collaboration  What  is  Philosophy?  (1991).  
Just  as  the  wasp  exists  as  a  species  not  despite  its  alterations  and  adaptations  
but  because  of  them,  and  just  as  the  development  of  the  wasp  is  tied  up  with  
                                                                                                                
16  ATP  558  
17  Drawing  on  Deleuze’s  terminology  in  Difference  and  Repetition,  we  could  say  that  while  
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  conceptual  framework  is  completely  determined,  it  is  produced  out  of  
the  relationship  of  indeterminate  elements  which  reciprocally  determine  one  another.    
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the  environment  in  which  it  functions,  we  will  see  that  the  concept  of  the  line  
of  flight  has  a  consistency  throughout  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  work  because  of  
the   ways   in   which   it   adapts   and   because   of   the   various   ways   in   which   it  
resonates  with  the  conceptual  environment  of  its  use.    
  
iii)  The  line  of  flight  within  Deleuze  and  Guattari  Studies  
  
The   secondary   literature   on   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   work   is   both   vast   and  
continually  expanding,  but  while  certain  aspects  of  the  pair’s  work  have  been  
studied  and  applied  with  great  care,  there  are  a  number  of  aspects  that  have  
been  systematically  overlooked  or  carelessly  deployed.  It  is  my  contention  that  
the  concept  of   the   line  of   flight,  despite   its   recurrence   through  a  number  of  
different  works  by  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  and  despite  the  authors’  comments  
concerning  its  importance  to  their  project,  has  been  treated  particularly  poorly  
within  the  secondary  literature.  To  my  mind,  this  is  due  in  part  to  a  number  of  
issues  surrounding  the  translation  of  the  concept,  and  in  part  to  the  ways  in  
which  the  secondary  literature  is  internally  divided.    
  
The  English   translation   ‘line  of   flight’   from   the  French   term   ligne  de   fuite   is  
problematic  in  a  number  of  respects.  In  later  chapters  I  will  explain  why  this  
translation  can  be  misleading  for  Anglophone  readers,  due  in  part  to  the  fact  
that  the  French  word  fuite  only  means  flight  in  the  sense  of  fleeing,  or  escape,  
and  not  in  the  sense  of  a  controlled  movement  through  the  air.  I  will  save  this  
discussion  of  the  quality  of  the  translation  for  later  chapters.  Here  I  will  only  
point   out   the   issues   arising   from   inconsistency   of   translation.   As   I   have  
previously  noted,  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  does  not  appear  until  Deleuze  
and   Guattari   publish   their   first   collaborative   work,   Anti-­Oedipus,   in   1972.  
However,  before  this,  Guattari  does  use  the  French  world  fuite  regularly  on  its  
own,  for  example  in  Psychoanalysis  and  Transversality,  where  the  translations  
render  the  word  fuite  as  ‘escape’.  Following  this,  all  of  the  major  publications  
of  Anti-­Oedipus  in  English,18  which  use  the  same  translation  by  Robert  Hurley,  
                                                                                                                
18  Including  those  from  University  of  Minnesota  Press,  Penguin,  Random  House,  and  
Bloomsbury  Continuum.  
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Seem  Mark,  and  Helen  R.  Lane,  also  render  ligne  de  fuite  as  ‘line  of  escape’.  
The  accepted  translation  of  Kafka:  Towards  a  Minor  Literature  (1975),  by  Dana  
Polan,   follows   this   translation   in   most   instances,19   but   occasionally   opts  
instead  to  translate  the  term  as  ‘line  of  flight’.20  On  the  other  hand,  the  accepted  
translation  of  A  Thousand  Plateaus  (1980),  by  Brain  Massumi,  uses  the  now  
conventional  term,  ‘line  of  flight’.  The  English  translations  of  Guattari’s  other  
work,   including   Andrew   Goffey’s   recent   translation   of   Lines   of   Flight:   For  
Another  World  of  Possibilities  also  use   ‘line  of   flight’.21  Curiously,  given   the  
translation   of   the   concept   from   Anti-­Oedipus,   the   English   translation   of  
Guattari’s   preparatory   notes   for   that   work,   published   as  The   Anti-­Oedipus  
Papers  and  translated  by  Kelina  Gotman,  also  uses  the  more  common  ‘line  of  
flight’.  The  result  of  this  confusion  is  that  the  Anglophone  literature  on  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  rarely  recognises  that  there  is  a  direct  continuity  between  the  ‘line  
of  escape’  of  Anti-­Oedipus  and  the  ‘line  of  flight’  of  A  Thousand  Plateaus.  It  is  
one  of  the  aims  of  this  thesis  to  correct  this  oversight.    
  
If  we  turn  to  the  full  collection  of  works  authored  by  either  Deleuze  or  Guattari,  
and  to  the  works  they  produced  in  collaboration,  and  if  we  include  published  
collections   of   essays   and   interviews   as   well   as   other   books,   the   resulting  
bibliography   includes  up   to   forty-­six   titles.   These  books   range  over   a   great  
variety   of   disciplines,   including   philosophy,   psychoanalysis,   political   theory,  
literature,  film  studies,  and  art  criticism  and  also  vary  greatly  in  their  style,  from  
more   traditional   monographs   on   well-­defined   philosophical   questions   and  
relatively   conventional   discourses   on   psychoanalytic   theory,   to   more  
experimental   and   interdisciplinary   works   of   schizoanalysis   and   rhizomatic  
micro-­politics.  Given  this   fact,   it   is  unsurprising   that   the  secondary   literature  
also  comes  in  a  variety  of  styles  and  disciplines.  Here  I  am  going  to  consider  
five  relatively  distinct  groups  in  order  to  point  out  the  different  ways  the  concept  
of  the  line  of  flight  has  been  received  in  each  of  them.  The  five  groups  I  will  
consider  are:  the  philosophical  reception  of  the  work  Deleuze  produced  without  
                                                                                                                
19  K  6,  21,  34-­36,  41,  59,  61,  65,  67,  86-­87.    
20  K  xvi,  14,  69  
21  For  an  explanation  of  the  provenance  of  the  work,  and  its  position  in  Guattari’s  oeuvre,  
see  Goffey’s  preface  (LF  xiv).  
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Guattari;;  the  psychoanalytic,  political,  and  philosophical  reception  of  the  work  
produced  by  Guattari  without  Deleuze;;  the  philosophical  reception  of  Deleuze  
and  Guattari’s  collaboratively  authored  work;;  the  range  of  reader’s  guides  and  
introductory   dictionaries   for   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   work;;   and   finally   the  
various   literary   and   other   interdisciplinary   works   that   draw   on   a  
Deleuzoguattarian  framework.  After  running  through  these  five  groups  in  turn,  
I  will  offer  some  comments  about  the  equivalent  reception  of  the  concept  of  
the  line  of  flight  in  the  Francophone  literature.    
  
The  secondary   literature  on  Deleuze’s  philosophical  project   is   impressive   in  
size.  The  first  major  attempts  in  English  to  grapple  with  the  legacy  of  Deleuzian  
thought   include   Michael   Hardt’s   Gilles   Deleuze:   an   Apprenticeship   in  
Philosophy  (1993)  and  Keith  Ansell-­Pearson’s  Germinal  Life:  The  Difference  
and  Repetition  of  Deleuze  (1999).  Among  the  most  engaging  of  the  works  to  
follow,  we   find  a  number  of   incisive  philosophical   texts   that  attempt   to  offer  
comprehensive  readings  of  Deleuze  as  a  major  philosopher  in  his  own  right.  
This   list   includes,   but   is   far   from   limited   to,   Gregg   Lambert’s   The   Non-­
Philosophy   of   Gilles   Deleuze   (2002),   James   Williams’   The   Transversal  
Thought   of   Gilles   Deleuze:   Encounters   and   Influences   (2005),   and   Levi  
Bryant’s  Difference  and  Givenness:  Deleuze's  Transcendental  Empiricism  and  
the   Ontology   of   Immanence   (2008).   There   have   also   been   a   number   of  
attempts   to  use  Deleuze’s  writing   to  produce  a  systematic   response   to  one  
area  of  philosophy,  such  as   in  Manuel  DeLanda’s  scientific   interpretation  of  
Deleuzian  metaphysics  in  Intensive  Science  and  Virtual  Philosophy  (2002).  On  
top   of   this,   the   secondary   literature   also   includes   a   number   of   attempts   to  
clarify   or   develop   specific   arguments   that   are   developed   across   Deleuze’s  
many  works,  such  as  Henry  Somers-­Hall’s  Hegel,  Deleuze,  and  the  Critique  
of  Representation   (2012).  Finally,  within   this  category   it   is  also   important   to  
include  the  works  written  by  Deleuze’s  critics,  the  most  influential  of  which  are  
Alain  Badiou’s  The  Clamour  of  Being  (2000)  and  Peter  Hallward’s  Out  of  This  
World:  Deleuze  and  the  Philosophy  of  Creation  (2006).      
  
As  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  is  one  that  is  produced  during  Deleuze  and  
Guattari’s  collaboration  and  deployed  almost  exclusively  in  their  co-­authored  
   19  
works,  it  might  be  expected  that  the  concept  would  be  absent  in  this  section  of  
the  secondary  literature  altogether,  however  this  is  not  the  case.  The  concept  
of  the  line  of  flight  is  in  fact  referenced  in  a  number  of  places  thought  these  
works,   but   without   any   accompanying   definition   or   analysis.22   On   closer  
inspection,   it   is   not   unusual   to   find   a   number   of   other   concepts   developed  
during   Deleuze’s   work   with   Guattari   scattered   throughout   this   literature,  
without  much  in  the  way  of  an  accompanying  explanation.23  In  short,  among  
the  vast  literature  on  Deleuzian  philosophy,  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  is  
rarely  mentioned  and  is  never  taken  as  an  object  for  investigation  in  its  own  
right.    
  
The  literature  surrounding  the  work  published  by  Guattari  is  noticeably  smaller.  
A   great   deal   of   this   work   has   been   written   by   Gary   Genosko,   who   has  
published  three  books  on  Guattari:  The  Guattari  Reader  (1996);;  Félix  Guattari:  
An   Aberrant   Introduction   (2002);;   and  Félix   Guattari:   A   Critical   Introduction  
(2009).  The  small  selection  of  other  publications  on  Guattari  in  English  include  
Franco  Berardi’s  Félix  Guattari:  thought,  friendship  and  visionary  cartography  
(2008),   Eric   Alliez   and   Andrew  Goffey’s  The   Guattari   Effect   (2011),   Janell  
Watson’s   Guattari's   Diagrammatic   Thought:   Writing   Between   Lacan   and  
Deleuze  (2009),  and  Paul  Elliot’s  Guattari  Reframed  (2012).  Given  the  fact  that  
the  literature  on  Guattari  is  so  restricted  in  comparison  to  the  work  devoted  to  
his  collaborations,  it   is  unsurprising  to  find  that  there  is  very  little  analysis  in  
these  works  of  the  conceptual  schema  developed  in  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  
works,  with  most  of   the  analysis  devoted   instead   to  an   interpretation  of   the  
aspects  of  Guattari’s  writing  that  are  unique  to  his  individually  authored  works,  
most  notably  the  concept  of  ‘transversality’.  As  such,  the  concept  of  the  line  of  
flight  is  not  analysed  in  depth  at  any  point  within  this  section  of  the  literature.    
  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  do  not  refer  to  their  collaborative  publications  as  works  
of   philosophy,   but   instead   call   them  by   a   host   of   different   names,   such   as  
                                                                                                                
22  Ansell  Pearson  (1999,  186-­189);;  DeLanda,  (2013,  128);;  Badiou  (2000,  36);;  Hallward,  
(2006,  3,  28,  40-­44,  57-­58,  99).  
23  ‘Rhizome’  in  Ansell  Pearson  (1999,  156-­157);;  Widder  (2002,  6-­7);;  DeLanda  (2013,  137);;  
Hallward  (2006,  2,  39,  83).  ‘Deterritorialization’  in  Ansell  Pearson  (1999,  199-­208);;  DeLanda,  
(2013,  206-­208).  
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schizoanalysis,   micro-­politics,   diagrammatism,   rhizomatics,   and  
cartography.24  They  also  explicitly  call  for  their  readers  to  treat  their  work  as  a  
kind  of  toolbox  that  should  be  applied  to  any  number  of  problems,  philosophical  
or  otherwise.25  Most  readers  have  taken  Deleuze  and  Guattari  at  their  word  
and  there  has  been  surprisingly  little  work  done  to  assess  their  collaborative  
project   from   a   purely   philosophical   standpoint.   Nonetheless,   there   are   a  
handful  of  books  which  do  treat  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  work,  especially  the  
Capitalism  and  Schizophrenia  series,  from  a  relatively  traditional  philosophical  
perspective.  Unfortunately,  within  these  works  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  
is   given   little   more   than   a   cursory   investigation.   For   example,   in   Ronald  
Bogue’s  Deleuze  and  Guattari  (1989),  the  first  book  length  study  of  Deleuze  
and  Guattari’s  work  to  be  published  in  English,  there  is  only  a  single  reference  
to  the  line  of  flight  and  the  extent  of  the  analysis  is  confined  to  a  one-­sentence  
definition  given   in  parenthesis.26  A  number  of  other  works,  such  as  Charles  
Stivale’s  otherwise  impressive  book,  The  Two  Fold  Thought  of  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  (1998),  use  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  regularly,  but  at  no  point  
try   to   offer   a   statement   of   its  meaning   or   a   guide   for   its   use.27   Somewhat  
surprisingly,   some  works   that  explicitly   attempt   to   explore   the  philosophical  
dimensions  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  project,  such  as  the  collection  of  essays  
titled  A  Shock  to  Thought:  Expression  after  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  edited  by  
Brian  Massumi,  hardly  mention  the  concept  at  all.28  The  most  recent  book  to  
include   in   this   grouping,   A   Thousand   Plateaus   and   Philosophy,   edited   by  
Henry  Somers-­Hall,  Jeffrey  A.  Bell,  and  James  Williams,  treats  each  plateau  
of  the  eponymous  text  separately,  and  while  many  of  the  authors  explore  the  
relevance  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  for  a  specific  plateau,  there  is  no  
consideration  given  to  the  role  it  plays  in  connecting  the  different  plateaus.29  
The  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  appears  most  frequently  among  this  section  of  
the  literature  during  philosophical  attempts  to  explore  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  
aesthetics.   For   example,   Simon   O’Sullivan   gives   a   concise   but   relevant  
                                                                                                                
24  D  94;;  AO  301;;  ATP  48,  161,  277  
25  ATP  26    
26  Bogue,  1989,  110-­112  
27  Stivale,  1998,  12-­13,  32-­35,  80-­84,  104-­105,  112-­119,  158-­159.  
28  The  line  of  flight  is  only  mentioned  during  Mani  Haghighi’s  section  of  this  book  (2002,  134-­
137).  
29  Somers-­Hall  et.  al.  (2018)  
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analysis  of  the  concept  and  its  relationship  to  art   in  his  book  Art  Encounters  
Deleuze  and  Guattari:  Thought  Beyond  Representation  (2006).30  For  reasons  
that  may   be   linked   to   the   issues   of   consistent   translation   that   I  mentioned  
earlier,   the   overwhelming   tendency   within   the   philosophical   reception   of  
Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   work   is   to   use   the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight   for  
ornament,  or  by  way  of  example,  but  with   little  or  no  attempt   to  explore   the  
specific  and  technical  way  in  which  Deleuze  and  Guattari  use  the  term.  
  
Given  the  range  of  new  terminology  developed  by  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  the  
breadth  of  their  references  to  scientific,  literary,  and  philosophical  figures,  and  
their  occasionally  abstruse  style,  it  can  be  difficult  for  new  readers  to  access  
their  texts.  In  response  to  this,  a  number  of  readers’  guides  and  introductions  
have  been  published,  as  well  as  two  ‘dictionaries’  of  their  concepts.  Of  the  two  
guides  to  Anti-­Oedipus,  neither  of  them  give  any  space  to  the  concept  of  the  
line  of  flight:  Ian  Buchanan’s  Deleuze  and  Guattari's  'Anti-­Oedipus':  A  Reader's  
Guide   (2008)   only   mentions   the   concept   once   and,   when   it   does   so,   it   is  
drawing  on  a  comment  made  by  Deleuze  and  not  to  the  text  of  Anti-­Oedipus;;31  
Eugene  W.   Holland’s  Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   Anti-­Oedipus:   Introduction   to  
Schizoanalysis  (1999)  also  only  mentions  the  concept  once,  and  without  any  
accompanying   analysis.32   This   book   also   includes   one   quote   from   Anti-­
Oedipus   in   which   the   concept   appears   as   the   ‘line   of   escape’,   but   no  
connection  is  made  between  this  and  the  line  of  flight.33  Eugene  W.  Holland’s  
follow-­up   guide   to   A   Thousand   Plateaus,   titled   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   A  
Thousand   Plateaus:   A   Reader’s   Guide   (2013),   fares   slightly   better,   with   a  
number   of   references   to   the   concept,   however   there   is   still   no   attempt   to  
explain  the  term  or  explore  its  technical  usage  within  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  
project.34  Brian  Massumi’s  A  User’s  Guide   to  Capitalism  and  Schizophrenia  
(1992),   which   covers   both   Anti-­Oedipus   and   A   Thousand   Plateaus,   is  
interesting   for   the   fact   that   it   follows   the   translation   given   in   the   English  
publications  of  the  former  and  refers  to  the  concept  throughout  as  the  ‘line  of  
                                                                                                                
30  O'Sullivan,  2006,  32-­35,  67-­68,147-­150;;  Zepke,  2005,  122-­127.  
31  Buchanan,  2008,  5.  
32  Holland,  1999,  121  
33  Holland,  1999,  p104.  
34  Holland  2013,  9,  84-­85,  99,  110.  
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escape’.35  Massumi’s  analysis  is  thorough  and  he  does  give  some  explanation  
of  how  the  line  of  escape  functions  within  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  analysis  of  
social  formations.36  The  only  guide  to  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  work  that  gives  
considerable   space   to   this   central   concept   is   Brent   Adkins’   Deleuze   and  
Guattari's   a   Thousand   Plateaus:   A   Critical   Introduction   and   Guide   (2015),  
which   explores  Deleuze   and  Guattari’s   use  of   this   concept   in   a   number   of  
different  passages,  including  its  relation  to  the  concept  of  the  rhizome  and  to  
the  example  of  the  wasp  and  the  orchid;;37  its  use  within  semiotic  analyses;;38  
its  role  in  the  process  of  subjectivation;;39  the  divergence  between  its  creative  
and  destructive  tendencies;;40  and  its  use  in  the  analysis  of  social  formations,  
especially  capitalism.41  This  work  is  a  considerable  resource  for  the  analysis  
of   the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight   as   it   appears   in  A   Thousand   Plateaus,  
however   Adkins’   book   makes   no   connection   between   this   concept   in   A  
Thousand  Plateaus   and   its   use   in  Anti-­Oedipus,  or   in   any   of   Deleuze   and  
Guattari’s  other  work.    
  
Of  the  two  dictionaries,  The  Deleuze  Dictionary  (2010),  edited  by  Adrian  Parr,  
gives  the  most  space  to  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight,  with  separate  entries  
on   ‘Lines   of   Flight’,   ‘Lines   of   Flight   +   Art   +  Politics’,   and   ‘Lines   of   Flight   +  
Suicide’.42   However,   while   each   of   these   entries   follows   up  on   a   particular  
aspect  of  the  concept  and  its  application  within  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  none  of  
the  entries   refer   to  Anti-­Oedipus,  and  none  of   them  show  how  the  different  
uses  of  this  concept  should  be  understood  together.  The  entry  on  the  line  of  
flight  in  The  Deleuze  and  Guattari  Dictionary  (2013),  edited  by  Eugene  Young,  
Gary  Genosko,  and  Janell  Watson,  does  refer  to  the  different  applications  of  
the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  in  the  different  works  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  
and  even  clarifies  the  fact  that  the  ‘line  of  escape’  in  Anti-­Oedipus  refers  to  the  
same  French  term  as  the  ‘line  of  flight’,  as  it  is  used  elsewhere.43  The  entry  on  
                                                                                                                
35  Massumi,  1992,  77,  85,  105,  117,  151,  175,  204.    
36  Massumi,  1992,  204.  
37  Adkins,  2015,  28,  31-­32.  
38  Adkins,  2015,  86,  94.  
39  Adkins,  2015,  88.  
40  Adkins,  2015,  118,  126-­127,138-­139.  
41  Adkins,  2015,  216,  230.  
42  Parr,  2010,  146,  149,  151  respectively.    
43  Young,  Genosko  &  Watson,  2013,  183-­185.  
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the  line  of  flight  in  Mark  Bonta  and  John  Protevi’s  Deleuze  and  Geophilosophy:  
A   Glossary   and   Guide   (2006)   is   also   relatively   comprehensive   and  makes  
some  useful  comments  on  the  distinction  between  relative  and  absolute  forms  
of  the  line  of  flight.44  What  both  of  these  references  to  the  line  of  flight  lack  is  
an  account  of  the  philosophical  work  performed  by  the  concept  and  its  role  in  
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  larger  project.    
  
The  final  section  of  the  literature  that  I  would  like  to  make  reference  to  here  
includes  works  that  fall  outside  of  the  boundaries  of  traditional  philosophical  
discourse,  but  which  draw  heavily  on   the   theoretical   framework  supplied  by  
Deleuze  and  Guattari.  The  extent  of  this  Deleuzoguattarian-­inspired  literature  
is   considerable   and   there   are   a   number   of   works   that   align   themselves  
specifically   with   the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight.   For   example,   there   are   a  
handful   of   works   of   literary   criticism   that   use   the   concept,   including   John  
Hughes’  Lines  of  flight:  reading  Deleuze  with  Hardy,  Gissing,  Conrad,  Woolf  
(1997),  Stefan  Mattessich’s  Lines  of  flight:  discursive  time  and  countercultural  
desire  in  the  work  of  Thomas  Pynchon  (2002),  and  Hidenaga  Arai’s  Literature  
Along  the  Lines  of  Flight:  D.H.  Lawrence's  Later  Novels  and  Critical  Theory  
(2014).  While  each  of  these  works  deploys  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  in  
an  innovative  way,  they  tend  to  gloss  over  the  more  technical  aspects  of  the  
concept   and,   perhaps   understandably,   do   not   give   any   space   to   its   direct  
philosophical  analysis.  This  is  also  the  case  for  the  collection  of  essays  titled  
Intensities  and  Lines  of  Flight:  Deleuze/Guattari  and  the  Arts  (2012),  edited  by  
Antonio  Calcagno.  On   top  of   this   literary   interest   in  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  
concept,   a   range   of   thinkers   writing   on   topics   as   diverse   as   art,   the   law,  
education,  music,  and  politics  have  also  put  it  use  in  their  own  discipline.45  The  
apparent  applicability  of  this  concept  to  such  a  range  of  fields  only  confirms  
the  need  for  a  deeper  analysis  of  its  philosophical  underpinnings.  This  thesis  
does  not  only   intend  to  serve  as  a  corrective   to   those  texts   that  have  taken  
Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   work   as   their   point   of   departure   without   a   deep  
understanding  of  their  metaphysical  implications,  but  also  as  a  guide  to  those  
                                                                                                                
44  Bonta  &  Protevi,  2006,  106.    
45Sauvagnargues  (2013);;  Murray  (2013);;  Semetsky  &  Masny,  (2013);;  Campbell  (2013);;  
Evans  &  Reid  (2013).  
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interdisciplinary  thinkers  in  the  future  that  wish  to  draw  on  the  concept  of  the  
line  of  flight,  and  wish  to  do  so  with  an  awareness  of  its  technical  application  
and  philosophical  lineage.    
  
While  most  of  the  secondary  literature  published  in  this  field  has  either  been  
written   in   English,   or   has   been   translated   into   English   almost   immediately,  
there   are   a   number   of   works   in   French   that   remain   untranslated.   French-­
speaking   readers   of   Deleuze   and   Guattari   are   also   at   a   considerable  
advantage  when  seeking  to  analyse  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  as  they  do  
not  have  to  grapple  with  the  aforementioned  issues  of  translation.  Despite  this,  
the  French  literature  reflects  the  broader  literature’s  limitations  in  a  number  of  
ways.   For   example,   the   main   works   of   philosophical   analysis   that   aim   to  
assess  Deleuze’s  contribution  to  that  field  do  not  also  explore  the  philosophical  
aspects   of   his   collaborations  with  Guattari:  Anne  Sauvagnargues’  Deleuze:  
l'empirisme   transcendental   (2009)   is   a   good   example,   with   a   couple   of  
mentions  of  the  line  of  flight,  but  no  close  analysis,46  as  is  Véronique  Bergen’s  
L’Ontologie  de  Gilles  Deleuze  (2001)  which  offers  no  mention  of  it  whatsoever.  
Some   of   the   more   expansive   texts   that   tackle   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s  
collaborative  work,  such  as  Manola  Antonioli’s  Géophilosophie  de  Deleuze  et  
Guattari  (2003)  and  the  work  she  produced  with  Pierre-­Antoine  Chardel  and  
Hervé  Regnauld,  titled  Gilles  Deleuze,  Félix  Guattari  et  le  politique  (2006),  do  
offer  some  space  to  the  line  of  flight,  but  only  by  paying  attention  to  one  of  the  
particular  ways  in  which  it  is  used  by  Deleuze  and  Guattari.  For  example,  the  
former  of  these  works  includes  a  section  on  the  line  of  flight  that  explores  its  
connection  with  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  investigation  of  nomadism.47  By  far  the  
most  comprehensive  analysis  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  in  the  French  
literature   comes   from  Philippe  Mengue’s  Espaces   lisses   et   lignes   de   fuite:  
Ethique,   esthétique   et   politique   deleuziennes   (2015).   However,   as   the   title  
suggests,  this  work  explores  the  ethical,  aesthetic,  and  political  implications  of  
this  concept,  and  not  its  development  or  its  place  within  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  
project.48  
                                                                                                                
46  Sauvagnargues,  2009,  350,  414.  
47  Antonioli,  2003,  26-­35.    
48  Mengue  (2015  &  1994)    
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In  summary,  we  can  say   that   the   line  of   flight   is   recognised  by  a  number  of  
commentators  as  a  central  concept  and  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  pick  it  out  
as  crucial  for  an  interpretation  of  their  project.  However,  despite  its  recurrence  
across  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  works  and  its  recurrence  within  the  secondary  
literature,  this  concept  has  not  yet  been  the  subject  of  a  focused  philosophical  
investigation.  Specifically,  there  has  not  yet  been  any  attempt  to  look  at  how  
the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  arises  out  of  the  work  produced  by  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  before   their  collaboration,  or  at  how  the   term  develops  across   their  
collaborative   works.   This   deficiency   in   the   secondary   literature   means   that  
there   is,  as  yet,  no  definitive  answer   to   the  questions:  How  does   the   line  of  
flight   function   in   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   work?   How   can   we   differentiate  
between  creative  and  destructive  lines  of  flight?  What  kind  of  analytic  work  can  
the  concept  be  used  for?  This  thesis  is  an  attempt  to  answer  these  questions.    
  
iv)  Thesis  methodology  
  
This  thesis  is  an  attempt  to  map  the  individuation  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  
flight.49  Instead  of  stating  what  this  concept  signifies,  or  what  it  refers  to,  I  will  
instead   explore   how   this   concept   comes   into   existence.   By   mapping   its  
emergence  in  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  collective  oeuvre,  I  will  explain  why  and  
how  it  can  be  productively  used.  As  such,  this  thesis  not  only  concerns  what  
the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  means,  but  what  it  can  do.50  
                                                                                                                
49  The  theory  of  individuation  that  I  am  drawing  on  here  comes  mainly  from  the  work  of  
Gilbert  Simondon.  In  both  The  Physico-­Biological  Genesis  of  the  Individual  (1964)  and  
Psychic  and  Collective  Individuation  (1989),  Simondon’s  work  was  concerned  primarily  with  
the  question  of  individuation.  It  is  my  decision  to  apply  this  theory  to  the  individuation  of  a  
concept.  Deleuze  was  heavily  influenced  by  Simondon,  praising  his  work  as  “a  profoundly  
original  theory  of  individuation,  which  entails  an  entire  philosophy”  (2001,  43).  
50  I  have  decided  to  follow  a  methodology  of  mapping  the  individuation  of  a  concept,  over  the  
more  well-­known  practices  of  archaeology  and  genealogy  (in  both  the  Nietzschean  and  
Foucauldian  senses),  for  two  interconnected  reasons.  First,  I  do  not  treat  Deleuze  and  
Guattari’s  work  as  a  ‘discourse’  in  need  of  excavation,  but  as  an  open-­ended  system  of  
thinking,  for  which  we  require  entries  and  exits.  Second,  while  my  chapters  do  follow  a  
chronological  order,  I  am  not  conducting  an  historical  analysis  of  the  concept.  I  do  not  wish  
to  show  what  the  concept  meant  at  different  moments  in  history,  or  to  look  at  how  it  came  to  
mean  what  it  means  today.  Instead,  I  aim  to  show  how  the  consistency  of  the  concept  
emerges  across  its  many  variations.  To  borrow  from  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  we  could  say  that  
I  aim  to  map  the  becoming-­concept  of  the  line  of  flight,  and  not  the  history  of  how  it  became  
a  concept.  
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In  a  letter  to  his  student  Kuniichi  Uno,  Deleuze  offers  a  comment  on  his  own  
philosophical  method,  stating  that,  “For  me  philosophy  is  an  art  of  creation…  
Philosophy   creates   concepts.”51      If   we   are   to   take   this   comment   seriously,  
however,  it  must  be  understood  within  the  context  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  
broad  critique  of   the  concept  of   identity.   In  short,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  
committed  to  the  idea  that  whenever  we  are  faced  with  identity,  we  must  first  
try  to  explain  how  that  identity  has  been  generated  and  we  must  do  this  without  
simply  referring  back  to  some  prior  identity  from  which  it  arose.  Commenting  
again  on  his  own  philosophical  approach,  Deleuze  explains  that  whenever  we  
are   faced   with   something   that   appears   as   an   individual,   and   which  
subsequently   exists   in  opposition   to  other   individuals,   “we   should  ask  what  
such   a   situation   presupposes.   It   presupposes   a   swarm   of   differences,   a  
pluralism   of   free,   wild   or   untamed   differences;;   a   properly   differential   and  
original  space  and  time.”52  This  swarm  of  differences  is  referred  to  elsewhere  
as  a  ‘pre-­individual’  field.  Using  this  terminology,  we  can  say  that,  according  to  
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  own  methodology,   in  order   to  give  an  account  of  an  
individual,  we  must  first  give  an  account  of  the  pre-­individual  field  out  of  which  
such  an   individual  arose.53  This  prioritisation  of   the  process  of   individuation  
over  the  unity  and  identity  of  the  individual  can  also  be  explained  in  terms  of  
the   relationship   between   Being   and   Becoming.   According   to   Deleuze   and  
Guattari’s   philosophy,   creation,   or   genesis,   is   not   a   linear   process   through  
which  something  is  brought  into  being,  a  movement  from  non-­Being  to  Being,  
but   is   instead  a  constant  process  of   individuation   that  does  not  presuppose  
Being,   but   seeks   to   explain   its   very   possibility.   As   such,   we   can   say   that  
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  philosophy  is  one  of  Becoming,  which  seeks  to  explain  
the  genesis  of  Being.  Given  this  context,  Deleuze’s  claim  that  philosophy  is  the  
art   of   creating   concepts   must   be   re-­evaluated.   Under   this   interpretation,  
philosophy  would  not  simply  be   the  movement   from   the  non-­existence  of  a  
concept  to  its  existence,  but  instead  the  process  of  thought  that  constitutes  the  
constant  becoming  of  the  concept.      
                                                                                                                
51  TRM  238.  See  also  WIP  15-­60.  
52  DR  61  
53  For  Deleuze’s  use  of  the  concept  of  the  pre-­individual,  see  DR  320-­322.    
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In  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  draw  an  analogy  between  a  
concept  and  a  brick,  stating   that,   “It  can  be  used  to  build   the  courthouse  of  
reason.  Or  it  can  be  thrown  through  the  window.”54  Once  again,  we  must  be  
careful   to   recognise   that   within   the   framework   of   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s  
thought,   even   the   brick   is   not   understood   as   a   fully   individuated,   complete  
object  with  an  essence  or  an  absolute  form.  The  brick  has  its  own  process  of  
becoming,  one  which  can  proceed  in  the  context  of  its  use  as  a  component  of  
a  building,  or  as  a  weapon  of  revolt.  In  either  case,  the  brick  does  not  pre-­exist  
its  activity,  but  is  engaged  in  a  constant  process  of  genesis  through  its  activity.  
This  same  point  must  equally  be  kept   in  mind  when   reading  Deleuze’s  oft-­
quoted  comment  during  his  discussion  with  Michel  Foucault,  where  he  states:  
“A  theory  is  exactly  like  a  box  of  tools…  It  must  be  useful.  It  must  function.”55  
A  theory  is  not  a  set  of  discrete  tools,  each  of  which  fulfil  a  singular  function,  
but   a   collection   of   tools   that   function   together,   each   one   defined   by   the  
connection   it  has  with   the   group.  The   tool-­box   is   also   not  an   inert  medium  
which   simply   contains   the   tools,   but   a   specific   collection,   which   allows   for  
certain   tasks   to   be   performed   rather   than   others.   The   tool-­box   is   an  
assemblage.  A  theory  is  then  an  assemblage  of  tools,  each  of  which  is  created  
and  actualised  by  the  diverse  set  of  relationships  it  has  with  other  tools,  and  in  
the   affects   it   produces   through   its   functioning.   A   concept,   like   a   tool,   is  
constituted  by  its  process  of  becoming  and  can  only  be  understood  through  
the  interrelationships  it  has  with  other  concepts  and  through  the  affects  that  
these  relationships  create.  
  
During  this  thesis,  I  will  treat  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  in  its  process  of  
becoming,  charting  the  procedure  by  which  it  becomes  individuated.  Instead  
of   attempting   to   separate   this   concept   out   from   the   context   in  which   it  was  
created,  in  order  to  offer  an  abstract  definition,  I  will  aim  to  put  this  concept  into  
a  dynamic  relationship  with  a  set  of  other  concepts,  such  that  they  create  an  
                                                                                                                
54  ATP  xiii.  This  is  also  a  reference  to  Kant’s  comments  on  the  first  critique  as  a  courthouse  
of  reason  (1998,  9/CPR  A  xii).  
55  Deleuze  &  Foucault,  1977,  208.  
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assemblage.   This   assemblage   will   bring   together   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s  
critique   of   psychoanalysis,   and   their   borrowings   from   it,   as   well   as   the  
relationships  they  maintain  with  a  set  of  other  thinkers  and  writers,  both  from  
within  the  philosophical  tradition  and  outside  of  it.  Through  these  connections,  
the  concept  of   the   line  of   flight  will  be   individuated   in  a  dynamic  system  of  
concepts   that   include   ‘the  multiplicity’,   ‘de/reterritorialization’,   ‘transversality’,  
‘the  molecular’,  and  the  ‘regime  of  signs’,  among  others.56  By  carrying  out  this  
process  it  will  be  possible  to  see  not  only  what  the  concept  of  the  ‘line  of  flight’  
signifies,  but  more  importantly,  how  it  functions,  what  affects  it  produces,  and,  
ultimately,  what  it  can  do.    
  
v)  Chapter  overview  
  
When   the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight   emerges   in   the   collaborative  work   of  
Deleuze   and   Guattari,   it   does   so   amid   a   mass   of   other   concepts.   It   is  
introduced  as   a   “molecular   schizophrenic   line   of   flight”57,   and  a   rhizomatic,  
micropolitical,  “line  of  flight  or  line  of  deterritorialization.”58  While  much  of  this  
conceptual  web  is  specific  to  the  milieu  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  Capitalism  
and  Schizophrenia  project,  these  concepts  are  offered  up  to  the  reader  within  
an   expanded   philosophical   discourse   that   takes   many   other   concepts   for  
granted.  A  large  number  of  these  concepts  are  not  original  to  the  Capitalism  
and  Schizophrenia  project  and  have  a  specific  and  detailed  history   in  either  
the  philosophical  work  completed  by  Deleuze  before  his  collaborations  with  
Guattari,  or  in  the  psychotherapeutic  framework  that  Guattari  produced  before  
he  met  Deleuze.  For  example,  in  both  Anti-­Oedipus  and  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  
the   authors   regularly   refer   to   the   distinction   between   the   virtual   and   the  
actual,59  the  question  of  intensity,60  the  concept  of  the  multiplicity,61  and  the  
problematic  relationship  between  quantity  and  quality,62  all  of  which  Deleuze  
                                                                                                                
56  For  example,  we  will  see  in  chapters  four  and  six  that  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  takes  
on  different  senses  in  its  relation  to  relative  and  absolute  deterritorialization  in  Anti-­Oedipus  
and  A  Thousand  Plateaus  respectively.  
57  AO  347  (translation  modified)  
58  ATP  141,  134  
59  AO  129,  249,  255,  358;;  ATP  104-­110,  122,  153,  396,  445  
60  AO  160-­162  
61  AO  38,  42,  60,  181,  280,  309;;  ATP  4-­10,  17-­19,  23-­59,  170-­175,  202-­204  
62  AO  65,  247,  301;;  ATP  35-­37,  487-­488,  502-­504  
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discusses   and   defines   in   his   earlier   work.   Similarly,   Deleuze   and   Guattari  
regularly  utilise  concepts  such  as  ‘transversality’63  and  the  ‘machinic’,64  which  
are  developed  in  Guattari’s  work  before  1969.  Any  comprehensive  account  of  
the  meaning  and  use  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  should,  therefore,  be  
able  to  explain  the  way  in  which  it  emerged  out  of  this  dual  intellectual  history.    
  
In  order   to  offer  such  an  account,   I  will   spend   the   first   two  chapters  of   this  
thesis  looking  at  the  work  produced  separately  by  Deleuze  and  Guattari  before  
1972.  Following  this,  in  chapters  three  and  four,  I  will  turn  my  attention  to  Anti-­
Oedipus  and  then  in  chapters  five  and  six  to  A  Thousand  Plateaus.  In  line  with  
my  previous  comments  on  the  process  of  individuation,  the  first  two  chapters  
can  be  understood  as  an  exploration  of  the  pre-­individual  field  of  the  concept  
of  the  line  of  flight,  while  the  third  and  fourth  chapters  chart  its  differentiation  
from   its   accompanying  milieu,   and   the   fifth   and   sixth   chapters   look   at   the  
activity  of  the  individuated  concept  in  both  theoretical  and  practical  situations.    
  
Chapter  1  –  Deleuze:  The  Metaphysics  of  Difference    
This  chapter  will  focus  on  the  metaphysics  of  difference  that  Deleuze  develops  
in  Difference  and  Repetition   (1968),  but  will  also   touch  on  some   ideas   that  
arise   in   Logic   of   Sense   (1969),   and   in   relation   to   Deleuze’s   comments  
elsewhere   regarding  Bergson,  Spinoza,   and  Merleau-­Ponty,   among  others.  
The   reason   for   this   selection   is   both   pragmatic   and   retrospective.   It   is  
pragmatic  in  the  sense  that  it  is  a  concession  made  to  the  impossibility  of  ever  
covering   the   totality   of   Deleuze’s   early   philosophy   in   a   single   chapter.   It   is  
retrospective  in  the  sense  that,  having  considered  the  way  the  concept  of  the  
line  of  flight  is  used  in  the  Capitalism  and  Schizophrenia  project,  I  have  traced  
the  development  of  any  related  concepts  back  into  the  work  of  Deleuze  and  
have  found  that  they  are  most  clearly  articulated  in  Difference  and  Repetition.  
Knowledgeable  readers  of  Deleuze  may  also  be  surprised  that,  given  the  fact  
that  the  line  of  flight  first  emerges  in  the  context  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  most  
psychoanalytic  writing,   I  have  not  chosen  to  look  more  closely  at  Deleuze’s  
early  comments  on  psychoanalysis,  either  in  his  work  on  Masochism  or  during  
                                                                                                                
63  AO  47,  77;;  ATP  12,  28,  184,  327-­333.  
64  AO  43-­44,  252-­258,  355-­356;;  ATP  4-­8,  40-­46,  97-­100.    
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the  more  psychoanalytic  sections  of  Logic  of  Sense.65  This  decision  is  based  
on   the  observation  that  Deleuze’s  relationship  with  psychoanalysis  changes  
irrevocably   after   his   first   interactions   with   Guattari.   This   fact   will   become  
apparent   as   we   look   at   Guattari’s   pre-­1972   writings   and   his   notes   for   the  
publication  of  Anti-­Oedipus.66    
  
The  specific  topics  that  will  be  covered  in  this  chapter  will  be  as  follows:  first  I  
will   explore   Deleuze’s   metaphysics   of   difference,   its   relationship   with   the  
concepts  of   the  multiplicity,   the  virtual,  and   the  actual;;  next   I  will   turn   to  his  
theory   of   individuation   and   depth;;   finally,   I   will   look   at   the   theory   of   linear  
perspective,  analysing  how  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  is  used  here  and  
the  implications  of  Deleuze’s  criticisms  of  it.  
  
Chapter  2  -­  Guattari:  Psychotherapeutic  and  Militant  Escapes  
Here  I  will  explore  the  practical  and  theoretical  work  undertaken  by  Guattari  
before  his  collaborations  with  Deleuze.  As  a  psychoanalyst  within  the  Lacanian  
school  and  one  of  the  founding  members  of  the  clinic  at  La  Borde,  Guattari’s  
life   was   consumed   by   the   practical   task   of   delivering   therapy.   Before  Anti-­
Oedipus,  Guattari  had  not  produced  any  book-­length  works  of  theory  and  the  
only  evidence  we  have  of  his  thought  at  the  time  is  contained  in  the  collection  
of  shorter  works  published  under  the  title  Psychoanalysis  and  Transversality:  
Texts  and   Interviews  1955-­1971.  Consequently,  my  analysis   in   this  chapter  
will  concentrate  on  this  collection.  Fortunately,  while  the  full  extent  of  Guattari’s  
social  and  political   theory  could  not  be  assessed  without  an  analysis  of   the  
work   he   published   during   the   final   two   decades   of   his   life,   including   The  
Molecular   Revolution   (1977/1980),   The   Machinic   Unconscious   (1979),  
Schizoanalytic   Cartographies   (1989),   The   Three   Ecologies   (1989),   and  
Chaosmosis:  an  Ethico-­Aesthetic  Paradigm  (1992),  this  first  collection  of  short  
texts  contains  a  clear  statement  of  his  early  psychoanalytic  theories.  It  lays  out  
his   initial   disagreements   with   both   Freudian   and   Lacanian   orthodoxy   and  
explains   the   theoretical   basis   for   the   development   of   Institutional  
Psychotherapy.    
                                                                                                                
65  LS  208-­288  
66  See  especially  section  vii  of  Chapter  2  of  this  thesis,  titled  ‘Machine  and  structure’.  
   31  
  
By  working  through  this  collection,  and  by  drawing  on  a  range  of  secondary  
sources,  this  chapter  will  offer  a  close  analysis  of  three  of  the  key  aspects  of  
Guattari’s  thought,  namely  the  production  of  group-­subjectivity,  the  role  of  the  
coefficient  of   transversality,  and   the  material  nature  of  machinic  processes.  
This  will  allow  me  to  highlight  the  role  of  ‘escape’  in  Guattari’s  understanding  
of  subjectivity  and  his  theory  of  revolution,  which  will  provide  the  pre-­individual  
field  for  the  production  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  in  Anti-­Oedipus.    
  
Chapter  3  -­  Anti-­Oedipus  1:  Desiring  Machines  
This  chapter  will  offer  an  analysis  of  the  emergence  of  the  concept  of  the  line  
of  flight  in  Anti-­Oedipus,  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  first  collaboration.  The  book  
was  produced  in  reaction  to  the  mobilisation  of  French  students  and  workers  
in  mass  protests,  strikes,  and  riots  in  May  of  1968.67  The  result  is  a  full-­scale  
attack  on  both  psychoanalytic  orthodoxy  and  the  system  of  capitalism,  which,  
according   to   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   analysis,   both   serve   to   uphold   one  
another  via  their  shared  misunderstanding  of  desire.  This  chapter  will  focus  on  
the   pair’s   engagements  with   psychoanalysis.   I   will   show   how  Deleuze   and  
Guattari  attack  psychoanalytic  theory  over  the  Oedipus  complex  and  how  they  
attempt   to   provide   a   positive   account   of   desire   to   replace   the   traditional  
understanding  of  desire-­as-­lack.  Here  I  will  give  an  outline  of  the  schizophrenic  
line  of  flight.  I  will  look  at  how  the  concept  emerges  in  an  attempt  to  theorise  
how   a   schizoid-­breakthrough   is   possible,   one   which   escapes   the   oedipal  
relation  of   the   family  and  releases   the  productive  and  creative  capacities  of  
desire.  This  is  the  line  of  flight  which  Deleuze  and  Guattari  claim  provides  a  
model  of  resistance  to  psychoanalysis  and  can  lead  the  schizoanalyst  beyond  
the  repressive  representation  of  individual  desire.    
  
Chapter  4  –  Anti-­Oedipus  2:  Social  Machines  
According   to  Anti-­Oedipus,   psychoanalysis   and   capitalism   collude  with   one  
another   to   produce   oedipalised,   docile,   and   consuming   subjects,   who   are  
easily  controlled.  As  an  analysis  of  power  and  of  social  control,   this  work   is  
                                                                                                                
67  Dosse,  2010,  179    
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also   distinctly   anti-­fascist.68   In   this   chapter,   I   will   show   how   Deleuze   and  
Guattari  organise  a  form  of  resistance  against  this  collusion,  which  relies  not  
only  on  a  schizophrenic,  but  also  a  revolutionary  line  of  flight.  By  providing  an  
outline   of   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   distinction   between  molecular   and  molar  
processes,  and  by  exploring  their  ironic  account  of  the  history  of  capitalism,  I  
will   show  how   this   revolutionary   line  of   flight  operates   in   their  anti-­capitalist  
politics.  At  the  end  of  this  chapter,  by  bringing  together  my  previous  comments  
on  the  schizophrenic  line  of  flight  and  the  revolutionary  line  of  flight,  I  will  offer  
an  analysis  of   the   four  different  senses  of   the  concept  of   the   line  of   flight   in  
Anti-­Oedipus.    
  
Chapter  5  –  A  Thousand  Plateaus  1:  The  Line  of  Flight  as  Concept  
In  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  finds  its  full  application  
across  a  range  of  different  theoretical  contexts.  This  chapter  will  introduce  the  
conceptual   framework   of   A   Thousand   Plateaus   by   offering   an   analysis   of  
Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   rhizomatic   or   vegetal   image   of   thought,   and   their  
concepts   of   the   assemblage   and   of   the   refrain.   Here   we   will   see   how   the  
concept   of   the   line   of   flight   begins   to   take   on   a   new   level   of   conceptual  
consistency.  I  will  then  explain  how  Deleuze  and  Guattari  use  the  concepts  of  
content,   expression,   and   stratification   to   provide   a   dynamic   account   of   the  
ontogenesis   of   physical,   organic,   and   ‘alloplastic’   matter.   Once   this   is  
complete,   I  will  use  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  distinction  between  the  plane  of  
consistency   and   the   plane   of   organisation   to   return   to   the   theory   of   linear  
perspective,   and   to   reassess   the   role   of   the   line   of   flight   in   Deleuze   and  
Guattari’s  reworking  of  the  theory  of  space  found  there.  This  chapter  will  end  
with  a  discussion  of  the  Body  without  Organs  (BwO)  and  the  role  of  the  line  of  
flight  in  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  ethics.  
  
Chapter   6   –   A   Thousand   Plateaus   2:   The   Line   of   Flight   and   Political  
Pragmatism  
                                                                                                                
68  For  more  on  the  anti-­fascism  of  the  book,  see  Foucault’s  preface.  He  writes  of  Anti-­
Oedipus:  “the  major  enemy,  the  strategic  adversary  is  fascism…  And  not  only  historical  
fascism,  the  fascism  of  Hitler  and  Mussolini…  but  also  the  fascism  in  us  all,  in  our  heads  and  
in  our  everyday  behavior,  the  fascism  that  causes  us  to  love  power”  (AO  xv).    
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The   final  chapter  of   this   thesis  will  move   from   the  metaphysical  and  ethical  
dimensions  of  A  Thousand  Plateaus  to  the  political  aspects  of  the  book.  I  will  
offer   an   analysis   of   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   linguistic   pragmatism,  
concentrating   on   the  way   in   which   they   differentiate   between   four   different  
‘regimes  of  signs’.  Each  of  these  regimes  entails  a  different  politics,  which  can  
be  defined  by  the  particular  relationship  it  holds  with  its  lines  of  flight.  Through  
a  close  reading  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  comments  on  molecular  becomings,  
and  on  the  possibility  of  micropolitics,  I  will  show  how  the  concept  of  the  line  
of  flight  takes  on  new  political  senses  in  this  work.  After  returning  to  the  concept  
of   the   refrain,   and   after   repositioning   Guattari’s   work   with   Institutional  
Psychotherapy  in  relation  to  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  I  will  show  how  Deleuze  
and  Guattari’s  politics  can  only  be  articulated  as  an  experimental  process  of  
drawing  lines  of  flight.  To  conclude  this  chapter,  I  will  show  how  the  different  
senses   of   the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight,   as   it   appears   in   A   Thousand  
Plateaus,  map   onto   the   various   ways   the   concept   was   deployed   in   Anti-­
Oedipus.  We  will   see   that,   while   the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight   takes   on  
different  senses  at  different  points  in  the  Capitalism  and  Schizophrenia  series,  
these   different   senses   are   not   unconnected,   and   it   is   precisely   from   the  
resonance   between   them   that   the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight   gains   its  
consistency.  
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i)  Introduction  
  
At  the  time  of  publishing  Difference  and  Repetition  (1968),  and  Logic  of  Sense  
(1969),  Deleuze  had  not  yet  begun  to  use  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight.  His  
work  from  this  time  does,  however,  contain  a  number  of  clues  as  to  the  origins  
of  this  concept.  The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  track  down  these  clues  and  
to  provide  a  strong  basis  for  subsequent  chapters,  where  the  examination  of  
the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight,   as   it   appears   in   the   Capitalism   and  
Schizophrenia  series,  will  begin  in  earnest.  I  have  chosen  to  concentrate  the  
majority  of  my  analysis  in  this  chapter  on  Difference  and  Repetition,  not  only  
because   it   is   the   text   that   contains   the   most   comprehensive   account   of  
Deleuze’s  metaphysical  programme,  but  also  because   it  contains  Deleuze’s  
most   sustained   comments   on   the   problematics   of   traditional   philosophical  
conceptions  of  space.  This   is   important  because   it   is  here   that  Deleuze  will  
brush  up  against  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight.    
  
As  we  will  see,  Difference  and  Repetition  is  scattered  with  critical  references  
to  traditional  methods  for  representing  space.  Specifically,  we  will  find  a  large  
number  of   references   to   the  way   in  which  painters  use   techniques  of   linear  
perspective  to  simulate  depth  in  their  work.  For  Deleuze,  these  techniques  can  
tell  us  a  great  deal  about  the  kinds  of  assumptions  that  western  thought  has  
made   about   the   nature   of   space.   Crucially,   the   phrase   ‘ligne   de   fuite’   is   a  
common   piece   of   terminology   used   in   French   to   describe   one   feature   of  
perspectival  painting.  This  connection  has  been  almost  completely  missed  by  
Anglophone   commentators   and   translators   of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  work:  
while  many  have  noted  that  the  French  term  ligne  de  fuite  might  have  some  
connection   to   the   French   term   point   de   fuite,   a   concept   conventionally  
translated  into  English  as  ‘vanishing  point’,  there  is  an  almost  complete  lack  of  
recognition  in  the  secondary  literature  that  the  phrase  ligne  de  fuite  is  used  in  
linear   perspective   to   designate   a   specific   line.  Brian  Massumi’s   note   to   his  
translation  of  A  Thousand  Plateaus  is  typical:  
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“Fuite  covers  not  only   the  act  of   fleeing  or  eluding  but  also   flowing,   leaking,  
and  disappearing  into  the  distance  (the  vanishing  point  in  a  painting  is  a  point  
de  fuite).  It  has  no  relation  to  flying.”69  
  
Similarly  restrained  references  to  the  possible  connection  with  the  concept  of  
the   vanishing   point   are   made   by  Massumi   elsewhere,   and   are   echoed   by  
Ronald   Bogue,   Jean-­Michel   Rabate,   Janae   Sholtz,   Meaghan   Morris,   and  
Edward  Kazarian,  among  others.70  The  connection  with  linear  perspective  is  
only  made  in  these  instances  to  clarify  what  kind  of  escaping  or  disappearing  
might  be  implied  by  the  French  word  fuite  and  no  direct  reference  is  made  to  
the  technical  meaning  of  the  ligne  de  fuite  in  linear  perspective.71  In  the  latter  
sections  of  this  chapter  I  will  give  a  full  account  of  the  use  of  this  term  among  
theorists  of  linear  perspective  and  will  aim  to  show  how  Deleuze’s  critiques  of  
the  model  of  space  that  these  techniques  assume  contain  an  implicit  reworking  
of  the  concept  of  the  ligne  de  fuite.    
  
Deleuze’s  comments  on  linear  perspective  are,  however,  only  given  within  the  
much   broader   context   of   his   attempt   to   overturn  many   of   the   assumptions  
embedded  in  the  philosophical  canon.  Before  attempting  to  comment  on  his  
specific  critiques  of  linear  perspective  it  will  therefore  be  useful  to  give  a  more  
comprehensive  account  of  what  is  going  on  in  Difference  and  Repetition.  This  
analysis  will  also  allow  us  to  touch  on  a  number  of  key  pieces  of  terminology  
that   will   be   useful   in   our   analysis   of   both   Anti-­Oedipus   and   A   Thousand  
Plateaus,   including   the   distinction   between   the   virtual   and   the   actual,   the  
concept   of   the  multiplicity,   the   distinction   between   intensive   and   extensive  
differences,  and  the  individuation  of  spatio-­temporal-­dynamisms.72  
  
                                                                                                                
69  ATP,  xvii  
70  Kazarian,  2001,  219;;  Morris,  2006,  195-­196;;  Sholtz,  2015,  Footnote  18;;  Bogue,  2007,  130;;  
Bogue,  2003,  156;;  Bogue,  2004,  110;;  Rabate,  2014,  43;;  Lamarre,  2002,  162.  
71  Bonta  and  Protevi  (2004,  106-­107)  are  a  notable  exception.  This  text  references  the  
importance  of  the  ligne  de  fuite  in  linear  perspective,  however,  the  implications  of  this  
allusion  are  not  followed  up.    
72  While  the  majority  of  the  conceptual  framework  presented  in  Difference  and  Repetition  will  
be  radically  altered  in  Deleuze’s  collaborations  with  Guattari,  it  is  also  the  case  that  much  of  
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  collaborative  work  can  be  read  as  a  direct  response  to  problems  
raised  in  Difference  and  Repetition.  See  Deleuze’s  preface  for  the  English  translation  of  
Difference  and  Repetition  (DR  xvii).  See  also  DI  238.  
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ii)  The  dogmatic  image-­of-­thought  
  
Deleuze’s  self-­professed  project  in  Chapter  1  of  Difference  and  Repetition  is  
“[t]o   rescue   difference   from   its  maledictory   state.”73   The   ‘maledictory   state’  
Deleuze  is  referring  to  here  is  the  state  of  being  subordinate  to  identity,  such  
that   ‘difference’   is   only   understood   as   the   difference   between   two   entities,  
which  each  possess  their  own  identity.  The  problem,  as  Deleuze  puts  it,  is  that,  
“[t]he  difference  ‘between’  two  things  is  only  empirical,  and  the  corresponding  
determinations  are  only  extrinsic,”  however,  properly  understood,  “[d]ifference  
is  the  state  in  which  one  can  speak  of  determination  as  such.”74  His  point  here  
is  that  any  conception  of  difference  that  relies  on  a  prior  distinction  between  
objects   of   our   judgement,   which   are   said   to   differ   from   one   another,   has  
already  assumed  that  each  of  these  objects  can  be  determined  as  individual  
objects,   and   such   a   procedure   already   requires   them   to   have   been  
differentiated  from  their  surroundings.  In  order  to  avoid  the  circularity  of  this  
presupposition,  Deleuze  argues  that  philosophy  must  find  a  way  of  thinking  the  
concept  of   ‘difference-­in-­itself’  as  something  positive,  which  differs  not   from  
other  things,  but  only  from  itself.    
  
In   the   first   chapter   of  Difference   and   Repetition,   after   working   through   the  
various   methods   used   by   a   number   of   canonical   western   thinkers   for  
conceptualising  difference,  Deleuze  picks  out  Aristotle  and  Hegel  as  those  who  
typify   the  main   forms  of  philosophy’s   traditional  misrecognition  of  difference  
most  clearly.75  According  to  Deleuze’s  reading,  Aristotle  defines  difference  in  
terms  of  contrariety,  which  he  asserts,  over  contradiction  or  privation,  to  be  the  
most   perfect   form  of   difference  because,   “[c]ontrariety   alone  expresses   the  
capacity   of   a   subject   to   bear   opposites   while   remaining   substantially   the  
same.”76  Hegel  takes  contrariety  as  his  starting  point  but  he  “extends  it  to  the  
infinite”   by   requiring   of   absolute   difference   that   it   entails   the   identity   of  
contraries.  However,  according  to  Deleuze’s  critique,  both  of  these  methods  
                                                                                                                
73  DR  37  
74  DR  36    
75  Deleuze  discusses  Plato,  Aristotle,  Descartes,  Leibniz,  Spinoza,  Kant,  Hegel,  and  
Heidegger,  among  others  (DR  38-­58).  
76  DR  39  
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for  defining  difference  rely  on  some  prior  understanding  of  identity,  which  itself  
requires  an  understanding  of  difference   for   its  determination.  We  will  never  
escape  the  vicious  circle  of  definition  by  finding  ‘stronger’  forms  of  difference,  
because   the   problem   does   not   lie   in   the   fact   that   Aristotle   or   Hegel’s  
conceptions  of  difference  are  somehow  too  weak,  but  in  the  fact  that  they  only  
consider  difference  from  the  point  of  view  of  identity.  The  problem  is  not  one  
of   degree,   but   one   of   kind.   Insisting   on   the   need   for   a   new   kind   of  
understanding   of   difference,   Deleuze   writes   that,   “a   more   profound   real  
element  must   be   defined   in   order   for   oppositions   of   forces   or   limitations   of  
forms  to  be  drawn.”77  
  
In   the   central   chapter   of   the   book,   Deleuze   will   claim   that   conceptual  
philosophical   thought   has   “as   its   implicit   presupposition   a   pre-­philosophical  
and  natural  Image  of  thought.”78  What  this  means  is  that,  despite  the  fact  that  
philosophers  have  often  defined  their  practice  by  the  way  in  which  they  banish  
all   previously   held   assumptions,   the   very   practice   of   philosophising   has  
retained   a   set   of   implicit   presuppositions   concerning   thought   itself.   What  
philosophers  have  taken  for  granted  is  “not  a  particular  this  or  that  but  the  form  
of  representation  or  recognition  in  general.”79  This  image-­of-­thought  contains  
two   distinct   presuppositions   that   Deleuze   will   attempt   to   overturn,   namely  
those  of  good  sense  and  common  sense.  Good  sense  is  the  assumption  that  
each   of   the   faculties   of   the  mind   is   faithful   in   principle   and   naturally   tends  
towards  truth.  Common  sense  is  the  assumption  that  these  faculties  cohere  in  
a  common  subject  and  share  a  common  object.  Despite  his  appreciation  for  
the  Kantian   project,  Deleuze  picks   out  Kant  as   having   taken  both   common  
sense   and   good   sense   for   granted.   He   writes   that   “the   Kantian   critique   is  
ultimately  respectful:  knowledge,  morality,  reflection  and  faith  are  supposed  to  
correspond  to  natural  interests  of  reason,  and  are  never  themselves  called  into  
question”  and  the  purpose  of  Kant’s  work  is  only  to  declare  each  of  the  faculties  
                                                                                                                
77  DR  61  
78  DR  167  
79  DR  166  
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“legitimate   or   not   in   relation   to   one   or   other   of   these   interests.”80   The  
acceptance  of  the  two  presuppositions  of  good  sense  and  common  sense  has  
led  philosophers  to  characterise  thought  as  inherently  representative,  so  that  
the   quality   of   thought   has   been   judged  on   its   ability   to   represent   the  world  
accurately.81   This   representative   image-­of-­thought   presupposes   a   certain  
distribution  of  the  empirical  and  the  transcendental  resulting  in  an  “inability  to  
conceive  of  difference  in  itself”.82  Deleuze’s  task  in  Difference  and  Repetition  
is  therefore  to  critique  this  distribution  of  the  empirical  and  the  transcendental  
to  produce  a  “thought  without  image”  capable  of  thinking  difference-­in-­itself.83  
  
The   fallout   from   rejecting   both   good   sense   and   common   sense   as   the  
foundation  for  thought  is  considerable.  No  longer  can  the  apparent  individuality  
of  the  subject  of  thought,  or  the  individuality  of  the  object  of  thought,  be  taken  
for  granted.  To  give  an  indication  of  the  consequences  of  this  move  I  will  give  
two  quick  examples  of  the  kind  of  philosophical  problems  that  arise.  First,  with  
neither  good  sense  nor  common  sense  on  our  side,  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  
take  the  agreed-­upon  sense  of  language  for  granted.  If  language  appears  to  
have  a  sense,  so  that  individual  words  have  individual  referents,  and  individual  
signifiers   correlate   with   individual   signifieds,   then   this   ordered   and  
individualised  reality  of  sense  is  what  needs  to  be  explained.  Deleuze  tackles  
this  problem  in  Logic  of  Sense,  where  he  reads  Stoic  philosophy  alongside  the  
writings  of  Lewis  Carroll,  to  offer  a  genetic  account  of  the  way  in  which  sense  
arises  out  of  non-­sense.  Here  he  argues  that  a  ‘surface’  of  sense  is  produced  
as  a  mediating  boundary  between  the  preconscious  and  pre-­individual  depths  
of  nonsense  and  the  transcendental  and  structuring  force  of  the  “voice  of  the  
heights”.84   Deleuze’s   arguments   in   this   book   are   organised   as   a   series   of  
paradoxes  in  which  he  describes  both  the  dynamic  genesis  of  sense,  from  the  
                                                                                                                
80  DR  173.  Deleuze’s  reading  of  Kant  is  not  straightforward.  While  he  recognises  that  for  
Kant  “Ideas  lead  us  into  false  problems”  he  does  not  attribute  this  error  to  the  faculties  
themselves,  but  to  their  misapplication  (DR  214)  
81  For  Deleuze,  this  model  of  representation  relies  on  Plato’s  theory  of  the  Forms,  and  his  
theory  of  recognition  as  anamnesis.  Following  Nietzsche,  Deleuze  therefore  writes  that  “the  
task  of  modern  philosophy  has  been  defined:  to  overturn  Platonism”  (DR  71).  For  Deleuze’s  
engagements  with  Plato,  see  DR  154-­156  and  LS  145-­154  and  219-­302.    
82  DR  174  
83  DR  208  
84  LS  271  
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perspective  of  psychoanalytic  development,  and  the  static  ontological  genesis  
of  sense.    
  
Second,  without  good  sense  or  common  sense  being  assumed,  the  framework  
of   spatio-­temporal   reality   and   the   individuality   of   the   here-­and-­now   can   no  
longer  be  taken  for  granted.  If   it   is   the  case  that  experience   is  organised   in  
such  a  way  that  space  and  time  appear  as  regular  and  rationally  ordered,  and  
that   the   current   moment   appears   to   have   its   own   individuality,   then   this  
structuring  of  phenomena  is  what  needs  to  be  explained.  If  the  “here  and  now”  
are  presupposed  “as  empty  identities”  and  “as  abstract  universalities”,  then  the  
identity   and   universality   of   these   categories  must   be   accounted   for.85   This  
problem,   concerning   the   given   spatio-­temporal   structure   of   phenomenal  
reality,   is  what  Deleuze  attempts  to  respond  to  in  Difference  and  Repetition.  
To  a  certain  degree,  Deleuze’s  response  to   this  problem  follows  from  Kant,  
who  also  recognises  that  the  spatio-­temporal  structure  of  experience  must  not  
be  assumed  to  organise  the  world  as  it   is  in  itself,  but  only  our  phenomenal  
experience  of  it.  However,  Deleuze  aims  to  go  further  than  Kant  by  attempting  
to  give  an  account  of  the  categories  of  experience  that  is  both  transcendental  
and  genetic.  What  makes  both  of  these  problems  all  the  more  challenging  is  
that  in  each  case  the  apparent  orientation  of  experience  along  a  subject-­object  
axis  is  also  problematized  and  is  taken  to  require  an  explanation.86  In  order  to  
introduce  Deleuze’s  solution  to  this  problem,  and  to  prepare  us  for  Deleuze’s  
critiques   of   linear   perspectival   conceptions   of   space,   we   will   first   need   to  
comprehend  the  distinction  that  Deleuze’  makes  between  the  virtual  and  the  
actual  aspects  of  reality.    
  
iii)  The  virtual  and  the  actual  
  
Commenting  on  a  passage  from  Plato’s  Republic,  Deleuze  makes  a  statement  
that  describes  his  project  in  Difference  and  Repetition:  “This  text  distinguishes  
                                                                                                                
85  DR  63  
86  Deleuze’s  characterisation  of  his  philosophy  as  a  ‘transcendental  empiricism’  is  defined  by  
exactly  this  problem.  While  Kant’s  problem  was  “How  can  the  given  be  given  to  a  subject?”  
and  Hume's  problem  was  “How  is  the  subject  constituted  within  the  given?”,  his  own  problem  
is  “How  can  a  subject  transcending  the  given  be  constituted  in  the  given?”  (EP  86).  
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two  kinds  of  things:  those  which  do  not  disturb  thought  and…  those  which  force  
us  to  think.”87  That  which  does  not  disturb  thought  is  given  by  representation  
and   includes   all   that   appears   to   us   in   an   actual   and   constituted   reality  
composed  of  individual  objects  of  thought.  That  which  forces  us  to  think  is  the  
problematic  dimension  of  reality.  If  we  are  to  think  difference-­in-­itself  then  we  
must   learn   to   think   these  problems,  which   are   real   and   yet   do   not   present  
themselves  to  us  in  what  is  actual.  To  name  those  aspects  of  reality  that  are  
real  without  being  actual,  Deleuze  uses  the  term  ‘virtual’.  Deleuze’s  ontology  
is  therefore  composed  of  two  aspects,  the  first  includes  what  is  given  (including  
the  subject  to  whom  the  given  is  given)  and  the  second  includes  that  which  
explains  how  the  subject  is  constituted  and  how  the  given  is  given  to  such  a  
subject.  For  Deleuze,   “the  virtual  and  the  actual  are   two  mutually  exclusive,  
yet  jointly  sufficient,  characterisations  of  the  real.”88  While  the  actual  aspects  
of   reality   are   extended   in   space  and   time,   the   virtual   aspects   of   reality   are  
defined  by  the  problems  that  such  an  extended  entity  has  been  actualised  to  
solve.  
  
In   his   article,   ‘Deleuze's   secret   dualism?’,   Dale   Clisby   offers   us   the   useful  
example  of  a  knot  to  explain  the  relationship  between  the  virtual  and  the  actual:  
“[W]hat   is   ‘actual’   is   that   which   appears   to   us   in   spatio-­temporal   reality.   A  
knotted  rope  is  one  such  example  of  an  actual  object.  The  virtual,  on  the  other  
hand,  explains  the  development  of  the  actual  object.  In  this  case,  a  knot  exists  
as   the   solution   to   a   problem,   perhaps,   ‘how   do   we   fasten   one   object   to  
another?’”   What   is   key   in   this   example   is   that   the   problem   “exists  
independently  of  the  various  actualised  forms  of  objects  that  provide  a  solution  
to   it.”89   The   virtual   field   may   determine   all   of   the   possible   solutions   to   a  
problem,  but  the  structure  of  the  problematic  field  is  not  only  possible,  but  real.  
For   this  reason,  Deleuze   is  very  clear   that   the  virtual   “is  opposed  not   to   the  
real  but  to  the  actual.  The  virtual  is  fully  real  in  so  far  as  it  is  virtual.”90  Because  
this  virtual  problematic  field  exists  not  only  in  possibility,  but  in  reality,  Deleuze  
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describes  the  virtual  as  the  structure  of  the  object.  He  states:  “The  reality  of  
the  virtual  is  structure.”91  Let  us  take  the  example  of  a  block  of  ice.  There  are  
certain  things  that  are  true  about  the  structure  of  a  block  of  ice,  but  which  are  
not  located  anywhere  in  the  extended  spatio-­temporal  actuality  of  the  object.  
The   melting   point   of   ice   is   a   real   and   determinate   point   defined   by   the  
temperature  and  pressure  at  which  the  ice  will  change  from  a  solid  to  a  liquid.  
This  point  is  not  located  anywhere  in  the  actual  space  and  time  of  reality,  but  
it  is  nonetheless  a  real  aspect  of  the  block  of  ice.  The  ‘structure’  that  Deleuze  
describes  as  virtual,  is  not  the  extended  spatial  structure  of  the  object,  but  the  
structure   of   the   singular   points,   like   the  melting   point   of   ice,   that   define   its  
conditions.  It  is  important  to  note  here  that,  for  Deleuze,  the  virtual,  problematic  
structure  of  an  object  and  the  actual,  extended  qualities  of  an  object  are   in  
constant  interaction,  and  mutually  presuppose  each  other,  such  that  the  reality  
of  the  object  is  produced  by  the  relation  between  these  two  aspects.92  
  
For  Deleuze,  the  virtual  does  not  resemble  the  actual,  just  as  problems  do  not  
resemble   their   solutions.   Instead,   responding   to  Kant’s  understanding  of  an  
Idea  as  that  which  is  not  instantiated  in  actual  reality  and  yet  “must  be  thought”  
according   to   certain   categories,   Deleuze   describes   the   virtual   as   being  
populated  by  Ideas.93  Unlike  Kant,  however,  Deleuze  takes  these  Ideas  to  be  
multiple  and  to  operate  as  the  structuring  principle  which  gives  rise  to  actual  
objects.  We  have  already  seen  that  Deleuze  produces  his  theory  of  the  virtual  
in  order  to  combat  the  representational  and  dogmatic  image-­of-­thought.  This  
means  that  his  conception  of  virtual  Ideas  must  not  take  good  sense,  common  
sense,   or   the   category   of   individuality   for   granted.   In   order   to   avoid   these  
potential  pitfalls,  Deleuze  argues  that  virtual  Ideas  are  not  individual  and  that  
they  are  not  self-­identical.  Instead,  virtual  ideas  are  composed  of  “a  continuum  
of   differential   relations”   which   differ   from   themselves   and   which   therefore  
                                                                                                                
91  DR  260  
92  It  is  a  common  misreading  of  Deleuze’s  work  to  assume  that  the  virtual  simply  precedes  
the  actual  and  gives  rise  to  it.  See,  for  example,  Out  of  This  World  (Hallward,  2006).  For  
correctives  to  this  misreading  see  Seigworth  and  Protevi’s  respective  reviews  of  Hallward’s  
book:  Seigworth,  2007;;  Protevi,  2007.  
93  CPR,  A245/B302;;  DR  263  
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contain  their  own  difference.94  This  form  of  logical  structure  is  what  Deleuze  
will  call  the  ‘multiplicity’.    
  
iv)  Riemann  and  the  multiplicity  
  
The   concept   of   the   multiplicity   is   used   to   designate   a   substantive   and  
numerical   property   that   is   opposed   to   both   the   many   and   the   one.95   For  
Deleuze,  the  substantive  categories  of  the  ‘one’  or  the  ‘many’  are  both  aspects  
of   the   representational   image-­of-­thought,   which   reduces   reality   to   either   a  
complete  individual  or  a  series  of  individuals.  Neither  of  these  options  are  able  
to  capture  the  problematic  nature  of  virtual  Ideas.  The  concept  of  ‘multiplicity’  
is  important  for  Deleuze  because  it  “denounces  simultaneously  the  One  and  
the  many,  the  limitation  of  the  One  by  the  many  and  the  opposition  of  the  many  
to  the  One.”96  Simply  put,  a  multiplicity  is  a  collection  of  elements  in  which  the  
elements   themselves   are   completely   indeterminate,   are   reciprocally  
determining   in   their   relation   to   one   another,   and   give   rise   to   the   complete  
determination  of  a  virtual  object.  Speaking  of  virtual  Ideas,  Deleuze  states  that  
“Ideas  are  pure  multiplicities  which  do  not  presuppose  any  form  of  identity”  and  
that  “Ideas  are  multiplicities:  every  idea  is  a  multiplicity.”97    
  
Deleuze  borrows  this  concept  from  the  work  of  the  19th  Century  mathematician  
Bernhard   Riemann,   a   figure   who   became   a   regular   point   of   reference   for  
Deleuze.98  Riemann’s  work  is  important  for  Deleuze  because  he  sees  it  as  the  
first  successful  attempt  to  formally  describe  how  a  collection  of  elements  could  
be  held  in  a  relationship  with  one  another,  such  that  these  elements  would  be  
indeterminate   in   themselves   and   yet  wholly  determined  by   their   relations.99  
                                                                                                                
94  DR  315  
95  DR  230  
96  DR  254  
97  DR  230  and  243  
98  B,  39-­40,  79,  117;;  F,  14;;  TF,  179;;  ATP,  36,  157,  and  532-­536;;  WIP,  124,  and  161  
99  We  might  assume  that  Deleuze  would  champion  Spinoza  as  the  first  to  have  achieved  this  
feat.  However,  Deleuze  never  takes  up  Spinoza’s  terminology  of  attributes,  substances,  and  
modes  in  order  to  talk  about  the  transcendental  field.  This  decision  can  probably  be  
attributed  to  Deleuze’s  claim  that  the  only  fault  in  Spinoza’s  philosophy  is  that  he  defined  the  
modes  in  relation  to  substance,  rather  than  making  “substance  turn  around  the  modes”  (DR  
377).    
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Such  a  collection  would  thus  be  constituted  not  simply  by  a  set  of  individuals,  
but  by  the  interrelations  of  a  set  of  relations.  Riemann’s  major  contribution  to  
the  study  of  geometry  came  with  his  use  of   integral  calculus   to  construct  a  
theory  of  multiplicities,  which  could  explain  the  properties  of  a  space,  without  
giving  a  designation  of  the  locations  of  points  within  that  space.100  When  giving  
an  exposition  of   the   logical   form  of  virtual   ideas,  Deleuze  states  specifically  
that  he  is  using  the  “Riemannian  usage  of  the  word  'multiplicity'.”101  Given  the  
fact  that  both  Edmund  Husserl  and  Henri  Bergson  also  developed  the  concept  
of  the  multiplicity,  and  given  the  fact  that  Deleuze  also  writes  extensively  on  
Bergson’s  use  of  the  concept,  it  will  be  useful  here  to  provide  a  careful  analysis  
of  Riemann’s  specific  understanding  of  the  concept  of  the  multiplicity.102  This  
                                                                                                                
100  Riemann,  2005.  The  term  used  by  Riemann  was  not  multiplicity,  but  Mannigfaltigkeit,  which  
is  most  often  translated  in  English  as  manifold  or  manifoldness.  However  in  French,  it  is  most  
often  translated  as  multiplicité,  while  the  accepted  English  translation  of  the  term  multiplicité  
in  Deleuze’s  work  is  multiplicity.      
101  DR  230  
102  While  I  will  be  taking  Deleuze  at  his  word  when  he  says  that  he  is  relying  on  the  Riemannian  
usage   of   the   concept   of   the   multiplicity,   it   is   worth   sketching   out   Deleuze’s   reasons   for  
choosing   to   follow   Riemann   here   over   Bergson.   In   Time   and   Freewill   and   Duration   and  
Simultaneity,  Bergson  developed  the  concept  of  the  multiplicity  to  elaborate  the  structure  of  
the  experience  of  time,  or  duration,  as  opposed  to  that  of  space.  Here  Bergson  will  argue  that  
while  space  can  be  understood  as  a  quantitative  and  discrete  multiplicity,  time,  or  duration,  
must   be   understood   as   a   qualitative   and   continuous   multiplicity.   In   his   book   on   Bergson,  
Deleuze  laments  the  fact  that  “too  little  importance  has  been  attached  to  the  use  of  this  word  
‘multiplicity’”,  which   in  Bergson’s  work,   “is  not   there  as  a  vague  noun  corresponding   to   the  
well-­known   philosophical   notion   of   the   Multiple   in   general”   (B   38).   According   to   Deleuze,  
Bergson  was  well  aware  of  Riemann’s  concept,  and  the  book  Duration  and  Simultaneity  should  
be  seen  as  an  attempt  on  Bergson’s  part  to  distinguish  his  own  ideas  from  Relativity  theory  by  
opposing   his   own   concept   of   the  multiplicity   to   that   of   Riemann   (B   39).   Unfortunately   for  
Deleuze’s  purposes,  there  is  one  fatal  flaw  in  Bergson’s  understanding  of  the  concept  of  the  
multiplicity.   Bergson’s  mistake,   according   to  Deleuze,  was   to   align   the   distinction   between  
continuous  and  discrete  multiplicities  with   two   further  distinctions,  namely  the  split  between  
the  qualitative  and  the  quantitative  and  the  split  between  the  intensive  and  the  extensive.  While  
Bergson  will  say  that  duration  is  a  continuous,  qualitative,  intensive  multiplicity  and  space  is  a  
discrete,  quantitative,  extended  multiplicity,  Deleuze  will  keep  these  distinctions  separate  while  
also   putting   forward   the   argument   that   Bergson   reintroduces   quantity   into   continuous  
multiplicities.  As  we  will  see  in  the  rest  of  this  chapter,  Deleuze  will  argue  that  both  continuous  
and  discrete  multiplicities  can  be  understood  as  quantitative  because   the  relation  between  
them  is   “static  and  purely   ideal”  and  “implies  no  more   than  number”   (DR  218-­219).  On  the  
other  hand,  Deleuze  will   argue   that   the  question  of   intensity  does  not   concern   the   relation  
between   the   kinds   of   multiplicity   directly,   but   instead   informs   the   process   of   individuation,  
which   occurs   between   the   virtual   continuous   and   the   actual   discrete   multiplicity.   For   this  
reason,   Deleuze   will   ultimately   argue   that   “the   Bergsonian   critique   of   intensity   seems  
unconvincing”  (DR  299,  fn.14  329).  Craig  Lundy  is  therefore  incorrect  to  claim  that  “Deleuze’s  
understanding   of   intensity   draws   from   Bergson’s   heterogeneous   multiplicity”   (2010,   74).  
Ansell-­Pearson  makes   a   similar   error   in   claiming   that  Deleuze   is   entirely   consistent   in   his  
acceptance  of  Bergson’s  theory  of  multiplicities  (1999,  155).    In  his  later  works,  Bergson  sees  
the   relationship   between   the   two   forms   of  multiplicity  as   a  Russelian-­style   paradox:   is   the  
difference   between   qualitative   multiplicities   and   quantitative   multiplicities   a   qualitative   or  
quantitative  difference?  In  answer  to  this  problem,  Bergson  talks  about  a  qualitative  multiplicity  
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will  also  allow  us  to  give  a  more  precise  account  of  how  Deleuze  attempts  to  
define   virtual   ideas   in   such   a   way   that   they   will   contain   difference   in  
themselves.    
  
Riemann’s  work  responds  to  a  particular  problem  that  arose  at  the  beginning  
of  the  19th  Century.  At  this  point,  a  number  of  mathematicians,  including  Carl  
Friedrich   Gauss,   Ferdinand   Karl   Schweikart,   János   Bolyai,   and   Nikolai  
Ivanovich   Lobachevsky,   had   all   shown   that   it   was   possible   to   construct  
internally   consistent   geometries   that   contravened  Euclid’s   fifth   axiom.  What  
these  mathematicians  had  shown,  contra  Euclid,  was  that  there  was  no  way  
of  proving  a  priori  that  parallel  lines  will  not  intersect  when  they  are  extended.  
In  fact,  these  mathematicians  had  shown  that  the  opposite  was  true:  that  it  was  
possible  to  construct  coherent  geometrical  systems  in  which,  for  any  straight  
line,  and  for  any  point  not  on  that  line,  there  are  either  zero,  or  multiple  other  
straight   lines   that   run   through  the  point   that  are  parallel   to   the   initial   line.   In  
brief,  space  need  not  be   ‘flat’  but  could  be   ‘curved’   in  a  number  of  different  
ways.  The  problem   facing  Riemann  was   the   following:   if   there   are  multiple  
possible,  consistent  geometries,  then  how  are  we  to  know  for  sure  which  of  
them  is  applicable  in  reality?  While  it  is  possible  to  use  experience  as  a  guide  
and   to   select   the   geometry  which   seems  most   applicable   to   space   as   it   is  
experienced,  this  will  lead  the  truths  stated  by  geometry  to  lose  their  rigorous  
mathematical   basis   and   become   “not   necessary,   but   only   of   empirical  
certainty”.103  In  order  to  overcome  this  challenge,  Riemann  developed  a  new  
and   particular   form   of   non-­Euclidean   geometry,   which   aimed   to   provide   a  
mathematical   description   of   all   possible   spaces,   or   ‘multiply   extended  
manifolds’,  of  which  Euclidean  space  and  the  non-­Euclidean  spaces  that  had  
now  been  proved  possible,  would  be  particular  limit  cases.  
  
Up   until   the   point   at   which   Riemann   tackled   this   problem,   there   was   one  
method  for  representing  curved  spaces  geometrically,  namely  by  embedding  
                                                                                                                
that  represents  a  higher-­order  difference,  which  subsumes  the  difference  between  the  two.  In  
Creative   Evolution   the   qualitative  multiplicity   becomes   both   ‘a   unity   that   is  multiple   and   a  
multiplicity  that  is  one.’  See  also  Mullarkey,  1999,  142-­144.  
103  Riemann,  2005,  380  
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these  non-­Euclidean  spaces  in  a  Euclidean  space  with  an  added  dimension.  
For  example,  a  two-­dimensional  surface  with  constant  positive  curvature  can  
be   represented  as   the  surface  of  a   three-­dimensional  sphere.  The  problem  
with  using  this  process  to  overcome  the  metaphysical  problem  of  how  to  select  
a  single  geometry  out  of  the  many  internally  consistent  geometries  available,  
is  that  it  begs  the  question:  if  we  have  abandoned  Euclid’s  fifth  axiom  following  
the  proofs  that  show  it  cannot  be  taken  as  a  necessary  truth,  then  to  assume  
the   framework   of   a   higher-­dimensional   Euclidean   geometry   will   simply  
reintroduce   the   contingency   of   this   form   of   geometry   at   a   higher   level.   If  
Riemann  wanted   to  define  a  geometry  which  could  account   for  all  possible,  
consistent  geometries,  without  having  to  assume  the  applicability  of  Euclid’s  
fifth  axiom,  then  he  would  have  to  do  so  without  also  assuming  the  existence  
of  any  higher-­dimensional  Euclidean  space.104  
  
Riemann  required  a  way  to  express  the  curvature  of  a  space  immanently.  To  
do   this,   he   turned   to   differential   calculus.   Differential   calculus   is   a   field   of  
mathematics  that  concerns  itself  with  the  study  of  the  rates  at  which  quantities  
change.   In  practical   terms,  differential  calculus  does   this  by  discovering   the  
properties  of  singular  points  that  lie  on  a  curve.  To  take  an  example,  in  order  
to  determine   the  speed  of  an  accelerating  object  at  a  specific  point   in   time,  
calculus  can  be  used  to  measure  the  angle  of  a  curved  line  used  to  represent  
the  acceleration  of  the  object,  at  a  specific  point.  Because  this  line  is  curved,  
it   is   not   possible   to   determine   the   speed   of   the   object   by   comparing   the  
distance  covered  over  a  set  period  with  the  time  taken  to  cover  this  distance.  
Instead,   differential   calculus   solves   this   problem   by   initially   considering   the  
average  velocity  of  the  object  over  a  period  of  time.  By  then  slowly  decreasing  
the  duration  used,  our  equation  will  approach  the  instantaneous  velocity  of  the  
object  at  the  point  we  want  to  consider.  The  shorter  the  duration  we  consider,  
the   closer   our   result   will   be   to   the   instantaneous   velocity   of   the   object.   By  
making   the   duration   tend   to   zero,   we   are   able   to   discover   the   exact  
instantaneous  velocity  of  the  object.  This  is  written  in  differential  calculus  using  
                                                                                                                
104  In  Deleuze’s  attempt  to  define  depth  without  simply  assuming  a  ‘fictitious  third  dimension’  
we  can  see  an  echo  of  this  problem.  Both  Riemann  and  Deleuze  recognise  that  to  explain  
the  extended  dimensions  of  space  a  non-­extended  spatial  thinking  is  required.    
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the  symbols  dx  and  dy,  where  each  of  these  refer  to  the  ever  decreasing,  or  
infinitesimal,  quantities  used  to  determine  the  rate  of  change  at  the  point.  The  
most   important   thing   to   note   here   is   that   while   the   dx   and   the   dy   are  
indeterminate   in   themselves,   by   their   mutual   determination   they   fully  
determine  the  rate  of  change  at  a  singular  point.  
  
Carl  Friedrich  Gauss,  one  of  the  originators  of  non-­Euclidean  geometry,  and  
under  whom  Riemann  had   studied,   had  proved   that   it  was  possible   to   use  
calculus  to  analyse  two-­dimensional  curved  spaces  without  the  need  to  embed  
them   in   a   non-­curved   three-­dimensional   space.105   Gauss   showed   that   the  
curvature  of  a  particular  surface  could  be  derived  from  the  way  that  distances  
relate  to  each  other  on  that  surface,  just  as  the  curvature  of  a  particular  point  
on  a  line  can  be  derived  from  the  relations  between  two  differentials  on  that  
line.  Riemann  developed  Gauss’s  proof  in  order  to  apply  it  to  multiply  extended  
manifolds,  or  multiplicities,  with  any  number  of  dimensions,  so  that  a  curved,  
n-­dimensional   manifold   could   be   defined   without   embedding   it   in   an   n+1-­
dimensional  Euclidean   space.  By   using   this  method,  Riemann  had   showed  
that  a  multiplicity  of  n-­dimensions,  and  with  any  possible  curvature,  could  be  
analysed   using   a   combination   of   n-­dimensional   geometry   and   differential  
calculus.    
  
What  Riemann  found,  however,  was  that  when  space  is  treated  according  to  
this   form   of   differential   geometry,   and   when   curvature   is   understood  
intrinsically,   it   has   a   number   of   striking   features   that   distinguish   it   from  
Euclidean  space.  Spaces  whose  curvature  is  expressed  extrinsically,  or  whose  
curvature   is  expressed  as  a  variation   in  another  dimension,  can  be  defined  
using  a  grid  of  regular  points,  which  are  metrically  determined.  Riemann  refers  
to   these  multiplicities  as  discrete  manifolds  because  relationships  within   the  
manifold  occur  between  points,  whose  location  can  be  determined  irrespective  
of  the  location  of  other  points,  and  hence  form  a  discontinuous  sequence.  A  
discrete  manifold  of   three  dimensions,   for  example,  can  be  defined  using  a  
Cartesian   co-­ordinate   system,   in   which   any   point   in   that   space   can   be  
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determined  by      ‘x’,   ‘y’  and   ‘z’  values,  which  each  define   the  distance  of   the  
point  from  one  of  the  three  axes.  However,  multiplicities  in  which  curvature  is  
expressed  intrinsically  cannot  be  defined  by  such  a  regular  grid  because  the  
‘curvature’  of  the  space  is  manifested  as  the  variability  of  distances  within  the  
space.  In  a  curved  three-­dimensional  space,  the  distances  defining  the  ‘x’,  ‘y’  
and   ‘z’   values   would   vary   depending   on   their   position   in   the   manifold.  
Manifolds,   or   ‘multiplicities’   of   this   type   are   called   continuous   manifolds  
because  relationships  within  the  manifold  occur  continuously  throughout  the  
space.106  
  
In  continuous  multiplicities,  unless  curvature  can  be  determined  as   regular,  
measurements  of  distance  cannot  be  generalized  across   the  space.  This   is  
due   to   the  way   in   which   the   concept   of   quantity   is   applied   here.   Riemann  
explains   that   “quantity   comes   in   discrete   magnitudes   by   counting,   in  
continuous   magnitude   by   measurement”.107   While   discrete   manifolds   are  
defined  by   regular   points,   so   that   the   length   of   a   line   can  be  measured  by  
counting  the  number  of  points  it  passes  through,  in  a  continuous  manifold  there  
is  no  such  regular  grid.  As  magnitudes  can  only  be  quantified  by  comparing  
one  against  another,  in  a  continuous  manifold  this  can  only  be  done  when  one  
length  constitutes  a  part  of   the  other   length.  These  measurements  are  only  
locally   defined   and   cannot   therefore   be   generalised   across   the   manifold.  
Riemann  is  clear  that  in  the  case  of  continuous  multiplicities,  all  quantities  can  
only  be  measured  relative  to  one  another  and  this  makes  it  impossible  to  give  
magnitudes  any  absolute  quantity:  
  
“Measuring  consists  in  superposition  of  the  magnitudes  to  be  compared;;  for  
measurement   there   is   requisite   some   means   of   carrying   forward   one  
magnitude  as  a  measure  for  the  other.  In  default  of  this,  one  can  compare  two  
magnitudes  only  when  the  one  is  a  part  of  the  other,  and  even  then  one  can  
                                                                                                                
106  Riemann  offers  the  following  definition:  “Notions  of  quantity  are  possible  only  where  there  
exists  already  a  general  concept  which  allows  various  modes  of  determination.  According  as  
there  is  or  is  not  found  among  these  modes  of  determination  a  continuous  transition  from  
one  to  another,  they  form  a  continuous  or  a  discrete  manifold”  (1929,  412).  I  have  given  my  
own  definition  above  in  order  to  highlight  the  importance  of  expressing  curvature  internally  
for  the  determination  of  curvature  in  continuous  manifolds.    
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only  decide  upon  the  question  of  more  and  less,  not  upon  the  question  of  how  
many.”108  
  
Here  it  is  only  possible  to  discuss  quantity  in  relative  terms.  For  example,  it  is  
possible  to  determine  that  a  straight  line  A  is  longer  than  another  straight  line  
B,  if  B  is  included  in  A,  and  that  B  is  longer  than  another  straight  line  C,  if  C  is  
included  in  B.  In  this  case,  it  is  also  possible  to  say  that  A  is  longer  than  C  and  
therefore  that  the  order  of  the  lines  in  terms  of  their  length  is  A,  then  B,  then  
C.  However,  we  cannot  determine  by  how  much  each  of  these  lines  varies  in  
length   from   the   other   two.  For   this   reason,   our  method   of  measurement   is  
restricted  to  the  use  of  ordinal  numbers,  such  as  1st,  2nd  and  3rd,  and  we  cannot  
legitimately   apply   any   cardinal   numbers   to   lengths,   such  as   1cm,   2cm  and  
3cm.  Riemann  sums  up  the  results  of  this  investigation  into  the  legitimacy  of  
the   use   of  measure   in   the   case   of   continuous  manifolds,   stating   that:   “the  
metric  relations  of  the  manifold  are  completely  determined  by  the  measure  of  
curvature”   and   that   given   the   impossibility   of   proving   mathematically   the  
necessary  curvature  of  space,  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  “the  spatial  relations  
of  size  are  not  in  accord  with  the  postulates  of  geometry”.109    
  
The  ultimate  result  of  Riemann’s  work  on  the  foundations  of  geometry  was  a  
radically  new  understanding  of  the  nature  of  geometrical  space.  Riemann  had  
shown   that   it   was   possible   to   describe   curved   spaces   in   any   number   of  
dimensions   without   relying   on   the   assumptions   made   by   Euclidean  
geometry.110   In   doing   this,   Riemann   also   showed   that   space   should   be  
considered   fundamentally   as   a   continuous,   curved   multiplicity,   of   which  
regular,  Euclidean  space  is  only  one  particular  limit  case.  He  also  showed  that  
space,  when  understood  as  such  a  continuous  multiplicity  is  necessarily  non-­
                                                                                                                
108  Riemann,  1929,  413  
109  Riemann,  1929,  421;;  424.  Riemann’s  argument  at  this  point  turns  on  the  question  of  
whether  it  is  possible  for  us  to  assume  the  ‘flatness  in  the  smallest  parts’  of  space.  Riemann  
follows  up  both  of  these  possibilities,  while  Deleuze  is  specifically  interested  in  the  
consequences  of  not  making  such  an  assumption.  For  a  detailed  account  of  Deleuze’s  
interpretation  of  this  aspect  of  Riemann,  see  Widder,  2017.  It  is  also  due  to  arguments  in  this  
article  that  I  have  followed  White’s  translations  of  Riemann  over  the  more  widely  circulated  
Clifford  translation.    
110  This  application  of  differential  geometry  in  n-­dimensional  spaces  allowed  Einstein  to  invent  
his  theory  of  general  relativity  and  the  associated  concept  of  space-­time.    
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metric,   as   relationships   can   only   be   measured   comparatively   rather   than  
absolutely,   using   an   ordinal   number   system   and   not   a   cardinal   one.   Most  
importantly,   however,   Riemann   had   shown   not   only   that   such   an  
understanding   of   geometry  was   possible,   but   that   it   was   the   only   way   that  
geometry  could  be  practiced  without  assuming  Euclid’s  fifth  axiom,  and  without  
subordinating  mathematics  to  physics,  by  forcing  mathematicians  to  justify  the  
truth   of   their   mathematical   analyses   on   the   basis   of   their   applicability   to  
experienced  reality.  
  
v)  The  virtual  Idea  as  multiplicity  
  
As  we  have  already  discussed,  Deleuze  claims  that  the  virtual  is  populated  by  
‘Ideas’  that  are  composed  of  “a  continuum  of  differential  relations”,  which  differ  
from   themselves   and   which   therefore   contain   their   own   difference.111  With  
Riemann’s  concept  of  the  continuous  multiplicity  in  hand,  we  are  now  able  to  
give  a  clear  picture  of  the  logical  structure  of  these  virtual  Ideas.  Here  we  will  
see   that   Deleuze   borrows   from   Riemann’s   use   of   differential   calculus,   but  
applies  its  insights  outside  of  the  strict  field  of  geometry.112    
  
The   relevance  of   the  differential  dx   in  calculus,  as   that  which   is  completely  
undetermined  in  itself,  but  determinable  in  relation  to  another  infinitesimal,  dy,  
is   profound   for   both   Riemann   and   Deleuze.   It   was   calculus   that   allowed  
Riemann  to  develop  his  own  form  of  differential  geometry  and  to  develop  his  
concept  of  the  multiplicity.  For  Riemann,  it  is  calculus  that  allows  us  to  define  
a   geometry   that   can   account   for   a   non-­metric   conception   of   space.   For  
Deleuze,   the   dx   is   important   at   a   conceptual   level   as   that   which   is  
indeterminate   in   itself,   but   which   has   a   determination   when   it   is   put   in   a  
relation.113   The   dx   and   the   dy   are   each   indeterminate   but   determinable  
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112   It  was  Russell’s  view  that  Riemann’s  quantitative  conception  of   the  multiplicity   restricted  
him   to   the   field  of  mathematics   (Russell,   1996,  25).  However,   in   the   lecture  where  he   first  
presented  the  concept  of  the  continuous  multiplicity,  Riemann  offered  the  experience  of  colour  
as   an   example   of   a   non-­mathematical   use   of   the   continuous  multiplicity.  Deleuze’s   use   of  
Riemann’s  concept  of  the  multiplicity  is  certainly  not  constrained  to  mathematical  examples.  
113  Deleuze’s  interpretation  of  the  calculus  is  a  contentious  one.  Deleuze  wants  to  consider  
differentials  not  as  having  a  minimal  (but  determinate)  positive  value,  but  as  genuinely  
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elements,   which   are   given   a   reciprocal   determination   in   their   relation,   and  
which   together  absolutely  determine  a  singular  point.  For  Deleuze,   it   is   this  
differential   relationship   between   the   indeterminate,   the   reciprocal  
determination,  and  the  absolute  determination  that  defines  the  virtual  Idea,  and  
it   is   for   this   reason   that   Deleuze   will   name   the   structure   of   the   Idea   a  
multiplicity.   Deleuze   makes   this   explicit   when   he   writes:   “The   symbol   dx  
appears   as   simultaneously   undetermined,   determinable   and   determination.  
Three  principles  which  together  form  a  sufficient  reason  correspond  to  these  
three  aspects:  a  principle  of  determinability  corresponds  to  the  undetermined  
as   such   (dx,   dy);;  a   principle   of   reciprocal  determination   corresponds   to   the  
really  determinable  (dy/dx);;  a  principle  of  complete  determination  corresponds  
to  the  effectively  determined  (values  of  dy/dx).  In  short,  dx  is  the  Idea.”114  
  
As   a   formal   definition   of   the   virtual  multiplicity   that   does  not   rely   strictly   on  
differential   calculus,   Deleuze   offers   three   distinct   criteria.   First,   that   a  
multiplicity  is  a  variety  of  elements  that  are  not  determinate  prior  to  the  relations  
that   they   form  with  one  another:   “the  elements  of   the  multiplicity  must  have  
neither   sensible   form   nor   conceptual   signification,   nor   therefore,   any  
assignable   function.”  Second,   that   in  a  multiplicity   the  elements  come  to  be  
determined  by  the  relationships  that  form  between  them:  “the  elements  must  
in  effect  be  determined,  but  reciprocally,  by  reciprocal  relations  which  allow  no  
independence  to  subsist”.  Third,  that  the  structure  of  the  multiplicity  must  be  
applicable  to  a  number  of  different  states  of  affairs:   it  “must  be  actualised  in  
diverse   spatio-­temporal   relationships,   at   the  same   time  as   its   elements   are  
actually  incarnated  in  a  variety  of  terms  and  forms”.115  For  Deleuze,  the  Idea  
cannot   be   split   into   a   number   of   elements   that   can   be   said   to   have   any  
existence,  or  any  sense,  independent  of  their  relation.  The  definition  given  by  
James  Williams  in  his  guide  to  Difference  and  Repetition  highlights  the  way  in  
which  the  multiplicity,  as  it  is  defined  by  Deleuze,  prioritises  relationships  over  
pre-­existing  elements:   “The  multiplicity   is,   therefore,  a  structure  of  elements  
                                                                                                                
undetermined.  For  a  comprehensive  elaboration  of  Deleuze’s  discussion  of  differential  
calculus  in  Difference  and  Repetition,  see  Somers-­Hall,  2013,  131-­143.  
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defined  as:  things   in  continuous  variation  resistant   to   identification;;   relations  
between   those   elements;;   relations   between   those   relations   and   actual  
relations;;  and  relations  between  the  elements  and  actual  forms  and  terms.”116  
Following   from  the  recognition   that  differential  calculus   is  only  a  method  for  
thinking   such   a   structure,   Williams   is   right   to   observe   that   our   structural  
definition  of  the  multiplicity  should  not  be  restricted  to  a  mathematical  reading  
and   that   Deleuze’s   definition   of   the   Idea   as   a   multiplicity   is   “allied   to   the  
statement  that  everything  is  a  multiplicity.”117    
  
While   the   mathematics   of   differential   calculus   provides   the   context   for  
Deleuze’s  definition  of  the  multiplicity,  he  is  also  clear  that  the  structure  of  the  
virtual  is  not  strictly  mathematic  in  nature.  Echoing  his  earlier  comment  about  
the  fact  that  any  space  presupposes  a  problematic  structure  of  primary  depth,  
be   it   “geometrical,   physical,   biophysical,   social…   [or]   linguistic,”118   Deleuze  
states  that  the  virtual,  understood  as  a  problematic  field,  is  not  mathematical,  
but   dialectic:   “Problems   are   always   dialectical.”   In   an   attempt   to   clearly  
distance  himself   from  what  he  sees  as   the  pitfalls  of   the  Hegelian  dialectic,  
Deleuze  is  careful  to  state  that  by  ‘dialectic’  he  does  not  mean,  “any  kind  of  
circulation  of  opposing  representations  which  would  make  them  coincide  in  the  
identity  of  a  concept,”  but  instead,  “the  problem  element  in  so  far  as  this  may  
be   distinguished   from   the   properly   mathematical   element   of   solutions.”119  
Differential  calculus  is  a  method  that  allows  us  to  think  the  differential  nature  
of  the  virtual  Idea,  but  the  structure  of  the  virtual  problematic  field  is  in  no  sense  
mathematical.   Instead,   “What   is   mathematical   (or   physical,   biological,  
psychical  or  sociological)  are  the  solutions.”120  
  
Before  moving  on  from  this  discussion  of  the  multiplicity  of  the  Idea,  and  its  
differential  structure,  it  is  worth  making  two  clarificatory  points.  First,  that  the  
virtual   Idea   is   not   indeterminate   or   underdetermined,   but   completely  
determined.  When  discussing  the  virtual,  Deleuze  writes:  “We  have  seen  that  
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a   double   process   of   reciprocal   determination   and   complete   determination  
defined   that   reality:   far   from   being   undetermined,   the   virtual   is   completely  
determined.”121  Second,  that  due  to  the  fact  that  the  virtual  is  real,  it  is  not  a  
negative  or   inert   transcendent   field,  but  a  positive  and  productive   immanent  
one.  In  his  work  on  Bergson,  Deleuze  is  clear  on  this  point:  “One  only  has  to  
replace   the  actual   terms   in   the  movement   that  produces   them,   that   is  bring  
them  back  to  the  virtuality  actualized  in  them,  in  order  to  see  that  differentiation  
is  never  a  negation  but  a  creation,  and  that  difference  is  never  negative  but  
essentially  positive  and  creative.”122  This  is  a  point  reiterated  by  a  number  of  
interpreters   of   Deleuze’s   work   and   is   captured   by  Michael   Hardt   when   he  
writes   that,   “virtual  being   is  not  abstract  and   indifferent,  and  neither  does   it  
enter  into  relation  with  what  is  other  than  itself  –  it  is  real  and  qualified  through  
the  internal  process  of  differentiation.”123  
  
The  task  of  giving  an  exposition  of  the  differential  structure  of  virtual  Ideas  is  
particularly  important  for  Deleuze  because  it  allows  him  to  offer  an  alternative  
to   the   dogmatic   image   of   thought,   with   its   reliance   on   the   subjective  
presuppositions  of  common  sense  and  good  sense.  Now,  Deleuze  is  able  to  
show  that  the  apparent  differences  that  we  apprehend  between  actual  entities  
rely  on  a  virtual  realm,  which  is  real  without  being  actual.  Here,  virtual  Ideas  
form   “an   n-­dimensional,   continuous,   defined  multiplicity.”124   The   differential  
relations  between  the  elements  of   this  multiplicity  are  the   internal  difference  
which  gives  rise  to  the  structure  of  the  world  of  actual,  differenciated  objects.  
It   is   this   realm  of  virtual   Ideas  which  allows  Deleuze  to  define  difference  as  
logically   prior   to   identity.   Here,   the   differential   relations   between   virtual  
elements  ‘make  the  difference’  between  those  actual  entities  that  appear  to  us  
to   differ   from   one   another.   To   be   clear   about   the   relationship   between   the  
differential   relations   that   exist   between  and  within   virtual   Ideas,   on   the  one  
hand,   and   the   differences   that  we  perceive  between  actual   objects,   on   the  
other,   Deleuze   utilizes   two   different   spellings   of   the   word  
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differentiation/differenciation.   According   to   this   distinction,   we   can   say   that  
there  are  differential  relations  (spelled  with  a  ‘t’),  which  hold  between  the  pre-­
individual  elements  of  virtual  Ideas.  These  compose  the  internal  or  immanent  
difference  which  explains  the  existence  of  differences  (spelled  with  a  ‘c’)  that  
exist   between   actual   entities   in   experience.125   In   his   essay   ‘How   Do   We  
Recognize   Structuralism’,   Deleuze  gives   the   following   explanation   of   these  
terms:  “Of  the  structure  as  virtuality,  we  must  say  that  it  is  still  undifferentiated  
(c),  even  though  it  is  totally  and  completely  differential  (t).  Of  structures  which  
are  embodied  in  a  particular  actual  form  (present  or  past),  we  must  say  that  
they  are  differentiated,  and  that   for   them  to  be  actualized   is  precisely   to  be  
differentiated   (c).”126   In   brief,   it   is   the   virtual   process   of   differentiation   that  
explains  the  genesis  of  the  actual  process  of  differenciation.  
  
vi)  Individuation,  intensity  and  dynamism  
  
There  is  one  final  aspect  of  Deleuze’s  metaphysical  project  in  Difference  and  
Repetition   that   we   must   clarify   before   we   can   offer   a   coherent   outline   of  
Deleuze’s   critique   of   linear   perspective,   and   before   we   can   see   how   the  
concept  of  the  line  of  flight  is  prefigured  in  this  text,  namely  Deleuze’s  account  
of   the   dynamic   genesis   of   the   individuation   and   dramatization   of   ‘spatio-­
temporal  dynamisms’.  While  Deleuze’s  use  of   the  concept  of   the  multiplicity  
has  shown  how  the  structural  relations  of  actual  terms  rely  on  the  differential  
relations  that  are  internal  to  virtual  Ideas,  these  relations  are  static,  while  the  
world  is  dynamic  and  our  experience  of  it  is  durational.  To  account  for  this,  and  
to  complete  his  genetic  account  of  actual  experience,  Deleuze  will  claim  that  
we  still  require  a  dynamic  and  generative  process  to  animate  the  process  of  
actualization   by   which   a   virtual   structure   can   give   rise   to   a   set   of   actual  
differences.  To  put  this  point  in  more  general  terms,  we  could  say  that  while  
the  actual/virtual  relation  can  give  us  an  account  of  difference  in  itself,  we  are  
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still   lacking   the   requisite   account   of   repetition   for   itself,   which   will   offer   a  
description  of  the  process  that  drives  the  genesis  of  experience.    
  
To  appreciate  why  Deleuze  believes  it  is  necessary  to  offer  an  account  of  the  
dynamic  and  intensive  nature  of  experience,  we  must  recognize  the  sense  in  
which  he  characterises  his  philosophy  as  a  ‘transcendental  empiricism’.  At  the  
point  of  writing  Difference  and  Repetition,  Deleuze  was  attempting  to  answer  
the   traditional   Kantian   problem,   namely   “How   can   the   given   be   given   to   a  
subject?”  by  utilizing  a  form  of  transcendental  philosophy.127  This  can  be  seen  
in  the  preceding  sections  where  Deleuze  shows  that  the  differential  relations  
of   virtual   Ideas   are   the   necessary   preconditions   for   the   possibility   of   the  
differences   that  exist   in  experience  between  actual  entities.   In  other  words,  
internal  difference   is   the  condition   for  external  differences.  Deleuze   is  also,  
however,  grappling  with  what  he  sees  as  the  traditional  question  of  empiricism,  
namely  “How  is  the  subject  constituted  within  the  given?”.128  It  is  to  this  latter  
problem   that   Deleuze’s   analysis   of   the   intensive   and   dynamic   nature   of  
experience  is  directed.129  Deleuze’s  philosophical  project  does  not  stop  here,  
but  aims  to  synthesize  these  questions  by  posing  the  more  complex  problem,  
“How  can  a  subject  transcending  the  given  be  constituted  in  the  given?”.130  In  
order   to   answer   the   empiricist’s   question   of   the   constitution   of   the   subject,  
Deleuze  begins   by   recognizing  what   he   calls   the   “privilege  of   sensibility   as  
origin”,  which  he  claims  “appears  in  the  fact  that,  in  an  encounter,  what  forces  
sensation  and  that  which  can  only  be  sensed  are  one  and  the  same  thing.”131  
It  is  an  encounter  with  pure  sensation  that  instigates  thought,  so  it  is  through  
an  analysis  of  sensation  that  Deleuze  will  provide  an  empirical  ground  for  his  
transcendental  philosophy.  What  strikes  Deleuze  about   thought’s  encounter  
with  pure  sensation  is  that,  despite  what  Kant  had  claimed  concerning  the  a  
priori  nature  of  the  structures  of  space  and  time,  sensation  is  not  necessarily  
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129  Deleuze’s  most  direct  answer  to  the  question  of  the  constitution  of  the  subject  is  given  in  
Chapter  2  of  DR.  Deleuze  shows  how,  starting  with  the  passive  synthesis  of  habit,  and  via  a  
process  of  repetition  in  which  what  is  repeated  is  not  the  same  but  different,  the  subject-­
object  relation  is  generated  as  an  integral  axis  of  actual  experience.    
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extended  spatiotemporally.  Instead,  sensation  is  intensive.  What  can  only  be  
experienced  in  sensation  is  its  intensity.  The  level  of  intensity  of  a  colour,  or  
the  intensity  of  a  sound  or  a  temperature,  are  not  thinkable  outside  of  sensation  
itself,  that  is  to  say  that  they  cannot  be  represented.  The  intensity  of  a  colour  
is  not  necessarily  experienced  as  covering  a  determinate  space,  or  of  lasting  
for   a   measurable   length   of   time.   These   intensities   constitute   a   form   of  
difference  unlike  that  of  the  differential  relations  internal  to  virtual  Ideas.  Here,  
differences  are  always  degrees  of  difference  and  are  constantly  changing  in  a  
dynamic  field  of   intensity.  Deleuze  will  claim  that  it   is  through  an  analysis  of  
this  “intense  world  of  differences”  that  we  can  account  for  the  extended  nature  
of  experience.  For  this  reason,  intensity  “is  precisely  the  object  of  a  superior  
empiricism.”132  Following  this,  Deleuze  will  try  to  show  how  this  sensory  field  
of  difference,  which  is  quantitative  and  intensive  in  itself,  can  give  rise  to  both  
the   qualitative   and   the   extended   nature   of   thought,   as   it   is   represented   in  
experience.    
  
The   qualitative   nature   of   experience   relies   on   the   differences   in   intensity  
expressed,   for   example,   in   colour,   light,   sound,   and   heat.   According   to  
Deleuze’s   analysis   in   Difference   and   Repetition,   sensation   is   simply   the  
contraction  of  intensive  differences.  To  put  this  another  way,  we  can  say  that  
while   sensory   experience   is   qualitative,   that   which   is   within   sensation   and  
gives   rise   to   sensation,   and   which   transcendental   empiricism   attempts   to  
capture,  is  a  pure  intensive  quantity.  However,  Deleuze  is  not  only  interested  
in   the   intensive   nature   of   sensation   as   a   transcendental   ground   for   the  
possibility  of  quality,  but  also  as  the  explanation  of  extension.  To  understand  
this   point   we  will   need   to   recognize   some   of   the   key   features   of   intensive  
differences.   One   such   defining   feature   is   the   fact   that   while   extensive  
differences  are  additive,  intensive  differences  are  not.  Differences  like  those  
of  length,  area  and  volume  are  extensive  because  they  can  be  increased  by  
adding  to  them  and  can  be  decreased  by  subtracting  away  from  them,  or  by  
dividing  them.  For  example,  when  a  length  of  one  metre  is  added  to  another  
length   of   one  metre,   the   total   length   is   two  metres   and  when   this   length   is  
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divided   into   two,   we   will   have   two   one  metre   sections   again.   The   defining  
feature   of   intensive   differences,   on   the   other   hand,   is   that   they   cannot   be  
increased   by   adding   or   decreased   by   subtracting   or   dividing.   Taking  
temperature  as  an  example  of  an  intensive  difference,  we  can  see  that  if  we  
add  one  litre  of  water  at  40°C  to  another  litre  of  water  at  40°C  we  do  not  get  a  
body  of  water  that  is  80°C.  Similarly,  if  we  divide  a  body  of  water  in  two,  the  
intensity  of  the  temperature  is  not  halved.  The  same  can  be  said  for  colour,  or  
for   sound.   Another   distinctive   feature   of   intensive   differences   it   that   here,  
increases   or   decreases   in   difference   will   result   in   a   change   of   nature.   For  
example,   if   a   body  of  water   is   heated,   it  will   alter   its  movement,   eventually  
being  transformed  into  a  gas.    
  
According   to  Deleuze,   it   is  due   to   the   fact   that  changes   in   intensity   lead   to  
changes  in  nature  that  the  explication  of  intensity  also  gives  rise  to  extension  
as  such.  It  is  the  intensities  of  heat  internal  to  a  body  of  water  that  determine  
the  way  that  such  a  body  is  extended  in  space  and  time,  and  not  the  other  way  
around.  Manuel   DeLanda   sums   up   this   position  with   the   slogan,   “intensive  
differences  are  productive”,  which  he  explains  by  writing  that  “wherever  one  
finds   an   extensive   frontier…   there   is   always   a   process  driven  by   intensive  
differences  which  produced  such  a  boundary.”133  The  boundary  distinctions  
used   to   measure   differences   in   extension   are   themselves   the   result   of  
intensive   differences   that   have   no   spatiotemporal   extension   of   their   own.  
Deleuze  writes  that  intensity  is  “the  uncancellable  in  difference  of  quantity,  but  
this  difference  of  quantity  is  cancelled  by  extension”,  going  on  to  clarify  that  
extension  is  nothing  other  than  “the  process  by  which  intensive  difference  is  
turned   inside   out   and   distributed   in   such   a   way   as   to   be   dispelled,  
compensated,  equalised  and  suppressed  in  the  extensity  which  it  creates.”134  
Deleuze’s  analysis  of  intensity  is  central  to  his  philosophical  project,  ultimately  
accounting  for  both  the  apparently  qualitative  nature  of  things  and  the  way  they  
are   extended   in   space   and   time.   He  writes   that,   “there  would   no  more   be  
qualitative  differences  or  differences  in  kind  than  there  would  be  quantitative  
differences   or   differences   of   degree,   if   intensity   were   not   capable   of  
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constituting  the  former  in  qualities  and  the  later  in  extensity.”135  It  is  intensity  
that  generates  extended  differences  and  not  the  other  way  around.  
  
According  to  Difference  and  Repetition,  the  aforementioned  intensive  field  is  
populated  by  ‘spatio-­temporal-­dynamisms’  and  its  explication  goes  by  way  of  
two  distinct  moments,  namely  ‘individuation’  and  ‘dramatization’.136  In  the  first  
of  these  moments,  bundles  of  intensity  known  as  ‘spatio-­temporal-­dynamisms’  
become   individual   objects   of   thought.   Here  Deleuze   is   drawing   heavily   on  
Gilbert  Simondon’s  explanation  of  the  process  of  individuation  in  an  attempt  to  
explain  the  genesis  of  individuated  forms  from  a  pre-­individual  field.137  In  the  
second  moment,  spatio-­temporal  dynamisms  dramatize  virtual  Ideas  in  order  
to   produce   the   actual.   In   an  attempt   to   describe   the   relationship   of   spatio-­
temporal  dynamisms  to  actualization,  Deleuze  writes  that,  “[t]hey  are  precisely  
dramas,  they  dramatize  the  Idea.”138  This  process  of  dramatization  does  not  
occur   within   a   metric   structure   of   time   and   space,   because   these   metric  
qualities  only  refer  to  extended  entities.139  Instead,  it   is  through  the  dynamic  
unfolding   of   individuation   and   dramatization   that   the   very   framework   of  
extended   space   and   time   is   created.   According   to   Deleuze’s   analysis,   the  
category  of  extensity  “does  not  account  for  the  individuations  that  occur  within  
it”  and  is  only  accounted  for  by  the  spatio-­temporal  dynamisms.140    
  
Talking  of   this  procedure,  Deleuze  writes   that  any  difference  of   intensity   “is  
cancelled  or  tends  to  be  cancelled  in  this  system,  but  it  creates  this  system  by  
explicating   itself.”141  What   is  key   for  Deleuze  here   is   that,   in   the  process  of  
cancelling  themselves  out,  intensive  differences  create  the  extended  structure  
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137   Deleuze   was   heavily   influenced   by   Simondon,   referencing   him   in   Nietzsche   and  
Philosophy,  Difference  and  Repetition,  and  Logic  of  Sense,  and  then  with  Guattari  in  both  Anti-­
Oedipus   and  A   Thousand   Plateaus,   praising   his   work   as   “a   profoundly   original   theory   of  
individuation,  which  entails  an  entire  philosophy.”  (Deleuze,  2001,  43).  See  also  Simondon,  
1964.  
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in   which   this   process   occurs.142   In   this   way,   the   process   of   dramatization  
“incarnates  the  two  traits  of  the  Idea,  differential  relations  and  corresponding  
singular  points.”143  It  is  through  this  incarnation  that  the  virtual  can  eventually  
be  fully  differenciated,  and  can  appear  in  the  form  of  the  actual.  While  some  
interpretations   of   Difference   and   Repetition   assume   that   the   process   of  
individuation   is   actual,   and   must   therefore   presuppose   the   process   of  
actualisation,   Deleuze   explicitly   warns   against   making   this   mistake.144   In  
Chapter   5,  Deleuze  writes   that,   “any   reduction   of   individuation   to   a   limit   or  
complication  of  differenciation,  compromises   the  whole  of   the  philosophy  of  
difference,”  and  that  individuation  “does  not  presuppose  any  differenciation;;  it  
gives  rise  to  it.”145  It  is  important  to  note  here  that  Deleuze  does  not  separate  
the  two  processes  completely,  or  say  that  one  is  completely  conditional  on  the  
other.  Instead,  these  two  processes  embody  a  complex  relation  in  which  the  
process  of  individuation  can  only  be  understood  in  the  context  of  the  process  
of  differenciation,  or  actualisation,  to  which  it  also  gives  rise.146  
  
The  intensive  realm  does  not  operate  of  its  own  accord.  It  is  understood  as  a  
kind  of  theatre  that  requires  stage-­direction  from  the  virtual  Ideas.  Taking  the  
generative  processes  contained  in  an  egg  as  inspiration,  Deleuze  writes:  “The  
world  is  an  egg,  but  the  egg  itself  is  a  theatre:  a  staged  theatre  in  which  the  
roles   dominate   the   actors,   the   spaces   dominate   the   roles   and   the   Ideas  
dominate   the   spaces.”147   So,   while   intensively   defined   spatio-­temporal  
dynamisms  drive  the  process  of  individuation,  this  process  is  directed  by  virtual  
Ideas   to   the   extent   that   we   can   say   that   these   Ideas   are   ‘dramatized’.148  
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146  This  form  of  complex  causation  between  two  different  processes  is  not  unusual  in  Deleuze’s  
work.  For  example,  it  may  be  worth  reading  this  relationship  with  reference  to  the  ‘quasi-­cause’  
as   it   is   discussed   in  Logic   of   Sense.   The   static   process   of   actualisation   and   the   dynamic  
process  of  individuation  in  Difference  and  Repetition  could  then  be  read  alongside  the  static  
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dynamic  genesis   that  he  discusses   in  the  context  of  psychoanalysis   (LS  126-­144  and  214-­
220).  These   two  texts  do  not,  however,  offer  analogous   readings  of   individuation,  which   is  
characterized   as   dynamic   in   Difference   and   Repetition   but   as   the   product   of   the   static  
ontological  genesis  in  Logic  of  Sense  (LS  137).  
147  DR  269  
148   In  an  echo  of  Kant’s   famous  claim  that   “Thoughts  without   content  are  empty,   intuitions  
without   concepts  are  blind”   (CPR  A51/B  75),  we  could  say   that   for  Deleuze,   “Virtual   Ideas  
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Ultimately,  Deleuze  will  combine  the  different  processes  discussed  here  into  
the   combination   “differentiation-­individuation-­dramatization-­differenciation”,  
which  describes  the  production  of  actual  experience:  a  process  of  individuation  
in   an   intensive   field   of   depth   produces   spatio-­temporal   dynamisms   in  
accordance  with  the  virtual  structure  of  the  Idea;;  these  dynamisms  are  then  
dramatised  to  produce  an  extended  field  of  actual,  differenciated  elements  that  
stand  in  relations  of  opposition  and  limitation  to  one  another.149  
  
The  four  different  moments  involved  in  this  process  are  distinct  and  they  do  
not  play  out  in  a  linear  order.  Deleuze  is  careful  to  clarify  that  the  previously  
discussed  process  of  differentiation-­differenciation,  which  relates  virtual  Ideas  
to  actual  entities,  relies  on  the  activity  of   individuation-­dramatization  and  not  
the   other   way   around.   As   Deleuze   puts   it:   “Individuation   always   governs  
actualisation”.150   This   means   that   while   there   are   “the   differential   relations  
which  constitute  the  pre-­individual  field  to  be  actualised”,  the  actualisation  of  
these  differential  relations  is  driven  by  the  individuation  and  dramatization  of  
spatio-­temporal  dynamisms.151  Returning  to  the  example  of  the  developmental  
process  undergone  by  an  egg,  Deleuze  will  explain  that  while  the  virtual  aspect  
is  defined  by  a  set  of  differential   relations,   “their  actualisation   is  determined  
only  by  the  cytoplasm,  with  its  gradients  and  its  fields  of  individuation”.152  For  
Deleuze,  the  process  of  individuation  is  carried  out  in  an  “intensive  field”  where  
pure  intensities  explicate  themselves,  and  through  this  process  individuate  the  
differential  relations  of  the  virtual  Idea.  As  Deleuze  writes:  “Intensity  creates  
the  extensities  and  the  qualities  in  which  it  is  explicated;;  these  extensities  and  
qualities  are  differenciated”,  which  is  to  say  that  they  are  actualised.153    
  
                                                                                                                
without   spatio-­temporal   dynamisms   are   empty,   spatio-­temporal   dynamisms   without   virtual  
Ideas  are  blind.”  However,  Deleuze’s  account  differs  from  Kant’s,  especially  due  to  the  fact  
that,  for  Deleuze,  the  subject  is  not  required  to  apply  concepts  to  intuitions.  On  the  contrary,  
the  subject  is  created  as  a  side-­effect  who  experiences  the  process,  without  playing  an  active  
role.    
149  DR  213  
150  DR  313  
151  DR  313  
152  DR  313  
153  DR  317  
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vii)  Depth  in  linear  perspective  
  
As  previously  mentioned,  despite  the  fact  that  he  does  not  mention  the  concept  
explicitly  in  the  text,  Deleuze’s  work  in  Difference  and  Repetition  approaches  
the   concept   of   the   ‘line   of   flight’   obliquely   via   his   engagement   with   linear  
perspective.  Now   that   I  have  outlined  Deleuze’s  metaphysical  project,   I  will  
give  a  short  account  of  linear  perspective,  including  a  discussion  of  the  use  of  
the  French   phrase   ‘ligne   de   fuite’   in   this   context.   Following   this   descriptive  
section,  I  will  show  why  Deleuze  finds  the  tendency  in  the  history  of  philosophy  
to   use   linear   perspective   as   a   model   for   our   understanding   of   space  
problematic,  and  exactly  how  he  aims  to  critique  such  a  tendency.  Here  we  will  
see   how   Deleuze’s   discussion   of   the   four-­part   process   of   differentiation-­
individuation-­dramatization-­differenciation  provides  an  alternative  account  of  
the  genesis  of  the  spatial  structure  of  actual  experience.  Finally,  putting  all  of  
the   previous   work   together,   I   will   offer   my   own   analysis   of   the   somewhat  
spectral   presence   of   the   concept   of   the   ‘line   of   flight’   in   Difference   and  
Repetition.    
  
First,  we  must  begin  with  linear  perspective  itself.  In  the  graphical  arts,  linear  
perspective   is   a   technique   for   representing   three   dimensional   shapes,   or  
spaces,  on  a   two  dimensional  plane,  such  as  a  painting  on  canvas.154  The  
techniques  associated  with  linear  perspective  reach  back  to  Greek  and  Roman  
painting,155  but  they  were  first  studied  and  codified  during  the  Renaissance,  by  
painters  such  as  Piero  della  Francesca  and  Paolo  Uccello.156  The  historical  
development   of   the   linear   perspectival   technique  during   the   fourteenth   and  
                                                                                                                
154  Here  I  will  attempt  to  explain  the  theory  of  linear  perspective  in  the  language  used  by  its  
progenitors.  This  requires  the  acceptance  of  a  particular  model  of  space,  as  it   is  thought  in  
extension.  We  will  see  later  that  Deleuze’s  critique  of  linear  perspective  is  tied  to  his  critique  
of  this  understanding  of  space.  
155  For  example,  Agatharcus  is  thought  to  have  used  perspective  in  his  skenographia,  or  stage  
sets.   It   is  this  sort  of   technique   that  Plato  mistrusts   in  the  arts:   "Thus  (through  perspective)  
every  sort  of  confusion  is  revealed  within  us;;  and  this  is  that  weakness  of  the  human  mind  on  
which  the  art  of  conjuring  and  of  deceiving  by  light  and  shadow  and  other  ingenious  devices  
imposes,  having  an  effect  upon  us  like  magic...  And  the  arts  of  measuring  and  numbering  and  
weighing  come  to  the  rescue  of  the  human  understanding  –  there  is  the  beauty  of  them  –  and  
the  apparent  greater  or  less,  or  more  or  heavier,  no  longer  have  the  mastery  over  us,  but  give  
way  before  calculation  and  measure  and  weight”  (Plato,  1973,  602c-­d).  
156  For  a  discussion  of  the  ways  in  which  ancient  perspectival  techniques  prefigured  the  
development  of  geometric  linear  perspective  in  the  renaissance,  see  White,  1956.  
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fifteenth  centuries  is  well  documented,  as  are  the  ways  in  which  this  technique  
was   closely   tied   to   a   new   understanding   of   the   nature   of   space.157   The  
mathematical  form  of  linear  perspective  was  most  clearly  conceived  in  1425  
by  Filippo  Brunelleschi  and  later  codified  as  perspectiva  artificialis,  or  artificial  
perspective,  by  Leon  Battista  Alberti   in  his  work,  Della  pittura  (On  Painting),  
published  in  1435.158  For  the  artist,  linear  perspective  is  intended  to  provide  a  
rational,  geometrical  technique  for  the  systematic  representation  of  objects  in  
space.  It  does  this  by  replicating  the  visual  illusion  that  the  parallel  edges  of  
rectilinear   bodies   converge   at   a   singular   point   on   the   horizon.   During   his  
discussion  of  perspective  painting  in  Mathematics  in  Western  Culture,  Morris  
Kline  explains  that,  by  developing  this  technique,  theorists  were  “motivated  by  
far   more   than   the   desire   to   attain   verisimilitude.   The   greater   goal   was  
understanding  of  the  structure  of  space.”159    
  
Linear   perspective   works   by   placing   the   canvas   on   an   imaginary   plane  
between  the  eye  of  the  artist  and  the  objects  perceived.  This  plane,  called  the  
picture  plane,  sits  at  right  angles  to  the  point  of  view  of  the  artist  and  acts  as  a  
screen  onto  which  the  light  from  the  objects  is  projected.  When  a  viewer  takes  
up  the  point  of  view  of  the  artist,  by  standing  in  front  of  the  painting,  the  painted  
image  forms  an  approximation  of  the  artist’s  view.  As  the  perceived  size  of  an  
object  decreases  the  further  it  is  from  the  viewer,  linear  perspective  reproduces  
this  effect  through  foreshortening.  The  result  is  that  two  parallel  lines  in  space  
are  represented  on  the  picture  plane  by  two  converging  lines.  As  these  lines  
recede   infinitely   into   the   distance   they   intersect   at   a   singular   point   on   the  
horizon.  The  point  at  which  any  two  parallel   lines  converge  is  known  as  the  
point  de  fuite  in  French,  and  as  the  ‘vanishing  point’  in  English.  This  point  does  
not  have  a  specific  location  in  the  space  being  represented,  but  in  the  painting  
it  is  a  singular  point  that  orientates  the  eye  of  the  viewer.  A  painting  in  linear  
perspective   can   have   any   number   of   vanishing   points,   depending   on   the  
number   of   pairs   of   parallel   lines   in   the   scene   being   represented.   While   a  
vanishing  point,  or  point  de  fuite,  refers  to  the  point  at  which  any  two  parallel  
                                                                                                                
157  Kline,  1982,  150-­169;;  Panofsky,  1991.  
158  Alberti,  1966  
159  Kline,  1982,  157  
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lines   on  a   plane  will   converge   if   they   are   extended  until   they   intersect,   the  
vanishing   line,   or   ligne  de   fuite,   refers   to   the   line   at  which  any   two  parallel  
planes  will   converge   if  extended  until   they   intersect.  The  horizon   line   is   the  
most   common   ligne   de   fuite,   which   represents   the   intersection   of   any   two  
planes  that  are  parallel  with  the  ground  plane  (and  are  thus  perpendicular  to  
the  eye  of  the  viewer).  However,  an  infinite  number  of  other  lignes  de  fuite  are  
possible,   corresponding   to   the   existence   of   any   two   parallel   planes   in   the  
space  being  represented.  While  two  parallel  lines  on  a  plane  that  is  not  parallel  
to   the  ground  plane  will   form  a  point  de   fuite   that   is  not  on   the  horizon,  two  
parallel  planes  that  are  not  parallel  with  the  ground  plane  will  form  a  ligne  de  
fuite  that  is  not  coextensive  with  the  horizon  line.  
  
The  ability   for   linear   perspective   to   accurately   reproduce   the   experience  of  
vision  has  been  comprehensively  contested.  For  example,   in  his  systematic  
review  of  linear  perspective,  Erwin  Panofsky  noted  that  perspective  painting  
makes  a  number  of  assumptions  about  vision,  such  as  the  stillness  of  the  eye,  
that  are  rarely  fulfilled  in  experience,  and  that  the  technique  is  not  able  to  deal  
with  either  the  stereoscopic  nature  of  vision  or  the  curvature  of  the  retina.  He  
states  that,  “In  order  to  guarantee  a  fully  rational  –  that  is,  infinite,  unchanging  
and   homogenous   –   space,   this   ‘central   perspective’   makes   two   tacit   but  
essential  assumptions:  first,  that  we  see  with  a  single  and  immobile  eye,  and  
second,   that   the  planar  cross  section  of   the  visual  pyramid  can  pass   for  an  
adequate   reproduction  of  our  optical   image.   In   fact   these   two  premises  are  
rather  bold  abstractions  from  reality.”160  For  the  purposes  of  our  discussion,  it  
is  also  worth  noting  one  further  point  about  linear  perspective,  which  restricts  
the  technique  to  the  formation  of  an  approximation  of  a  scene  as  it  is  viewed  
by  the  eye,  namely  that  while  two  parallel  planes  in  our  field  of  view  seem  to  
converge  under  certain  circumstances,  in  the  three-­dimensional  space  being  
represented  these  planes  do  not  converge  and  will  therefore  never  intersect.  
While  the  ligne  de  fuite  has  a  definite  and  located  existence  in  the  picture,  it  is  
defined  by  the  position  of  the  viewer  and  does  not  correspond  to  any  line  in  
the  ‘reality’  of  the  space  depicted.    
                                                                                                                
160  Panofsky,  1991,  28-­30  
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Following  the  numerous  critiques  of  linear  perspective  as  a  mimetic  technique,  
a  number  of  thinkers  have  also  questioned  the  social  or  political  neutrality  of  
perspective   painting.161   Panofsky   addresses   the   ways   in   which   linear  
perspective  was  a  kind  of  visual  corollary  of   the   renaissance  conception  of  
man   as   a   disengaged,   individual   and   rational   observer.162   The   historical  
question  of  the  relationship  between  linear  perspective  and  the  development  
of  modern   subjectivity   has   also   been   addressed   by   thinkers   as   diverse   as  
Marshal  McLuhan,  who  claims  that  “far  from  being  a  normal  mode  of  human  
vision,   three-­dimensional   perspective   is   a   conventionally   acquired  mode   of  
seeing”163,   and   Michel   Foucault,   who   offers   an   analysis   of   the   mode   of  
subjectivation  carried  out  by  the  viewing  of  a  perspectival  painting.164  
  
viii)  Difference  contra  linear  perspective  
  
As   we   might   expect,   Deleuze   is   heavily   critical   of   the   image   of   human  
experience,   and   the   image-­of-­thought,   contained   in   this   theory   of   linear  
perspective.   Put   most   simply,   for   Deleuze,   the   problem   is   that   this   way   of  
speaking  about  vision  makes  a  number  of  unfounded  assumptions:  we  must  
assume   a   fully   constituted   viewing   subject,   already   distinct   from   a   fully  
constituted  three-­dimensional  spatial  reality;;  and  we  must  assume  that  such  a  
subject  has  an  organised  two-­dimensional  field  of  vision,  from  which  he  or  she  
must  deduce  the  existence  of  a  third  dimension.  For  Deleuze,  it   is  precisely  
these  assumptions  that  need  to  be  explained:  How  is  the  subject  generated?  
How  is  the  object  of  experience  constituted?  How  does  experience  come  to  be  
organised?  In  more  general  terms,  we  can  also  say  that  Deleuze  will  critique  
the   model   of   linear   perspective   for   its   representational   form   and   for   its  
consistent  attempts  to  cover  over  difference-­in-­itself  and  to  reduce  difference  
                                                                                                                
161  One  of   the  only  current  writers   to  offer  a  philosophical  defense  of   linear  perspective   is  
Hubert   Damisch,   a   student   of   Merleau-­Ponty.   Damisch   offers   a   Lacanian   reading   of  
perspective   and   claims   that   the   visual   grammar   of   perspective   painting   is   integral   to   the  
symbolic  formation  of  subjectivity,  in  the  same  way  that  the  grammar  of  indexicals  in  speech  
is  necessary  for  the  formation  of  the  self-­reflexive  subject.  See  Damisch,  1994;;  Wood,  1995,  
677-­682.  
162  Panofsky,  1991,  67  
163  McLuhan,  1970,  16  
164  See  Foucault’s  analysis  of  Las  Meninas  by  Velásquez  (2002,  3-­18).  
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to  the  false-­differences  of  opposition  and  limitation.  Deleuze’s  critique  of  linear  
perspective  is  therefore  quite  different  from  that  of  Panofsky,  McLuhan,  and  
Foucault  as  it  is  based  on  a  metaphysical  disagreement  concerning  the  nature  
of   space  and   the  nature   of   the   subject,   rather   than  an  empirical   or   directly  
political  disagreement.  He  does  not  simply  want  to  show  that  linear  perspective  
is  inaccurate,  or  that  it  is  an  historically  located  form  of  subjectivation,  but  that  
it  is  part  of  an  image-­of-­thought  tied  up  with  the  Euclidean  model  of  space,  and  
the  Cartesian  model  of  the  thinking  subject.165  Theories  of  linear  perspective,  
assuming  that  vision  is  in  some  way  analogous  to  the  projection  of  an  image  
onto  a  screen,  or  canvas,  take  for  granted  the  organisation  of  objects  in  a  field  
of  vision  and  try  to  deduce  depth.  Deleuze  will  argue  that  depth,  as  a  form  of  
difference,  must  be  thought  independently  of  vision,  and  of  experience,  so  that  
the  genesis  of  such  experience  can  be  accounted  for.    
  
Perhaps  Deleuze’s  most  direct  criticism  of  linear  perspective  concerns  the  way  
in  which  depth   is  supposedly  generated   in  a  field  of  view  via   the  opposition  
between  two  forms  that  represent  parallel  planes.  As  Deleuze  points  out,  the  
opposition   between   these   planes,   organised   by   their   orientation   towards   a  
shared  ligne  de  fuite,  can  only  be  understood  if  it  is  assumed  that  in  vision  they  
are   “spread  out   upon  a   flat   surface”   and   “polarised   in   a   single   plane”.  The  
problem  with  this  model  is  that  it  requires  the  implicit  assumption  of  “a  fictitious  
third  dimension”  in  which  height  and  breadth  can  be  differentiated  from  each  
other.166  To  put   this  another  way,   in  order   to   interpret   the  apparent   location  
and   orientation   of   the   two   planes   in   question  as   converging,   we  must   first  
recognise  that  this  orientation  can  only  exist  in  depth.  During  a  discussion  of  
the   Hegelian   dialectic,   Deleuze   extrapolates   on   this   line   of   argument   by  
claiming   that   philosophers   have   traditionally   misunderstood   difference   as  
“traced  or  projected  on  to  a  flat  space”  only  when  they  have  forced  it  “into  a  
previously  established  identity.”  Deleuze  goes  on  to  state  that  the  form  of  the  
identity  that  is  all-­too-­often  taken  for  granted  is  specifically  the  identity  of  the  
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‘here   and   now’.   He   writes   that,   “the   here   and   now   are   posited   as   empty  
identities,  as  abstract  universalities  which  claim  to  draw  difference  along  with  
them.”  In  direct  contrast  to  this,  Deleuze  states  that,  “difference  does  not  by  
any  means  follow  and  remains  attached  in  the  depths  of  its  own  space,  in  the  
here-­now   of   a   differential   reality   always   made   up   of   singularities.”167   This  
comment   returns   us   to   one   of   the   central   problems   of   Difference   and  
Repetition,  namely  how  to  think  the  genesis  of  the  actual,  without  assuming  in  
advance  anything  that  is  given  in  the  actual.  While  actual  entities  are  structured  
in  an  extended  space  and  an  extended  time,  the  process  that  produces  these  
actual  entities  cannot  be  structured  in  such  a  way.  Talking  specifically  about  
the   apparent   separation   of   space   and   time   as   a   duality   of   structures   that  
contain  all  actual  experience,  Deleuze  writes  that  this  duality  “does  not  exist  in  
the  process  of  actualisation  itself,  but  only  in  its  outcome,  in  the  actual  terms,  
species  and  parts.”168  What  this  section  makes  clear  is  that,  when  it  comes  to  
the  question  of  space,  a  differential  metaphysics  requires  a  way  of  thinking  the  
here-­now,  not  as  an  empty  identity,  to  be  filled  by  oppositions  and  limitations,  
but  as  a  differential  and  pre-­individual  reality.169  
  
We  can  now  begin  to  see  how  Deleuze  will  offer  his  own,  positive  response  to  
the  problem  of  depth.  Deleuze’s  recasting  of  the  nature  of  difference  in  terms  
of  a  relation  between  the  differential  relations  internal  to  the  virtual  Idea  and  
the  differences  that  exist  between  actual  entities,  will  provide  a  way  of  thinking  
the  here-­now  as  a  form  of  differential  reality,  which  does  not  presuppose  any  
spatio-­temporal  extension.  The  difference  that  exists  between  the  two  planes  
in  my  field  of  view  is  formally  determined  by  a  set  of  differential  relations  that  
are   purely   virtual.   It   is   possible   to   articulate   this   response   in   the   terms   of  
Riemann’s  theory  of  multiplicities:  Just  as  Riemann  had  showed  how  we  could  
avoid  any  assumption  about  the  geometrical  nature  of  space  by  creating  an  
immanent   geometry   using   differential   calculus,   Deleuze   produced   a  
metaphysical   explanation   of   the   genesis   of   space,   while   avoiding   any  
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assumptions   about   the   structure   of   such   a   space,   or   of   the   structure   of  
experience  in  general.  Via  a  form  of  transcendental  argument,  Deleuze  is  able  
to  define  virtual  ideas  as  having  no  identity,  but  only  internal  difference  among  
pre-­individual  elements.  This  virtual  field  is  a  form  of  the  here-­now  construed  
as   a   continuous   multiplicity,   which   can   be   thought   without   imposing   any  
particular  spatial  extension  upon  it.    
  
ix)  Intensity  contra  linear  perspective  
  
Deleuze’s  critique  of  linear  perspective  does  not,  however,  concentrate  solely  
on   the  problem  of  difference,  and   it  does  not   respond  only  with  a   theory  of  
virtual  multiplicities.  On  the  contrary,  perhaps  the  most  consistent  critique  that  
Deleuze   levels   at   linear   perspectival   forms  of   thinking   is   that   they   take   for  
granted  an  organisation  of  the  visual  field.  It  may  be  the  case  that  given  a  two-­
dimensional   representation   of   an   extended   space   it   is   possible   to   simulate  
depth,  but  the  question  remains,  how  would  such  a  representation  be  given  to  
a   subject   in   the   first   place?   Taking   the   most   basic   operation   of   linear  
perspective  as  an  example,  in  which  two  parallel  planes  seem  to  converge  on  
the  horizon,  Deleuze  asks  how  each  of  these  planes  appear  as  distinct  and  
individual  entities  in  my  field  of  vision  in  the  first  place.  To  answer  this  question,  
we  will  not  only  need  to  mobilise  Deleuze’s  theory  of  the  virtual,  but  we  must  
return   to   his   comments   on   intensity   and   the   dynamic   individuation   and  
dramatization  of  spatio-­temporal  dynamisms.    
  
For  Deleuze,  before  any  form  can  be  compared  or  opposed  to  other  forms,  it  
must  become  determinate  in  experience.  In  vision,  we  can  say  that  the  form  
must  separate   itself   from  an   indeterminate  background.   In  direct  contrast   to  
the  way  in  which  linear  perspective  relies  on  the  mutual  differentiation  of  two  
things   from   each   other,   Deleuze   recommends   that,   “instead   of   something  
distinguished   from   something   else,   imagine   something   which   distinguishes  
itself  –  and  yet  that  from  which  it  distinguishes  itself  does  not  distinguish  itself  
from  it.”170  Deleuze  also  writes  here  that,  “form  distinguishes  itself…  from  the  
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ground,  but  not   the  converse,  since  distinction   itself   is  a   form.”171  The  point  
Deleuze  is  making  here  is  deceptively  simple;;  in  order  to  claim  that  two  planes  
in  my  field  of  view  are  parallel,  or  that  they  are  converging,  I  first  need  to  be  
able   to  make   them  out,  and   this   requires  a  dynamic  process  by  which   they  
come  to  stand  out  in  my  field  of  view.  Deleuze  will  argue  that  such  a  process  
requires   a   primary   dimension   of   depth.   He   writes:   “The   law   of   figure   and  
ground  would  never  hold  for  objects  distinguished  from  a  neutral  background  
or  a  background  of  other  objects  unless  the  object  itself  entertained  a  relation  
to   its  own  depth.”172  To  put   it  another  way,  no   figure  could  show  up  for  me,  
unless   it   did   so   out   of   the   depth   of  my   vision.   Deleuze   concludes   that   the  
relation  between  figure  and  ground  “is  only  an  extrinsic  plane  relation”  and  that  
this  relation  presupposes  “an  internal,  voluminous  relation  between  surfaces  
and   the   depth   which   they   envelop.”173   The   question   here   concerns   not  
actualisation  as  such,  but  specifically  the  individuation  of  figures  in  a  field  of  
view.  As  we  have  already  seen,  it  is  through  the  process  of  individuation  that  
intensive  differences  are  dramatised  and  ultimately  generate  extension.  Thus,  
the  individuation  of  figures  must  be  explained  by  the  relation  between  intensity  
and  extension.    
  
Framing   the   problem   in   this  way,  Deleuze  will   claim   that   linear   perspective  
assumes  that  space  is  extended,  but  extensity  “can  emerge  from  the  depths  
only  if  depth  is  definable  independently  of  extensity.”174  This  means  that  we  
cannot  use  an  operation  that  takes  place  in  extension  to  give  an  account  of  the  
dimension  of  depth.  Instead  we  must  understand  that  an  intensive  depth  pre-­
exists   the   act   of   vision,   in   which   the   dynamic   nature   of   the   visual   field   is  
distributed,  before   it   takes  on  an  extended  spatial   form.  While   the  extended  
space  of  actual  entities  is  named  the  extensum,  the  intensive  depth  that  is  its  
transcendental  ground  is  named  the  spatium:  “The  extensity  whose  genesis  
we  are  attempting  to  establish  is  extensive  magnitude,  the  extensum  or  term  
of  reference  of  all  the  extensio.  The  original  depth,  by  contrast,  is  indeed  space  
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as   a   whole,   but   space   as   an   intensive   quantity:   the   pure   spatium.”175   The  
spatium  referred  to  here  is  the  intensive  space  of  spatio-­temporal  dynamisms  
and  the  extensio  is  the  space  generated  by  their  dramatization.  There  are  four  
key  ways   in   which   these   two   spaces   differ;;  while   the   spatium   is   intensive,  
continuous,  unlimited,  and  immanently  defined,  the  extensio,  which  is  simply  
assumed  in  the  linear  perspectival  model,  is  extended,  discrete,  bounded,  and  
defined   transcendently   by   an   external   measure.   Instead   of   thinking   of   the  
extended   forms   as   a   surface,   which   completely   covers   the   depths   of   the  
spatium,   the   intensive   relationship   between   determinate   forms   and   their  
indeterminate   background   means   that   they   are   in   a   constant   process   of  
individuation.  The  result  of   this  constant   tension   is   that   intensive  space  and  
extended  space  can  never  be  fully  separated  from  each  other.176  
It  is  interesting  to  note  here  the  similarity  between  Deleuze’s  critique  of  linear  
perspective,   and   that   of   Merleau-­Ponty.   Although   Merleau-­Ponty   is   only  
mentioned   twice  by  name   in  Difference  and  Repetition,   the   influence  of  his  
phenomenological  critique  of  linear  perspective  is  hard  to  ignore.177  Deleuze’s  
claim  that,  “[i]t  is  no  use  rediscovering  depth  as  a  third  dimension  unless  it  has  
already   been   installed   at   the   beginning,   enveloping   the   other   two   and  
enveloping  itself  as  third”,  echoes  almost  exactly  the  wording  used  in  Eye  and  
Mind,   where  Merleau-­Ponty   writes   of   traditional   conceptions   of   depth   that:  
“Once   depth   is   understood   in   this   way,   we   can   no   longer   call   it   a   third  
dimension.  In  the  first  place,  if  it  were  a  dimension,  it  would  be  the  first  one.”178  
Although  articulated  in  different  terms,  Merleau-­Ponty’s  argument  is  based  on  
the  same  form  of  critique  as  that  of  Deleuze,  namely  that  any  attempt  to  define  
depth  through  the  opposition  of  forms  is  logically  undermined  by  the  fact  that  
these  forms  cannot  be  determined  apart  from  their  relation  in  depth.  He  states  
this  by  noting  that,  “there  are  forms  and  definite  planes  only  if  it  is  stipulated  
how   far   from  me   their   different   parts   are.”179     Unlike   in   Deleuze’s   account,  
Merleau-­Ponty  is  concerned  with  the  ability  of  linear  perspective  to  accurately  
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describe  our  experience  of  vision  and  unlike  Deleuze  he  aims  to  recapture  an  
originary   and   ‘spontaneous’   vision.   Despite   this   difference,   the   influence   of  
Merleau-­Ponty’s  critique  of  depth  on  Deleuze  is  interesting  to  us  here  for  two  
reasons.   Firstly   because,   unlike   Deleuze,   Merleau-­Ponty   specifically  
discusses  the  concept  of  the  ligne  de  fuite:    
“In   spontaneous   vision,   things   rivalled   one   another   for  my   look   and,   being  
anchored  in  one  of  them,  I  felt  the  solicitation  of  the  others  which  made  them  
coexist  with  the  first…  In  perspective,  I  renounce  that  ambiguity  and  agree  to  
let  only  that  figure  in  my  drawing  which  could  be  seen  from  a  certain  reference  
point  by  an  immobile  eye  fixed  on  a  certain  ‘vanishing  point’  [point  de  fuite]  of  
a  certain  ‘vanishing  line’  [ligne  de  fuite],  chosen  once  and  for  all.”180  
The   distinction   made   here   by   Merleau-­Ponty,   between   the   fluid   and   ever-­
changing  experience  of  ‘spontaneous  vision’  and  the  structured  space  of  linear  
perspective,  with  its  dominating  ‘vanishing  line’  or  ‘ligne  de  fuite’,  shares  much  
with  Deleuze’s  approach.  Both   thinkers  also  refer   to   the  error  made  by   the  
linear  perspectival  model  as  a   transcendental   illusion.  There   is,  however,  a  
second  reason  why  Merleau-­Ponty’s  influence  on  Deleuze  is  interesting  to  us  
here.  While   Deleuze   is   ambivalent   toward   the   phenomenological   project   in  
general,   the   similarities   between   Deleuze   and  Merleau-­Ponty’s   critiques   of  
linear  perspective  highlights  a  mutual  commitment  to  a  philosophy  concerned  
primarily  with  a  metaphysics  of  immanence.  What  they  share  is  the  recognition  
that  the  structure  of  reality  cannot  be  considered  from  an  imaginary,  external,  
Archimedean   point,   from   which   it   would   be   possible   to   provide   the   prior  
conditions  for  the  possibility  of  that  experience.  For  example,  in  his  comments  
on  the  genesis  of  space,  as  we  have  considered  them  here,  Deleuze  is  critical  
of   any   attempt   to   discover   the   spatial   conditions   for   experience   from   a  
transcendent,  non-­spatial  perspective.  Instead,  like  many  thinkers  within  the  
phenomenological  tradition,  Deleuze  is  committed  to  a  philosophy  that  accepts  
its  own  inherently  perspectival  nature.  This  is  worth  clarifying  in  the  context  of  
his  critique  of  linear  perspective.    
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Deleuze’s  critique  of  linear  perspective  is  not  based  on  the  way  in  which  such  
a   theory   considers   the   genesis   of   space   in   relation   to   the   perspective   of   a  
particular   point   of   view.   On   the   contrary,   Deleuze’s   criticism   is   that   linear  
perspective   assumes   that   any   individual   perspective   is   only   one   of   many  
possible  perspectives  on  an  otherwise  non-­perspectival  world.  With  Deleuze’s  
theory  of  intensive  space,  perspective  will  not  only  be  considered  as  an  aspect  
of   our   perceptive   apparatus,   but   as   an   essential   element   of   the   world.181  
Returning  to  Deleuzian  terminology,  we  can  say  that  both  Merleau-­Ponty  and  
Deleuze   show   that   the   extensio  must   presuppose   a   spatium,   because   the  
difference  that  exists  between  a  form  and  its  background  is  an  intensive  and  
not  an  extensive  difference.  
x)  The  ligne  abstrait  and  the  ligne  de  fuite  in  Difference  and  Repetition    
  
Given  Deleuze’s  comprehensive  critique  of  linear  perspective,  we  might  think  
that   there   is   no  way   that   the   concept   of   the   ligne  de   fuite,   as   it   is   used   in  
perspective   painting,   could   be   recuperated   by   a   Deleuzian   metaphysics.  
However,  in  an  attempt  to  prefigure  some  of  the  ways  in  which  the  concept  will  
appear   later   in  his  collaborative  work  with  Guattari,   I  will  offer   two  possible  
methods  for  such  a  recuperation.  The  first  will  involve  maintaining  the  sense  
of  the  ligne  de  fuite  as  a  vanishing  line,  or  horizon  line,  while  detaching  it  from  
the  frame  of  the  visual  field  and  relocating  it  as  a  transcendental  condition  for  
the   emergence  of   such  a   field.   For   the   second  method,   I  will   introduce   the  
concept  of   the  abstract   line   (ligne  abstrait),  as   it  appears   in  Difference  and  
Repetition,   and   show   how   these   two   concepts   might   relate,   and   might  
ultimately  collapse  into  each  other.  By  sketching  out  these  two  options,  and  by  
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departs   from   Merleau-­Ponty   in   his   attempt   to   give   a   positive   account   of   the   genesis   of  
experience  by  broadening  his  philosophical  view  beyond  the  actual  world,  to  the  virtual.  For  a  
more   detailed   discussion   of   Deleuze’s   debt   to   Merleau-­Ponty,   and   the   way   in   which   his  
perspectival   account   of   the   conditions   of   experience   attempts   to   overturn   Platonism,   see  
Somers-­Hall  (2009;;  and  2012,  111).  
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analysing   them  side-­by-­side,   I   hope   to  give  an  account   of   the   role   that   the  
missing-­concept  of  the  line  of  flight  might  play  in  our  reading  of  Difference  and  
Repetition.  This  reading  will  also  give  us  one  final  opportunity  to  examine  the  
precise   relationship   between   the   four   different   moments   of   differentiation-­
individuation-­dramatization-­differenciation.  
In  standard  accounts  of  linear  perspective,  the  ligne  de  fuite  is  taken  as  a  line  
that  orientates  the  viewer  within  the  visual  field,  by  providing  a  line,  nominally  
located  at  infinity,  toward  which  parallel  planes  seem  to  converge.  The  problem  
with  this  account,  according  to  the  Deleuzian  critique,  is  that  it  is  also  taken  to  
appear   within   an   already   orientated   visual   field.   If   the   ligne   de   fuite   is   a  
necessary  condition   for   the  orientation  of  vision,   then   it   cannot  also  appear  
within  an  orientated  vision.  This  problem  may,  hypothetically,  be  resolved  by  
rethinking  the  ligne  de  fuite  as  a  virtual  line.  Such  a  line  would  be  real,  in  the  
sense  that  it  marks  something  that  really  is  significant,  without  being  actual,  in  
the  sense  that  it  is  not  located  within  an  extended  spatio-­temporal  framework.  
To   rethink   this   line   as   virtual,   we   must   recognise   that   it   is   not   given   in  
experience,   but   acts   as   a   necessary   precondition   for   the   genesis   of  
experience.  We  previously  examined  the  three  criteria  that  Deleuze  provides  
as  a  formal  definition  of  the  virtual  multiplicity.  First,  in  the  virtual,  elements  are  
not   determinate   prior   to   the   relations   that   they   form  with   one   another:   “the  
elements  of   the  multiplicity  must  have  neither  sensible   form  nor  conceptual  
signification.”  Second,  that  these  virtual  elements  come  to  be  determined  by  
the   relationships   that   form   between   them:   “the   elements  must   in   effect   be  
determined,   but   reciprocally,   by   reciprocal   relations   which   allow   no  
independence   to   subsist”.   Third,   that   the   structure   of   this   virtual  multiplicity  
must   be   applicable   to   a   number   of   different   states   of   affairs:   it   “must   be  
actualised   in   diverse   spatio-­temporal   relationships,   at   the   same   time   as   its  
elements  are  actually  incarnated  in  a  variety  of  terms  and  forms”.182  If  we  take  
the  horizon  line  as  our  example  of  a  ligne  de  fuite,  then  we  can  see  how  it  fulfils  
each  of   these  criteria.  A   ligne  de   fuite   is  nothing  other   than  a   line   that   runs  
through,   and   connects,   all  points   de   fuite   for   a   given  plane.  Each  of   these  
                                                                                                                
182  DR  183  
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vanishing   points   is   an   indeterminate   element,   defined   only   by   the   relation  
between   parallel   lines   on   a   single   plane.   These   indeterminate   elements  
reciprocally   determine   one   another   to   form   a   straight   line,   which   can   be  
actualized  in  any  number  of  spatio-­temporal  relationships.  That  is  to  say,  the  
horizon   is   actualized   whenever   and   wherever   such   a   reciprocal   relation  
between  vanishing  points  is  generated.  It  is  not  the  case  that  parallel  objects  
define  the  location  of  the   ligne  de  fuite,  but  that  the   ligne  de  fuite  opens  the  
possibility  of  parallelism.183  In  this  way,  it  is  possible  to  detach  the  ligne  de  fuite  
from  the  visual   field  and  to  conceptualize   it  as  a  virtual  precondition   for   the  
genesis  of  any  actual  visual  field.  As  a  line  that  connects  up  virtual  elements,  
it   should   also   be   understood   as   the   line   that   separates,   and   connects,   the  
virtual  and  the  actual.  Only  when  a  selection  of  virtual  elements  resonate  with  
one  another  in  this  way,  will  a  field  of  vision  be  actualized.  To  draw  such  a  line  
is  an  act  of  differentiation-­differenciation.  It  is  double  edged,  in  that  it  is  both  
the  point  of  convergence  and  the  point  of  divergence  between  the  virtual  and  
the  actual.184    
A  second  method  for  recuperating  the  ligne  de  fuite  can  be  accomplished  by  
comparing  it  with  the  alternative  concept  of  the  ligne  abstrait.  In  opposition  to  
his  criticisms  of  the  practice  of  using  linear  perspective  in  painting  to  simulate  
depth,  Deleuze  writes  positively  about  painters  such  as  Odilon  Redon,  who  
prefer  to  use  the  chiaroscuro  technique.185  This  technique  uses  only  shading  
and  continuous  gradations  of  colour  to  convey  a  sense  of  depth.  It  does  not  
rely  on  the  distinct  borders  of  objects,  but  on  the  way  in  which  the  intensity  of  
light  defines  the  relative  positions  of  bodies.  While  no  border  lines  are  drawn,  
‘abstract  lines’  are  created  by  the  divisions  of  light  and  dark.  For  example,  if  a  
                                                                                                                
183  By  ‘parallelism’  here  I  only  mean  to  denote  the  condition  of  being  parallel.  However,  this  
discussion  of  the  way  in  which  parallel  planes  are  generated  may  also  apply  to  Deleuze’s  
reading  of  Spinoza’s  famous  ‘parallelism’  between  extension  and  thought.  
184  The  fact  that  this  line  is  a  convergence  opens  the  possibility  that  it  is  here  that  the  virtual  
can  be  glimpsed  in  the  actual.  Deleuze  explores  the  possibility  of  escaping  the  actual  through  
the  contours  of  actual  forms  via  an  analysis  of  the  subjects  in  Francis  Bacon’s  paintings,  who  
attempt   to   “pass   through   the   syringe   and   to   escape   through   this   hole   or   vanishing   point  
functioning  as  prosthesis-­organ”  (FB,  11-­14).  
185  In  the  original  French,  Deleuze  does  not  use  the  Italian  chiaroscuro,  but  the  French  term  
clair-­obscur.  This  resonates  with  Deleuze’s  critique  of  Descartes’  distinction  between   ‘clear  
and  distinct’  ideas  and  ‘obscure  and  confused’  ideas,  to  which  Deleuze  contrasts  the  ‘clear-­
confused’  and  the  ‘distinct-­obscure’.  These  alternative  pairings  are  borrowed  from  Leibniz  (DR  
315).  
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body  is  lit  from  the  side,  so  that  one  side  of  the  body  is  in  shadow,  the  edge  of  
the  shadow,  where  light  fades  into  dark,  will  create  a  line  that  cuts  across  the  
face  of   the  body.   In  a  passage   that  beautifully   reflects  Deleuze’s  claim   that  
forms  can  only  be  determined  in  relation  to  an  indeterminate  ground,  he  quotes  
Redon  as  stating:    
“No   plastic   form   will   be   found   in   my   works,   I   mean   any   form   perceived  
objectively,   for   itself...   All   of   my   art   is   confined   solely   to   the   resources   of  
chiaroscuro,  and  also  owes  much  to  the  effects  of  the  abstract  line,  that  agent  
from  a  profound  source,  acting  directly  on  the  spirit.”186  
For   Deleuze,   an   abstract   line   of   this   kind   is   neither   virtual,   nor   actual,   but  
intensive.  It  is  a  line  that  connects  up  zones  of  intensity  –  here,  intensities  of  
light   –   to   allow   for   the   emergence   of   a   determinate   form   against   an  
indeterminate  background.  It  is  a  line  that  individuates  a  form,  and  dramatizes  
it,   to  allow   for   the  actualisation  of  an  object  of  experience.  What   is  of  extra  
interest   to   us   here   is   that,   in   Deleuze’s   collaborations   with   Guattari,   the  
abstract  line,  or  ligne  abstrait,  will  become  synonymous  with  the  line  of  flight.187    
As   an   alternative   example   of   the   abstract   line,   Deleuze   discusses   the  
dynamics  of  a  lighting  strike.  Deleuze  calls  the  abstract  line,  “the  determination  
absolutely  adequate  to  the  indeterminate,  just  as  the  flash  of  lightning  is  equal  
to  the  night.”188  Unlike  a  line  that  marks  the  border  between  two  determined  
forms,  the  abstract  line  is  described  as  a  determination,  “which  is  not  opposed  
to  the  indeterminate  and  does  not  limit  it.”189  The  flash  of  lighting  is  of  special  
interest  to  Deleuze,  not  only  because  it  seems  to  differentiate  itself  from  a  dark  
sky,   while   the   sky   remains   indeterminate,   but   because   it   is   a   connection  
brought   about   due   to   an   intensive   difference   between   points   of   differing  
                                                                                                                
186  DR  37.  Deleuze  cites  the  following  reference:  Odilon  Redon,  A  soi-­meme:  Journal,  1867-­
1915,  Paris:  Fleury,  1922,  p.  63  
187  ATP  10,  218,  224,  226,  305.  
188  DR  345.  Deleuze  also  writes  that  “like  thunder  and  lightning…  Spatio-­temporal  dynamisms  
come  to  fill  the  system”  (DR  144).  The  line  of  flight  can  also  be  understood  in  relation  to  the  
concept   of   the   ‘dark   precursor’   which   Deleuze   develops   while   discussing   lightning   as   an  
example  of  actualisation  (DR  145-­151).    
189  DR  345  
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electrical  charge,  and  made  between  a  set  of  singular  points.190  By  defining  
the  abstract  line  in  this  way,  and  by  using  both  the  abstract  line  in  a  chiaroscuro  
painting  and  a  lighting  strike  as  his  examples,  Deleuze  gives  us  a  concept  that  
differentiates,   or   ‘makes   the   difference’   between,   the   intensive   field,   or  
spatium,  and  extended  space,  or   the  extensio.   It   is  a   line   that  connects  up  
zones  of  intensity  to  allow  for  the  distribution  of  an  individuated  entity  in  space  
and  time,  and  thus  allows  for  the  distribution  of  space  and  time  themselves.  It  
is  also  a   line  of  double-­orientation  at  which   the   intensive  and   the  extensive  
simultaneously  converge  and  diverge.    
What  I  would  like  to  suggest  at  the  close  of  this  chapter,  is  that  these  two  lines,  
the  ligne  de  fuite  and  the  ligne  abstrait,  are  not  wholly  distinct,  and  by  thinking  
them  together,  we  can  gain  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  four  moments  in  the  
process   of   ‘differentiation-­individuation-­dramatization-­differentiation’.   As  
previously   discussed,   Deleuze’s   metaphysical   project   in   Difference   and  
Repetition  is  a  kind  of  transcendental  empiricism.  Deleuze  aims  to  show  how  
the   intensity  of  sensation,  and  the   intensity  of  an  encounter   in   thought,  can  
provide  the  transcendental  ground  for  the  genesis  of  actual  experience,  with  
its   subject-­object   orientation   and   its   extended   spatio-­temporal   structure.  
Showing  how  the  ligne  de  fuite,  once  detached  from  the  visual  field,  and  the  
ligne  abstrait   relate   to  each  other   in   the  context  of  our  experience  of  visual  
space,  can  help  us  to  see  this  process  in  action.  A  field  of  varying  intensities  
of  light,  seen  from  no  particular  perspective  and  given  no  particular  extension,  
begins  to  individuate  as  zones  of  intensity  start  to  resonate  with  one  another.  
The   line   that   connects   these   zones   of   intensity   is   the   ligne   abstrait.   The  
formation  of  this  line  is  not,  however,  totally  independent.  The  individuation  of  
the  line  is  directed  by  the  structure  of  a  virtual  multiplicity.  This  is  to  say  that  a  
collection  of  indeterminate  points  reciprocally  determine  one  another  to  create  
a   complete   determination   of   the   line.   This   is   the   ligne   de   fuite,   taken   as   a  
transcendental  precondition  for  the  genesis  of  vision.  It  is  the  virtual  that  directs  
                                                                                                                
190  Somewhat  surprisingly,   the  mechanics  of   lightning   is  not   clearly  understood  by  modern  
science.  The  basic  process  involves  the  polarization  of  positive  and  negative  charges  within  a  
storm  cloud  and  a  corresponding  polarization  of  charges  in  the  ground  below  the  cloud.  When  
the   electric   potential   between   the   cloud   and   the   ground   reaches   a   certain   threshold,   the  
electrical  energy  passes   through  the  atmosphere  separating   the   two  bodies,  equalizing   the  
polarization  (Rakov  &  Uman,  2006,  4-­12).  
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the   individuation  and  dramatization  of  spatio-­temporal  dynamisms,  and   it   is  
spatio-­temporal  dynamisms  that  dramatize  the  virtual  Idea.  As  such,  we  can  
say  that  it  is  the  ligne  de  fuite  that  directs  the  ligne  abstrait,  and  it  is  the  ligne  
abstrait   that   dramatizes   the   ligne  de   fuite.   It   is   through   this   interaction   that  
actual  forms  take  shape,  become  distinct  from  their  background,  and  orientate  
themselves  to  determine  the  position  of  the  subjective  viewer.      
The  analysis  I  have  provided  here  must  be  contextualised.  Deleuze  does  not  
use  the  concept  of  the  ligne  de  fuite  in  Difference  and  Repetition  and  does  not  
compare  the  ligne  de  fuite  to  the  ligne  abstrait.  However,  by  sketching  out  the  
possibility  of   this   reading,   I  have  aimed   to  show  how   it   is  possible   to   find  a  
significant  precursor  for  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  later  use  of  the  concept  of  the  
‘line  of  flight’   in  Deleuze’s  earlier  work.  By  doing  this,  the  following  chapters  
will   be   better   positioned   to   show   exactly   what   changes   in   the   shift   from  
Difference  and  Repetition,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  from  Logic  of  Sense,  to  Anti-­
Oedipus  and  A  Thousand  Plateaus.  Before  moving  on  to  these  texts,  however,  
it  will  be  useful  to  give  an  account  of  some  of  the  themes  in  the  intellectual  and  
practical  work  that  Guattari  completed  before  he  began  his  collaboration  with  
Deleuze.  This  will  allow  us   to  give  a   full  account  of   the  problems   that  both  
thinkers  were  dealing  with  when  they  created  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight.    
  
  
     
   77  
Chapter  2  –  Guattari:  Psychotherapeutic  and  Militant  
Escapes  
  
i)   The  militant  psychoanalyst    
ii)   Sartre  and  group  subjectivity    
iii)   Lacan,  the  Symbolic  and  ‘full  speech’  
iv)   Subject-­groups  
v)   Transversality  and  escape    
vi)   Materialism  contra  Lacan  
vii)   Machine  and  structure    
viii)   From  base  to  superstructure    
ix)   Lacan’s  machines  
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i)  Introduction    
  
Guattari  was,  first  and  foremost,  a  political  militant  and  his  theoretical  work  is  
all  produced  in  an  attempt  to  grapple  with  questions  of  political  praxis.  Unlike  
Deleuze,  whose  work  aimed   to  solve   long-­standing  philosophical  problems,  
Guattari  wrote  that,  “[t]he  whole  fabric  of  my  inmost  existence  is  made  up  of  
the  events  of  contemporary  history.”191  Shortly  after  Paris  was  liberated  from  
the  Nazis  in  1944,  Guattari  joined  the  Student  Hostel  organization,  where  his  
high  school  social  science  teacher  Fernand  Oury,  a  leftist  activist  and  a  great  
influence  on   the   young  Guattari,  was   in   charge  of   recreational   activities.192  
Guattari  soon  started  attending  meetings  of  the  French  Communist  Party,  with  
whom  the  Student  Hostel  organization  had  close  ties.193  From  this  point  on,  
and  until  his  death,  Guattari  would  always  be  involved  with  communist  groups.  
After   his   time   in   the   youth  wing  of   the  French  Communist  Party,  where   he  
worked  on  its  newspaper  Tribune  de  discussion,  and  in  the  Union  Nationale  
des  étudiants  de  France,  Guattari  participated  in  alternative  Trotskyist  groups  
and   on   the   subversive   journal   La   Voie   communiste.194   He   was   greatly  
influenced  by  Trotsky’s  autobiography  My  Life,195  and  most  of  his  early  adult  
life  was  spent  as  an  organiser  of  communist  splinter  groups.  Always  on   the  
fringes  of  authority,  and  permanently  uncomfortable  with  conformity,  Guattari  
preferred  the  Trotskyist  model  of  permanent  revolution  and  self-­emancipation.  
He  maintained  Trotsky’s  concern  for  the  way  in  which  party  bureaucracy  could  
stifle  a  genuinely  proletarian  movement  and  worked  constantly  to  ward  off  the  
emergence   of   Stalinist   style   dictatorships   at   any   level   of   the   communist  
program.196  
  
At  university,  Guattari  initially  studied  pharmacology  before  switching  to  study  
philosophy  at  the  Sorbonne.  However,  Guattari  never  settled  into  university  life  
and  in  December  of  1950,  Fernand  Oury  suggested  that  Guattari  escape  the  
                                                                                                                
191  PT  209-­210  
192  Dosse,  2010,  24-­25  
193  Dosse,  2010,  26  
194  Genosko,  2002,  11  
195  PT  209-­210  
196  PT  348-­356  
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university  and  visit  the  psychiatric  clinic  at  Saumery,  where  his  brother  Jean  
Oury  was  the  director.197  Jean,  in  turn,  suggested  that  Guattari  read  Lacan’s  
recent  works  and  then  asked  Guattari  to  attend  Lacan’s  lectures  on  his  behalf.  
In  1954  Guattari  was  invited  by  Lacan  to  attend  his  seminar  at  the  Sainte-­Anne  
psychiatric  hospital  in  Paris,  where  Guattari  was  the  first  non-­psychiatrist  to  be  
a   regular   member.198   Guattari   would   soon   go   into   analysis   with   Lacan,  
ultimately  qualifying  as  a  Lacanian  analyst  and  joining  Lacan’s  psychoanalytic  
school,  to  which  he  remained  a  member  for  life.  Jean  Oury,  who  had  previously  
worked  at  the  famous  St  Alban  clinic  with  the  celebrated  François  Tosquelles,  
soon  left  Saumery  to  set  up  his  own  psychiatric  clinic  at  La  Borde  in  1953.  La  
Borde  was  founded  on  communist  ideals  as  an  asylum  for  psychotic  patients,  
where   the  model  was  anti-­bureaucratic  and  where   the  staff  would  alternate  
between  manual  and  intellectual  work.199  Oury  invited  Guattari  to  work  at  La  
Borde  and  in  1955  Guattari  moved  there  to  take  up  a  permanent  organizational  
and  therapeutic  role.  In  what  follows,  it  will  be  important  to  keep  in  mind  that,  
as   a   Trotskyist   political   activist,   with   an   academic   background   in   both  
pharmacology  and  philosophy,  Guattari  was  working  in  a  therapeutic  clinic  for  
psychotic  patients.  Here,  as  a  follower  and  analysand  of  Lacan,  Guattari  was  
primarily  concerned  with  putting  psychoanalytic  theory  to  work  in  the  context  
of  a  psychiatric  asylum  operating  under  a  communist  model.  
  
By   the   time   he   met   Deleuze   in   1969,   Guattari   had   already   developed   a  
complex  and  distinctive  conceptual  style  that  utilised  political,  psychoanalytic  
and  philosophical  thinking  to  tackle  the  practical  issues  arising  in  his  life  as  a  
militant  psychotherapist.  However,  much  of  the  secondary  literature  discounts  
Guattari’s   role   in   the   collaborations   with   Deleuze,   either   by   paying   little  
attention   to   his   writing200   or   by   actively   deriding  Guattari’s   influence   on   his  
                                                                                                                
197  Dosse,  2010,  37  
198  Dosse,  2010,  38  
199  Oury  wrote  a  constitution  for  his  new  clinic  under  the  title  ‘Year  I’  (Dosse,  2010,  44).  
200  For  example,  while  Buchanan  (2008)  does  reference  some  of  Guattari’s  preparatory  
notes  for  Anti-­Oedipus,  he  does  not  consider  any  of  the  essays  written  by  Guattari  prior  to  
1972.  This  is  odd  given  Buchanan’s  comments  that,  “the  secondary  criticism  on  the  work  of  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  has  tended  to  overlook  his  contributions  altogether  or  consign  them  to  
a  merely  secondary  role”  (2005,  248).  Holland  (1999)  fares  slightly  better  and  includes  
mention  of  Molecular  Revolution,  which  contains  a  concise  selection  of  Guattari’s  work  prior  
to  1972.    
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more   philosophically   accomplished   counterpart.201      The   majority   of  
Anglophone  readers  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari  therefore  lack  the  resources  to  
see   how   the   conceptual   innovations   presented   in   the   Capitalism   and  
Schizophrenia  series,  including  that  of  the  line  of  flight,  respond  to  problems  
arising  in  Guattari  work  prior  to  1969.202  
  
While  Guattari  does  not  refer  to  the  ligne  de  fuite  before  his  work  with  Deleuze,  
and  while  he  only  uses  the  term  fuite  a  small  number  of  times  in  his  writing  
prior  to  1972,203  he  does  develop  a  number  of  theoretical  devices  that  rely  on  
the  concept  of  an  escape.204  During  the  course  of  this  chapter  I  will  try  to  show  
the   relevance   of   these   references,   and   demonstrate   how   they  will   become  
integral   to  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s   later  project.   The   ten   subsections   in   this  
chapter   can   be   divided   into   two   groups.   The   first   five   sections   explore  
Guattari’s  psychotherapeutic  work  and  his  theory  of  group  subjectivity.  Here  I  
will  show  how  Guattari  borrowed  from  Lacan  and  Sartre  to  rethink  subjectivity  
as  a  group  phenomenon,  adding  his  own  concept  of  the  ‘transversal   line’  to  
explain  how  the  ability  of  such  groups  to  interact  with  their  milieu  is  determined  
by  something  which  cuts  across  them,  escapes  them,  and  connects  them  with  
their  outside.  By  paying  attention  to  these  lines,  Guattari  aimed  to  empower  
both   therapeutic  and  revolutionary  groups   to  affect   the  worlds   in  which   they  
were  embedded.  The  five  subsequent  sections  will  explore  Guattari’s  concept  
of  the  ‘machine’,  defined  as  that  which  escapes  structural  relations.  Here  I  will  
show   how   Guattari   used   this   position   to   respond   to   Deleuze’s   work   in  
Difference   and   Repetition   and   Logic   of   Sense   in   his   essay   ‘Machine   and  
Structure’.  Finally,   I  will   show  how  Guattari’s  machinic  conception  of  desire  
arises  from  a  combination  of  certain  insights  from  Marx  and  Lacan.  It  is  these  
two  broad  aspects  of  Guattari’s  work  –  the  transversal  line  and  the  machinic  
                                                                                                                
201  See  Zizek,  (2004,  20).  Also  see  Buchanan’s  comments  on  Zizek  and  Badiou’s  critique  of  
Guattari  (Buchanan,  2008,  135-­136).  
202  See  Watson’s  characterisation  of  Guattari’s  early  work  (Watson,  2009,  23).  Guattari  had  
his  own  form  of  Freudo-­Marxism  (PT  248,  278),  and  used  the  concepts  of  ‘machine’  (PT,  
318-­328),  ‘deterritorialization’  (PT  341),  and  ‘war  machine’  (PT  242  &  262).  
203  In  the  English  publications  the  French  term  fuite  is  translated  variously  as  leak,  escape,  or  
evasion.  See  PT  8/ii,  16/viii,  32/14,  87/61,  and  202/148  (English/French  pagination).    
204  Guattari  regularly  uses  the  French  term  échappe  to  refer  to  escape,  for  example  when  he  
talks  about  “madness  as  something  that  escapes  social  determination”  (PT  62/41).  For  other  
uses  of  échappe,  see  PT  59/37,  89/61,  89/62,  91/63,  123/88,  126/90,  129/93,  134/96,  
153/111,  188/137,  236/174,  239/177,  337/255,  360/278.  
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nature  of  desire  –  that  allow  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  to  emerge  in  Anti-­
Oedipus.    
  
ii)  Sartre  and  group  subjectivity  
  
Guattari’s   development   of   a   robust   theory   of   group   subjectivity   can   be  
understood  as  a  reaction  to  the  mismatch  between  the  psychoanalytic  theories  
he  had  acquired  in  his  Lacanian  training  and  the  practical  context  of  working  
with  psychotic  patients  at  La  Borde.  This  mismatch  occurred  because  while  
both  Freudian  and  Lacanian  psychoanalytic  theory  are  interested  in  psychosis  
as   an   object   of   study,   ultimately   they   agree   that   the   traditional   method   of  
psychoanalytic  treatment  in  the  form  of  a  ‘talking  cure’  cannot  be  used  to  treat  
psychosis.  Freud  argued  that   the  analyst-­analysand  relationship   is  at   root  a  
contractual  one  and  the  psychotic  patient  has  neither  a  strong  enough  ego  nor  
a  strong  enough  grasp  on  reality  to  uphold  such  a  contract.205  Despite  the  fact  
that  Lacan  wrote  extensively  on  the  question  of  psychosis,206  his  explanation  
of   it  as  a   form  of  psychic   ‘foreclosure’   led  him   to  side  with  Freud,207  and   to  
claim  that  any  attempt  to  apply  the  therapeutic  technique  of  psychoanalysis  to  
psychosis  is  “as  stupid  as  to  toil  at  the  oars  when  the  ship  is  on  the  sand."208  
Despite   these   warnings,   this   is   exactly   what   Guattari   would   try   to   do.   To  
sidestep   the   issue   of   the   individual   psychotic’s   inability   to   maintain   a  
therapeutic  relationship,  Guattari  developed  a  form  of  psychoanalysis  that  did  
not  require  a  one-­on-­one  relationship  between  the  doctor  and  his  patient,  but  
which  could  operate  at  the  level  of  the  relationship  between  a  large  group  of  
patients  and  the  hospital  as  a  whole.  In  this  form  of  therapy,  which,  along  with  
Jean  Oury,  Guattari  would  name  ‘Institutional  Psychotherapy’,  the  institution  
becomes  an  analytic   tool   capable   of  working   simultaneously  with   all   of   the  
patients   in   the   hospital.   The   aim   here   is   to   foster   group   subjectivity   of   a  
particular  kind.  The  theory  of  group  subjectivity  used  here  by  Guattari  relies  on  
a  distinction  he  makes  between  ‘subject-­groups’  and  ‘subjugated-­groups’.  To  
                                                                                                                
205  Freud,  1940,  26-­37  
206  Lacan  1975  &  1993  
207  Lacan,  1993,  34  
208  Lacan,  1977,  22  
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understand  this  distinction,   it  will  be  necessary   to  explore  Sartre’s   theory  of  
groups,  as  it  is  developed  in  Being  and  Nothingness  and  Critique  of  Dialectical  
Reason,   and  Lacan’s   theory   of   the  Symbolic,   as   it   is   deployed   in   his   early  
seminars.  
  
Guattari  admitted  on  a  number  of  occasions  that  his  conceptual  work  owed  a  
great  debt  to  Sartre,  whom  he  idolised  in  the  years  before  he  took  up  his  more  
long-­standing  Lacanian  affiliation.209  Perhaps  surprisingly,  Guattari  does  not  
draw  any  explicit  connection  between  Sartre’s  critique  of  Freud  and  his  own  
deviations   from   psychoanalytic   orthodoxy.210   Instead,   most   of   Guattari’s  
interactions   with   Sartre   concern   the   question   of   the   relation   between  
subjectivity  and  communism.211    In  the  Critique  of  Dialectical  Reason,  Sartre  
aimed  to  create  a  synthesis  of  his  earlier  existentialist  position  and  that  of  his  
burgeoning   Marxism   by   reconciling   the   concept   of   freedom   that   he   had  
developed  in  Being  and  Nothingness  with  the  concrete  social  context  of  the  
subject.  Here  Sartre  moves  away   from  his  model  of   the  human  being  as  a  
distinct   and   isolated   object   of   study   and   considers   the   relevance   of   the  
economic,  political  and  social  structures  in  which  the  individual  exists.  Sartre  
aims  to  immerse  the  subject  “in  a  material  world  which  radically  conditions  and  
limits  it.”212  The  result  is  that  one  of  the  central  themes  that  runs  through  the  
Critique  “is  the  nature  of  our  bond  to  each  other.”213  In  the  first  chapter  of  part  
three  of  Being  and  Nothingness,  Sartre   had  explored   the  way   in  which   the  
relation  between   the  act  of   looking  at  another  person  and   recognising   their  
subjectivity,  and  the  subsequent  act  of  being-­looked-­at  by  the  other,  and  thus  
seeing  oneself  from  the  perspective  of  the  other,  allows  for  one  to  see  oneself  
                                                                                                                
209  “Everything  I  said  or  did  was  obviously  affected  by  him.  His  reading  of  annihilation,  of  
detotalization,  which  became  becoming  for  me,  deterritorialization,  his  idea  of  seriality,  of  the  
pratico-­inert,  which  informed  my  idea  of  the  group-­subject,  his  understanding  of  freedom,  
and  of  the  commitment  and  responsibility  of  the  intellectual,  which  he  embodied,  all  of  these  
remained  imperatives  or  at  least  immediate  givens  for  me.”  Félix  Guattari,  “Plutôt  avoir  tort  
avec  lui,”  Libération  (June  23–  24,  1990)],  in  Dosse  (2010,  29).  See  also  PT  210.  Guattari  
interviewed  Sartre  in  February  1961  (Dosse,  2010,  28-­31,  33)    
210    Sartre’s  accusation  is  that  Freud’s  metapsychology  initially  splits  the  mind  into  distinct  
parts  in  order  to  overcome  the  problem  of  self-­knowledge,  but  then  treats  at  least  some  of  
these  parts  as  capable  of  self-­knowledge  (1958,  50).  See  Gardner  (2009,  123).    
211  For  example,  where  Sartre  aims  to  establish,  “whether  the  principles  and  truths  that  
constitute  Marxism  allow  subjectivity  to  exist  and  have  a  function”  (2016,  3).    
212  Anderson,  1993,  88  
213  Catalano,  1986,  31  
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as  an  object  in  the  world.  Following  this,  Sartre  also  comments  on  how  a  similar  
process  can  occur  for  groups:  “[T]here  are  two  radically  different  forms  of  the  
experience  of  the  ‘we’,  and  the  two  forms  correspond  exactly  to  the  being-­in-­
the-­act-­of-­looking   and   being   looked-­at.”214   In   the   Critique   of   Dialectical  
Reason,  Sartre  returns  to  the  process  of  group  formation  in  more  detail,  now  
more   aware   of   the   ways   in   which   group   interactions   form   the   conditioning  
environment   for  the  emergence  of   the   individual.  Here  Sartre  describes   first  
the  process  by  which  a  selection  of  individuals  come  together  to  from  a  group  
and  then  goes  on  to  explain  the  different  ways  that  this  group  can  develop  and  
eventually   break   down.   I   am   going   to   concentrate   on   the   distinction   Sartre  
draws   between   a   selection   of   individuals   loosely   united   around   the   same  
object,  or  what  Sartre  calls  a   ‘series’,  and   the   first   form  of  group  cohesion,  
which  he  calls  a  ‘group-­in-­fusion’.  
  
A  ‘series’  is  a  collection  of  individuals  who  have  no  common  connection  other  
than  the  fact  that  they  are  part  of  a  particular  gathering.  There  is  no  internal  
connection   between   the  members   of   the   series   and,   as   such,   each   of   the  
members   is   effectively   alone   among   others.   Sartre   gives   the   example   of  
people  waiting  in  a  queue,  who  form  a  group  only  in  the  most  basic  sense,  due  
to  the  fact  that  they  all  have  a  similar  relation  with  something  outside  the  group,  
namely  whatever  it  is  they  are  queuing  for.  As  other,  more  politically  motivated  
examples,  Sartre  mentions  the  workers  in  a  factory  and  the  consumers  in  a  
market.215  A  series  is  constituted  by  an  external  determination  in  which  each  
of  the  members  is  ‘looked  at’  by  something  outside  of  the  group.216  As  such,  
each   of   the   members   of   the   series   is   defined   in   contra-­distinction   to   the  
surrounding  others.   In  a  series,   I  am  simply   that  which   is  not   the  other,  my  
place  in  the  queue,  the  market,  or  the  factory  is  defined  in  opposition  to  the  
place   of   the   others.   As   Sartre   writes:   “In   the   series,   however,   everyone  
becomes  himself  (as  Other  than  self)  in  so  far  as  he  is  other  than  the  Others,  
and  so,  in  so  far  as  the  Others  are  other  than  him…  every  member  is  serial  by  
                                                                                                                
214  Sartre,  1956,  415  
215  Sartre,  2004,  256  &  277  
216  Anderson,  1993,  96-­97    
   84  
virtue  of  his  place  in  the  order.”217  The  series  is  only  a  group  in  the  sense  that  
it   is  defined  as  such  by  something  external   to   it.  Due  to   this   reliance  on  an  
external  ‘common  object’,  the  series  is  incapable  of  acting  as  a  group.  In  the  
case   of   the   queue,   this   ‘third’   or   ‘common   object’   would   be   the   item   being  
queued  for  and   in   the  case  of   the   factory   the   ‘common  object’  could  be   the  
commodity  being  produced,  or  even   the  capitalist  who  owns   the   factory,   to  
whom  each  of  the  workers  sells  their  labour.  As  Sartre  writes:  “I  have  described  
serial  being  as  the  determination  of  the  bond  of  alterity  as  a  unity  of  plurality  
by  the  exigencies  and  structures  of  the  common  object  which  in  itself  defines  
this  plurality  as  such.”218  It  is  this  reliance  on  an  external  common  object  that  
constrains  the  series  to  inactivity.    
  
In  the  Critique  of  Dialectical  Reason,  Sartre  attempts  to  explain  the  possibility  
for  agency  by  making  a  distinction  between  what  he  names  ‘praxis’,  which  is  
free,   self-­conscious,   purposive,  or   active   consciousness  working  on  matter,  
and  what  he  names  the  ‘practico-­inert’,  which  is  the  worked  matter,  the  matter  
in  which  past  praxis  is  embodied,  or  sedimented  praxis.  For  Sartre,  the  series  
is  incapable  of  acting  as  a  community  and  taking  up  a  praxis  and  as  such  it  is  
said  to  be  embedded  in  the  practico-­inert.  He  states  that  the  series  is  defined  
by   “relations   which   are   established   in   the   practico-­inert   field   between   the  
individual   activities   of   men”   and   that   “this   serial   being   is   constituted   as   a  
negative  unity.”219  As  an  alternative  to  this  powerlessness,  according  to  Sartre,  
it  is  possible  for  the  members  of  a  group  to  join  together  in  common  action  and  
to   form   a   ‘group-­in-­fusion’.   This   occurs   when,   instead   of   each   defining  
themselves  by  their  relation  with  an  external  object,  the  members  of  the  group  
turn  to  one  another  and  recognise  themselves  in  one  another.  Describing  the  
change  in  relation  between  members  of  a  series  and  members  of  a  group-­in-­
fusion,  Sartre  writes:  “Through  the  mediation  of   the  group,  he   is  neither   the  
Other   nor   identical:   but   he   comes   to   the   group  as   I  do;;   he   is   the   same  as  
me.”220  If  a  queue  of  people  is  a  good  example  of  a  series,  then  a  group-­in-­
                                                                                                                
217  Sartre,  2004,  262  
218  Sartre,  2004,  303  
219  Sartre,  2004,  303  
220  Sartre,  2004,  377  
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fusion   is   formed   when   the   people   in   the   queue   recognise   their   shared  
grievance,   overcoming   their   mutual   alienation.   Now   the   position   of   each  
member  of  the  group  is  no  longer  defined  negatively  by  its  alterity  to  the  other  
members,  but   reciprocally.221  Those   in   the  queue  can  now  work   together   to  
take   what   they   are   waiting   for,   or   can   work   to   produce   it   themselves.  
Subsequently,   each   individual   becomes   defined   by   his   or   her   place   in   the  
group,  the  group  is  no  longer  defined  by  its  position  of  ‘being  looked  at’,  and  
the  group  appears  as  a  group  from  its  own  perspective.222  According  to  Sartre,  
the  act  of  entering  into  a  group-­in-­fusion  increases  the  power  and  freedom  of  
each  individual,  because  it  provides  a  context  in  which  to  become  active.223  
Utilising   the   language   of   Being   and   Nothingness,   we   can   say   that   in   the  
formation  of  a  group-­in-­fusion,  the  members  turn  away  from  ‘bad  faith’,  escape  
their   embeddedness   in   the   practico-­inert,   accept   the   responsibility   of   their  
radical  freedom,  and  become  capable  of  taking  up  a  praxis.224  
  
Guattari  was  taken  by  Sartre’s  distinction  between  the  series  and  the  group-­
in-­fusion  and  would  try  to  apply  it  in  the  psychiatric  hospital  as  a  model  for  the  
production  of  group  subjectivity  among  patients.  If  psychotics  are  those  who  
have  been  excluded  from  society  and  from  action,  and  if  those  in  the  hospital  
are  defined  by  the  act  of  being  looked  at  –  most  commonly  by  the  doctors  –  
then  perhaps   if   they  could   turn   to  one  another  and  define   themselves  via  a  
form  of  group  praxis,  thus  becoming  a  group-­in-­fusion,  they  could  overcome  
the  marginalisation  which  they  face  and  could  work  to  reshape  the  institutions  
that   subjugate   them.   We   can   see   here   why   Guattari’s   development   of  
Institutional  Psychotherapy  had  both  a  therapeutic  and  a  political  dimension.  
                                                                                                                
221  In  a  striking  similarity  with  Deleuze’s  distinction  between  continuous  and  discrete  
multiplicities,  Sartre  claims  that  the  distinction  between  a  cardinal  and  an  ordinal  number  
system  is  analogous  to  that  of  the  distinction  between  a  series  and  a  group-­in-­fusion  (2004,  
262-­263).  
222  In  these  cases,  Sartre  claims  the  ‘third  party’  can  be  each  member  for  the  others,  or  the  
praxis   of   the   group   (2004,   377).   These   different   forms   of   group   determination   produce   a  
‘group-­in-­constraint’  or  a  ‘pledged  group’  (2004,  420).  See  also  Santori  (2003,  41-­45).  Sartre  
applied  this  model  to  the  question  of  psychoanalysis,  claiming  that  the  analyst  is  capable  of  
becoming  the  ‘third  party’  by  which  the  subject  of  the  analysand  can  relate  to  itself  (Gardner,  
2009,  186).  
223  Anderson,  1993,  97-­98  
224  There  may  be  a  linguistic  connection  here  between  Sartre’s  definition  of  bad  faith,  or  ‘la  
Mauvaise  foi’,  as  a  fleeing  from  freedom,  or  ‘la  fuite  devant  la  liberté’,  and  Guattari’s  use  of  
the  word  ‘fuite’  in  his  work  with  Deleuze.    
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The  production  of  group  subjectivity  among  the  patients  could  never  remain  a  
personal   affair   as   their   group   action   would   need   to   be   turned   against   the  
practico-­inert  structures   that  conditioned  them,   including   the  State,   the   legal  
system,  and  all  structures  of  power.  However,  for  Guattari,  it  is  not  enough  to  
simply  produce  group  subjectivity  in  the  hospital,  instead  it  must  be  done  in  a  
particular  way,   so   as   to   guard   against   the   possibilities   of   destructive   group  
identifications.   In   order   to   understand  how  Guattari   attempted   to   apply   this  
theory  of  groups  in  a  particular  fashion,  it  is  important  to  recognise  the  ways  in  
which   it   comes   to   be   embedded   within   a   strictly   Lacanian   psychoanalytic  
framework.    
  
iii)  Lacan,  the  Symbolic,  and  ‘full  speech’  
  
Guattari  was  ultimately  critical  of  Sartre’s  theory  of  groups  because  it  failed  to  
recognise   the   crucial   difference   between   group   identification   and   group  
subjectivity.   To   overcome   this   issue,   Guattari   would   incorporate   Lacan’s  
distinction   between   the   Imaginary   and   the   Symbolic   into   his   own   theory   of  
group-­subjectivity.   Lacan’s   distinction   between   the   Imaginary   and   the  
Symbolic  is  explained  clearly  in  his  first  three  seminars,  given  between  1953  
and  1956,  at  exactly  the  time  Guattari  was  first  working  on  his  theories  of  group  
subjectivity.225  According  to  this  model,  the  process  of  ego  formation  begins  in  
the   mirror   stage,   when   an   infant   first   recognises   its   own   reflection.   Lacan  
contends   that  before   this  point   the  child   is  not  able   to  differentiate  between  
itself  and  the  world  around  it,  but  that  by  seeing  an  image  of  itself  it  becomes  
aware  that  it  is  an  individual  thing  separated  from  the  world.  However,  in  this  
moment,   the   infant   feels   threatened  by   its   image.  Unable   to  control   its  own  
body,   the   child   feels   inferior   to   the   image,  which   is   clearly   constituted   and  
appears  complete.  To  compensate  for  this  inferiority  the  child  appropriates  the  
image  it  sees  in  the  mirror  as  the  image  it  has  of  itself:  this  constitutes  the  birth  
of  the  ego.  The  contest  that  initially  defines  the  ego’s  relation  with  its  mirror  
image  recurs   throughout   life   in   the  relation  that   the   individual  holds  with   the  
                                                                                                                
225  Speaking  of  the  second  seminar,  Miller  writes:  “The  imaginary/symbolic  distinction  is  the  
main  thrust  of  the  seminar”  (1996,  13).    
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‘other’,  specifically,  the  ego  is  always  defined  against  the  image  of  the  other  
and  by  internalising  the  image  of  the  other.226  As  this  whole  process  occurs  at  
the  level  of  images  –  the  ego  is  the  image  one  has  of  oneself  that  is  generated  
in  contrast  to  the  image  of  the  other  –  Lacan  names  this  register  of  reality  the  
‘Imaginary’.    
  
For  Lacan,  this  process  of  ego  formation  at  the  level  of  the  imaginary  is  very  
different   from   the   process   of   subject   formation,   which   occurs   only   with   the  
child’s  entry  into  language.  In  his  early  seminars,  Lacan  argued  that  the  social  
field   is   essentially   linguistic   and   that,   as   a   social   being,   the   subject   only  
emerges  within  the  structure  of  language.227  According  to  this  model,  it  is  by  
saying   the  word  “I”   that  one   is  able   to  represent  oneself  with  a  signifier  and  
locate  oneself  within  the  structure  of  language,  and  subsequently  in  the  wider  
social   field.   Following   Saussure,   Lacan   claims   that   the   subject,   like   the  
signifier,  is  not  defined  by  its  relation  with  a  signified  (some  object  for  which  it  
stands),  but  instead  by  its  relation  to  other  signifiers.  The  subject  is  constituted  
by  its  social  relation  with  other  people,  in  and  through  language.  For  Lacan,  
“the  subject  is  the  agency  that  understands  meaning,  the  agency  correlated  
with  meaning”,  and  as  such,  “[w]e  call  ‘subject’  that  instance  or  agency  which  
understands  meanings  or  is  correlated  thereto,  such  that  there  is  no  meaning  
without  a  subject.”228  While  the  ego  was  defined  at  the  level  of  the  Imaginary  
by   its   relation  with  an   ‘other’,   in  what  Lacan   calls   the   ‘Symbolic’   register  of  
reality  the  subject  of  language  is  defined  by  its  relation  to  the  whole  structure  
of   language,  which  predates   it  and  conditions   it.  This  structure  of   language,  
which  Lacan  also  equates  with  the  ‘law’  and  ultimately  the  Oedipal  law  of  the  
father,  and  which  is  what  one  addresses  oneself  to  when  one  speaks,  Lacan  
calls  the  ‘big  Other’.  For  Lacan,  the  ego  and  the  subject  are  not  the  same  thing:  
they  are  generated  out  of  two  different  processes  and  they  do  not  necessarily  
cohere  in  reality.  Lacan  clearly  states  that  “the  ego  is  never  just  the  subject.”229  
                                                                                                                
226  See  ‘The  Mirror-­Stage  as  Formative  of  the  I  as  Revealed  in  Psychoanalytic  Experience’  
(Lacan,  2006).  
227  “Prior  to  signifying  something,  a  sign  signifies  to  someone.  Lacan  thereby  emphasised  
the  fact  that  a  patient  speaks  to  someone…  He  stressed  the  social  function  of  language  –  
language  as  a  social  link”  (Miller,  1996,  17).    
228  Miller,  1996,  22  
229  Lacan,  1988,  177  
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Guattari  follows  Lacan  here  almost  to  the  letter,  but  leaves  open  the  possibility  
of  applying  this  distinction  to  group  formations  when  he  writes:  “A  subject  is  
not  necessarily  the  individual  or  even  one  individual.”230  
  
While  Lacan  is  careful  to  distinguish  the  ego,  as  a  feature  of  the  Imaginary,  
and  the  subject,  as  a  feature  of  the  Symbolic,  he  does  not  separate  the  two  
absolutely,  but  attempts  to  describe  their  interaction  by  way  of  a  diagram  he  
names  the  L-­Schema:  If  the  ego  is  constituted  by  its  relation  to  ‘an  other’  and  
the  subject  is  constituted  by  its  relation  with  the  ‘big  Other’,  these  relations  form  
two  different  axes,  namely  the   imaginary  axis  and  the  symbolic  axis.  These  
two  axes  “are  situated   in  such  a  way  as   to   intersect  and  constitute  a  cross”  
and  “[t]he  imaginary  relationship  –  in  other  words,  the  relationship  that  derives  
from  the  mirror  stage  –  is  an  obstacle  to  the  establishment  of  a  truly  symbolic  
relationship.”   This   means   that   one  must   “trespass   upon   or   cross   over   the  
imaginary   in   order   to   pave   the   way   to   the   symbolic.”231   For   Lacan,   in   the  
process  of   psychoanalytic   treatment,   the   analyst   is   tasked  with   helping   the  
patient  form  a  cohesive  subject  position.  What  matters  here  is  the  relation  that  
the  analyst  holds  with  the  subject  and  not  with  the  ego  of  the  analysand.  The  
analyst  and  the  analysand  must  work  to  ‘cross  over’  the  Imaginary  axis  of  the  
ego  and  constitute   their   relationship   in   the  register  of   the  Symbolic  –   this   is  
why  Lacan  was  so  staunchly  opposed   to  ego-­psychology.  While   the  ego   is  
purely  imaginary  and  based  on  phantasy,  the  subject  is  able  to  speak  and  to  
communicate,   and   thus   to   interact.   Stressing   the   difference   between   the  
imaginary   nature   of   the   ego   and   the   symbolic   nature   of   the   subject,  Miller  
states  that:  “The  imaginary  level  is  fundamentally  characterized  by  aggression,  
so  we   have   to   distinguish   the   level   of   language,   where   understanding   and  
dialogue  are  possible,  from  the  level  of  the  imaginary…  The  imaginary  is  war;;  
the  symbolic   level  of  speech   is   language,  and   its   fundamental  phenomenon  
appears  to  be  peace.”232  Guattari,  at  this  point  at  loyal  follower  of  Lacan,  found  
that  Sartre’s  theory  of  groups  did  not  distinguish  between  the  Imaginary  and  
the  Symbolic  registers  of  reality.    For  Guattari,  this  meant  that  Sartre’s  theory  
                                                                                                                
230  PT  69  
231  Miller,  1996,  29  
232  Miller,  1996,  21  
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of  groups,  based  as  it  is  on  an  explanation  of  the  differing  dynamics  of  the  act  
of  looking-­at  and  the  act  of  being-­looked-­at,  would  be  unable  to  distinguish  the  
Imaginary  effects  of  group  phantasy  and  group  identification  from  the  Symbolic  
effects  of  group  subjectivity.  Following  Lacan’s  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  
the  Symbolic  register  for  the  production  of  subjectivity,  but  applying  it  to  the  
question  of  groups,  Guattari  states:  “The  concept  of  group  subjectivity  implies  
the   development   of   a   theory   of   the   signifier   in   the   social   field.”233   To   put  
Guattari’s  insight  another  way,  we  can  say  that  Sartre’s  category  of  ‘groups-­
in-­fusion’   is   too   broadly   construed  because   it   does  not   distinguish   between  
group  identifications,  at  the  level  of  the  Imaginary,  and  group-­subjects,  at  the  
level  of  the  Symbolic.    
  
One  clarificatory  point  is  required  here  concerning  the  relation  of  language  to  
the   Imaginary  and  the  Symbolic   in  Lacan’s  early  seminars.  Despite   the   fact  
that  the  Symbolic  is  understood  as  essentially  linguistic,  while  the  Imaginary  is  
not,  our  use  of  language,  and  the  analysand’s  use  of  language,  is  not  confined  
to   the   Symbolic   realm.   It   is   also   possible   for   speech   to   be   used   along   the  
Imaginary  axis,  as  a  tool  for  the  antagonistic  mirroring  that  defines  that  relation.  
Lacan  codifies  this  by  stating  that  the  ego  only  has  access  to  ‘empty  speech’  
in   which   true   desire   is   avoided   or   repressed   in   favour   of   imaginary  
identifications.  Here  language  is  used  only  to  determine  the  ego  in  its  relation  
to  an  ‘other’.  On  the  other  hand,  when  a  subject  is  engaging  with  another  on  
the   level   of   the   Symbolic,   this   subject   has   access   to   ‘full   speech’   which   is  
performative  and  which  allows  access  to  desire.234  In  this  case,  the  speaking  
subject   is  addressing  himself  not  only   to  an   ‘other’,  but   to   the   ‘big  Other’  of  
language   itself.  The  subject   is   taking  part   in  a  collective  discourse   in  which  




                                                                                                                
233  PT  128  
234  Lacan,  1991,  107  
235  For  more  on  full  and  empty  speech  see  Soler,  1996,  43-­47.    
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In   his   group-­therapeutic   work   at   La   Borde,   Guattari   was   aware   that   the  
formations  of  groups   is  not  always  productive:   “Group   life  can  have  harmful  
effects:  when  people  use  the  other  as  a  pretext  to  quietly  turn  inward  and  let  
things  happen.”236  In  order  to  aid  in  the  formation  of  groups  within  the  hospital,  
while   avoiding   the   pitfalls   of   group   identifications   and   obstructive   group  
phantasy,  Guattari   produced   his   own   theory   of   group   subjectivity   that   took  
Sartre’s  theory  of  groups  from  the  Critique  of  Dialectical  Reason  as  a  model,  
but   reinscribed   it   within   a   Lacanian   framework.   Guattari’s   theory   of   group  
subjectivity   relies   on   a   distinction   between   subject-­groups   and   subjugated-­
groups.  Just  as  the  collection  that  Sartre  named  a  ‘series’  was  defined  by  an  
external  determination,  Guattari’s  ‘subjugated-­groups’  are  those  that  “receive  
their  law  from  the  outside.”237  Like  those  in  a  ‘series’,  subjugated-­groups  are  
unable  to  take  up  a  praxis  and  are  conditioned  by  the  inertia  of  the  practico-­
inert.   They   form   “a   subjectivity   which   is   lost   to   view   in   the   otherness   of  
society”238   and   consequently   they   “are   only   something   passive   for  
themselves.”239   Just   as  Sartre   claims   that  a   series  will   become  a   group-­in-­
fusion   when   it   is   able   to   define   itself   by   an   internal   relation   between   its  
members,   for   Guattari,   the   formation   of   a   subject-­group   is   “based   on   the  
assumption   of   an   internal   law,”240   which   gives   the   group   a   “vocation”   and  
allows  it    “to  control  its  own  behavior  and  elucidate  its  object.”241    
  
However,  Guattari’s  distinction  diverges  from  Sartre’s  on  a  number  of  crucial  
points.   First,   Guattari   explains   that   subject-­groups   differ   from   subjugated-­
groups  because  the  former  relate  to  one  another  at  the  level  of  the  Symbolic,  
while  the  latter  relate  to  one  another  at  the  level  of  the  Imaginary:  “the  subject  
group   is   articulated   like   a   language  and   links   itself   to   the   sum  of   historical  
discourse,  whereas  the  dependent  group…  has  a  specifically  imaginary  mode  
of  representation,  that  is  the  medium  of  the  group  phantasies.”242  Guattari  is  
consistent   here   in   using   Lacanian   terminology   to   explain   the   essential  
                                                                                                                
236  PT  345.  See  Guattari’s  comments  on  ‘dependent  groups’  in  PT  119.    
237  PT  64  
238  PT  107  
239  PT  71  
240  PT  64  
241  PT  107  
242  PT  224  
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differences  between  subject  and  subjugated-­groups,  often  using  the  Lacanian  
concept  of  ‘meconissance’,  which  characterizes  the  child’s  relationship  with  its  
image  in  the  mirror  stage,  to  describe  the  dynamics  of  the  subjugated-­group.243  
Second,  unlike  Sartre,  Guattari   is  keen  to  stress   the   fact   that   the  distinction  
between  subject  and  subjugated-­groups  is  not  absolute;;  the  two  coexist  in  any  
group  situation.  Guattari’s  distinction  is  “not  so  much  with  two  sorts  of  group,  
but  two  functions,  and  the  two  may  even  coincide.”244  Just  as  Lacan  uses  the  
L-­Schema  to  explain  how  subject  formation  at  the  level  of  the  Symbolic  must  
‘cross-­over’  the  Imaginary  relation  between  the  ego  and  the  ‘other’,  subject-­
groups  must   always   contend  with   their   potential   subjugation   on   the   axis   of  
group  phantasy.  Third,  while  Sartre  spoke  of  the  agency  of  the  group-­in-­fusion  
in  terms  of  ‘praxis’,  following  Lacan,  Guattari  defines  the  agency  of  the  group  
in  relation  to  its  ability  to  engage  with  speech.  For  Guattari,  the  subject  group  
“hears   and   is   heard”   and   is   defined   by   “a   subjectivity   whose   work   is   to  
speak.”245  To  be  more  precise  here,  we  should  say  that  the  subject-­group  has  
access   to   ‘full   speech’   while   the   subjugated-­group   cannot   get   beyond   the  
barrier  of   ‘empty  speech’.246  Applying  this  Guattarian-­Lacanian  development  
to  our  previous  Sartrean  example  of  the  queue,  we  can  say  that  the  group  that  
is  formed  when  those  standing  in  the  queue  turn  to  one  another  can  either  be  
a   subject-­group,   or   a   subjugated-­group.   Imagine   that   the   group   produce  
banners  and  badges  with  a  chosen  slogan,  which  they  chant  at  the  shop  owner  
to  express  their  frustration.  It  might  be  the  case  that  the  only  effect  of  this  act  
of  collective  speech  is  to  unite  the  members  of  the  group.  It  provides  a  way  for  
the  members   to  align   their  group  phantasy  at   the   level  of   the   Imaginary  by  
defining  who  is  in  the  group  and  who  is  outside  of  it,  but  it  does  not  allow  for  
the  production  of  discourse  in  the  Symbolic.  Guattari  would  call  this  group  a  
subjugated-­group  with  access  to  ‘empty  speech’  only.  Alternatively,  the  group  
might   use   language   to   address   their   demands   to   the   shop   owner,   or   to  
organise  an  alternative  access  to  the  product.  This  requires  them  to  relate  to  
                                                                                                                
243  PT  79;;  258  
244  PT  224  
245  PT  107  
246  As  we  will  see,  Guattari’s  theory  of  semiotic  relations  differs  significantly  from  Lacan’s  
semiotics,  based  as  it  is  on  structural  linguistics.  For  the  moment,  it  is  enough  to  note  that  
unlike  Sartre,  but  like  Lacan,  Guattari  concentrates  on  the  semiotic  relations  of  groups.    
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one  another  symbolically,  through  a  shared  language  in  which  they  are  able  to  
listen  and  to  have  dialogue.  In  this  case  Guattari  would  say  that  the  group  have  
access  to  ‘full  speech’  and  constitute  a  subject-­group.247    
  
As   well   as   these   numerous,   Lacanian   adaptations   of   Sartre’s   analysis   of  
groups,  Guattari   also  makes   at   least   two   further  modifications   that   are   not  
borrowed   from   Lacan.   First,   unlike   Sartre,   Guattari   does   not   give   any  
precedence  to   the  role  of   the   individual  over  that  of   the  group.  While  Sartre  
starts  from  the  assumption  that  a  collection  of  fully  individuated  subjects  exists,  
and   then  goes  on   to  explain  how   they  can  come   together   to   form  a  group,  
Guattari  is  interested  in  how  subjectivity  at  the  level  of  the  group  and  the  level  
of  the  individual  are  co-­produced.  Guattari’s  group  practice  at  La  Borde  works  
in  the  opposite  direction  to  that  of  Sartre.  Institutional  Psychotherapy  functions  
precisely   by   producing   a   group   subject   within   the   hospital,   within   which  
psychotic  patients  will  be  given   the  necessary  structure   to  define   their  own  
subject  positions.  As  Guattari’s  theory  of  groups  progresses,  he  will  dismiss  
the  concept  of  individual  subjectivity  completely  and  claim  that  all  subjectivity  
is   always   group-­subjectivity.   In   ‘We   are   all  Groupuscules’,   he  writes:   “[t]he  
model  of   the   individual…  is   too   fragile”  and  we  must   therefore  “build  a  new  
form  of   subjectivity   that   no   longer   relies   on   the   individual   and   the   conjugal  
family.”    Coining  a  term  that  will  later  be  used  regularly  with  Deleuze,  Guattari  
names   these   new   units   of   group   subjectivity,   “collective   agents   of  
enunciation.”248    
  
Second,   because   Guattari   recognises   that   subjugated-­groups   and   subject-­
groups   are   not   different   general   categories,   but   that   subjectivity   and  
subjugation  exist  as  the  two  sides  of  any  group  formation,  it  is  not  simply  the  
case   that   a   group   will   be   defined   either   by   an   external   or   an   internal  
determination,   but   instead   that   any   group   will   be   defined   by   the   level   of  
internality/externality  of  its  determining  relations.  For  Guattari,  a  group  is  made  
                                                                                                                
247  The  key  distinction  between  full  speech  and  empty  speech  does  not  concern  the  content  
of  speech,  but  on  whether  it  engages  in  social  discourse  and  whether  it  is  heard.  Guattari  
would  readily  admit  that  political  chants  and  slogans  fulfil  the  conditions  of  full  speech  in  
many  cases.    
248  PT  368-­369  
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up  of  a  multiplicity  of  relations,  some  of  which  exist  between  members  of  the  
group  while  others  connect  a  member  of  the  group  with  something  outside  of  
the  group,  while  both  internal  and  external  connections  may  be  either  Symbolic  
or  Imaginary.  Group  subjectivity  is  produced  when  a  relative  stability  is  attained  
between  the  internal  and  external  relations  in  the  group,  which  Guattari  names,  
“the  notion  of  subjective  consistency.”249  For  Guattari,  the  elements  that  make  
up  any  group-­subject  must  relate  to  one  another  internally,  however  the  group-­
subject  is  defined  as  much  by  those  connections  and  relations  that  escape  the  
group  structure  as  by  those  that  uphold  it.  This  is  a  line  of  thought  that  Guattari  
will   take  up  with  Deleuze  in  Anti-­Oedipus,  and  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  where  
the  question  of  how  a  group  relates  to  that  which  escapes  it  becomes  of  central  
ethical  and  political   importance.  Interestingly,  one  of  the  first  occurrences  of  
the   concept   of   the   ‘line   of   flight’   in   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   work   comes   in  
Deleuze’s   preface   to  Psychoanalysis   and   Transversality,  where   he   praises  
Guattari’s   theory  of  group  subjectivity   for   “pursuing   the   flows  that  constitute  
myriad   lines   of   flight”   and   allowing   “collective   agents   of   enunciation   to  
emerge.”250    
  
v)  Transversality  and  escape  
  
In  his  role  at  La  Borde,  Guattari  aimed  to  find  ways  of  transforming  subjugated-­
groups   into   subject-­groups   by   altering   the   institutional   operations   of   the  
hospital.  To  do   this,  Guattari  would   turn  once  again   to  his  Lacanian   training  
and   adapt   the   conceptual   tools   he   found   there,   in   this   case   reworking   the  
traditional  psychoanalytic  concept  of  transference  into  that  of  transversality.251  
For  Freud,  transference  refers  to  the  process  by  which  an  analysand  redirects  
previously  repressed  emotions  and  desires  toward  the  analyst,  projecting  the  
role  of  another  person  onto  the  analyst,  usually  the  mother  or  father.  According  
to   Freud,   this   process   can   be   useful   for   analysis   when,   by   taking   on   the  
projected   role,   the   analyst   is   able   to   help   the   analysand   work   through  
                                                                                                                
249  PT  346  
250  PT  16/viii  (English/French  pagination).    
251  For  a  full  discussion  of  the  ways  in  which  the  concept  of  transversality  evolved  over  the  
course  of  Guattari’s  career  see  Genosko  (2000)  and  Goffey  (2016).    
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unresolved  family  relationships.  However,  it  can  also  interrupt  analysis  when  
the  love  or  hate  that  the  analysand  ends  up  feeling  towards  the  analyst  blocks  
the  possibility  of  progress.  Lacan,  who  dedicated  his  1960-­61  seminar  to  the  
concept   and   named   it   as   one   of   the   ‘four   fundamental   concepts’   of  
psychoanalysis  in  his  seminar  of  1963-­64,  recast  the  double-­edged  nature  of  
transference   using   his   own   distinction   between   the   Imaginary   and   the  
Symbolic.252  For  Lacan,  transference  is  ineffective  when  the  analyst  becomes  
a   mirror   for   the   analysand’s   ego.   Here   the   relation   is   imaginary   and   the  
analysand   treats   the   analyst   like   an   ‘other’   with   whom   he   or   she   has   an  
antagonistic  relationship.  Alternatively,  transference  can  be  effective  when  the  
analysand  treats  the  analyst  not  as  an  ‘other’,  but  as  the  ‘big  Other’,  or  what  
Lacan   also   calls   the   “subject-­supposed-­to-­know.”253   As  Miller   explains:   “As  
long  as  Lacan  defined   transference  as   imaginary,   it   remained  a  moment  of  
inertia   in   psychoanalytic   experience…   His   theory   of   transference   changes  
when   he   tries   to   offer   a   symbolic   definition   of   transference.”254  Where   the  
transference   operates   in   the   Symbolic   it   can   be   used   to   foster   subject-­
formation  in  the  analysand.    
  
Guattari   borrows   this   latter,   Symbolic,   understanding   of   transference   from  
Lacan,  but  takes  it  out  of  the  analyst’s  office,  where  the  relation  can  only  ever  
be  enacted  by  two  people,  and  puts  it  to  work  in  the  hospital.255  At  first,  Guattari  
describes  how  a  relation  exists  between  the  institution  as  a  whole,  which  plays  
the  role  of  the  analyst,  and  the  group  of  patients  in  the  hospital,  who  play  the  
role  of  the  analysand.  However,  as  Guattari  is  aware  that  group  subjectivity  is  
not  produced  by  any  single  relation,  but  by  the  ‘subjective  consistency’  that  is  
produced  out  of  a  multiplicity  of  interacting  relations,  he  proposed  “to  replace  
the   ambiguous   idea   of   the   institutional   transference   with   a   new   concept:  
                                                                                                                
252  Lacan,  2015;;  and  ‘The  Transference  and  the  Drive’  and  ‘The  Field  of  the  Other  and  back  
to  the  Transference’,  in  Lacan,  1998.  
253  For  more  on  transference  see  Lacan,  2006,  184  &  503.    
254  Miller,  1996,  23.  
255  For  Guattari’s  description  of  the  difficulties  involved  in  reworking  this  concept  for  use  in  
group  therapy  see  PT  123-­124:  “In  this  somewhat  eclectic  way,  we  came  to  recast  a  series  
of  notions  from  various  sources  for  our  institutional  use...  Some  of  these  notions,  like  the  
superego  and  fantasy,  were  easier  to  adapt  due  to  the  ambiguities  of  Freudian  doctrine,  
which  does  not  differentiate  between  their  use  at  the  level  of  individuals  or  groups.  Other  
notions,  like  transference,  involved  a  deeper  reassessment.”  
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transversality  in  the  group.”256  In  geometry,  a  transversal  is  defined  as  a  line  
that  crosses  any  two  lines  in  the  same  plane  at  two  distinct  points.257  Adapting  
this   usage,   Guattari   states:   “Transversality   is   a   dimension   that   tries   to  
overcome  both  the  impasse  of  pure  verticality  and  that  of  mere  horizontality”  
and   to   describe   “communication   among   different   levels   and,   above   all,   in  
different   meanings”   within   the   hospital.258   As   we   have   seen,   Guattari’s  
distinction   between   subjugated-­groups   and   subject-­groups   recognises   the  
ways   in   which   various   internal   relations,   which   tend   to   be   horizontal,   and  
various   external   relations,   which   tend   to   be   vertical,   exist   for   the   group  
simultaneously.   The   degree   of   openness   of   this   web   of   relations   is   what  
mediates  between  that  side  of  the  group  that  achieves  its  own  subjectivity  and  
the  reverse  side  which  remains  subjugated.  The  overall  degree  of  openness  
of  the  group  is  what  Guattari  names  the  “coefficient  of  transversality”.259  
  
In  the  hospital,  a  wide  range  of  relationships  exist  between  the  patients,  the  
doctors,  the  nurses,  and  the  other  staff,  all  of  which  play  a  role  in  determining  
the   ‘coefficient  of   transversality’   in   the  hospital.  The  analyst’s   job   is   to  work  
with   all   of   these   different   groups   to   maximize   communication   between   the  
various  levels  of  language  that  exist  there,  and  the  different  meanings  that  they  
produce.  As  Guattari  states:  “it  is  possible  to  change  the  various  coefficients  
of  unconscious  transversality  at  the  various  levels  of  an  institution.”260  Most  of  
the   time,   the   technical   language  of   the   doctors,   the   social   discourse  of   the  
cleaning  staff,  and   the  schizophrenic  speech  of   the  patients  do  not  connect  
with   one   another.   However,   by   fostering   communication   between   these  
different   levels,   these   groups   can   interact,   and   group   subjectivity   can   be  
                                                                                                                
256  PT  112.    
257  Transversals  are  used  in  Euclidean  geometry  to  determine  whether  two  lines  are  to  be  
considered  as  parallel  to  one  another.  According  to  Euclid’s  fifth  postulate,  Deleuze’s  critique  
of  which  I  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  if  two  lines  are  parallel  then  the  consecutive  
interior  angles  produced  by  the  transversal  that  crosses  them  will  be  supplementary,  the  
corresponding  angles  produced  will  be  equal,  and  the  alternate  angles  will  also  be  equal.  
258  PT  113  
259  PT  113.  For  more  on  the  role  of  ‘openness’,  see  PT  108.  Here  Guattari  imagines  the  
effects  on  a  group  of  horses  in  a  field  who  are  all  wearing  blinkers.  If  the  blinkers  are  set  too  
tightly  then  the  horses  will  not  be  able  to  see  one  another  and  will  not  move  around  freely.  
However,  if  one  was  to  open  the  blinkers  too  quickly,  this  could  frighten  the  horses.  Guattari  
equates  the  degree  of  openness  of  the  blinkers  with  the  group’s  coefficient  of  transversality.  
260  PT  113  
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produced.  For  example,  Guattari  explains  how  “the  overt  communication  that  
takes  place  within  the  circle  consisting  of  the  medical  superintendent  and  the  
house-­doctors  may  remain  on  an  extremely   formal   level,  and   it  may  appear  
that  its  coefficient  of  transversality  is  very  low”  while  the  “coefficient  existing  at  
department   level  may   be   found   to   be  much   higher:   the   nurses   have  more  
genuine  relationships  among  themselves,  in  virtue  of  which  the  patients  can  
make  transferences  that  have  a  therapeutic  effect.”261  
  
Guattari  also  argued  that   the   formation  of  subject-­groups  was  central   to   the  
practice  of  Marxist  politics.    According  to  Guattari’s  analysis,  the  Communist  
movement  can  be  understood  as  an  attempt  to  transform  the  proletariat  from  
a  subjugated-­group  into  a  subject-­group.  Like  the  factory  workers  that  Sartre  
gave  as  an  example  of  a   ‘series’,   the  working  classes  under  capitalism  are  
organized  as  a  group  only  by  a  form  of  external  determination  by  capital.  To  
break   out   of   this   subjugation,   the   proletariat   must   escape   the   Imaginary  
identification  which  organizes  them  as  workers  and  enter  the  Symbolic  register  
as   a   cohesive   group-­subject.      One   effect   of   Guattari’s   psychoanalytic  
evaluation  of  communist  struggle  is  that  it  gives  him  a  fundamental  distrust  of  
the  concept  of  the  avant-­garde,  or  of  the  centralized  Party,  who  claim  to  act  on  
behalf  of  the  people.  Guattari  is  clear  on  this  point  when  he  states:  “A  subject  
group  is  not  embodied  in  a  delegated  individual  who  can  claim  to  speak  on  its  
behalf.”262  The  problem  with  the  party  structure  is  that  while  “[i]t  is  always  the  
mass  of  the  people  who  have  created  new  forms  of  struggle…  the  Party  and  
the  unions  have  systematically  retreated  from  the  creativity  of  the  people.”263  
For  this  reason,  Guattari  always  aligned  himself  with  the  ideas  of  permanent  
revolution   and   self-­emancipation,   and   aimed   to   ward   off   the   possibility   of  
dictatorships  establishing  themselves  in  communist  circles.    
  
                                                                                                                
261  PT  113-­114.  There  is  an  echo  here  with  Guattari’s  later  distinction  between  macro  and  
micro-­politics:  “Everyone  knows  that  the  law  of  the  State  is  not  made  by  the  ministries;;  
similarly,  in  a  psychiatric  hospital,  de  facto  power  may  elude  the  official  representatives  of  
the  law  and  be  shared  among  various  sub-­groups.”  
262  PT  219  
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While   Guattari   was   a   member   of   the   French   Communist   Party   he   was  
constantly  critical  of  it,  claiming  that,  “revolutionary  organization  has  become  
separated   from   the   signifier   of   the  working   class’s   discourse…   the   subject  
groups   spoken   of   by   Marx.”264   Guattari   was   especially   critical   of   those  
intellectuals  who  proposed  to   interpret  Marx’s   texts  on  behalf  of   the  people,  
claiming   that,      “[u]nlike   Althusser,   the   subject   group   is   not   a   theoretician  
producing   concepts.”265   As   an   alternative   to   this   intellectualism,   Guattari  
helped   set   up   a   number   of   splinter   groups   which   aimed   to   dislodge   the  
hegemony   of   the   party   line.   Pushing   against   both   the   idea   of   the   ‘mass  
movement’  and   that  of   the   ‘avant  garde’,  Guattari  spoke  of  these  groups  as  
‘analytical  groups’,  defined  as  “a  group  that  positions  itself  against  the  ‘normal’  
order  of  things.”266  In  order  to  produce  subject-­groups  consisting  of  workers,  
intellectuals,  and  young  people,  capable  of  producing   their  own  statements  
and   locating   themselves   in   the   Symbolic   order,   Guattari   helped   set   up  
collaboratively   written   communist   newspapers,   including   the   ‘Tribune   de  
Discussion’   which   he   described   as,   “an   internal   dissident   organ   within   the  
French   Communist   Party.”267   In   both   his   psychotherapeutic   work   and   his  
political  militancy,  Guattari  had  discovered  that  to  produce  transformations  in  
the  normal  order  of  things,  it  was  necessary  to  produce  subject-­groups  capable  
of  taking  responsibility  for  their  own  world.  To  do  this,  he  would  manipulate  the  
transversal  lines  that  cut  across  the  varying  levels  of  discourse  in  any  particular  
milieu,   opening   the   coefficient   of   transversality   in   the   group,   and  ultimately  
reconfiguring  the  power  dynamics  that  subsided  there.    
  
Guattari’s  work  during  this  period  directly  informed  his  later  work  with  Deleuze,  
and  it  is  possible  to  place  Guattari’s  concept  of  the  ‘coefficient  of  transversality’  
within  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  larger  philosophical  task.  Guattari  describes  the  
coefficient  of  transversality  as:  “a  certain  opening  or  closing  of  the  collective  
acceptance”  of  various  forms  of  group  investments.268  To  put  this  another  way,  
                                                                                                                
264  PT  218  
265  PT  219  
266  PT  299-­300,  316,  357  
267  PT  352.  This  model  of  dissident  collective  writing  and  publication  was  reused  by  Guattari  
outside  of  a  strictly  political  setting  with  the  research  group  CERFI.  
268  PT  290  
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we  could  say  that   the  coefficient  of   transversality  of  a  group  determines   the  
way   in  which  such  a  group  relates   to  the  outside,  and  to   those  connections  
that   escape   its   internal   composition.   Transformation   occurs   at   the   level   of  
group  subjectivity  only  when  this  coefficient  of  escape  is  set  at  the  correct  level,  
too  high  and  the  group  will  be  subjugated  to  an  external  image,  too  low  and  it  
will   turn   in  on   itself   toward  a  reliance  on  group  phantasy.  Transformation   is  
determined  by  the  relation  of  an  group  to  that  which  escapes  it.  My  intention  
here  is  not  to  claim  that  Guattari  had  invented  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  
during   his   early   writing   on   Institutional   Psychotherapy  without   naming   it   as  
such,  but   to  point  out   the  way   in  which  he  was  exploring  the  role  played  by  
‘escape’  or   ‘flight’   in   transformational  change.  The   idea   that   transformations  
rely   on   a   particular   kind   of   escape   will,   in   Anti-­Oedipus   and   A   Thousand  
Plateaus,  form  the  basis  of  one  aspect  of  the  line  of  flight.  
  
vi)  Materialism  contra  Lacan    
  
Guattari’s   relationship   with   Marxism   and   his   relationship   with   Lacanianism  
were  both  heterodox.  In  one  sense,  however,  it  was  his  adherence  to  Marx’s  
materialism   that   led   Guattari   to   break   from   Lacanian   orthodoxy   over   the  
question   of   structuralism.   Against   Lacan’s   Hegelian   understanding   of   the  
structural  and  dialectical  nature  of  change,  Guattari  would  insist  on  the  material  
nature  of  the  Real.  Briefly  put,  we  could  say  that  just  as  Marx  was  happy  to  
call   himself   a   pupil   of   Hegel   and   to   hail   him   as   a   “mighty   thinker,”   while  
simultaneously  criticising  his  master  for  “mystifying”  the  dialectic  and  ignoring  
the  material  and  productive  basis  for  reality,  which  exists  independently  of  the  
structural  articulations  of   thought,269  Guattari   remained  a  committed  pupil  of  
Lacan,  while  criticising  Lacan’s  mystification  of  the  Real  and  his  refusal  to  deal  
with   the   material   and   machinic   nature   of   the   unconscious.   Marx   famously  
argued   that   Hegel’s   focus   on   thought   over   material   nature   meant   that   his  
understanding  of  the  dialectic  was  “standing  on  its  head”  and  that  it  “must  be  
                                                                                                                
269  Marx,  1982,  103  
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inverted.”270  Borrowing  this  turn  of  phrase,  we  might  say  that  Guattari  aimed  
to   invert  Lacanian   theory  by   jettisoning  structural   linguistics,  simultaneously  
putting   psychoanalysis   on   its   feet   by  accepting,   and   then  working  with,   the  
material  and  productive  nature  of  the  unconscious.    
  
During  the  1950s,  Lacan  attempted  to  resolve  a  number  of  issues  he  perceived  
in   the   received   interpretation   of   Freud’s  work.   Specifically,   Lacan   aimed   to  
overcome   the   split   between   Freud’s   psychological   works,   where   the  
unconscious   is   treated  as  a  kind  of  unthought-­thought  structured  by  a  strict  
topography,   and   his   metapsychological   works,   where   the   unconscious   is  
understood   as   an   economic   machine   for   the   material   mediation   of  
sensation.271   To   produce   a   theory   that   could   account   for   both   the   socially  
structured  nature  of  desire  and  the  apparently  biological  and  pre-­social  nature  
of  the  drives,  Lacan  prioritised  Freud’s  psychological  and  structural  theory  of  
desire  over  his  metapsychological  theory,  ultimately  aiming  to  show  that  the  
drives  are  always  already  embedded  within  a   linguistic  structure.   In  his   first  
two   seminars,   Lacan   argues   that   “the   drives   are   completely   embedded   in  
language  and  that  they  are  structured  like  a  language.”272  In  Lacan’s  structural  
and  linguistic  reading  of  Freud,  the  drives  appear  as  the  paradoxical  element,  
or  objet  petit  a,  which  circulates  within  the  structure  and  guarantees  both  the  
constant  slippage  of  the  signifier  and  the  constant  deferral  of  the  fulfilment  of  
desire.273  Commenting  on  the  objet  petit  a,  Miller  writes  that  Lacan  “invented  
it  to  try  to  integrate  drives  into  the  structure  of  language,”  but  that  in  doing  so,  
“he   paid   a   price;;   for   in   the   structure   of   language,   you   have   signifiers   and  
meanings,  but  he  was  obliged   to   invent  something  which   is  neither.”274   It   is  
Lacan’s  decision  to  include  the  drives  within  a  linguistic  structure  that  allows  
him   to   reverse   the   traditional  priority  of   instincts  over   the  complexes  and   to  
                                                                                                                
270  Marx,  1982,  103.  Exactly  how  this  is  understood  is  a  matter  of  contention.  For  example,  
Althusser  is  insistent  that  it’s  not  a  simple  inversion,  but  a  complete  overturning  of  the  
Hegelian  dialectic  (1970,  15,  28  fn.  10).  
271  See  Shuster  (2016,  27-­47),  where  the  author  differentiates  the  alternative  methods  used  
by  Lacan  and  Deleuze  to  overcome  this  perceived  split.    
272  Miller,  1996,  20  
273  In  Seminar  XI,  Lacan  gives  a  more  complex  description  of  the  relation  of  the  subject  to  
the  drives,  namely  that  they  share  the  same  topological  space  (1998,  203-­209).  In  this  text  
Lacan  also  explains  that  the  drives  are  like  ‘headless  subjects’  (181-­184)  that  circulate  
around  the  objet  a  (174-­184).  See  Widder  (2012,  100-­104).    
274  Miller,  1996,  19  
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argue  that  the  human  psyche  is  social  and  structured  by  language  ‘all  the  way  
down’.  However,  as  Miller  adds,  “if  you  do  that,  instinct  in  humans  appears  to  
be  dependent  on  structure  as  social.”275  Specifically,  this  move  will  allow  Lacan  
to  claim  that  the  Oedipus  complex  is  not  simply  an  acquired  condition,  but  a  
necessary  aspect  of  the  structure  of  thought.  This  affected  Lacan’s  therapeutic  
practice,   because  once   the   apparently  organic   and  pre-­social  nature   of   the  
drives  has  been  recognised  as  linguistic  in  nature,  the  analyst  need  only  deal  
with   the   analysand’s   use   of   language   to   cure   them:   “[I]n   psychoanalysis  
proper,  you  do  not  refer  anything   that   is  said   to  what   is…  you  simply  check  
whether   his   or   her   discourse   is   consistent.”276   Despite   retaining   his   official  
allegiance   to   Lacan,  Guattari  was  uncomfortable  with   this  move  away   from  
Freud’s  material  and  economic  metapsychology  of  the  unconscious.    
  
According   to  Lacan’s   tripartite  schema,   that  which   is   included   in  neither   the  
Imaginary   nor   the   Symbolic   belongs   to   the   Real.   There   are   at   least   two  
different  interpretations  of  Lacan’s  early  formulation  of  the  Real.  According  to  
the   first,   the   Real   is   external   and   prior   to   the   symbolic   order,   something  
“concrete  and  already  full,  a  brute,  pre-­symbolic  reality.”277  On  the  other  hand,  
by  his  use  of  the  objet  petit  a  as  an  empty  placeholder  for  the  lost  object  of  
desire,  Lacan  also  describes  the  Real  as  the  gap  within  the  symbolic  structure  
of   thought.   It   is   “a  void  which   is  not  nothing,  but   functions  to  empty   the   real  
material  of  the  partial  drives  into  language.”278  For  Guattari,  those  followers  of  
Lacan  who  concentrate  solely  on  the  latter  of  these  two  interpretations  make  
the  mistake  of  confusing  the  Real  with  its  structural  representation.  According  
to  Guattari,  while  the  Real  can  only  be  represented  within  symbolic  reality  by  
the  use  of  a  void,  psychoanalysis  must  move  past   this  mere  representation  
and  deal  with   the  pre-­symbolic  nature  of   the  Real  as   it  exists  outside  of   its  
manifestations   in   structural   thought.   If   psychoanalysis   restricts   itself   to   the  
Symbolic  register,  then  it  can  never  account  for  the  fact  that  our  motivations  
for   action   lie   outside   of   social   discourse.   Taking   anxiety   as   an   example,  
                                                                                                                
275  Miller,  1996,  20  
276  Miller,  1996,  17  
277  Ragland,  1996,  192  
278  Ragland,  1996,  193-­194  
   101  
Guattari   writes   that,   “Freud   reaffirms   that   anxiety   precedes   repression:   the  
anxiety  is  caused  by  an  external  danger,  it  is  real…  It  is  not  therefore  any  use  
trying   to   recognize   this   persistence   of   anxiety   beyond   actual   ‘situations   of  
danger’   through   some   impossible   dialogue   between   the   ego   ideal   and   the  
super-­ego.”279  Explaining  his  therapeutic  reasoning  for  his  insistence,  Guattari  
adds:   “It   is  obvious   that  the   theoretical   field,  while   it  carries  with   it  a  unique  
requirement  of  coherence,  cannot  be  separated  from  the  pragmatic  field.”280  
Ultimately,  Guattari  will  criticize  those  structuralists  who  refuse  to  deal  directly  
with   the   Real,   as   something   other   than   a   gap   in   the   otherwise   consistent  
symbolic  field.  As  Watson  explains,  Guattari  claims  that  the  Lacanian  school  
closes  off  access  to  the  Real,  “in  order  to  safeguard  the  tranquillity  of  the  couch  
setting  as  well  as  the  sociopolitical  status  quo,”  and  that,  “[t]o  Guattari’s  way  
of   thinking,   both   institution  and   revolution   require  access   to   the   real,   as   do  
creativity,  production,  and  change.”281  At  various  points  in  his  work,  Guattari  
distinguishes   Institutional   Psychotherapy   from   traditional   psychoanalysis   by  
the  fact  that  the  former  insists  on  a  direct  interpretation  of  the  Real,282  while  
also  differentiating  the  full  speech  of  subject  groups  from  the  empty  speech  of  
subjugated-­groups  by  the  former’s  ability  to  engage  with  the  Real.283  Guattari  
rarely   criticises   Lacan   directly   on   this   point,   but   instead   attacks   those  
Lacanians  who  aim  to  take  his  thought  in  a  structural  direction.  Guattari  also  
argues  against  Lacan’s  therapeutic  method  for  its  inability  to  work  with  patients  
suffering  from  psychosis.  Despite  his  ambivalence  to  the  wider  anti-­psychiatry  
movement,   Guattari   sides   with   thinkers   like   Laing   in   their   criticism   of  
psychoanalysis’  tendency  to  ignore  the  content  of  the  psychotic’s  speech  and  
to  simply  search  the  structure  of  their  speech  for  clues  about  their  underlying  
                                                                                                                
279  PT  104-­105  
280  PT  122  
281  Watson,  2009,  17  
282  “[I]nstitutional  psychotherapy…  is  precisely  a  determination  never  to  isolate  the  study  of  
mental  illness  from  its  social  and  institutional  context,  and,  by  the  same  token,  to  analyse  
institutions  on  the  basis  of  interpreting  the  real,  symbolic  and  imaginary  effects  of  society  
upon  individuals”  (PT  305).    
283  See  Deleuze’s  comments  regarding  subjugated-­groups:  “Their  centralization  works  
through  structure,  totalization,  unification,  replacing  the  conditions  of  a  genuine  collective  
‘enunciation’  with  an  assemblage  of  stereotypical  utterances  cut  off  both  from  the  real  and  
from  subjectivity  (this  is  when  imaginary  phenomena  such  as  Oedipalization,  
superegofication,  and  group-­castration  take  place).  Group-­subjects,  on  the  other  hand,  are  
defined  by  coefficients  of  transversality  that  ward  off  totalities  and  hierarchies.  They  are  
agents  of  enunciation,  environments  of  desire,  elements  of  institutional  creation”  (PT  14).  
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condition.284   Guattari   had   a   further   issue   with   the   structuralist   Lacanians’  
interpretation  of  the  unconscious,  namely  that  it  could  not  account  for  historical  
change.    
  
In  his  essay  ‘Causality,  Subjectivity,  and  History’  (1965),  Guattari  agrees  with  
Lacan’s  claim  that  the  subject  is  defined  by  its  structural  location  in  relation  to  
other   signifiers,   but   he   also   claims   that   the   subject   is   produced   by   an  
alternative,  historical  process,  which  cannot  be  accounted  for  within  a  purely  
structural  account  of  subjectivity.  According  to  Guattari’s  argument,  there  is  an  
aspect   of   durational   time   that   is   irreducibly   real.   He   claims   that   under   the  
auspices   of   the   structural   turn   in   psychoanalysis:   “Reality   and  history   have  
become   subject   to   an   eternal   symbolic   order   from   which   they   are   totally  
isolated  and  which  essentially  nullifies  them.”285  Guattari  makes  the  point  that  
while   the   subject   experiences   the   symbolic   structure   of   language   as   pre-­
existing,  and  while  the  subject  is  thus  conditioned  by  the  structure  of  language,  
the   particular   nature   of   the   language   into   which   the   subject   is   thrust   is  
historically  determined.  This   line  of  argument  will  bring  Guattari   into  dispute  
with  Lacan  over  the  question  of  the  Oedipus  complex.  For  Lacan,  the  subject  
only   comes   into   existence   when   it   enters   the   social   and   symbolic   field   of  
language  and,  as  this  symbolic  field  is  structured  by  the  Oedipus  complex,  all  
subjectivity  is  necessarily  Oedipal.  However,  according  to  Guattari’s  critique,  
while  the  symbolic  field  pre-­exists  the  subject,  we  must  also  give  a  historical  
account  of  the  production  of  the  symbolic  field.  To  put  this  in  psychoanalytic  
terms,   we   could   say   that,   while   conscious   desire   is   socially   structured   and  
linguistic  in  form,  the  unconscious  is  not  structured  like  language  and  as  such  
it  is  subject  to  historical  change.  This  is  especially  important  for  Guattari  at  a  
political  level  because,  “it  is  primarily  at  that  unconscious  level  that  history  is  
woven  and  that  revolutions  arise.”286    
  
                                                                                                                
284  For  more  on  Guattari’s  relationship  with  Laing,  and  with  the  anti-­psychiatry  movement,  
see  CY  124-­129.  
285  PT  238  
286  PT  245  
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Guattari  has  not  yet  put  forward  his  own  account  of  exactly  how  it  is  possible  
for  analysts  to  access  the  Real,  or  how  it  is  possible  to  analyse  the  historical  
progression  by  which   the  signifying  structure  of  society   is  produced.  At   this  
point,  Guattari   is  simply  making  a  critical  assertion.  He  is  claiming  that   if  we  
treat  the  Real  as  inaccessible  and  if  we  locate  the  unconscious  drives  within  
the  structure  of  language,  then  we  will  have  no  way  of  providing  an  account  of  
the  progression  of  history.  This  would  mean,  for  example,  that  there  would  be  
no  way  to  explain  how  the  Oedipal  structure  of  language  came  about,  or  why  
the  modes  of  subjectivation  that  existed  under  feudalism  are  different  to  those  
that  exist  under  capitalism.  It  is  at  this  point  that  we  can  see  Guattari’s  critique  
of   linguistic  structuralism  as  an  essentially  Marxist  one:  Guattari  claims  that  
when  the  signifier  is  regarded  as  a  universal  category,  analysis  is  subject  to  
“the  cleverness  of  a  new  idealism  that  actually  betrays  the  linguistic  discovery  
of   the   signifier.”287   It   is   a  mystification   of   the   unconscious   that   can  only   be  
combated  by  a  return  to  materialism.  
  
In   order   to   save   Lacanian   theory   from   this   encroaching   threat   of   idealism,  
Guattari  argues  for  a  move  away  from  the  linguistic  categories  of  Saussure  to  
the  semiotic  theories  put  forward  by  Hjelmslev.288  This  move  will  allow  Guattari  
to   claim   that   while   subjectivity   is   necessarily   embedded   in   the   structure   of  
signification   and   is   therefore   incapable   of   accessing   the   Real,   signification  
itself   is   not   a   closed   totality,   but   is   in   constant   conversation   with   other   a-­
                                                                                                                
287  PT  238  
288  Hjelmslev  was  a  Danish  linguist  who  challenged  Saussurean  linguistics  by  recasting  the  
distinction  between  signifier  and  signified  as  the  distinction  between  an  expression  
plane  and  a  content  plane,  while  simultaneously  making  a  distinction  between  the  form  and  
substance  of  each  of  these  planes.  He  was  thus  able  to  distinguish  between  form  of  
content,  form  of  expression,  substance  of  content,  and  substance  of  expression,  where  the  
substances  of  the  content  and  expression  of  speech  will  be  the  physical  and  psychical  
material  in  which  speech  is  manifest  (Hjelmslev,  1969,  57-­58).  Guattari  is  drawn  to  
Hjelmslev’s  work  because  it  shows  that  “structures  are  connected  to  processes”  (AOP  201),  
and  that,  rather  than  being  inert,  “substance  functions”  (AOP  203).  Using  Hjelmselv’s  model,  
Guattari  was  able  to  argue  that  linguistic  processes  could  interact  with  non-­linguistic  semiotic  
systems.  It  thus  gave  Guattari  a  way  of  conceptualising  the  semiotic  nature  of  the  
unconscious  without  falling  back  on  the  Lacanian  understanding  of  the  unconscious  as  being  
structured  like  a  language.  Having  said  this,  Guattari  later  criticises  Hjelmslev  for  his  
“pseudo-­dualism  for  expression  and  content”  (AOP  204).  He  claims  that  Hjelmslev  leads  
himself  into  a  paradox  when  he  claims  that  these  two  terms  are  “absolutely  reversible”,  and  
yet  treats  them  as  “two  planes:  that  of  the  signified—content—and  that  of  the  signifier—
expression”  (AOP  204).  In  response  to  this,  Guattari  suggests  to  Deleuze  that  in  their  work  
there  should  not  be  “two  planes  of  expression  and  content  but  one  single  plane  of  
consistency”  (AOP  207).  
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signifying   semiotic   forms   which   are   in   direct   contact   with   the   Real.   Here  
Guattari  makes  two  significant   revisions   to  Lacan’s  conception  of  semiotics.  
First,   he   expands   the   Symbolic   field   to   include   not   only   the   ‘signifying  
semiologies’  of  linguistic  utterance  but  also  the  ‘symbolic  semiologies’  of  non-­
linguistic  forms  of  meaning,  such  as  human  gesture.289  Second,  Guattari  also  
picked   out   two   further   semiotic   categories   that   operate   outside   of   human  
language,   namely   ‘diagrammatic   processes’   and   ‘natural   encodings’,   which  
include  those  semiotic  practices  that  operate  without  expressing  any  meaning,  
such  as  those  used  in  information  technology  and  computer  science,  and  the  
a-­semiotic   transmission   of   codes   that   occurs   in   biological   and   chemical  
processes.  Working  against  the  general  turn  to  linguistics,  popular  among  his  
contemporaries,   Guattari   is   keen   to   show   that   there   are   material   semiotic  
systems,   which   exist   independently   of   language   and   which   cannot   all   be  
captured  under  a  single  signifying  logic:  “Our  aim  is  not  to  blur  the  differences  
among  the  various  semiotic  machines,  but,  on  the  contrary,  to  see  as  clearly  
as  possible  what   is  specific   to  each.”290  For  Guattari,   the   two  categories  of  
‘diagrammatic  processes’  and  ‘natural  encodings’  are  non-­linguistic  and  pre-­
signifying   and   are   thus   pre-­subjective.   This   means   that   they   escape   the  
conditions  of   representation   and   consistency   that  are   incumbent  on  human  
language.  While  it  may  be  the  case  that  the  Real  can  only  be  represented  in  
the  Symbolic  order  by  a  void,  semiotic  processes  that  are  non-­representative  
have  no  such  constraint.  This  means  that  it  is  possible  for  the  analyst  to  work  
directly   with   the   Real   by   looking   outside   of   the   analysand’s   speech   to   the  
material   processes   that   produce   the   possibility   of   the   entire   symbolic   field.  
Guattari  “agrees  with  Lacan  that  the  signifier  remains  cut  off  from  the  real…  
but  he  at  the  same  time  insists  that  other  semiotic  components,  such  as  those  
at  work  in  nature  and  in  science,  can  in  fact  directly  connect  to  the  real.”291  
  
At   this   point   in   his   work,   Guattari’s   relationship   with   Lacanian   theory   is   a  
complex  one.  Guattari  is  using  Lacan’s  distinction  between  the  Symbolic  and  
the  Imaginary  in  his  analysis  of  group  subjectivity,  but  he  is  aware  that  to  stop  
                                                                                                                
289  MR  89  
290  MR  90  
291  Watson,  2009,  48  
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at  this  point  would  be  to  fall  into  a  kind  of  psychoanalytic  idealism,  which  would  
nullify  the  effects  of  history  and  constrain  psychoanalysis  from  ever  accounting  
for   the  possibility  of  revolution.292   In  order   to  avoid   this   fate,  psychoanalysis  
must  look  outside  of  language  to  the  Real  in  order  to  give  a  genetic  account  of  
the  production  of  the  Symbolic  field.  To  carry  out  such  a  task,  Guattari  claims  
that  psychoanalysis  must  do  two  things,  first  it  must  recognise  those  semiotic  
processes  that  exist  externally  to  linguistic  structure,  and  then  it  must  offer  an  
analysis   of   how   these   pre-­signifying   semiotic   processes   interact   with   the  
Symbolic   field.   For   Guattari,   to   carry   out   such   a   psychoanalytic   revolution  
would  be  a  Marxist  political  act  because,    “[t]o  recognize  non-­linguistic  semiotic  
modes,  according  to  his  schema,  is  to  find  ways  of  escaping  the  control  of  the  
despotic   signifier,   which   imposes   the   stifling   reign   of   representation,   in  
collusion  with   capitalism.”293   It   is   as   part   of  Guattari’s   attempt   to   follow   this  
trajectory,  and  to  map  out  the  interactions  between  the  real,  material  basis  for  
psychic  life  and  the  linguistic  superstructure  of  the  Symbolic  field,  that  he  would  
begin  his  analysis  of  the  role  played  by  ‘machines’.    
  
vii)  Machine  and  Structure  
  
Guattari’s  introduction  of  the  concept  of  the  ‘machine’  as  a  means  for  analyzing  
the   relationship   between   the   structure   of   the   symbolic   field   and   the   real,  
material  basis  from  which  it  is  produced,  occurs  in  two  essays,  namely  ‘From  
One  Sign   to   the  Other’   (1966)  and   ‘Machine  and  Structure’   (1969).   In   both  
cases,  Guattari  explains  the  process  by  which  the  structural  and  symbolic  field  
of  language  is  generated,  and  on  both  occasions  the  majority  of  the  discussion  
is  given  over  to  an  exploration  of  the  relationship  between  subjectivity  and  ‘the  
machine’.294   In  Deleuze’s   introduction   to  Psychoanalysis  and  Transversality  
he  picks  out  these  two  essays  as  “two  texts  in  particular  that  seem  especially  
                                                                                                                
292  Lacan’s  work  includes  a  number  of  internal  changes  throughout  his  career.  Guattari’s  
disagreements  with  the  Lacanian  school  do  not  arise  during  Lacan’s  early  emphasis  on  the  
Imaginary  (in  the  1930s  and  1940),  or  during  his  middle  stage  with  its  emphasis  on  the  
Symbolic  (1950s),  but  over  the  question  of  how  to  interpret  Lacan’s  seminars  that  deal  with  
the  Real  (1960s  and  1970s).  
293  Watson,  2009,  48  
294  PT  198  &  318  
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important  in  this  collection.”295  Here  I  will  focus  my  analysis  on  ‘Machine  and  
Structure’  as  the  language  developed  by  Guattari  in  this  essay,  such  as  that  of  
‘desiring  machines’,  is  carried  into  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  collaborative  work,  
whereas  the  terminology  of  ‘point-­signs’  and  ‘unitary  traits’  used  in  ‘From  One  
Sign   to   the   Other’   was   dropped   prior   to   Anti-­Oedipus.296   ‘Machine   and  
Structure’  is  of  extra  interest  because  of  the  role  it  played  in  Guattari’s  personal  
break  with  Lacan,  and  in  his  first  meeting  with  Deleuze.  The  essay  was  written  
when   Lacan   asked   Guattari   to   review   Deleuze’s   recent   publications   of  
Difference   and   Repetition   and   Logic   of   Sense.   However,   after   Guattari  
presented  his  review  as  a  paper  at  Lacan's  Ecole  Freudienne  de  Paris  in  1969,  
Lacan  refused  to  publish  it.  As  a  result  of  this,  and  via  an  introduction  by  their  
mutual   friend   Jean-­Pierre   Faye,   Guattari   sent   the   text   directly   to   Deleuze,  
initiating  the  pair’s  first  formal  meeting.297  
In   ‘Machine   and   Structure’   Guattari   sets   out   to   analyse,   and   then   critique,  
Deleuze’s   general   use   of   the   concept   of   structure   in   both   Difference   and  
Repetition  and  Logic  of  Sense.  Paying  surprisingly  little  attention  to  Deleuze’s  
use  of  psychoanalytic   theory,  Guattari  brings   together  what  he  sees  as   the  
most  insightful  sections  of  Deleuze’s  work  to  explain  a  distinction  of  his  own,  
namely  the  distinction  between  machine  and  structure.  Guattari’s  reworking  of  
Deleuze’s   concepts   can   be   summed   up   as   follows:   first,   Guattari   accepts  
Deleuze’s  key  distinction  in  Difference  and  Repetition  between  repetition  of  the  
same,   defined   by   the   generality   of   particulars   that   are   inherently  
exchangeable,   and   repetition   with   difference,   defined   by   singularities   that  
cannot  be  exchanged;;  second,  Guattari  maps  this  distinction  onto  Deleuze’s  
split  in  Logic  of  Sense  between  the  surface  of  language,  which  Guattari  reads  
as  a  space  of  generality,  and  a  depths  of  the  body,  in  which  Guattari  sees  the  
                                                                                                                
295  PT  21  
296  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  decision  to  drop  this  terminology  is  frustrating  for  the  reader  as  
Guattari’s  use  of  the  concept  of  the  ‘point-­sign’  to  designate  a  partial  or  pre-­individual  
element  involved  in  the  differential  production  of  signs  resonates  with  Deleuze’s  discussion  
of  partial  elements  in  Difference  and  Repetition.  Guattari  continued  to  use  this  terminology  in  
his  notes  for  Anti-­Oedipus,  but  these  terms  do  not  appear  in  the  final  work.  Guattari  also  
connects  the  point-­sign  to  differential  calculus  (AOP  360).    
297  For  an  evaluation  of  the  different  accounts  of  this  story,  see  Dosse  (2010,  268),  and  
Watson  (2009,  39).  For  Deleuze’s  first  ever  letter  to  Guattari,  and  for  his  first  written  
response  to  ‘Machine  and  Structure’,  see:  Deleuze,  2015,  35-­36  and  40-­44  respectively.    
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productive   capacity   of   the   repetition   of   difference.   Guattari   only   criticises  
Deleuze’s   work   for   offering   a   definition   of   ‘structure’   that   includes   both  
repetition  and  generality.  Guattari  summarises  this  break  from  Deleuze  in  the  
following  way:  “Of  Deleuze’s  three  minimum  conditions  determining  structure  
in  general,   I  shall   retain  only  the   first   two.”298  Deleuze’s   first   two  conditions,  
which  Guattari  accepts  wholesale,  state  that  in  any  structure:  “(1)  There  must  
be  at  least  two  heterogeneous  series,  one  of  which  is  defined  as  the  signifier  
and  the  other  as  the  signified”,  and  that,  “(2)  Each  of  these  series  is  made  up  
of   terms   that   exist   only   through   their   relationship   with   one   another.”299  
Deleuze’s   third  condition,  which  Guattari   rejects,  states   that  any  structure   is  
made   up   of   “two   heterogenous   series   [converging]   toward   a   paradoxical  
element,  which  is  their  ‘differentiator.’”300  Guattari’s  point  here  is  that  while  the  
first   two   criteria   deal   with   the   generality   of   particulars,   and   are   therefore  
correctly  understood  as  structural,   the   third  criteria  deals  with   the  repetition  
with  difference  of  singularities,  which  are  extra-­structural.  To  put   it  briefly,   if  
repetition  and  generality  are  radically  different,  then  they  should  not  both  be  
considered  as  aspects  of  the  structure.   It   is   in  order  to  resolve  this  difficulty  
that  Guattari   introduces  his  distinction  between  machine  and  structure:  “The  
essence  of  the  machine  is  precisely  this  function  of  detaching  a  signifier  as  a  
representative,  as  a  “differentiator,”  as  a  causal  break,  different  in  kind  from  
the  structurally  established  order  of  things.”301  While  language  is  structural  and  
defined  by  its  generality,  the  material  body  is  machinic  and  is  defined  by  the  
repetition   of   difference.   As   Watson   puts   it   so   concisely:   “Using   Deleuze’s  
terms,  Guattari  posits  that  machines   involve  repetition  with  difference,  while  
structures  consist  in  repetition  of  the  same.”302  
It  is  worth  clarifying  here  that  the  structuralism  that  Guattari  finds,  and  critiques,  
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300  PT  381.  It  is  unclear  whether  either  Deleuze  or  Guattari  distinguish  between  the  two  
spellings  of  the  “differenciator”  and  the  “differentiator.”  In  Différence  et  Répétition,  Deleuze  
uses  différenciant  (1968,  48,  90,  154,  159,  161,  316,  355)  but  in  Logique  du  Sens  he  uses  
différentiant  (1969,  66).  Guattari  seems  to  misquote  Logique  du  Sens  here  by  using  the  term  
différenciant  (Guattari  2003,  240).  However,  this  is  ‘corrected’  in  the  English  translations  
(2015,  322,  382).  
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in  Deleuze’s  earlier  work  is  not  a  traditional  form  of  structuralism.  Deleuze  had  
already  made  his  own  criticisms  of  structuralist  thought  based  on  the  need  to  
give  a  genetic  account  of  the  incarnation  of  structures.  For  example,  in  the  field  
of   linguistics,  Deleuze   is  critical  of   those  Saussurean   forms  of  structuralism  
that  “constantly  speak  in  negative  terms  and  assimilate  the  differential  relations  
between   phonemes   to   relations   of   opposition”.303   This   is   inadequate   for  
Deleuze   because   “opposition   teaches   us   nothing   about   the   nature   of   that  
which   is   thought   to   be  opposed”.304   Turning  away   from  Saussure,  Deleuze  
finds  an  alternative  and  genetic  theory  of  language  in  the  writing  of  Gustave  
Guillaume,  whose  work  carries  out  “the  substitution  of  a  principle  of  differential  
position  for  that  of  distinctive  opposition”.305  Following  Guillaume,  Deleuze  will  
attempt  to  show  how  individual  phonemes,  which  constitute  the  building  blocks  
of   the   linguistic  structure,  must   first  be  differentiated   in  speech.   In  brief,  we  
could   say   that   Deleuze   had   already   challenged   structuralist   thought   by  
showing   the   necessity   for   a   virtual   structuralism   in   which   the   differential  
relations   that   produce   the   structure   are   held   between  pre-­individual,   rather  
than   individual,   entities.306   However,   while   Guattari   appreciates   Deleuze’s  
virtual   interpretation   of   structuralism,   he   argues   that   Deleuze   is   wrong   to  
assume   that   the   “differenciator”   which   “makes   the   difference”   between   the  
preindividual   elements   is   internal   to   the   structure.307   If   this   differenciator  
operates  via  the  repetition  of  difference,  then  it  should  not  be  counted  as  an  
element  of  the  structure,  but  should  instead  be  designated  as  a  ‘machine’.  
The  driving  force  behind  Guattari’s  criticism  of  Deleuze’s  virtual  structuralism  
rests   on  a  disagreement   over   the   nature  of  historical   change.  According   to  
Guattari,  when  Deleuze  explains  the  motivating  force  behind  structural  change  
by  positing  a  paradoxical  element,  referred  to  variously  as  the  esoteric  word,  
the  phallus,  or  even  the  objet  petit  a,  within  the  structure  itself,308  he  constrains  
the   possibility   of   real,   historical   change.   According   to  Guattari’s   reasoning,  
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306  Deleuze  is  not  the  first  to  make  such  arguments.  As  well  as  drawing  on  Guillaume’s  work,  
Deleuze  was  influenced  by  Roman  Jakobson’s  concept  of  the  “zero  phoneme”  (LS  83).    
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such  an  account  of  structure  can  never  explain  the  way  in  which  the  particular  
form  of   any   given   structure   is   contingent  upon   its   historical   production.  For  
Guattari,  any  given  structure  develops  historically  because  of  something  alien  
to   it,   which   intrudes   on   it.   While   it   may   be   the   case   that   this   intrusion   is  
represented  within  the  structure  by  way  of  a  paradoxical  element  such  as  the  
object  petit  a,  the  driving  force  behind  this  eruption  must  be  located  outside  of  
the  structure  in  a  material  and  ‘machinic’  process.  Guattari  claims  that  in  order  
to,   “identify   the  peculiar  positions  of  subjectivity   in   relation   to  events  and   to  
history”  it  will  be  necessary  to  recognize  that  no  given  structure  can  ever  be  
analysed  as  something  distinct,  but  must  always  be  treated  as  the  structural  
articulation   of   something   non-­structural.309   This   non-­structural   or   extra-­
structural  element,  which  is  articulated  by  a  given  structure,  Guattari  will  call  
the   machine.   Putting   forward   his   basic   claim,   Guattari   states   that   “each  
contingent   structure   is   dominated…   by   a   system   of   machines”   and   that  
conversely   “a  machine   is   inseparable   from   its   structural   articulations”.310   In  
some  ways   it  may  be  more  accurate   to  say  here   that  Guattari’s  analysis   in  
‘Machine  and  Structure’  does  not  really  criticize  Deleuze,  as  much  as  offer  a  
particular   reading   of   Deleuze’s   work   that   plays   up   the   split   between   the  
structural   articulation  of   language  and   the   non-­structural   force   of   repetition.  
Guattari’s  comments  on  Deleuze’s  description  of  the  voice  in  Logic  of  Sense  
give  us  a  good  example  of  this.  Almost  echoing  Deleuze,  he  writes  that,  “[t]he  
voice,  as  speech  machine,  is  the  basis  and  determinant  of  the  structural  order  
of  language,”  but  he  is  careful  to  warn  against  overtly  structuralist  readings  of  
Deleuze:  “In  trying  to  see  things  the  other  way  round,  starting  from  the  general,  
one  would  be  deluding  oneself  with  the  idea  that  it  is  possible  to  base  oneself  
on   some   structural   space   that   existed   before   the   breakthrough   by   the  
machine.”311  
Guattari’s   use   of   the   concept   of   ‘the   machine’   to   designate   that   which   is  
external  to  structural  thought  and  that  which  produces  structural  thought  via  
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311  PT  322.  Deleuze  writes:  “The  voice…  presents  the  dimensions  of  an  organized  language,  
without  yet  being  able  to  grasp  the  organizing  principle  according  to  which  the  voice  itself  
would  be  a  principle”  (LS  221).    
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the  repetition  of  difference,  is  not  without  precedent.  In  fact,  we  can  see  clear  
precursors  of  this  concept  in  two  of  Guattari’s  most  important  influences,  first  
in  Marx’s  description  of  the  relation  between  the  material  and  economic  base  
of  reality  and  its  intellectual  and  super-­structural  articulations,  and  second  in  a  
section   of   Lacan’s   second   seminar   titled   ‘Odd   or   even?   Beyond  
intersubjectivity,’  where  Lacan  uses   the  concept  of   the  machine   to  describe  
the  interrelation  of  the  Real  and  the  Symbolic  structure  of  language.  In  what  
remains  of  this  section,  I  will  explore  each  of  these  references  in  turn,  before  
returning  to  Guattari’s  comments  in  ‘Machine  and  Structure’  to  clarify  his  use  
of   the   term   ‘machine’  and   its  connection   to  his  understanding  of  subjectivity  
and  historical  change.  
viii)  From  base  to  superstructure  
  
One  of  the  grounding  principles  of  Marxist  theory,  which  announces  its  radical  
break  from  Hegelian  philosophy,  is  the  distinction  made  between  the  economic  
base  of  a  society  and  its  institutional  superstructure.  According  to  Marx,  each  
stage   of   history   is   defined   by   its   mode   of   production,   where   the  mode   of  
production  is  understood  as  a  set  of  material  and  economic  relations  that  serve  
to  uphold  the  society  and  provide  for  its  material  needs.  At  different  stages  of  
history,  this  economic  base  of  society  has  been  constituted  by  various  relations  
between  land,  labour,  and  machinery.  What  is  key  here  is  that  the  accepted  
level  of  political  and   intellectual  discourse   is  shown   to  operate  at  a   remove  
from   the   historical   progress   of   society,   such   that   anyone   interested   in   the  
progression  of   society  must   turn   away   from  purely   intellectual   debates  and  
involve  themselves  in  the  material  conditions  of  their  environment.  Describing  
the  role  of  economic  relations,  Marx  writes  that,  “[t]he  totality  of  these  relations  
of  production  constitutes  the  economic  structure  of  society,  the  real  foundation,  
on  which   arises   a   legal   and  political   superstructure.”  As   a   result   of   this   he  
claims   that,   “[i]t   is   not   the   consciousness   of   men   that   determines   their  
existence,  but  their  social  existence  that  determines  their  consciousness.”312  
What   is   crucial   here   is   that,   for   Marx,   the   realm   of   human   thought   and  
understanding  does  not  progress  according  to  its  own  dialectic,  as  it  does  with  
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Hegel,  but  as  a  result  of  alterations  in  the  material  constitution  of  society.  For  
example,   Marx   explains   that   technological   advances   in   agricultural   and  
industrial  techniques  alter  the  constitution  of  the  material  basis  for  society,  and  
that   this   leads   to  a  secondary  change  at   the   level  of   the  political  and   legal  
frameworks  of  intellectual  life.  This  process  does  not  occur  smoothly,  however,  
and  as  such  the  historical  development  of  society  involves  a  series  of  social  
revolutions:  “At  a  certain  stage  of  development,  the  material  productive  forces  
of   society   come   into   conflict  with   the  existing   relations   of   production…  The  
changes  in  the  economic  foundation  lead,  sooner  or  later,  to  the  transformation  
of  the  whole,  immense,  superstructure.”313  Just  as  Marx  claims  that  changes  
in   the   base   can   be   determined   with   the   precision   of   a   natural   science,  
Guattari’s  materialist   psychoanalysis   of  machinic   desire   can  be   read  as   an  
attempt   to   develop   a   science   capable   of   understanding   the   unconscious  
operation  of  desire.    
Translating  Guattari’s  criticisms  of  Deleuze’s  structural  account  of  thought,  as  
they  are  given  above,  into  the  terminology  of  Marxist  theory,  we  might  say  that  
Guattari  argues  that  Deleuze’s  explanation  of  the  structural  nature  of  thought  
can  only  account  for  the  legal,  political  and  institutional  superstructure  of  social  
life,   and   that   by   locating   the   ‘paradoxical   element’   within   the   structure   of  
thought  he  is  failing  to  recognize  the  way  in  which  the  whole  of  the  structure  is  
in  fact  contingent  upon  the  historical  development  of  the  means  of  production.  
Marx  and  Engels  are  careful  to  clarify  that  the  relation  between  the  base  and  
the  superstructure  of  society  is  not  a  simple  one-­way  relation  and  Guattari  is  
similarly  careful  to  recognize  the  complexity  of  the  relation  between  what  he  
calls   the   ‘machine’   and   the   ‘structure’.  Marx  and  Engels  make  at   least   two  
clarifications  to  their  general  point  about  the  way  in  which  the  material  base  of  
society   effects   the   constitution   of   the   superstructure,   first   that   the   different  
superstructural  activities  of  man,  such  as  those  in  the  fields  of  art  and  politics,  
can  develop  at  different  rates  in  their  relation  to  the  base,  and  second  that  the  
relation  between  the  base  and  the  superstructure  is  a  reciprocal  one  in  which  
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the  material  base  only  determines  the  superstructure  in  the  last  instance.314  In  
his  essay   ‘Nine  Theses  of   the  Left  Opposition’,  Guattari   claims   that  Marxist  
theorists   have   historically   failed   to   give   a   proper   account   of   the   relation  
between  the  basic  and  superstructural  elements  of  social  life.  He  calls  it  a  “real  
puzzle  for  Marxist  theorists”  and  one  “that  revolutionary  Marxism  must  resolve  
at  all  costs  on  the  level  of  theory  and  on  the  level  of  practice,  if  it  wants  to  move  
beyond  the  alternative  between  vulgar  materialism  and  Hegelian  idealism.”315  
The   reason   for   this   failure,   according   to  Guattari’s   analysis,   is   that  Marxist  
theorists   have   never   successfully   solved   “the   problem   of   the   subject.”316  
Returning   to  Guattari’s   founding  claim   in   ‘Machine  and  Structure’   that   “each  
contingent   structure   is   dominated…   by   a   system   of   machines”   and   that  
conversely  “a  machine   is   inseparable   from   its  structural  articulations,”317  we  
can  now  see  this  claim  as  a  reworking  of  the  Marxist  assertion  that  the  social  
superstructure   is   dominated   by   the   material   structure   of   the   means   of  
production   and   that   the   means   of   production   is   inseparable   from   the  
superstructure.     With   this   in  mind,  Guattari  aims   to  go   further   than  Marx  by  
using  psychoanalytic  theory  to  explain  the  way  in  which  the  subject  emerges  
only  in  its  relation  with  the  ‘machine’  at  this  exact  point  of  intersection  between  
the   material   base   of   society   and   the   intellectual   superstructure.   While   the  
subject  of  feudalism  is  produced  in  part  by  its  direct  material  relation  with  the  
scythe,   or   with   the   thresher,   the   subject   of   capitalism   is   produced   by   its  
interactions  with  the  factory  and  the  machinery  of  industrial  production.  Aware  
of  the  myriad  of  difficulties  that  Marxist  theorists  have  traditionally  faced  when  
trying   to   think   through   the   ‘problem   of   the   subject’,   Guattari   returns   to  
psychoanalytic   theory   by   which   he   hopes   to   explain   the   production   of  
subjectivity  using  the  Lacanian  terminology  of  the  Real  and  the  Symbolic.    
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ix)  Lacan’s  machines     
  
When  Guattari  devises  this  distinction  between  machine  and  structure,  he  is  
not  only  offering  a  Marxist   reading  of  Deleuze’s  work,  and  he   is  not  simply  
rejecting  Lacanian  theory.  As  is  so  often  the  case  in  his  work,  Guattari  borrows  
from  Lacanian   terminology,  even  when  offering   revisions   to   the  work  of  his  
teacher.  For   this  purpose,  Guattari   turns   to  a  discussion   in  Lacan’s  second  
seminar   which   begins   in   the   section   titled   ‘Odd   or   even?   Beyond  
intersubjectivity,’   and   which   continues   in   his   ‘Seminar   on   “The   Purloined  
Letter.”’  318  In  this  bizarre  lesson,  Lacan  devises  a  game  by  which  he  hopes  to  
explore  “what  in  a  confused  fashion  is  called  cybernetics”  in  order  to  answer  
the  question  “what  is  the  subject?”319  By  the  use  of  this  game,  Lacan  shows  
how  a  symbolic  field  can  be  produced  by  an  unthinking  and  machinic  process.    
The  Lacanian  psychoanalytic  subject  is  a  symbolic  construction,  it  inhabits  the  
Symbolic  field,  rather  than  that  of  the  Imaginary  or  the  Real,  and  is  defined  by  
a   set   of   structural   and   symbolic   laws.   In   this   seminar,   Lacan   explores   the  
nature  of  this  symbolic  subject  by  explaining  the  process  by  which  the  entire  
symbolic  field  is  constituted.    
The  game  that  Lacan  describes,  and  which  his  seminar  audience  play,   is  a  
version  of  the  game  ‘evens  and  odds’  in  which  one  player  flips  a  coin  and  the  
other  player  must  guess  the  outcome.  Lacan  explains  how  it  is  possible  for  a  
machine,   which   is   not   conscious,   to   play   the   game,   and   to   do   so   with   a  
strategy.   The   game   begins  with   a   string   of   random   coin   tosses,   which   are  
written  down  as  a  string  of  symbols,  here  the  plus  sign  is  used  to  signify  a  head  
and  a  minus  sign  is  used  to  signify  a  tail.  At  this  point  it  is  clear  that  for  each  
toss  of  the  coin  there  is  a  50/50  chance  of  the  machine  successfully  guessing  
the  outcome.  Lacan  then  explains  what  happens  if  you  introduce  an  arbitrary  
set  of  symbolic  rules  into  the  recording  of  the  series.  In  Lacan’s  example,  each  
consecutive  group  of  three  coin  tosses  is  named  using  the  following  rules:  any  
three  tosses  of  the  same  result,  either  (+++)  or  (-­-­-­),   is  called  a  1;;  any  three  
tosses  that  includes  exactly  two  consecutive  tosses  of  the  same  result,  (++-­),  
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(+-­-­),   (-­-­+),   or   (-­++),   is   a   2;;   and   finally,   any   three   tosses   that   includes   no  
consecutive  tosses  of  the  same  result,  (-­+-­)  or  (+-­+),  is  a  3.  Lacan  is  now  able  
to  transcribe  a  string  of  plusses  and  minuses  into  a  string  of  numbers.  When  
writing  this  string,  each  of  the  numbered  triplets  of  coin  tosses  overlaps  with  
the  previous  triplet  by  two.  The  string  of  tosses  that  results  in  the  series  ++-­+-­
-­+  would  contain  five  groupings  of  three  tosses  as  follows:  (++-­),  (+-­+),  (-­+-­),  
(+-­-­),   and   (-­-­+),   which   would   be   transcribed   as:   2,   3,   3,   2,   and   2.   What  
fascinates  Lacan  here  is  that  while  in  the  string  of  plusses  and  minuses  there  
is  no  connection  between  the  signs  –  plusses  and  minuses  follow  each  other  
at   random   –   in   the   string   of   numbers   a   set   of   rules   emerges:   “This  
transformation  alone  gives  rise  to  extremely  precise  laws.  The  1s  the  2s  and  
the  3s  cannot  succeed  each  other  in  just  any  order.”  320  For  example,  Lacan  
explains  that  a  1  will  never  be  able  to  follow  a  3  and  that  an  indefinite  number  
of  2s  is  always  possible  between  a  1  and  a  3.    
What   is   important  here   is   that  an  arbitrary  set  of   rules  produces  a  string  of  
symbols  that  have  a  syntax.  In  this  transcription,  each  symbol  determines  the  
possibilities  open  to  the  symbol  that  will  come  next  so  that,  “independently  of  
any  attachment  to  some  supposedly  causal  bond,  the  symbol  already  plays,  
and   produces   by   itself   its   necessities,   its   structures,   its   organisations.”321  
Lacan  is  interested  in  this  non-­causal  but  necessary  connection  between  the  
symbols   in   the   chain   because   it   gives   him   the   opportunity   to   explain   the  
possibility   of   unconscious   memory.   According   to   the   arbitrary   rules   of  
transcription  used  above,  certain  patterns  emerge  in  the  string  of  numbers  that  
have  effects  on  other  numbers  occurring  at  a  great  distance  from  them.  For  
example,  if  a  string  of  an  even  number  of  2s  is  preceded  by  a  1,  then  it  will  be  
followed  by  a  1,  but  when  an  odd  number  of  2s  is  preceded  by  a  1,  it  will  be  
followed  by  a  3.  It  is  therefore  possible  for  the  chain  of  symbols  to  ‘remember’  
what  happened  further  back  in  the  chain.322  The  lesson  that  Lacan  draws  from  
                                                                                                                
320  Lacan,  1988,  193  
321  Lacan,  1988,  193  
322  Lacan  uses  this  phenomenon  to  argue  for  the  existence  of  unconscious  memory.  Fink  
explains  that,  in  this  example,  “rather  than  being  remembered  by  the  individual  (in  an  active  
way,  that  is,  with  some  sort  of  subjective  participation),  things  are  ‘remembered’  for  him  or  
her  by  the  signifying  chain…  We  have  here  a  clear  connection  between  the  letter  (or  
signifying  chain)  and  the  unconscious.  The  unconscious  cannot  forget,  composed  of  ‘letters’  
working,  as  they  do,  in  an  autonomous,  automatic  way”  (1996,  183).    
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this   game,   and   from   the   emergence   of   syntactical   rules   in   the   chain   of  
transcribed   numbers,   is   that   it   is   possible   to   explain   the   emergence   of   the  
entire   symbolic   field   of   language   as   an   effect   of   an   unconscious   process,  
carried  out  by  a  machine.  As  we  move  from  the  level  of  the  coin  tosses  to  the  
level  of  their  transcription,  “we  are  no  longer  at  all  in  the  domain  of  the  real,  but  
in   that   of   the   symbolic.”323   The   lesson   that   Guattari   draws   from   Lacan’s  
seminar  is  that  the  Real  and  the  Symbolic  relate  to  one  another  via  a  process  
in   which   a  machine   gives   rise   to   a   structure.   The  machinic   and  unthinking  
process   that   produces   the   random   string   of   plusses   and   minuses   can   be  
thought   of   as   the   productive   and   material   base   of   this   system,   while   the  
resulting  string  of  transcribed  numbers  can  be  understood  as  a  superstructure  
of  thought,  ultimately  determined  and  inseparable  from  that  which  produces  it.    
However,   Guattari’s   interpretation   of   Lacan’s   ‘Seminar   on   “The   Purloined  
Letter”’  differs  significantly  from  that  of  the  majority  of  Lacanians.  For  example,  
for  Bruce  Fink,  while  this  seminar  “points  to  the  limits  of  structure,  suggesting  
there  is  something  ‘above  and  beyond’  structure,  something  ‘outside  of’  and  
radically  different   from  or   in  excess  of  structure,”   the  work  of   the  seminar   is  
ultimately  seen  as  a  way  of  “extending  ever  further  the  impact  of  structure”  by  
showing   that   whatever   is   ‘beyond’   the   structure   is   something   “which  
nevertheless  can  be  seen  at  work  ‘within’  structure  itself.”324  This  is  patently  
not  the  case  for  Guattari,  who  sees  this  seminar  as  a  means  for  describing  the  
Real  without  simply   reducing   it   to  something   internal   to   the  structure  of   the  
Symbolic.  Fink  and  Guattari  differ   in   their   readings  of  Lacan  by   focusing  on  
different  aspects  of  the  coin  game:  while  Fink  concentrates  on  the  automatic  
and   machinic   production   of   structural   rules   and   concludes   that   even   the  
unconscious  is  structured  like  a  language,  Guattari  concentrates  on  the  fact  
that  the  rules  which  allow  for  the  transcription  of  the  coin  tosses  into  a  symbolic  
field  are  arbitrary,  leading  him  to  conclude  that  the  structure  of  language  is  not  
something  eternal  and  unconscious,  but  something  historically   located.  The  
result  of  these  two  different  readings  can  also  be  seen  in  Guattari  and  Fink’s  
alternative   readings   of   the  Oedipus   complex.   For  Fink,   and   also   for  Miller,  
                                                                                                                
323  Lacan,  1988,  182  
324  Fink,  1996,  174  
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Lacan’s  seminar  shows  that  the  Oedipus  complex  is  embedded  in  the  structure  
of  unconscious  desire.  For  Guattari,  on  the  other  hand,  the  arbitrary  nature  of  
the  rules  of  transcription  shows  that  not  only  is  the  unconscious  not  Oedipal,  
but   the   subject   need  not   be   either.325  We  will   see   in   the   next   chapter   how  
important  this  disagreement  is  for  Anti-­Oedipus,  where  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
first  clarify  the  operational  difference  between  mechanism  and  machinism.  In  
that  text,  Guattari  and  Deleuze  sum  up  their  ambivalence  to  Lacan  in  a  direct  
reference   to  Lacan’s   ‘Seminar  on   “The  Purloined  Letter”’,  where   they  state:  
“We  owe  to  Jacques  Lacan  the  discovery  of  this  fertile  domain  of  a  code  of  the  
unconscious,  incorporating  the  entire  chain  –  or  several  chains  –  of  meaning…  
The  chains  are  called  ‘signifying  chains’  because  they  are  made  up  of  signs,  
but  these  signs  are  not  themselves  signifying.”326  In  short,  Lacan  was  right  to  
think  of   the  unconscious   in   terms  of  a  machinic  code,  but  he  was  wrong   to  
have  modeled  this  code  on  the  signifying  capacities  of  language.    
  
x)  Revolutionary  escapes  
  
If  there  is  a  single  thought  that  binds  all  of  Guattari’s  work  prior  to  1969,  it  is  
that  there  is  something  non-­structural,  or  anti-­structural,  in  all  assemblages.327  
That  which  is  not  structural  is  machinic  and  it  is  this  which  escapes  structural  
relations,   connects   an   assemblage   with   its   outside,   and   brings   about  
revolution.  For  Guattari,  all  subjectivity  –  in  the  form  of  group  subjectivity  –  is  
necessarily  revolutionary  in  the  sense  that  it  is  only  produced  when  transversal  
connections   cut   across   the   hierarchical   stratifications   in   a   group   and   put  
heterogeneous  discourses  into  communication.  When  Guattari  claims  that  the  
human   being   “is   caught   where   the  machine  and   the   structure  meet”,   he   is  
                                                                                                                
325  Guattari’s  break  from  the  Lacanian  school  can  be  seen  clearly  in  the  different  ways  in  
which  Lacan  and  Guattari  use  the  example  of  the  coin  game  to  reinvestigate  Freud’s  case  of  
the  Wolfman.  Lacan  argues  that  this  game  explains  how  the  Wolfman  is  able  to  
unconsciously  remember  the  primal  scene  (1988,  176).  Guattari,  writing  with  Deleuze,  takes  
the  opposite  tack,  arguing  that  it  is  only  the  arbitrary  nature  of  the  symbolic  field  that  allows  
Freud  to  oedipalise  the  Wolfman’s  schizophrenic  tendencies  (ATP,  29).    
326  AO  41  
327  I  have  used  the  terminology  of  ‘assemblages’  here,  despite  the  fact  that  it  was  not  part  of  
Guattari’s  lexicon  at  the  time.  While  Guattari  does  discuss  groups  that  consist  of  
heterogeneous,  non-­human  elements,  he  does  not  begin  using  the  concept  of  the  
‘assemblage’  until  his  collaborations  with  Deleuze.    
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pointing  out   that  human  subjectivity   is  only  produced  when  machinic   forces  
cause   alterations   in   structural   relations.328   Guattari’s   early   writings   can  
therefore   be   understood   as   an   attempt   to   rethink   the   relation   between  
subjectivity,  history,  revolution,  and  escape.    
  
Initially,  Guattari  brings  Lacan’s  distinction  between  the  Real  and  the  Symbolic  
together  with  Marx’s  distinction  between  the  base  and  the  superstructure  of  
society.  Also  following  Lacan,  Guattari  locates  the  subject  within  the  symbolic  
field.   He  writes   that,   “[t]he   agent   of   action,  whose   definition   here   does   not  
extend   beyond   this   principle   of   reciprocal   determination,   is   included   in   the  
structure.”329   Moving   away   from   traditional   interpretations   of   Lacan’s   work,  
Guattari   then   offers   his   own   reading   of   Lacan’s   concept   of   the   machine.  
According  to  Guattari’s  interpretation,  the  structural  field  of  the  symbolic  realm  
is  not  constituted  by  a  set  of  eternal  rules,  but  is  produced  by  the  Real,  where  
the  Real  is  understood  to  be  made  up  of  a  set  of  productive,  material,  machinic  
relations.  This  alteration  convinces  Guattari  that  it  is  a  mistake  to  explain  the  
dynamics  of  desire  using  the  concept  of  the  objet  petit  a,  functioning  only  as  a  
representation   of   the   drives,   and   instead   to   use   the   concept   of   the   “objet-­
machine  petit   ‘a’”  which  is  “unable  to  be  absorbed  into  the  references  of  the  
structure.”330  Once  Guattari  has  recognized  that  the  driving  force  behind  desire  
is  not  a  gap  within  the  symbolic  structure,  but  the  eruption  of  a  machine  into  
the  symbolic  order,  he  is  able  to  conceptualize  desire  as  something  inherently  
productive  rather  than  something  inherently  lacking.  However,  what  is  just  as  
crucial  for  Guattari  is  the  fact  that  by  separating  the  machine  from  the  structure  
he  is  able  to  give  a  historical  account  of  the  nature  of  desire.  
  
While  Guattari   criticizes   structuralism   for   nullifying   the   effects   of   history   by  
capturing  it  within  an  eternal  symbolic  order,  the  concept  of  the  machine  allows  
him  to  account  for  historical  change.  He  writes  that,  machines  “are  not  related  
                                                                                                                
328  PT  322.  Guattari’s  description  of  the  human  being  is  similar  to  that  of  A  Thousand  
Plateaus:  “the  self  is  only  a  threshold,  a  door,  a  becoming  between  two  multiplicities”  (ATP  
275);;  “Every  society,  every  individual,  are  thus  plied  by  both  segmentarities  simultaneously:  
one  molar,  the  other  molecular”  (ATP  235).  
329  PT  318  
330  PT  324  
   118  
in  their  structural  determinations:  only  by  a  process  of  historical  analysis.”331  
This  claim  is  easy  to  understand  if  we  return  once  again  to  Marx’s  distinction  
between  the  base  and  the  superstructure  of  society.  The  subject  exists  in  the  
legal   and  political   framework   of   the   superstructure   in   the   sense   that   one   is  
‘subject   to   the   law’  or   ‘subjected   to  power’.  The  productive  capacities  of   the  
machine   are   not,   however,   constrained   under   any   such   symbolic   law.   For  
example,  the  development  of  technology  that  moves  a  society  from  a  feudalist  
to  a  capitalist  mode  of  production  advances  by  a  historical  and  non-­structural  
progression.332      Because   it   is   the   historical   development   of   the   Real   that  
produces  the  Symbolic  realm,  in  which  the  subject  is  embedded,  the  subject  is  
also  historically  defined  by  the  mode  of  production  that  produced  it.    It  is  only  
one  small  step  from  this  claim  to  Guattari  and  Deleuze’s  later  criticism  of  the  
institution  of  psychoanalysis.  If  psychoanalysis  restricts  itself  to  the  symbolic  
realm   of   the   political   and   legal   subject,   and   if   the   political   and   legal  
superstructures   refuse   to   reflect   contemporary   changes   in   the   mode   of  
production,   then   the  model  of  subjectivity  used  by  psychoanalysis  will   soon  
become  regressive  and  anti-­revolutionary.    
  
According  to  his  reinterpretation  of  the  base/superstructure  relation,  Guattari  
saw   an   appalling   mismatch   developing   between   the   accelerating   pace   of  
material  change  and  the  inertia  of  political  and  legal  structures:  “With  industrial  
capitalism,   the   spasmodic   evolution   of  machinery   keeps   cutting   across   the  
existing  hierarchy  of  skills.”333  This  means  that  workers  become  alienated  from  
their  society  and  have  no  way  of  being  recognized  by  the  legal  and  political  
frameworks   that   govern   their   lives.   According   to   Guattari’s   analysis,   the  
mismatch  between  the  Real  and  the  Symbolic,  places  the  human  being  in  a  
double-­bind.  It  only  survives  because  political  and  legal  institutions  manage  to  
“conceal  what  is  happening  by  setting  up  systems  of  equivalents,  of  imitations”  
such  as   the   “oppressive  myth   of   the  model  worker.”334  Guattari  names   this  
                                                                                                                
331  PT  319  
332  In  the  case  of  revolutionary  struggle,  however,  Marx  claims  that  the  development  of  
technology  provides  only  the  conditions  for  social  transformation  by  creating  a  contradiction  
in  the  mode  of  production,  and  that  class  consciousness  of  this  contradiction  is  required  to  
bring  about  the  revolutionary  transformation.    
333  PT  322  
334  PT  320  
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process   of   concealment   ‘anti-­production’.335   To   this   list   of   anti-­productive  
practices   we   could   add   the   way   in   which   the   institution   of   psychoanalysis  
upholds   the   oppressive   myth   of   the   Oedipus   complex   and   its   necessary  
equivalent  of  the  lacking,  neurotic  subject.    
  
All  of  Guattari’s  psychoanalytic  and  political  work  prior   to  1969   leads  him  to  
conclude  first  that  revolutionary  modes  of  subjectivity  –  those  not  conditioned  
by   the   structural   determinations   of   the   Symbolic   order   –   are   possible,   and  
secondly  that  such  modes  of  subjectivity  are  necessary  if  we  are  to  move  past  
the  political   stalemates   that  plague  contemporary   life.  For  Guattari,  political  
revolution  is  always  a  subjective  revolution.336  Periods  of  political  oppression  
and  stagnation  occur,  “when  the  superstructures  are  imposed  as  impossible  
representations  of  machine  effects,”  while  revolutions  are  possible,  “when  the  
machine   represents  social   subjectivity   for   the  structure.”337  The  work  of   the  
politically   committed   psychoanalyst   must   be   to   aid   in   the   exploration   and  
discovery  of  new  forms  of  subjectivation  that  are  capable  of  escaping  from  the  
structural  status  quo.  Psychoanalysts  must  recognize  that  the  unconscious  is  
not  structured   like  a   language,  and   is  not  a   theatre   for   the  dramatization  of  
desire,   but   is   a   factory   of   material   relations.338   The   unconscious   must   be  
understood  as  a  factory  not  only  in  the  sense  that  it  is  productive,  but  also  in  
the  political  sense  that  it  is  the  site  of  structural  subjugation.  With  this  in  mind,  
we  can  now  see  how  closely  Guattari’s  work  at  La  Borde  is  connected  to  his  
political   project.   His   attempts   to   aid   in   the   production   of   group   subjectivity  
should  not  only  be  understood  as  a  therapeutic  means  for  treating  psychosis,  
but  also  as  an  attempt  to  deal  with  the  cause  of  psychosis,  namely  the  double-­
bind   created   by   the   incompatibility   of   the   material   unconscious   with   the  
structural   forms   of   consciousness   currently   available.   Ultimately,   Guattari  
                                                                                                                
335  This  term  plays  a  similar  role  to  that  of  ‘ideology’  for  Marx,  however  Guattari  locates  this  
less  in  the  people’s  consciousness  and  more  in  the  disciplinary  functions  of  social  
institutions.    
336  As  well  as  placing  Guattari  in  the  history  of  Marxist  theory’s  attempt  to  think  through  the  
production  of  revolutionary  subjectivities,  this  move  also  locates  Guattari  in  a  philosophical  
trajectory  that  runs  through  Neitzsche,  Foucault  and  Deleuze.    
337  PT  237  
338  Guattari  describes  the  unconscious  as  a  factory  early  on:  “Grabbing  psychoanalysts  by  
the  collar  and  putting  them  in  an  asylum  is  like  putting  a  medieval  priest  in  a  factory,  or  a  
pool!  They  would  both  try  to  escape  by  exorcisms  and  excommunications”  (PT  73).  
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would   claim   that   the   theoretical   tools   available   to   psychoanalysts   were  
incapable  of  the  task  at  hand  because  of  the  way  that  they  are  restricted  to  a  
single  discourse.  After  having  defined  revolution  as  a  moment  at  which   the  
machine  is  able  to  fully  determine  the  form  of  the  structure,  Guattari  explains  
that,  “no  such  permanent  grasp  of  machine  effects  upon  the  structures  could  
really  be  achieved  on  the  basis  of  only  one  ‘theoretical  practice.’”  Instead,  such  
a  task,  “presupposes  the  development  of  a  specific  analytical  praxis  at  every  
level  of  organization  of  the  struggle.”339  This  is  what  Guattari  will  try  to  achieve  
in  his  schizoanalytic  work  with  Deleuze.  
  
     
                                                                                                                
339  PT  329  
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i)  Introduction  
  
The  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  is  first  introduced  by  Deleuze  and  Guattari  in  
Anti-­Oedipus.   It  arrives   in   this  work  with   little   introduction  and  yet   it  plays  a  
central  and  organising  role   in   the  conceptual  architecture   that  Deleuze  and  
Guattari   develop   in   the   book.   Simply   put,   Deleuze   and   Guattari   use   the  
concept  of  the  line  of  flight  to  define  the  way  that  desire  operates  when  it  is  not  
inhibited,  captured,  or  turned  against  itself  by  the  structuring  forces  of  social  
reality.  The  concept   is  an   important  one,   in   this  sense,  because   it  connects  
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  theory  of  desire  with  their  theory  of  political  change.  
The  fact  that  the  concept  emerges  here  is  also  telling  because,  unlike  many  of  
the   other   concepts   deployed   in   Anti-­Oedipus,   the   line   of   flight   is   a   novel  
creation  that  does  not  appear  in  the  lexicon  of  either  of  the  authors  previous  
works.  In  this  chapter,  and  in  the  one  that  follows,  I  will  argue  for  a  particular  
interpretation   of   the   role   that   the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight   plays   in  Anti-­
Oedipus.  Specifically,   I   will   argue   that   the   concept   is   used   in   at   least   four  
distinct  senses   in   the   text,  all  of  which  are  necessary   to  define   the  political  
project  of  schizoanalysis.  To  do  this,  in  this  chapter  I  will  first  concentrate  on  
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  novel  conception  of  the  unconscious.  I  will  show  how  
the  pair  use  a  number  of  insights  from  Guattari’s  earlier,  materialist  and  anti-­
structural   confrontations   with   Lacan   to   reformulate   the   metaphysical  
framework  offered  by  Deleuze  in  his  earlier  works.  This  will  allow  me  to  explain  
what  Deleuze  and  Guattari  mean  when  they  write  that,  in  the  unconscious,  “it  
is  not  the  lines  of  pressure  that  matter,  but  on  the  contrary  the  lines  of  escape  
(lignes  de  fuite).”340  In  the  subsequent  chapter,  I  will  continue  my  analysis  of  
the   role   of   the   line   of   flight   in   Anti-­Oedipus   by   considering   Deleuze   and  
Guattari’s  historical  and  political  analysis  of  capitalism.  
  
ii)  Framing  Anti-­Oedipus  
  
                                                                                                                
340  AO  371.  As  mentioned  previously,  accepted  English   translations  of  Anti-­Oedipus   render  
‘ligne  de  fuite’  as  ‘line  of  escape’.  In  order  to  find  some  consistency  with  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  
later  work,  and  with  the  majority  of  the  secondary  literature,  I  will  include  the  French  phrase  
‘ligne  de  fuite’  in  brackets  whenever  it  is  rendered  other  than  as  ‘line  of  flight’  in  the  translations.  
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Up   to   this   point,   I   have  offered  my  account   of  what  we  might   call   the   pre-­
individual  field  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight,  by  locating  the  conceptual  
moves   in   both   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   separate   work   before   1969   that  
prefigure   their   later   use   of   the   concept.   In   this   chapter   I   will   tackle   the  
individuation   of   the   concept   directly.   However,   the   fertile   domain   of  
individuation  created  by  the  collision  of  these  two  thinkers  has  its  own  historical  
context.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  first  met  in  1969  with  the  civil  unrest,  student  
protests   and  massive   general   strikes   of   May   ’68   still   fresh   in   their   minds.  
Besides  the  grand  scale  of  the  protests,  what  marked  out  the  uprisings  of  ’68  
was   the   fact   that   they  were   relatively   spontaneous  and  were   directed  by  a  
dislocated   assembly   of   students   and   workers   groups.   The   protests   also  
manifested  in  an  enormous  outpouring  of  desire,  with  the  writing  of  slogans,  
songs,   and   graffiti   demonstrating   the   drive   and   passion   that   animated   the  
students  and  the  workers  alike.  What  is  more,  the  events  were  not  predicted  
by   the   political   scholars   of   the   time,   by   the   government,   or   by   the   French  
Communist   Party,   and   they   received   little   institutional   support.341   These  
circumstances  fuelled  Guattari’s  scepticism  for  the  revolutionary  power  of  the  
official  French  Communist  Party,  who  he  had  already  criticised  for  their  role  in  
restoring  the  bourgeoisie  to  power  after  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War,342  
and  whose  politics  he  declared  “totally  determined  by  the  state  of  the  economic  
and   social   relations   of   State   monopoly   capitalism”.343   Deleuze   had   also  
retained   his   distance   from   the  Communist   Party,  making  him   an   exception  
among   French   intellectuals   of   the   time.   Despite   this   fact,   he   was   a   vocal  
supporter  of  the  student  protests  and  was  the  only  professor  in  the  philosophy  
department   of   Lyon   to   publicly   declare   his   support   and   attend   the   student  
organised  events.344  Thus,  before   their  meeting,  both  Guattari  and  Deleuze  
were  aware  that  a  new  theory  of  desire  and  a  new  theory  of  political  revolution  
were   required,  one   that   did   not   rely   on  party   political  power   and   that   could  
account  for  the  supposed  unpredictability  of  May  ’68.  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  
first  meeting  was   organised   after  Guattari   had   sent   Deleuze   a   copy   of   his  
                                                                                                                
341  For  more  on  the  role  of  the  PCF  in  the  events  of  May  1968,  see  Bell  &  Criddle  (1994,  90-­
93).  
342  PT  158  
343  PT  247-­248  
344  Dosse,  2010,  177  
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essay  ‘Machine  and  Structure’.  These  first  meetings  were  highly  productive,  
with  each  forced  to  rethink  their  previous  work  in  a  mutual  attempt  to  develop  
a  theory  of  desire  that  could  account  for  May  ’68  and  overcome  the  failures  of  
traditional   Freudianism  and   traditional  Marxism.  Only   three   years   later,   the  
result  of  these  conversations  emerged  as  Anti-­Oedipus,  a  veritable  explosion  
of   novel   ideas   combining   philosophical   moves   from   Kant,   Spinoza,   and  
Nietzsche,  with  insights  from  the  literature  of  D  H  Lawrence,  Samuel  Butler,  
and  Antonin  Artaud,  as  well  as  the  anthropological  studies  carried  out  by  Pierre  
Clastres,  Marcel  Griaule,  and  Germaine  Dieterlen  (along  with  the  ontologies  
of  the  different  societies  they  studied  such  as  the  Dogon,  Guayaki  and  nomads  
from  Mongolia),   the  psychoanalytic  work  of  Freud,  Reich,  Kline,  and  Lacan,  
and  of  course  the  theories  of  political  economy  advanced  by  Marx  and  Engels,  
Adam  Smith,  and  David  Ricardo.  The  book  is  an  attempt  to  offer  an  account  
of  universal  history  that  incorporates  a  theory  of  desire  and  of  the  unconscious,  
which   is   capable   of   explaining   the   drivers   of   political   change   and   political  
revolution,  as  well  as  the  ways  that  these  revolutions  go  sour,  or  morph  into  
self-­destructive   fascisms.   345   It   is   in   the   context   of   this   psychoanalytic   and  
politically  motivated  text  that  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  is  born.  
  
iii)  Negative  psychoanalytic  task:  dealing  with  the  Oedipus  Complex  
  
One   of   the   central   aims   of   Anti-­Oedipus   is   to   provide   a   theory   of   the  
unconscious  that  challenges  both  the  Freudian  convention  of  interpreting  the  
unconscious  as  a  kind  of  theatre,  where  the  narrative  of  desire  is  played  out,  
and   the   Lacanian   convention   of   interpreting   the   unconscious   as   an  
inaccessible  and  impossible  ‘Real’  defined  by  its  structural  role,  namely  as  the  
gap,   cut,  or   lacuna  within   the  Symbolic.346  Perhaps   the   clearest   reason   for  
                                                                                                                
345  While  this  may  sound  like  a  direct  continuation  of  Guattari’s  work  and  a  change  in  direction  
for  Deleuze,  many  of   the  conceptual   innovations  of  Deleuze’s  previous  metaphysical  work  
involved   reworkings   of   both   Marxist   and   Freudian   concepts.   Deleuze’s   earliest   academic  
interests  also  concerned  the  relationship  between  desire  and  the  existence  of  societal  norms.  
See  Deleuze’s  edited  selection  of  texts  in  Instincts  et  Institutions  (1953),  the  introduction  of  
which  is  translated  in  DI,  19-­21.  
346  Lacan  does  not  strictly  define  the  unconscious  as  inaccessible  as  he  does  offer  a  route  to  
the  unconscious  via  the  structure  of  language.  It  would  be  more  accurate  to  say  that  Lacanian  
theory  treats  desire  as  necessarily  barred,  and  therefore  the  unconscious  is  only  readable  in  
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Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  rejection  of  these  approaches  is  that  they  both,  in  their  
own  way,  subordinate  the  activity  of  unconscious  desire  to  some  form  of  social  
convention.  In  both  cases  this  subordination  of  the  unconscious  is  carried  out  
by  a  championing  of   the  Oedipus  complex.  Criticising  Freud’s   insistence  on  
the  universality  of  the  Oedipus  complex,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  question  what  
it  means  to  say  that  Freud  “discovered  Oedipus  in  his  own  self-­analysis.”347  
According  to  their  reading,  it  would  be  more  accurate  to  say  that  what  Freud  
‘discovered’  was  only  that  the  familial  situation  in  which  he  was  raised  shared  
certain  traits  with  the  patients  he  treated  because  of  the  common  family  form  
that  conditioned  them.  Freud’s  decision  to  draw  on  the  myth  of  Oedipus  is  then  
simply  one  way  of  explaining  a  societal  norm  by  utilising  a  familiar  trope  from  
his  own   “Goethian  classical  culture”.348  Unfortunately,  according   to  Deleuze  
and  Guattari’s  reading,  Freud  reverses  the  order  of  determination  by  which  the  
social   convention   of   the   nuclear   family   creates   Oedipal   subjects,   instead  
claiming   that   the   familial   romance   is   a   “mere   dependence   on   Oedipus.”349  
Starting  from  this  error,  Freud  then  “neuroticizes  everything  in  the  unconscious  
at  the  same  time  as  he  oedipalizes,  and  closes  the  familial  triangle  over  the  
entire  unconscious.”350  The  reason  that   this  generalised  use  of   the  Oedipus  
complex   is   so   disastrous   in   the   eyes   of   Deleuze   and   Guattari   is   that,   by  
elevating  the  Oedipus  to  the  level  of  the  necessary  form  of  desire,  Freud  also  
made  desire  inherently  representative  or  signifying,  rather  than  productive.  It  
is  in  this  move  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  claim  that,  “the  unconscious  ceases  
to  be  what  it  is  –  a  factory,  a  work-­shop  –  to  become  a  theatre,  a  scene  and  its  
staging.”351  To  clarify,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  do  not  attempt  to  dismantle  the  
entire  Freudian  edifice,  but  instead  attempt  to  extract  those  Freudian  insights  
that  capture  the  active,  productive  and  pre-­personal  aspects  of  unconscious  
desire,   from   those   that   reduce   the  unconscious   to   a   theatre   for   the   eternal  
staging  of  the  oedipal  drama.  Specifically,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  credit  Freud  
                                                                                                                
the  effects  produced  by   the   repression  of  social   reality.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  will   attempt,  
however,  to  analyse  desire  directly,  without  any  reliance  on  its  repression.    
  
347  AO  62  
348  AO  62  
349  AO  62  
350  AO  62  
351  AO  62  
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with  the  discovery  of  the  unconscious  and  with  the  discovery  of  the  abstract  
category  of  desire,  praising  in  particular  Freud’s  1915  paper  The  Unconscious,  
where  he  brought  together  his  dynamic,  topographical,  and  economic  models  
of   the  unconscious.  Much   to   the  satisfaction  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  here  
Freud   also   shows   that   unconscious   desire   is   “exempt   from   mutual  
contradiction”   so   that,   “there   are   in   this   system   no   negation,   no   doubt,   no  
degrees   of   certainty”,   and   finally   that   the   impulses   in   this   system,   “are   not  
ordered   temporally,   are   not   altered   by   the   passage   of   time;;   they   have   no  
reference  to  time  at  all”.352  On  top  of  this,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  particularly  
enamoured  by  Freud’s  work  in  Beyond  the  Pleasure  Principle  (1920),  where  
Freud  moves  past  his  earlier  theories  of  an  unconscious  desire  motivated  by  
the  pleasure  principle,  to  more  critical  and  metaphysical  questions  concerning  
the  necessary  existence  of  a  more  complex  relationship  with  reality,  especially  
in  the  context  of  the  apparent  tendency  of  life  towards  death.353  Among  many  
other  arguments,   it   is  here   that  Freud  elaborates  on   the  ways   in  which   the  
unconscious  is  not  necessarily  ordered  by  the  categories  of  space  and  time,  
and  offers  a  direct  challenge  to  Kantian  metaphysics:  “As  a  result  of  certain  
insights  afforded  to  us  by  psychoanalysis,  Kant’s  dictum  that  time  and  space  
are  necessary  forms  of  human  thought  is  today  very  much  open  to  debate.  We  
have   come   to   appreciate   that   unconscious   psychic   processes   are   in  
themselves   ‘timeless’.”354  While  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  more   cautious   in  
their  analysis  of  Kant,  they  praise  these  works  of  Freud  because  it  is  here  that  
he  explicates  the  abstract  concept  of  desire,  without  tarnishing  this  discovery  
with  the  apparent  necessity  of  sexual  repression.    
  
In  the  case  of  Lacan,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  also  attempt  to  split  those  insights  
they   deem   useful   from   those   that   confirm   the   psychoanalytic   structuring   of  
unconscious  desire.  Both  of  these  sides  of  Lacan’s  work  can  be  seen  in  his  
treatment  of  the  Oedipus.  For  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  Lacan’s  most  influential  
impact  on   the   interpretation  of   the  Oedipus  was  his  claim  that   it  was  purely  
                                                                                                                
352  Freud,  1957,  186-­187.  See  also  Freud’s  comments  on  “the  quantitative  distribution  of  the  
libido”  (Freud,  2006b,  11).  
353  This  essay  also  plays  a  significant  role  in  Deleuze’s  previous  account  of  the  three  
syntheses  (DR  120-­140).  
354  Freud,  2006a,  155  
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imaginary.  Where  Freud  had  claimed  that  all  desire  related  back   to   the   first  
feeling  of  lack  experienced  by  the  child  when  he/she  was  removed  from  the  
mother   by   the   imposition   of   the   father,   Lacan,   “shows   on   the   contrary   that  
Oedipus   is   imaginary,   nothing   but   an   image,   a   myth.”355   This   means   that  
instead  of  thinking  about  the  Oedipus  complex  as  something  which  comes  into  
existence  at  a  particular  point  in  the  development  of  subjectivity,  Lacan  sees  it  
as  a  myth  that  is  used  to  explain  the  fact  that  in  order  to  enter  the  Symbolic  
realm  of  social  interaction  the  subject  must  necessarily  be  lacking,  barred  or  
castrated.  Interestingly,  Lacan’s  argument  against  Freud’s  mythical  version  of  
the  Oedipus   is   given  most   explicitly   in   the   two   seminars,  The  other   side   of  
psychoanalysis  and  On  a  discourse  that  might  not  be  a  semblance,  which  he  
delivered   from   1969   to   1971,   at   exactly   the   same   time   that   Deleuze   and  
Guattari   were   writing   Anti-­Oedipus.356   During   these   two   seminars,   Lacan  
continuously  refers  to  the  Oedipus  as  a  myth  and  as  a  dream  of  Freud.357  He  
offers  a  close  reading  of  the  Oedipus  myth  that  Freud  borrows  from  Sophocles,  
and  the  alternative  Oedipus  story  that  Freud  articulated  in  Totem  and  Taboo,  
and   shows   how   they   contradict   each   other.  Using   Barthes’   analysis   of   the  
structure   of   myth,   Lacan   argues   that   both   versions   of   the   Oedipus   are   an  
attempt   to   deal   with   the   unanswerable   question   of   origin,   and   that   both  
ultimately  grapple  with  the  difficulty  of  an  individual’s  conception  through  the  
sexual  relationship  of  the  parents.  However,  according  to  Lacan,  the  role  that  
the   father  plays   in   these   two   stories   is  dramatically   different.   In  Sophocles’  
Oedipus,  neither  the  father  nor  the  child  are  allowed  to  fulfil  their  desire  for  the  
mother.  The  curse  laid  upon  Oedipus  is  the  result  of  a  previous  injunction  put  
upon  the  father,  which  forbade  him  from  consummating  his  marriage.  It  is  when  
the  father  breaks  this  rule  that  he  sets  in  motion  the  narrative  that  will  ultimately  
lead  to  his  own  death  and  the  repetition  of  the  transgression  by  his  son.  In  this  
story,  the  father  and  the  son  are  ultimately  ‘castrated’  by  the  impossibility  of  
enjoyment.  The  oedipal  story  in  Totem  and  Taboo,  on  the  other  hand,  does  
not  place  the  same  restriction  on  the  primal  father.  According  to  this  story,  the  
father  initially  had  free  access  to  all  of  the  women,  but  when  he  is  killed  by  the  
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horde  of  brothers   the  remaining   image  of   the  dead  father  constitutes  a  rule  
against  the  fulfilment  of  desire  by  incest.  It  is  the  second  version  of  the  Oedipus  
story   that  Lacan  refuses   to  accept.  He  calls   it  a  “cock-­and-­bull  story”358  and  
refers   to   Freud’s   “blessed   story   of   the   father   of   the   horde”   as   a   kind   of  
“Darwinian  buffoonery.”359  Speaking  of  the  power  of  the  father,  Lacan  writes  
that,  “the  mystagogy  that  makes  him  into  a  tyrant  is  obviously  lodged…  at  the  
level   of   the   real   father  as   a   construction  of   language”   and  adds,   “[t]he   real  
father  is  nothing  other  than  an  effect  of  language.”360  Crucial  for  Deleuze  and  
Guattari   in  this  interpretation  is  the  fact  that  if  the  Oedipus  is  a  myth,  then  it  
does  not  necessarily  tell  us  anything  about  the  nature  of  desire,  but  only  about  
a  particular  way  in  which  that  desire  has  been  repressed.  
  
However,   the   error   that   Deleuze   and   Guattari   claim   to   locate   in   Lacanian  
psychoanalysis  can  be  seen  creeping  in  just  as  soon  as  Lacan  first  dismissed  
Freud’s   version   of   the   Oedipus   as   imaginary.   Immediately   after   Lacan’s  
critique  of  Freud’s  Oedipus  myth   in   seminar  XVII,   he  writes   that,   despite   it  
being  a  myth,  in  analysis  “the  myth  of  Oedipus  is  necessary  to  designate  the  
real.”361  By  defining  the  Oedipus  complex  as  necessary  for  the  interpretation  
of  desire,  Lacan  is  able  to  develop  a  structural  account  of  desire,  supposedly  
abstracted  from  its  social,  cultural,  and  historical  context.  It  is  precisely  at  this  
point,   the  point  at  which   the   imaginary  Oedipus   is  defined  as  necessary,  at  
which  Deleuze  and  Guattari  depart   from   the  Lacanian   reading  of  desire.   In  
Anti-­Oedipus,   Deleuze   and   Guattari   identify   the   structural   development   in  
Lacanian   analysis   as   a   missed   opportunity   in   which   the   discovery   of   the  
imaginary  nature  of  the  Oedipus  was  followed  by  a  re-­imposition  of  the  Oedipal  
system  in  structuralist  terms.  They  write  that  “it  was  inopportune  to  tighten  the  
nuts  and  bolts  where  Lacan  had  just  loosened  them”362,  and  even  joke  about  
how  perfectly  the  logic  of  the  Oedipus  is  reintroduced  in  Lacan’s  structuralist  
account   claiming   that,   “it   is   like   the   story   of   the   Resistance   fighters   who,  
wanting  to  destroy  a  pylon,  balanced  the  plastic  charges  so  well  that  the  pylon  
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blew  up  and  fell  back  into  its  hole.”363  In  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  eyes,  Lacan  
had  managed   to  destroy   the  mythical  Oedipus  only  by  creating  a  structural  
one,  and  in  this  way  had  reintroduced  all  of  the  misconceptions  about  desire  
inherited  from  Freud.  Regardless  of  whether  it  is  used  as  a  mythical  reference  
point   or   a   structural   law,   if   unconscious   desire   is   captured   by   the   yolk   of  
Oedipus,   then   it   will   appear   as   an   a-­historical  mirror   of   human   nature.   For  
Deleuze   and   Guattari,   this   interpretation   of   desire   involves   an   illusion   that  
reverses  the  true  order  of  determination:  unconscious  desire  is  not  produced  
by  our  lived,  socially  constructed  reality,  but  is  the  productive  force  that  gives  
rise  to  such  a  reality.  It  cannot,  therefore,  be  the  case  that  unconscious  desire  
represents   or   mirrors   the   social   convention   of   the   nuclear   family,   on   the  
contrary,   it  must  be  the  case  that  desire  is  inherently  an-­oedipal  and  is  only  
captured   by   the   structure   of   the   Oedipus   complex   under   certain   historical  
conditions.    
  
iv)  Positive  psychoanalytic  task:  Defining  desiring-­production    
  
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  engagements  with  psychoanalysis  are  not  only  critical  
in  Anti-­Oedipus  and   it   is   their   stated  aim  to  provide  a  positive   theory  of   the  
unconscious  that  does  not  reduce  it  to  either  a  theatre  for  the  shadow  play  of  
desire,  or  a  structural  void  necessary   for   the  process  of  analysis.  Given  the  
fact  that  the  previous  two  chapters  have  offered  readings  of  previous  works  
completed  by  both  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  perhaps  the  most  direct  way  to  give  
a  clear  account  of  the  positive  and  productive  theory  of  the  unconscious  that  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  develop  in  Anti-­Oedipus   is  to  show  how  it  differs  from  
the   equivalent   theories   offered   in   each   of   the   pair’s   work   prior   to   their  
collaboration.    
  
We   saw   in   the   last   chapter   how   Guattari’s   essay   ‘Machine   and   Structure’  
challenged  the  form  of  structuralism  found  in  both  Difference  and  Repetition  
and  Logic  of  Sense  because  of  the  fact  that  Deleuze  was  forced  to  include  a  
non-­structural  element  –  variously  called  the  object=x,  or  the  differentiator  –  
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into  his  definition  of  the  structure  itself.  In  opposition  to  this,  Guattari  opened  
up  a  distinction  between  the  category  of  the  structure,  which  requires  nothing  
more  than  two  heterogeneous  series,  the  terms  of  which  are  defined  mutually  
by   their   reference   to   one  another,   and   the   category   of   the  machine,  which  
functions  outside  of  the  structure  and  plays  a  role  in  its  genesis  via  a  process  
of   incessant   repetition.  With   Guattari’s   insistence   on   the   separation   of   the  
structure  and  the  machine  in  mind,  in  Anti-­Oedipus  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  
able   to  explain  exactly  where  Lacan’s  Oedipal   theory  of  desire  goes  wrong,  
namely   in   that   it  does  not   recognize   the  a-­structural  and  machinic  nature  of  
desire,   which,   far   from   being   structured   like   a   language,   or   necessarily  
structured  by  the  Oedipus  complex,  is  a  machine  that  has  logical  priority  over  
the   structure.   When   this   challenge   to   the   foundations   of   structuralism   is  
incorporated  into  Anti-­Oedipus,  we  find  that  the  ontological  categories  offered  
in   Difference   and   Repetition   are   considerably   altered.   In   Difference   and  
Repetition,  Deleuze  had   claimed   that   the   genesis   of   any   actual   experience  
required   both   a   field   of   individuation   and   a   virtual   Idea.   The   former   was  
intensive   and   dynamic   and   served   to   drive   the   individuation   and   the  
dramatization  of  spatio-­temporal  dynamisms,  while  the  latter  was  differential  
and  provided  the  structuring  template  by  which  the  actualization  of  experience  
could  be  given  form.  To  put  it  briefly,   in  Anti-­Oedipus,  the  main  alteration  to  
this  process  is  that  the  virtual  Idea  is  no  longer  considered  necessary  for  the  
process  of  actualization  and  the  intensive  field  of   individuation  is  considered  
capable  of  directing  its  own  actualization.  The  intensive  field  is  renamed  as  the  
multiplicity  of  desiring-­production  and  the  spatio-­temporal-­dynamisms,  which  
are  now  considered  as  machinic  and  self-­directed,  are  renamed  as  desiring-­
machines.   Desiring-­production   differs   from   the   intensive   field   defined   in  
Difference  and  Repetition,  and  from  the  ‘depths’  as  they  are  defined  in  Logic  
of  Sense,  because  of  the  fact  that  they  do  not  require  any  structuring  from  the  
heights  of  the  virtual  Idea  in  order  to  be  productive.  This  is  why  Deleuze  and  
Guattari   claim   that   “desiring-­production   is   production   of   production.”364  
Desiring-­machines,   on   the   other   hand,   differ   from   the   spatio-­temporal  
dynamisms  of  Difference  and  Repetition  because  of  the  fact  that  they  operate  
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according   to   three   immanent   syntheses   of   production,   which   require   no  
interaction  with  the  virtual.  Summarizing  their  position,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
state   that   the   real   decision   to   be  made   in   analysis   is   not   between  Lacan’s  
structural  Oedipus  and  Freud’s  mythical  one,  but  “between  Oedipus,  structural  
as  well  as   imaginary,  and  something  else   that  all   the  Oedipuses  crush  and  
repress:  desiring-­production.”365  
  
Where   Deleuze   and   Guattari   do   retain   the   category   of   the   virtual   in   Anti-­
Oedipus,   it   is   no   longer   used   to   designate   a   differential   structure   that  
dominates  the  actualization  of  reality,  but  is  instead  considered  as  a  secondary  
effect  of  the  machinic  process  of  desiring-­production.  Take  the  example  of  the  
Oedipus  complex  again:  Deleuze  and  Guattari  show  that,  while  it  is  the  case  
that  a  particular,   tripartite  structure  of  desire   is   regularly   found   in   the   family  
unit,   this  structure   is  an  effect  of  desiring-­production,  and  not   its  cause.  To  
follow  this  logic  is  not  to  question  the  “vital  importance”  of  the  love  attachments  
formed  in  the  family,  but  it   is  a  question  of  knowing  “what  the  place  and  the  
function   of   parents   are   within   desiring-­production”,   rather   than   doing   the  
reverse  and  “forcing  the  entire  interplay  of  desiring-­machines  to  fit  within  the  
restricted   code   of  Oedipus.”366   Following   from   this   reasoning,   Deleuze   and  
Guattari  state  that  “it  is  Oedipus  that  depends  on  desiring-­production…  And  it  
is  the  Oedipus  complex  that  is  virtual.”367  Oedipus  is  virtual  in  the  sense  that  
while  it  is  really  made  manifest  in  any  number  of  human  relationships,  it  has  
no   actual   existence,   no   spatio-­temporal   location,   and   no   necessity.   This  
reorientation   of   the   virtual   is   crucial   for   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   theory   of  
unconscious   desire   because   it   opens   the   possibility   of   defining   desire   as  
distinct  from  the  forces  that  dominate  and  repress  it.  For  Lacan,  and  perhaps  
for   the   early   Deleuze   too,   desire   can   never   be   considered   apart   from   its  
repression,  and  hence  the  Real  unconscious  remains  constantly  blocked  and  
always  impossible,  however  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  theory  makes  space  for  a  
direct   analysis   of   desiring-­production.   More   specifically,   while   Lacanian  
structuralism   can   only   consider   desire   as   it   is   captured   in   the  Oedipal   net,  
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Deleuze  and  Guattari  aim   to  analyse   those   flows  of  desire   that  escape   the  
virtual  Oedipus.  From  this  perspective,  these  escapes  are  not  anomalies,  but  
indicative  of   the  very  foundation  of  desire   itself.  Much  of   the  psychoanalytic  
project  of  Anti-­Oedipus  is  then  given  over  to  explaining  how  desiring-­machines  
function,   and   how   they   generate   our   lived   experience   without   the   input   of  
virtual  Ideas.368  Central  to  this  task  is  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  account  of  the  
nature  of  machinic  processes  and  of  the  three  syntheses  of  the  unconscious  
that  define  the  operations  of  desire.  Here  I  will  first  give  a  brief  account  of  the  
role  of  machinic  processes,  before  introducing  each  of  the  three  syntheses  in  
turn.    
  
In  Anti-­Oedipus,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  do  not  simply  borrow  the  concept  of  the  
machine  from  Guattari’s  work  in  ‘Machine  and  Structure’,  but  develop  it  further.  
Here,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  explain  their  use  of  the  category  of  the  machinic  
in  contradistinction  to  theories  of  both  mechanism  and  vitalism  and  their  aim  is  
to  produce   the  category  of   the  machinic  by  splitting   the  difference  between  
these   two   traditional   categories.369   Deleuze   and   Guattari   take  mechanistic  
theories   as   those   that   explain   the   real   as   a   series   of   combinations   and  
collisions   of   inert   material   elements,   such   as   atoms,   whereas   traditional  
vitalisms  assume  a  teleological  force  that  runs  through  matter  and  orientates  
it.  The  problem   that  Deleuze  and  Guattari   see  with   this  binary   is   that  while  
mechanistic   theories   are   capable   of   explaining   how   systems,   be   they  
composed  of  bodies  or  other  structures,  maintain  themselves  over  time,  they  
cannot   explain   how   these   systems   arise,   whereas   theories   of   vitalism   can  
explain   the   genesis   of   form,   but   rely   on   an   otherwise   consistent   and   inert  
matter.   Deleuze   and   Guattari   overcome   this   distinction   by   recognizing   the  
intensive  nature  of  matter.  While  theories  of  mechanism  and  vitalism  each  take  
the  extended  nature  of  space  and  of  time  for  granted,  in  Anti-­Oedipus  ‘matter’  
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is  not  something  already  distributed   in  space  and  made  up  of  distinct  units,  
instead  it  is  nothing  other  than  a  field  of  intensities.  Intensities  always  seem  to  
cancel   themselves   out   in   extensity,   and   drive   the   individuation   and  
dramatization  of  what  in  Difference  and  Repetition  Deleuze  had  called  spatio-­
temporal  dynamisms,  which  compose  their  own  space  and  time  as  they  unfold.    
Crucially  then,  desiring  machines  do  not  operate  within  the  structures  of  time  
and   space,   but   produce   these   structural   effects.   The   tendency  of   intensive  
matter   that   is  always  oriented  outside  of   itself   is  what  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
call  desire,  and  it  is  the  drive  of  this  material  desire  that  produces  the  actual  
relations  of  bodies  in  space  and  time.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  explain  that  their  
theory   of   desiring   machines   “shatters   the   vitalist   argument   by   calling   into  
question   the   specific   or   personal   unity   of   the   organism,   and   the  mechanist  
argument…   by   calling   in   question   the   structural   unity   of   the   machine.”370  
Following  from  this,  the  pair  note  that  once  the  structural  unity  of  the  machine  
has  been  undone  “a  direct  link  is  perceived  between  the  machine  and  desire,  
the  machine  passes  to  the  heart  of  desire,  the  machine  is  desiring  and  desire,  
machined.”371   In   ‘Machine  and  Structure’,  Guattari   first  defined   the  machine  
using  Deleuze’s  category  of  repetition,  in  which  what  is  repeated  is  never  the  
same,  but  something  different.  This  insistence  is  carried  over  into  Anti-­Oedipus  
via  the  fact  that  desiring-­machines  are  said  to  have  no  structural  consistency  
of  their  own;;  they  do  not  function  by  simply  maintaining  a  structure,  but  instead  
by  continually  breaking  down.372  To  put  this  another  way,  the  driving  force  of  
desire   is   nothing   other   than   the   drive   towards   difference,   it   is   that   which  
continually   differs   from   itself.   One   important   effect   of   this   intensive   driving  
force,  that  distinguishes  the  theory  of  desiring-­machines  from  both  mechanism  
and  vitalism,  is  that  it  is  capable  of  generating  a  history.  Vitalism  traditionally  
requires   a   particular   form   of   life,   such   as   that   of   man,   to   orientate   its  
development  and  is  thus,  in  a  certain  sense,  anti-­historicist,  while  mechanistic  
theories   traditionally  assume  that   temporal  moments  are  nothing  other   than  
                                                                                                                
370  AO  313.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are   referring   to  Samuel  Butler,  who   they  credit  with   first  
collapsing  the  distinction  between  mechanism  and  vitalism.    
371  AO  314  
372  Opposing  them  to  mechanistic  processes,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write:  “Desiring-­machines,  
on  the  contrary,  continually  break  down  as  they  run,  and  in  fact  run  only  when  they  are  not  
functioning  properly”  (AO  33-­34).  
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reversible   or   exchangeable   states   of   matter.   In   contrast   to   this,   desiring-­
machines  emerge  historically  because  the  bodies  that  they  compose  can  only  
be  understood  via  a  historical  analysis  of  the  intensive  relations  that  gave  rise  
to  them.  By  defining  machinic  processes,  and  therefore  the  activity  of  desiring-­
machines,  in  this  way,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  give  an  intensive,  materialist,  and  
historical  account  of  the  unconscious.    
  
Another   way   to   characterize   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   machinism,   and   its  
challenge  to  mechanism,  would  be  to  say  that  while  mechanistic  accounts  of  
reality  always  separate  a  force  from  the  mechanism  that  transmits  it,  machinic  
accounts  conceive  of  things  solely  in  terms  of  the  interrelation  of  forces.  It  is  
for   this   reason   that   Deleuze   and  Guattari   define  machines   in   general,   and  
desiring-­machines  in  particular,  as  systems  of  flows  and  breaks  in  which  “every  
machine  functions  as  a  break  in  the  flow  in  relation  to  the  machine  to  which  it  
is  connected,  but  at  the  same  time  is  also  a  flow  itself,  or  the  production  of  a  
flow,  in  relation  to  the  machine  connected  to  it.”373  Flows  are  only  cut  by  other  
flows,  and  there  is  no  external  mechanism  that  moderates  their  behaviour.  If  
we  were   to   ask  what   it   is   that   is   flowing,   then   the   answer   for  Deleuze  and  
Guattari   could   only   be   ‘unconscious   desire’,   understood   as   a   material   and  
intensive  force.    
  
To  explain  how  this  material  and  intensive  unconscious  functions,  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  offer  a   transcendental  account  of  unconscious  desire.  Just  as  Kant  
had  developed  his  own  critical  philosophy  of  reason,  not  by  considering   the  
external  factors  that  limit  reason,  but  by  considering  it  immanently  and  noting  
the   illusions   that   reason   creates   by   its   own   mode   of   functioning,   in   Anti-­
Oedipus  Deleuze   and   Guattari   give   an   immanent   account   of   the  machinic  
processes   of   desire.   In   place   of   Kant’s   immanent   and   critical   account   of  
reason,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  define,  what  they  call,  the  three  syntheses  of  the  
unconscious,  noting  the  ways  in  which  each  of  these  syntheses  can  lead  to  a  
specific   transcendental   illusion.  When   turning   to   the   three   syntheses  of   the  
unconscious  as  they  are  given  in  Anti-­Oedipus,  it  is  worth  noting  that  even  in  
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‘Machine   and   Structure’,   while   Guattari   was   first   differentiating   the   two  
concepts   in   question,   he   was   also   careful   to   note   that   “a   machine   is  
inseparable   from   its   structural   articulations   and,   conversely,   that   each  
contingent  structure  is  dominated…  by  a  system  of  machines.”374  The  theory  
of  desiring-­machines  in  Anti-­Oedipus  is  consistent  with  this  early  intuition  and  
when  Deleuze  and  Guattari  describe  the  three  syntheses  of  the  unconscious  
that   determine   the   operation   of   desiring-­machines   these   operations   are  
inextricable   from   the   structural   articulations   of   the   body   that   they   serve   to  
organize.   In   Anti-­Oedipus   there   is   a   continuum   between   machine   and  
structure,   which   is   filled   with   the   becoming   of   a   body.   Bodies   can   either  
become  more  or  less  organized,  depending  on  the  activities  of  the  desiring-­
machines,   and   can   thus   tend   towards   one   of   two   poles;;   becoming   an  
organized  and  structured  body  that  takes  the  form  of  an  organism,  or  becoming  
a   Body  without  Organs   (BwO).   Specifically,   the   desiring  machines   operate  
according  to  three  syntheses,  called  the  connective  synthesis  of  production,  
the   disjunctive   synthesis   of   recording,   and   the   conjunctive   synthesis   of  
consumption-­consummation.375  These  syntheses  describe  the  self-­organising  
capabilities  of  intensive  matter.  They  are  driven  by  the  tendency  within  matter  
to  differentiate  itself,  a  tendency  which  Deleuze  and  Guattari  name  desire.376  
  
The   first,   connective  synthesis   is   the  operation  by  which  desiring  machines  
connect  to  one  another.  If  the  field  of  desiring-­production  is  understood  as  a  
kind  of  distribution  of  energetic  indeterminacy,  then  the  first  synthesis  of  the  
unconscious   is   the  process  by  which  different  areas   in   this   field  attract  one  
another   and   form   connections.   It   builds   on   Freud’s   notion   of   libidinal  
investment   and   the   nature   of   the   drives   and   is   just   that   process   by   which  
desire,   understood   as   the   tendency   inherent   in   intensive   states,   constantly  
reaches  outside  of  itself.  As  we  have  already  noted,  desiring-­production  is  a  
multiplicity   and   desiring-­machines   can   therefore   never   be   understood   as  
                                                                                                                
374  PT  318  
375  An  analysis  of  how  this  presentation  of  the  three  syntheses  differs  from  Deleuze’s  earlier  
account  will  follow  later  in  this  chapter.    
376  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  comments  echo  Simondon’s  critique  of  hylomorphic  accounts  of  
the   relation  between  matter  and   form,  and  his  development  of   the  concept  of   ‘information’  
(1964).  
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individual.  There  is  never  just  one  machine,  but  always  “machines  driving  other  
machines,  machines  being  driven  by  other  machines,  with  all  the  necessary  
couplings   and   connections.”377  Borrowing   from   the  psychoanalytic   tradition,  
especially   that  of  Melanie  Klein,  Deleuze  and  Guattari   take   the  case  of   the  
child’s  mouth,  understood  as  a  sucking  machine,  to  the  breast,  understood  as  
a   machine   producing   milk,   as   their   primary   example   of   the   connective  
synthesis.   In   line   with   their   critical   project,   Deleuze   and   Guattari   aim   to  
differentiate  between  legitimate  and  illegitimate  interpretations  of  this  primary  
synthesis.  According  to  their  analysis,   interpretations  of  this  synthesis  fail  to  
be  legitimate  when  they  do  not  recognise  the  fact  that  the  connections  made  
here  are  always  transverse  connections  between  heterogeneous  and  partial  
elements.  They  argue  that  any  interpretation  of  this  synthesis  that  takes  the  
elements   that   are   connected   in   this   synthesis   as   logically   preceding   the  
connections   made   between   them   involves   a   logical   fallacy.   To   treat   the  
connective  synthesis  as  a  process  occurring  between  pre-­given  homogenous  
elements  produces  a  transcendental  illusion  in  the  following  way:  That  which  
creates  a  linear  series  of  connections  on  a  homogenous  field  must  be  different  
in  kind  from  that  which  it  produces;;  the  process  of  the  first  synthesis  cannot  
therefore  take  for  granted  the  pre-­existence  of  the  elements  that  it  connects,  
or  of  the  homogeneity  of  the  field  on  which  it  connects  them;;  the  first  synthesis  
must   therefore   connect   only   partial   elements,   drawn   from   heterogeneous  
fields.   It   is   important   to   note   here   that   the   transversal   nature   of   the   first  
synthesis  results  in  a  series  of  connections  between  machines  that  is  constant  
and  additive,  not  just  an  “and”,  but  always  “and…”  “and  then…”378    
  
It   is   in   this   first  synthesis   that   the  BwO  is  created.  Borrowing   the   term  from  
Artaud,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  use   the  concept  of   the  BwO  to  designate   the  
unformed  and  unorganised  state  of  the  body,  which  desiring  machines  must  
work  against  in  the  first  synthesis  to  form  connections.379  Most  generally,  the  
BwO  stands  for  matter  without  a  form  of  content  or  expression.  The  genesis  of  
                                                                                                                
377  AO  1  
378  AO  5  
379  The  BwO  was   first   introduced  by  Deleuze   in  Logic  of  Sense,  where   it   played  a  slightly  
different  role  (LS  223).  For  a  clear  articulation  of  the  concept,  and  its  relation  to  structure,  see  
the  Young,  Genosko,  &  Watson  (2013,  51-­55).  
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desiring  machines  and  the  BwO  are  concurrent  because  they  each  articulate  
a  force  that  opposes  the  other.  They  both  rely  on  the  tension  produced  in  “the  
opposition   of   the   process   of   production   of   the   desiring-­machines   and   the  
nonproductive  stasis  of  the  body  without  organs.”380  At  this  point,  the  BwO  is  
understood   as   nothing   other   than   that   force   of   inertia,   against   which   the  
connective  tendency  of  desire  must  work.  The  first  synthesis,  by  which  matter  
constantly   creates   new   transversal   connections   between   heterogeneous  
partial   elements,   begins   to   construct   regularities   in   matter,   understood   as  
primitive  chains  of  code,  and  these  regularities  are  defined  against  the  threat  
of  absolute  indeterminacy,  in  which  difference  is  equally  distributed.  The  BwO  
is   just   that   name   for   the   even   distribution   of   indeterminate   difference.   As  
connections   are   constantly   formed   and   reformed   by   desiring-­machines,  
desiring-­production   takes   on   different   levels   of   organisation.   The   BwO   is  
therefore  one  pole  towards  which  the  desiring  machines  can  tend,  namely  the  
pole  of  absolute  disorganisation.    
  
The   second   synthesis   of   the   unconscious   is   the   disjunctive   synthesis   of  
recording.   This   describes   the   way   in   which   desiring-­machines   detach  
themselves  from  one  another  in  order  to  make  new  connections:  for  the  mouth  
to  move  from  the  breast  to  the  hand,  to  the  hair,  to  a  stone  etc.,  it  must  also  
break  each  connection   in   turn.  Here  Deleuze  and  Guattari  develop  some  of  
Freud’s  thoughts  concerning  memory  and  the  role  of  signs  in  the  psyche.  They  
intend  to  show  that  by  the  process  of  constant  disconnection-­connection,  the  
desiring  machines  “attach  themselves  to  the  body  without  organs  as  so  many  
points  of  disjunction,  between  which  an  entire  network  of  new  syntheses   is  
now   woven,   marking   the   surface   off   into   co-­ordinates,   like   a   grid.”381   The  
processes  of  disconnection  and  disjunction  are  said  to  ‘record’  desire  because  
they   leave   traces   on   the   BwO,   like   scars   where   connections   have   been  
continually   reopened   and   reclosed.382   Once   again,   Deleuze   and   Guattari  
                                                                                                                
380  AO  10  
381  AO  13.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  speak  of  both  attaching  and  detaching  in  relation  to  the  
second  synthesis  (AO  13,  43).  Just  as  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  machinism  conceptualizes  
desire  as  a  flow  and  a  break  simultaneously,  in  the  second  synthesis,  each  apparent  
detachment  is  simply  an  attachment  to  something  else.  
382  AO  360  
   138  
differentiate   between   the   legitimate   and   illegitimate   uses   of   this   synthesis.  
Here,   legitimate   interpretations   recognise   the   inclusive   nature   of   the  
disjunctions,  while  illegitimate  uses  treat  disjunctions  as  exclusive.  I  will  come  
back  to  the  distinction  between  inclusive  and  exclusive  disjunctions  later  in  this  
chapter,  however,  put  briefly  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  argument  is  that  because  
of  the  transversal  nature  of  the  connections  being  made,  the  disjunctions  of  
desiring-­machines  cannot  be  binary,  but   instead  must  be  seen  as  affirming  
alternatives.   To   assume   that   disjunctions   are   exclusive   is   based   on   a  
transcendental   illusion   because   it   involves   projecting   back   the   possibility   of  
opposition  (which  only  holds  between  individuals)  to  a  pre-­individual  process.  
According  to  the  legitimate  use  of  the  second  synthesis,  disjunctions  do  not  
involve  opposition  or  negation,  but  positive  difference.     This  means  that   the  
aforementioned  ‘grid’  produced  on  the  BwO,  which  allows  for  the  recording  of  
the  process  of  desire,  is  not  yet  a  structure  in  the  normal  sense  of  the  word.  
The  inclusive  nature  of  the  disjunctions  means  that  the  process  of  the  second  
synthesis   operates   not   by   the   binary   of   “either   or”,   but   by   the   constant  
extension  of  an  “either  or…or…or”.383    
  
The   third   synthesis   of   the   unconscious   is   that   of   the   conjunction   of  
consumption-­consummation   and   it   describes   the   way   that   the   first   two  
syntheses  give  way  to  the  production  of  a  subject,  who  exists  alongside  the  
desiring-­machines,  and  who  experiences  the  intensities  produced  on  the  BwO.  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  write  that  in  the  third  synthesis  “the  subject  is  produced  
as   a  mere   residuum   alongside   the   desiring-­machines.”384   According   to   this  
analysis,   the   first   two   syntheses   produce   a   series   of   “intensive   quantities”,  
which   could   otherwise   be   thought   of   as   pure   sensations.   These   intensive  
quantities  must  be  “consumed”  by  “personages”  who  are  not  yet  individuals.385  
In  fact,  the  subject  is  an  effect  of  these  states,  rather  than  being  their  owner.  
In   his   analysis   of   the   third   synthesis   of   the   unconscious,   Nathan   Widder  
explains   the   relationship   between   the   subject   and   the   intensive   states  
                                                                                                                
383  Deleuze  first  describes  the  difference  between  inclusive  and  exclusive  disjunctions  in  LS  
194-­201.  The  distinction  is  important  in  Anti-­Oedipus  where  it  marks  the  difference  between  
the  legitimate  and  the  illegitimate  use  of  the  second  synthesis.    
384  AO  19  
385  AO  92-­95  
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produced  in  the  first  two  syntheses  when  he  writes  that  “[t]hese  states  are  in  
no  way  chosen  by   the  subject;;   rather,   the  subject   is  driven   to   them,  and   is  
constituted  by  being  so  driven.”386  The  difference  between  the  legitimate  and  
the   illegitimate   uses  of   the   third   synthesis   depends  on  whether   the  subject  
recognises  itself  as  a  product  of  these  sensations  or  projects  its  own  image  
back   into   the   process   as   the   producer   of   these   states.   With   this   in   mind,  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  can  now  offer  their  account  of  the  Oedipus  complex  as  
an  example  of  the  illegitimate  use  of  the  three  syntheses.  The  recognition  of  
this  illusion  is  central  to  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  anti-­psychoanalytic  project  in  
Anti-­Oedipus  in  which  they  attempt  to  show  that  the  traditional  insistence  on  
the  necessity  of   the  oedipalization  of   the  child   relies  on  exactly   this  kind  of  
illusion.   The   illegitimate   use  of   the   third   synthesis   occurs  when   the   subject  
produced  there  “confuses  himself  with  this  third  productive  machine  and  with  
the   residual   reconciliation   that   it   brings   about:   a   conjunctive   synthesis   of  
consummation  in  the  form  of  a  wonderstruck  ‘So  that's  what  it  was!’”387  This  
misapprehension   occurs   when   the   subject   places   itself,   as   an   individual,  
before   the   process   of   individuation   that   produces   it.   It   is   a   retrospective  
appropriation   of   the   processes  of   desiring-­machines  by   the   subject,  who   is  
produced   only   as   an   after-­effect   of   the   three   syntheses.   Specifically,   the  
illegitimate  use  of   the   third  synthesis   follows   from  an   illegitimate  use  of   the  
second  synthesis  in  the  following  way:  while  a  legitimate  and  inclusive  use  of  
the  disjunctive  synthesis  produces  a  schizophrenic  subject,  who  experiences  
only  intensive  quantities  (as  delusions  and  hallucinations),  an  illegitimate  and  
exclusive   use  of   the  disjunctive   synthesis   produces  a   neurotic   subject  who  
experiences   desire   as   a   relation   between   extended   quantities.   The   way   in  
which   the   third   synthesis   of   the   unconscious   relates   to   the   BwO   is   also  
dependent  on  whether  it   is  applied  legitimately  or  illegitimately.  According  to  
the  former,  the  body  is  produced  as  a  site  of  becoming  on  which  desire  remains  
productive   and   active,   while   according   to   the   latter   the   body   becomes   an  
organized,  structured  and  stratified  body  across  which  desire  can  no   longer  
flow.  Thus,  while   it   is  possible   for   the  unconscious   to  produce  a  productive  
BwO,   the   systematic   misrepresentation   of   the   three   syntheses   by  
                                                                                                                
386  Widder,  2012,  109    
387  AO  19  
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psychoanalysis   instead  produces  an  organism   in  which  each  organ  plays  a  
specific   role   in  desire  and  for  whom  genuine  change,  outside  of  an  Oedipal  
structure,  becomes  impossible.    
  
There  are  at  least  two  key  differences  that  should  be  highlighted  here  between  
the  three  syntheses  of  the  unconscious  given  in  Anti-­Oedipus  and  the  three  
syntheses  of  the  production  of  sense  given  in  Logic  of  Sense,  and  to  a  certain  
extent  the  three  passive  syntheses  given  in  Difference  and  Repetition.  First,  
the  order  of  the  three  syntheses  has  been  altered.  In  Logic  of  Sense,  Deleuze  
describes  the  production  of  the  surface  of  sense,  which  separated  the  primary  
depths  of  bodies  from  the  secondary  organization  of  language,  via  the  three  
syntheses   of   connection,   conjunction,   and   disjunction.   In   Logic   of   Sense,  
Deleuze  worked  on  the  assumption  that  it  was  necessary  for  a  certain  kind  of  
subject   to   be   produced   in   the   second   synthesis   before   the   disjunction   of  
signifiers   could   be   possible,   however   in  Anti-­Oedipus,  partly   due   to   a   new  
conception  of  a-­signifying  semiotics  drawn  from  Guattari’s  work  on  Hjelmslev,  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  can  now  explain  the  disjunction  of  recording  on  the  BwO  
without  reference  to  a  subject  of  any  kind.  This  is  important  for  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  because  while  the  Oedipus  complex  plays  a  central  role  in  Deleuze’s  
dynamic  account  of  genesis  in  Logic  of  Sense,  in  Anti-­Oedipus  the  complex  is  
recognized   as   nothing   other   than   a   misapplication   of   the   syntheses.  
Subsequently,  the  synthesis  of  conjunction  is  placed  after,  rather  than  before,  
the  synthesis  of  disjunction.  Second,  while   the   three  syntheses  of  sense   in  
Logic   of   Sense  were   placed  between   the   primary   order   of   bodies   and   the  
tertiary  structure  of  language,  in  Anti-­Oedipus  the  three  syntheses  operate  in  
the   depths   of   desiring-­production.   In   Logic   of   Sense   the   primary   order   of  
bodies  could  not  be  given  a  semiotic  articulation  as  it  was  pre-­signifying,  but  
in  Anti-­Oedipus  this  is  no  longer  the  case  and  it   is  possible  for  Deleuze  and  
Guattari   to   claim   that   the   three   syntheses   are   located   directly   in   the  
unconscious  and  material  real.388  We  could  say  that  the  theory  of  signification  
                                                                                                                
388  This  resonates  with  Dan  W  Smith’s  argument  that  the  major  difference  between  Logic  of  
Sense  and  Anti-­Oedipus  is  that  it  is  only  in  the  latter  that  Deleuze  “unhesitatingly  attempts  to  
write  about  the  ‘depths’  in  a  straightforward  manner”  (Smith  2006,  146).  While  Smith  is  
correct  to  make  this  assertion,  it  is  Guattari’s  reformulation  of  Deleuze’s  structuralism  and  his  
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available  to  Deleuze  at  the  point  of  writing  Logic  of  Sense  only  allowed  him  to  
give  an  account  of  the  three  syntheses  of  sense  using  Carroll’s  menagerie  of  
esoteric   words,   but   that   at   the   point   of   writing   Anti-­Oedipus   Deleuze   and  
Guattari   can  draw  on   the   functioning  of  a-­signifying   semiotics   to   locate   the  
three  syntheses  directly  within  the  schizophrenic  order  of  language  glimpsed  
in   Artaud’s   use   of   the   breath-­word.389   To   compare   this   move   with   the  
categories   of  Difference   and   Repetition,  we   can   simply   say   that   the   three  
syntheses   of   the   unconscious   are   not   virtual   or   abstract   in   relation   to   the  
unconscious,  but  are  actually  present  there.  They  define  the  way  in  which  the  
intensive   field   of   desiring-­production   is   able   to   explicate   itself   without   the  
direction  of  the  virtual  Idea.    
  
This  material,   intensive  and  historical  definition  of  the  unconscious,  and  this  
explication  of  the  immanent  regulation  of  the  three  syntheses,  allow  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  to  describe  unconscious  desire  separately  from  the  various  ways  
in  which  it  is  repressed.  The  machinic  unconscious  is  not  understood  as  a  kind  
of   Real   or   brute   force,   which   requires   external   articulation,   but   as   an  
unconscious  in  possession  of  its  own  mode  of  articulation.  It  is  the  machinic  
character   of   the   unconscious,   on   top   of   its   intensive   nature,   that   allows  
Deleuze  and  Guattari   to  write   that   in   the  unconscious,   “it   is  not   the   lines  of  
pressure   that   matter,   but   on   the   contrary   the   lines   of   escape   (lignes   de  
fuite).”390   This   is   to   say   that   the   unconscious   is   not   only   an   intensive   field  
consisting  of  areas  of  pressure,  which  can  only  be  understood  by  way  of  its  
repression,   but   a   machinic   entity   capable   of   following   its   own   line   of  
articulation,   which   is   not   conditioned   by   any   social   structure,   but   flees   and  
escapes   in  a  direction  defined   immanently  by   the   legitimate  use  of   its   three  
syntheses.  This  discovery  entails  a  major  reworking  of  the  process  of  analysis.  
                                                                                                                
introduction  of  a  machinic  conception  of  semiotics  that  allows  Deleuze  to  write  about  the  
depths  in  this  manner  (Thornton,  2017).  
389  Deleuze  had  a  robust  critique  of  Saussurean  linguistics  before  he  began  his  collaborations  
with  Guattari.  However,  while  Deleuze  uses  of  the  work  of  Gustave  Guillaume  to  challenge  
the  notion  of  difference  utilised  by  Saussure,  he  does  this  in  order  to  give  a  genetic  account  
of  signification,  while  maintaining  signification  as  the  model  for  language.  Deleuze’s  analysis  
of   Lewis   Carrol   is   telling:   esoteric   words   help   us   to   explore   the   realm   of   non-­sense   and  
challenge  the  ground  of  sense,  but  what  makes  them  nonsensical  is  specifically  their  failure  
to   signify   anything.   The   breath-­words   and   howl-­words   of   Artaud   challenge   the   grounds   of  
sense  in  another  way,  namely  by  exposing  the  bodily  dimension  of  sound.    
390  AO  371    
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While  psychoanalysis  can  only  point  toward  the  underlying  lines  of  pressure  in  
the   unconscious   by   considering   the   processes   of   psychic   repression,  
“schizoanalysis  follows  the  lines  of  escape  (lignes  de  fuite)  and  the  machinic  
indices  all   the  way  to   the  desiring-­machines.”391  Before  we  move  on   to  see  
how  Deleuze  and  Guattari  connect  their  analysis  of  these  lines  of  flight  to  the  
project  of  revolutionary  political  change,  it  is  important  to  recognise  why  they  
also   claim   that   the   activity   of   lines   of   flight   renders   the   unconscious  
schizophrenic.    
  
v)  Multiplicity  of  Code  and  the  Schizophrenic  Unconscious  
  
A  number   of  questions   still   remain   concerning  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s   new  
model  of  the  unconscious.  Specifically,  how  is  it  possible  for  an  intensive  field  
to   contain   its   own   conditions   of   articulation?   The   answer   provided   in  Anti-­
Oedipus  is  that  “every  machine  has  a  sort  of  code  built  into  it,  stored  up  inside  
it.”392  Rather  than  following  the  direction  of  virtual  Ideas,  the  intensive  field  of  
desiring-­production   explicates   itself   according   the   chains   of   code   that   are  
contained  within  desiring-­machines.  In  order  to  explain  this  use  of  ‘coding’   it  
will   be   necessary   to   look   again   at   how   Deleuze   and   Guattari   attempt   to  
overturn   Lacanian   linguistic   structuralism.   In   their   resolutely   ambivalent  
fashion,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  at  once  praise  Lacan  for  his  “discovery  of  this  
fertile  domain  of  a  code  of   the  unconscious”  while  criticising  his  decision   to  
treat   this   code   as   if   it   were   a   single   language   when   it   is   “a   multiplicity   so  
complex   that   we   can   scarcely   speak   of   one   chain   or   even   one   code   of  
desire.”393  To  put   it  briefly,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  agree  with  Lacan   that   the  
explication  of  unconscious  desire  necessarily  goes  by  way  of  a  semiotics,  but  
they  refuse  Lacan’s  claim  that  this  semiotics  is  signifying,  or  that  it  is  structured  
like  a  language.394    
  
                                                                                                                
391  AO  372  
392  AO  41  
393  AO  41  
394  While  it  could  be  argued  that  the  virtual  Ideas  in  Difference  and  Repetition  were  a-­signifying,  
the   important   innovation   of   Anti-­Oedipus   is   the   ability   to   analyse   processes   that   are   a-­
signifying  and  yet  semiotic  in  nature.    
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For   Lacan,   reality   is  made   up   of   the   two   realms   of   the   ‘Symbolic’   and   the  
‘Imaginary’,   which   constitute   the   lived   reality   of   social   experience   of   the  
psychoanalytic   subject.   Reality,   according   to   this   reading,   is  made   up  of   a  
structure  of  linguistic  and  social  signifying  relations  and  is  related  to  conscious  
life.  The   ‘Real’,  Lacan’s   third  category,   is   that  which  cannot  be  captured  by  
either  the  Symbolic  or  the  Imaginary  and  which  sits  outside  of  it.395  The  Real  
is   the  site  of   trauma,  of   jouissance  and  of  unconscious  desire.  According   to  
this   account,   the   subject   is   only   produced  at   the  moment   that   it   enters   the  
Symbolic,   however,   as   the   laws   governing   the   linguistic   structure   of   the  
Symbolic  pre-­exist  the  subject,  the  subject  is  never  able  to  fully  constitute  itself  
there,   while   real,   unconscious   desire   always   remains   ‘impossible’   for   the  
subject,   who   can   only   ever   experience   it   as   that   which   was   necessarily  
repressed   in   order   to   enter   the   Symbolic.   According   to   this   psychoanalytic  
structuralism,   the   functioning   of   desire   is   analogous   to   the   functioning   of  
signification.  While  any  one  signifier  gains  its  meaning  not  by  its  relation  to  an  
external  signified,  but  by  the  way  that  it  refers  to  other  signifiers,  in  the  same  
way,  desire  is  not  defined  by  that  which  it  desires,  but  by  the  way  it  relates  to  
other  desires.  Similarly,  just  as  the  Symbolic  realm  is  constituted  by  a  constant  
slippage  of  meaning  from  one  signifier  to  the  next,  desire  is  constituted  by  a  
constant  deferral.  The  subject   thinks   it  desires  an  object,  but  upon  attaining  
the  object   realises   that  this  was   just  a  stand-­in   for  something  else  and  thus  
goes  on  to  desire  another  object.  To  designate  the  real  object  of  desire,  which  
is  constantly  lost,  and  always  retreating  from  the  subject,  Lacan  uses  the  term  
‘objet  petit  a’.  The   impossibility  of  ever   reaching   this  object,  and  of   fulfilling  
desire,  is  constituted  by  the  law  of  the  father  and  the  threat  of  castration.  Thus,  
in   Lacanian   terminology,  we   can   say   that   the   subject   of   desire   is   a   barred  
subject,  the  object  of  desire  is  the  objet  petit  a,  and  the  role  of  the  law  is  played  
by  the  phallus.  The  barred  subject  is  always  in  the  process  of  reaching  for  a  
desired  object  and  yet  always  failing  to  attain  it,  the  objet  petit  a  is  the  name  
for  this  desired  object,  which  always  retreats  and  is  never  attainable,  and  the  
                                                                                                                
395  Lacan’s  theory  of  the  three  registers  is  not  formally  introduced  during  his  seminars  as  a  
complete   theory,   but   develops   throughout   his   career.   References   to   these   three   registers  
begin  at  least  as  early  as  his  first  seminar,  Freud’s  Papers  on  Technique  (1954),  and  continue  
throughout   the   rest   of   his   seminars.   For   more,   see   the   accompanying   sections   in   Evans  
(1996).    
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phallus   is   the   abstract   third   term   that   signifies   the   constant   failure   of   the  
desiring   subject   to   attain   the   desired   object.396   This   structural   account   of  
unconscious  desire  operates  by  using  linguistics  to  universalise  the  Oedipus  
complex.  The  account  is  Oedipal  in  the  sense  that  it  takes  desire  to  be  always  
unfulfilled,  always  lacking,  and  always  castrated  by  the  paternal  injunction  of  
law.  However,  as  we  have  already  seen,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  argue  that  the  
logic  of  the  Oedipus  is  based  on  a  kind  of  transcendental  illusion  by  which  the  
contemporary,   capitalist   forms   of   social   repression   are   assumed   to   be   the  
logical  foundation  of  desire,  rather  than  its  effect.  For  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  
desire  is  not  necessarily  lacking  but  is  inherently  productive,  while  the  real  of  
the  unconscious  is  not  impossible  or  inaccessible,  but  material  and  intensive.  
  
While  Deleuze  and  Guattari  agree  that  the  unconscious  must  involve  a  process  
of  recording,  by  which  unconscious  memory  is  created,  the  semiotics  of  this  
system  are  not  signifying  and  hence  the  logic  of  desire  is  not  Oedipal.  They  
write  that  the  chains  of  the  unconscious  “are  called  ‘signifying  chains’  because  
they  are  made  up  of  signs,  but  these  signs  are  not  themselves  signifying.”397  
In   a   challenge   to   Lacan,   and   drawing   on   Guattari’s   work   in   ‘Machine   and  
Structure’   and   on   his   interest   in   the   semiotic   theories   of   Louis   Hjelmslev,  
Deleuze   and   Guattari   are   claiming   here   that   the   unconscious   process   of  
recording   functions  by  use  of  a  semiotics   that   is  a-­signifying.  Such  semiotic  
processes   function  without   referring   to   anything   outside   of   themselves   and  
without  the  need  to  express  any  content.  For  example,  both  genetic  code  and  
computer  code  operate  by  the  use  of  signs,  but  do  not  express  any  sense  that  
exists  outside  of   themselves.398  Perhaps   the  most   important  aspect  of  such  
semiotic  systems  for  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  their  ability  to  refuse  the  binary,  
exclusive  disjunctions  offered  by  Saussurean  signification,  in  favour  of  a  form  
of   inclusive  disjunction.  A  brief  analysis  of   the  difference  between  exclusive  
                                                                                                                
396  Lacan’s  theory  of  desire  does  not  remain  constant  throughout  his  work  and  the  relationship  
between  these  three  elements  alters  during  his  career.  For  his  most  nuanced  description  of  
the  desiring  relationship  of  the  subject,  see  The  Subversion  of  the  Subject  and  the  Dialectic  of  
Desire  in  the  Freudian  Unconscious  (2006b).    
397  AO  41  
398  Watson,  2009,  47  
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and   inclusive  disjunctions  will  be  useful  here   in  order   to  show  how  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  will  claim  that  the  coding  of  desiring-­machines  functions.    
  
Well   before   the   publication   of  Anti-­Oedipus,   at   the   time   of   writing  Logic   of  
Sense,  Deleuze  makes  a  distinction  between  those  forms  of  judgement  that  
are  based  on  binary  and  exclusive  disjunctions,  in  which  two  different  options  
are  set  up  against  each  other  and  where  one  must  be  selected  in  favour  of  the  
other,  and  the  form  of  the  inclusive  disjunction,  in  which  two  options  differ  from  
one   another   without   being   opposed,   and   which   can   thus   both   be   affirmed  
together.   An   inclusive   disjunction   is   defined   as   “an   operation   according   to  
which  two  things  or  two  determinations  are  affirmed  through  their  difference,  
that  is  to  say,  that  they  are  objects  of  simultaneous  affirmation  only  insofar  as  
their  difference  is  itself  affirmed  and  is  itself  affirmative.”399  In  this  case,  “we  
are   no   longer   faced   with   an   identity   of   contraries,   which   would   still   be  
inseparable  as  such  from  a  movement  of   the  negative  and  of  exclusion.”400  
However,   while   Deleuze  makes   this   distinction   in   Logic   of   Sense,   he   also  
claims  there  that  this  “positive  difference”  of  inclusive  disjunctions  “belongs  to  
topology  and  to  the  surface.”401  This  is  because,  given  the  understanding  of  
signification   utilised   by   Deleuze   at   this   point,   the   organisation   of   the   voice  
bears  only  exclusive  disjunctions  of  opposition,  while  the  primary  depths  lack  
the  necessary  organisation  all  together.  At  the  point  of  writing  Anti-­Oedipus,  
on  the  other  hand,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  speak  of  a  form  of  semiotic  encoding  
produced  by   the  second  synthesis  of  desiring-­machines.  Here,   the  constant  
disjunction  and  reconnection  of  desiring-­machines  to  the  BwO  creates  a  web  
of  code   that   is  neither  signifying  nor  exclusive.402  The  upshot  of   this   is   that  
when  it  comes  to  desiring-­machines  “the  breaks  in  the  process  are  productive,  
and  are  reassemblies  in  and  of  themselves”,  which  means  that  “[d]isjunctions,  
by  the  very  fact  that  they  are  disjunctions,  are  inclusive.”403  Given  the  form  of  
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positive   difference  used  here,  we   can   say   that   the   semiotic   encodings   that  
direct  the  operation  of  desiring-­machines  rely  on  an  immanent  conception  of  
disjunction,   and   thus   determine   the   operation   of   desiring-­machines  without  
being  external  to  them.  
  
Once   again,   it   is   interesting   to   note   here   how   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s  
conceptual   innovations   are   turned   against   the   Oedipus   complex.   While  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  claim  that  the  recording  function  of  the  unconscious  is  
carried  out   immanently  by  a  series  of   inclusive  disjunctions,   they  also  claim  
that  an  illegitimate  reading  of  the  disjunctive  synthesis,  which  considers  it  from  
a   transcendent  point  of  view,   is  at   the  core  of   the  oedipal  understanding  of  
desire.  They  claim  that  the  disjunctive  synthesis  “is  capable  of  two  uses,  the  
one   immanent,   the   other   transcendent”   and  ask   “why  does  psychoanalysis  
reinforce   the   transcendent   use   that   introduces   exclusions   and   restrictions  
everywhere  in  the  disjunctive  network,  and  that  makes  the  unconscious  swing  
over   into   Oedipus?”404   Their   point   here   is   that,   under   a   certain   reading  
favoured  by  Lacanians,  there  are  two  options  open  to  the  child:  either  accept  
the  pre-­given  laws  of  the  Symbolic  structure  and  constitute  yourself  as  a  barred  
subject  within  a  community  of  speakers  where  you  will   remain  castrated,  or  
foreclose   the  Symbolic,   fail   to  develop  a  subject  position  at  all  and  become  
psychotic.  In  this  case,  the  child  must  either  pass  through  oedipalization  and  
become   a   neurotic,   or   fail   to   pass   through   oedipalization   and   become   a  
psychotic.  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  critique  against  this  reading  is  subtle,  they  
do   not   simply   claim   that   it   is   better   to   refuse   oedipalization   and   become  
psychotic,   but   instead   that   we   can   refuse   the   binary   decision,   or   exclusive  
disjunction,  that   the  whole  of  the  Oedipus  presents  us  with.  They  claim  that  
“the   exclusive   relation   introduced   by   Oedipus   comes   into   play   not   only  
between  the  various  disjunctions  conceived  as  differentiations,  but  between  
the  whole  of   the  differentiations   that   it   imposes  and  an  undifferentiated   (un  
indifferencie)   that   it   presupposes.”405   The   result   of   this   analysis   is   that   the  
binary  options  of  the  oedipalized  neurotic  and  the  foreclosed  psychotic  result  
from   a   transcendent   misapprehension   of   the   recording   process   of   the  
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unconscious  in  which  “there  is  Oedipus  on  either  side.”406  The  schizophrenic  
mode  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  champion  in  Anti-­Oedipus  is  not  based  on  the  
model  of  the  schizophrenic  patient  who  is  foreclosed  to  the  Symbolic  and  has  
thus  become  catatonic.   Instead,  what  Deleuze  and  Guattari   seek  out   is   the  
immanent  mode  of  functioning  of  the  unconscious,  where  all  disjunctions  are  
inclusive   and  where   the   question   of  Oedipus   does   not   arise.   This  move   is  
important   because   it   gives   a   positive   and  productive   role   to   schizophrenia.  
They   claim   that   in   the   case   of   those   catatonics   given   the   diagnosis   of  
schizophrenia,   it   is   the  case  that   their   “loss  of   reality   is  not   the  effect  of   the  
schizophrenic   process,   but   the   effect   of   its   forced   oedipalization.”407   For  
Deleuze   and   Guattari,   the   binary   choice   offered   by   Oedipus   relies   on   a  
misunderstanding  of  the  semiotic  nature  of  the  unconscious.  The  choice  need  
not  be  between  a  completely  a-­signifying  and  chaotic  abyss  and  a  signifying  
linguistic  structure.  Instead,  it  is  possible  to  recognise  that  the  unconscious  is  
a   semiotic   system   that   is   neither   an   undifferentiated   chaos   nor   a   fully  
differentiated   structure,   but   an   encoded  machinic   process   that   resists   this  
binary.  From  a  transcendent  interpretation  of  unconscious  recording  it  would  
follow   that   the   intensive   field   of   desiring-­production   required   some   kind   of  
external   direction,   however   the   immanent   interpretation   of   unconscious  
recording  as  a  series  of  inclusive  disjunctions  requires  no  such  thing.  Here,  the  
unconscious  is  not  structured  like  a  language,  but  is  organised  semiotically  by  
a  heterogeneous  multiplicity  of  code  that  determines  the  processes  of  desiring-­
machines  from  within.    
  
vi)  The  Schizophrenic  Line  of  Flight  
  
Given  this  analysis  of  the  way  in  which  the  intensive  field  of  desiring-­production  
contains  its  own  conditions  of  articulation,  we  are  now  closing  in  on  Deleuze  
and  Guattari’s   first  uses  of   the  concept  of   the   line  of   flight.   In  Anti-­Oedipus  
Deleuze   and  Guattari   use   the   concept   of   the   “line   of   flight”   to   designate   a  
“schizoid   breakthrough”408   which   is   always   “schizophrenic,   machinic,   and  
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dispersed”409.  They  say  that  the  line  of  flight  is  “extra-­oedipal”410,  that  lines  of  
flight  have  “the  capacity  for  causing  the  flows  of  desire  to  circulate”411,  and  that  
they  resist  the  “familial  position”412  of  the  Oedipus  complex.  In  this  sense,  the  
concept  of  the  line  of  flight  holds  an  important  position  in  the  book.  It  is  central  
to  the  anti-­oedipal  project  of  showing  that  the  unconscious  is  not  structural,  in  
either  a  strictly  linguistic  or  oedipal  sense,  and  that  unconscious  desire  is  never  
lacking,   but   positive,   creative,   and   productive.   However,   in   order   to   give   a  
technical  definition  of  the  line  of  flight,  as  it  appears  in  this  section  of  the  book,  
it  is  important  to  show  how  it  operates  in  relation  to  the  coded,  machinic  and  
a-­signifying  nature  of  the  unconscious.    
  
As  we  have  seen,  according  to  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  the  unconscious  does  
not   represent  anything.   It   is  a   factory  made  of  desiring-­machines  and  not  a  
theatre  for   the  dramatization  of  desire.   It   is  constituted  by  “flows  and  partial  
objects”   that   form   semiotic   chains   that   are   constantly   being   decoded   and  
recoded.413  Much  like  the  genetic  code,  it   is  an  open-­ended  series  of  coded  
chains   that   constantly   rewrite   themselves.   As   we   have   also   seen,   the  
processes  by  which  this  code  is  constantly  rewritten  is  defined  by  the  constant  
connection,  disjunction,  and  conjunction  of  desiring-­machines.  However,  the  
resulting   encodings   never   remain   static   because   the   three   syntheses   just  
mentioned   are   of   a   special   kind,   namely   they   are   “transverse   connections,  
inclusive  disjunctions,  and  polyvocal  conjunctions.”414  What  this  means  is  that  
rather   than   connections   being   formed  only   between  part-­signs  of   the   same  
chain  of  code,  the  connections  are  transversal  and  so  they  cut  across  multiple  
chains  of  code.  Connections  are  made  when  a  partial-­element  escapes  (fuite)  
one  chain  to  connect  with  another.  Then,  because  the  disjunctions  formed  are  
inclusive,  and  not  exclusive,  the  processes  of  connection  and  disjunction  are  
never  arrested,  but  continue  fleeing  (fuite)  unceasingly,  such  that  the  chains  
“all   intersect,   following   the  endlessly   ramified   paths   of   the   great   disjunctive  
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synthesis.”415  In  this  way,  we  can  see  that  there  are  certain  processes  within  
the  unconscious   that   resist   the  possibility  of  the  codes  becoming  engrained  
and  that  ensure  that  desire  continues  to  differ  from  itself.  These  processes  are  
transformations  or  mutations  that  ward-­off  the  possibility  of  stagnation.  In  his  
introduction   to   Anti-­Oedipus,   Mark   Seem   calls   them   “the   schizzes-­flows—
forces  that  escape  coding,  scramble  the  codes,  and  flee  in  all  directions.”416  
When   a   part-­sign   makes   a   connection   that   is   transversal,   and   when   the  
disjunction  from  the  previous  chain  is  inclusive,    “the  chain  no  longer  has  any  
other  function  than  that  of  deterritorializing  the  flows  and  causing  them  to  pass  
through  the  signifying  wall,  thereby  undoing  the  codes”  and  it  is  thereby  called  
“a  chain  of  escape  (fuite),  and  no  longer  a  code.”417  With  the  chain  of  escape,  
“the  signifying  chain  has  become  a  chain  of  decoding  and  deterritorialization,  
which  must  be  apprehended—and  can  only  be  apprehended—as  the  reverse  
of   the   codes   and   the   territorialities.”418   Subsequently,   these   decoding  
processes  of   the  unconscious  are  named  as   “the   lines  of   flight   (fuite)”,  and  
their   activity   is   to   “follow   the   decoded   and   deterritorialized   flows”   of   the  
unconscious.419   Lines   of   escape,   or   lines   of   flight,   are   simply   those  
schizophrenic  processes  of  the  unconscious  that  create  mutations  in  the  code  
by  making  transversal  links  between  codes,  in  an  open  and  inclusive  series  of  
disjunctions.  The  first  sense  of  the  word  fuite,  when  it  appears  in  the  phrase  
ligne  de  fuite,  is  therefore  the  fleeing  or  escaping  of  partial  elements  from  one  
code  to  another.420  
  
There  is,  however,  a  second  sense  in  which  the  line  of  flight  ‘escapes’  or  ‘flees’,  
namely  it  designates  that  which  resists  capture  by  signification.  While  Deleuze  
and   Guattari   aimed   to   show   that   the   unconscious   is   not   structural,   but  
machinic,  it  remains  the  case  that  the  unconscious  can  only  be  represented  as  
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structural.  This  is  to  say  that,  due  to  the  persistent  illusion  of  individual  being  
in  representation,  the  unconscious  appears  as  structural,  or  is  given  to  us  as  
such.   This   makes   the   practice   of   schizoanalysis   more   difficult:   “What  
complicates   everything   is   that   there   is   indeed   a   necessity   for   desiring-­
production   to   be   induced   from   representation,   to   be  discovered   through   its  
lines  of  escape  (lignes  de  fuite).”  To  put  this  another  way,  as  an  a-­signifying  
machine  the  unconscious  cannot  be  given  directly  within  the  signifying  web  of  
consciousness,  however,  by  starting  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  structure,  the  
analyst  can  work  back  to  the  machinic  unconscious  by  following  those  lines  
that  constantly   fail   to  be  adequately  captured  by   the  structure.  The  primary  
example   of   how   the   schizoanalyst  must   complete   this   task   is   presented   in  
cases  of  schizophrenia.  Rather  than  interpreting  schizophrenia  as  a  failure  to  
enter   the   structure   of   the  Symbolic,   or   as   a   lack   of   subjective   consistency,  
schizophrenic  processes  must  be  understood  as  excessive  and  creative  forces  
that  actively  resist  the  oedipal  structure  and  escape  from  it  at  all  costs.  Deleuze  
and   Guattari   state   that   in   order   to   reach   the   unconscious,   “schizoanalysis  
follows  the   lines  of  escape  (lignes  de   fuite)  and   the  machinic   indices  all   the  
way  to  the  desiring-­machines.”421  
  
When   we   see   that,   despite   its   illusions,   the   structural   interpretation   of   the  
unconscious   can   still   be   a   useful   tool   for   discovering   the   machinic  
unconscious,   it   becomes   clear   why   Deleuze   and   Guattari   hold   such   an  
ambivalent  relationship  with  Lacan.  By  breaking  with  Freud,  by  showing  that  
the  Oedipus  complex  is  imaginary,  and  by  setting  up  a  structural  interpretation  
of  the  unconscious,  Lacan  had  developed  a  rigorous  method  for  locating  all  of  
the  ways  in  which  the  unconscious  resists  the  structure  of  oedipal  desire  that  
is  imposed  on  it.  Speaking  of  Lacan,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write  that  “[t]o  trace  
back  from  images  to  the  structure  would  have  little  significance  and  would  not  
rescue  us  from  representation,  if  the  structure  did  not  have  a  reverse  side  that  
is   like   the   real   production   of   desire.”422   While   the   structure   is   a   mere  
representation   of   the   unconscious,   this   “reverse   side”   is  made   up   of   “pure  
positive  multiplicities  where  everything   is  possible,  without  exclusiveness  or  
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negation,   syntheses   operating   without   a   plan,   where   the   connections   are  
transverse,  the  disjunctions  included,  the  conjunctions  polyvocal.”423  The  signs  
that  compose  the  signifying  structure  may  follow  the  rules  of  signification,  but  
the   “signs   of   desire”   on   the   side   of   the   machine   have   “no   other   statutory  
condition  than  that  of  being  dispersed  elements  of  desiring-­machines  that  are  
themselves   dispersed.”424  Given   this   practical   restriction   on   schizoanalysis,  
which  necessitates  an  engagement  with   the  structural   representation  of   the  
unconscious,  the  importance  of  the  lines  of  flight  are  doubled.  Not  only  do  they  
have  a  functional  role  in  the  unconscious,  namely  to  constantly  ward  off  the  
possibility   of   the   codes   becoming   engrained   by   creating   constant  
transformations   and  mutations   of   the   code,   but   they   also   have   a   practical  
significance   for   the   schizoanalyst.   The   semiotic   encodings   of   desiring-­
machines  can  only  be  partially  captured  by  the  signifying  structure  of  Oedipus,  
of   which   it   is   the   reverse   side.425   What   escapes   this   capture   are   those  
processes   of   decoding   that   cannot   be   integrated   into   the   socio-­linguistic  
structure.   These   are   the   lines   of   escape,   or   the   lines   of   flight,   that   the  
schizoanalyst  must  follow.    
  
In  order  to  clarify  how  the  line  of  flight  functions  in  this  second  sense  it  will  be  
useful   to   briefly   explore   the   way   in   which   Deleuze   and   Guattari   draw   on  
Deleuze’s  earlier  reading  of  Riemann’s  concept  of  the  multiplicity  to  describe  
the   relationship   between   the   structural   representation   of   the   unconscious,  
which  Lacan’s  analysis  made  possible,  and  the  machinic  unconscious  that  is  
its  reverse  side.  This  will  lead  us  back  to  the  critique  of  linear  perspective  and  
the   question   of   intensive   depth   that   Deleuze   discussed   in   Difference   and  
Repetition.  To  put   it  briefly,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  will  equate   the  structured  
representation  of  the  unconscious  with  the  discrete  multiplicity  of  Riemannian  
geometry  and  with  the  structured  space  of  linear  perspective.  Here,  depth  is  
                                                                                                                
423  AO  339  
424  AO  339  
425  When  referring  to  the  machinic  unconscious  as  the  ‘reverse  side’  of  the  structure,  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  include  a  footnote  on  Leclaire’s  interpretation  of  Lacan  (AO  340).  However,  it  is  
also  likely  that  the  ‘reverse  side’  (l’envers)  is  a  reference  to  Lacan  himself,  whose  seminar  of  
1969-­1970  was  titled  ‘L'envers  de  la  Psychanalyse’  or  ‘The  Reverse  Side  of  Psychoanalysis’.  
Following   this   chain   of   reference   once  more,   Lacan   seemingly   alights   on   this   title   for   his  
seminar  as  an  allusion  to  Balzac’s  final  novel  L'Envers  de  l'histoire  contemporaine,  published  
in  English  as  The  Wrong  Side  of  Paris,  (2003).  
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produced   in   representation   by   means   of   discrete   elements,   in   this   case  
linguistic   signifiers,   that   relate   to   one   another   on   a   flattened   plane.   The  
machinic   unconscious,   on   the   other   hand,   will   be   analyzed   using   the  
Riemannian  understanding  of  the  continuous  multiplicity  in  which  the  endless  
transversal   connections   of   partial-­signs   create   an   unconscious   of   intensive  
depth.    While  Deleuze  and  Guattari  do  not  mention  Riemann  by  name  in  Anti-­
Oedipus,  they  are  clearly  drawing  on  his  work  when  they  describe  the  process  
by   which   the   unconscious   envelops   “distances   within   intensive   quantities”  
such  that  “it  does  not  divide  without  changing  its  nature  or  form.”426  They  also  
draw  on  the   language  of  differential  calculus   to  name  the  “flows  and  partial  
objects”  of  the  machinic  unconscious  as  “infinitesimal  lines  of  escape  (lignes  
de  fuite).”427  It  is  also  claimed  repeatedly  that  desiring-­production,  understood  
as  the  basic  material  of  the  unconscious,  is  a  continuous  multiplicity:  “It  is  only  
the  category  of  multiplicity,  used  as  a  substantive  and  going  beyond  both  the  
One  and  the  many,  beyond  the  predicative  relation  of  the  One  and  the  many,  
that   can   account   for   desiring-­production:   desiring-­production   is   pure  
multiplicity,   that   is   to   say,   an   affirmation   that   is   irreducible   to   any   sort   of  
unity.”428  By  describing  the  difference  between  the  structural  representation  of  
the  unconscious  and  the  machinic  unconscious  itself  in  these  terms,  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  are  also  able  to  explain  how  the  two  relate  to  each  other.  As  we  
saw  in  the  first  chapter  of  this  thesis,  an  n-­dimensional  curved  space  can  be  
represented  within  a  flat  space  of  n+1  dimensions.  For  example,  it  is  possible  
to   represent   a   two-­dimensional   space   of   regular   positive   curvature   as   the  
surface   of   a   three-­dimensional   sphere.   However,   in   order   for   this  
representation  to  be  given,  a  regular  measurement  is  required,  taken  outside  
of  the  space  in  question,  by  which  to  measure  the  relative  distances  within  the  
curved   space.   In   contrast   to   this   method,   which   relies   on   the   ability   to  
transcend  the  multiplicity  in  question  in  order  to  measure  and  order  it,  by  the  
use  of  differential  calculus  it  is  also  possible  to  give  an  immanent  account  of  
spaces   of   fixed  or   variable   curvature  without   embedding   them   in   a   higher-­
dimensional   space.   Using   this   terminology,   we   can   say   that   Deleuze   and  
                                                                                                                
426  AO  95-­96  
427  AO  308  
428  AO  45  
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Guattari   take   the   Lacanian   structuralist   account   of   the   unconscious   as   a  
representation   of   the   unconscious,   which   functions   by   taking   the   Oedipal  
relation  between  the  mother  and  the  child  as  the  transcendent  measuring  rod,  
against  which  to  judge  all  other  relations.  The  problem  with  this  method  is  that  
it  relies  on  an  external  measure  that  can  never  be  immanently  justified,  and  
that   by   the   use   of   this   measure   the   infinite   variation   of   the   multiplicity   in  
question   is   reduced   to   a   single,   ordered   expression.   What   Deleuze   and  
Guattari  attempt  to  do  in  Anti-­Oedipus  is  to  start  with  the  representation  of  the  
unconscious   that   is   handed   down   to   them,   but   then   to   carry   out   a   kind   of  
differential   calculus   of   the   unconscious   in   order   to   move   past   this  
representation  towards  an  immanent  account  of  the  unconscious.    
  
Interestingly,  in  a  small  number  of  comments,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  return  to  
the  example  of  linear  perspective,  which  Deleuze  discussed  in  Difference  and  
Repetition  as  one  example  of  the  way  in  which  a  representation  of  space  can  
fail  to  capture  the  intensity  of  the  dimension  of  depth.  In  the  previous  analysis,  
we  saw  how  Deleuze  showed  that  linear  perspective  creates  an  organized  and  
regular  space  of  perception  at  the  cost  of  burying  the  intensive  nature  of  space  
under  the  representation  of  extensity.  This  was  most  evident  in  the  fact  that  
linear  perspective  gives  priority  to  the  two  dimensions  of  height  and  breadth,  
which  are  said  to  generate  the  dimension  of  depth,  rather  than  the  other  way  
around.   This   critique   of   linear   perspective,   as   it   is   given   in  Difference   and  
Repetition,  acts  as  a  model  for  the  analysis  of  psychoanalytic  structuralism  in  
Anti-­Oedipus.  For  example,   talking  of   the  way   in  which  Lacan’s  work  points  
towards  the  intensive  and  machinic  unconscious  as  the  ‘reverse  side’  that  is  
hidden  under  the  face  of  the  structure,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write:  “It   is  this  
entire   reverse   side   of   the   structure   that   Lacan   discovers,   with   the   ‘a’   as  
machine.”429  However,   in   an   interview  given   in   1973   in  which  Deleuze  and  
Guattari   defend   some   of   their   concepts   from   Anti-­Oedipus,  Guattari   offers  
more  insight  into  just  how  the  lost  object  of  desire,  or  the  objet  petit  ‘a’,  points  
to  the  real  machinic  unconscious:  “I'm  not  at  all  sure  that  the  concept  of  the  "a"  
object  in  Lacan  is  anything  but  a  vanishing  point,  an  escape,  precisely,  from  
                                                                                                                
429  AO  339.  The  little  ‘a’  here  refers  to  the  French  word  ‘autre’  and  so  is  often  translated  as  ‘o’  
for  ‘other’.  I  have  retained  the  ‘a’  in  order  to  conform  with  the  quote  from  Chaosophy  below.  
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the  despotic  character  of  signifying  chains.”430  The  vanishing  point  in  a  painting  
of   linear  perspective   is   the  point  at  which  depth   is  represented  by  making   it  
disappear  at  an  infinite  distance,  beyond  the  picture  plane.  According  to  this  
analysis  while  linear  perspective  gives  only  the  illusion  of  depth,  the  vanishing  
point,  where  parallel  lines  escape  the  plane  to  meet  at  infinity,  offers  the  viewer  
a  point  at  which  to  escape  from  this  frame.  What  Deleuze  and  Guattari  seem  
to  be  saying  here  is  that  instead  of  seeing  the  object  of  desire  as  a  kind  of  cut,  
a  gap,  or  a  vanishing  point   (point  de   fuite),   in   the  structural  organization  of  
desire,   we   must   recognize   that   this   structural   organization   is   only   a  
representation,  and  that  by  treating  desire  as  an  intensive  excess  rather  than  
a  lack  in  extensity,  it  is  possible  to  follow  the  line  drawn  by  this  desire  (ligne  de  
fuite)   to   reach   the   real   unconscious.   This   way   of   speaking   about  
psychoanalytic  structuralism  in  Anti-­Oedipus  is  of  particular  interest  to  us  here  
because  of  the  way  it  combines  the  insights  from  both  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  
work   prior   to   their   collaborations.   According   to   the   interpretation   of  
structuralism   given   by   Deleuze   in   Difference   and   Repetition   and   Logic   of  
Sense,  both  the  vanishing  point  in  linear  perspective  and  the  objet  petit  ‘a’  in  
Lacanian  psychoanalysis  can  be  read  as  second  order  differences,  much  like  
the   ‘empty   square’   or   ‘object   =   x’   required   in   any   structure   to   allow   for   the  
circulation  of  elements  between  series.  However,  after  Guattari’s  reworking  of  
Deleuzian   structuralism   in   his   essay   ‘Machine   and   Structure’,   the   pair   can  
recognize  that  this  element  should  not  be  considered  as  part  of  the  structure  
at  all,  but  as  a  machinic  element  that  exists  outside  of  the  structure  and  is  not  
contained  by  its  rules.  In  ‘Machine  and  Structure’  Guattari  had  already  named  
the  lost  object  of  desire  the  “object  machine  petit  ‘a’”431.  Later,  in  Anti-­Oedipus,  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  can  develop  this  idea  further  to  show  that,  rather  than  
being   a   mere   vanishing   point   (point   de   fuite)   in   the   extended   structure   of  
desire,  the  unconscious  is  a  machine  that  operates  by  drawing  lines  of  flight  
(lignes  de  fuite)  that  create  the  extended  structure  as  a  secondary  effect.  The  
‘beyond’  indicated  by  the  vanishing  point  of  structural  psychoanalysis  is  not  an  
                                                                                                                
430  CY  69.  The  ‘vanishing  point’  referred  to  here  is  written  in  French  as  ‘point  de  fuite’.    
431  PT  323-­324  
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undifferentiated  abyss,  but  a  heterogeneous  interconnection  of  part-­signs   in  
intensive  relations:  not  an  Oedipal  theatre,  but  a  productive  machine.432  
  
At  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  the  line  of  flight  was  given  a  provisional  role  as  
the   concept   used   by   Deleuze   and   Guattari   to   define   the   way   that   desire  
operates   when   it   is   not   inhibited,   captured,   or   turned   against   itself   by   the  
structuring  forces  of  social  reality.  Given  the  subsequent  analysis  of  Deleuze  
and  Guattari’s  critique  of  the  Oedipus  complex,  their  immanent  account  of  the  
three   syntheses   of   unconscious,   and   their   positive,   machinic,  material   and  
intensive  account  of  the  unconscious  of  desiring-­production,  it  is  now  possible  
to   add   some   nuance   to   this   definition.   Lines   of   flight   are   drawn   in   the  
unconscious  when  the  code  embedded  in  desiring-­machines  undoes  itself  by  
extracting   elements   from   one   code   and   making   transversal   connections  
between  heterogeneous  chains  of  code.  These  lines  are  endlessly  ramified  by  
the  inclusive  disjunctions  of  the  second  synthesis  to  create  ever  new  forms  of  
desiring   activity.   This   procedure   is   central   to   the   schizophrenic   process   of  
desire,  which  constitutes   the  unconscious  as  a  continuous,   intensive  and  a-­
signifying  multiplicity.  From  the  point  of  view  of  representation,  these  lines  of  
flight  appear  only  as  processes  that  escape  the  capture  of  signification.  Rather  
than  following  the  Lacanian  psychoanalytic  tendency  of  treating  these  escapes  
as   empty   place-­holders   for   the   structural   invariant   of   lack,   Deleuze   and  
Guattari  advocate  a  new  form  of  schizoanalysis  where  these  lines  of  flight  are  
treated  as  positive  and  creative  and  are   followed   in  order   to   reach   the   real  
nature  of  the  machinic  unconscious.433  
     
                                                                                                                
432  Returning  to  the  question  of  linear  perspective,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  elaborate  this  point  
through  an  analysis  of  the  later  works  of  J.M.W.  Turner,  where  the  structured  space  of  linear  
perspective  gives  way  to  a  space  of  pure  colour,  a  “transverse  organization  of  the  canvas  is  
born,  with  lines  of  escape  (lignes  de  fuite)  or  breakthrough”  (AO  403).  They  call  this  move  a  
“decoding  of  the  flows  of  painting”  via  a  use  of  “schizoid  lines  of  escape  (lignes  de  fuite)”  which  
they  contrast  with  “a  properly  pictorial  axiomatic  that  chokes  off  the  escapes  (fuites),  closes  
the  whole  constellation  to  the  transversal  relations  between  lines  and  colors,  and  reduces  it  to  
archaic  or  new  territorialities  (perspective,  for  example)”  (AO  403).  
433  Lacanian  theory  does  not  simply  define  desire  as  a  lack  in  the  Symbolic,  but  also  as  an  
excess   in   the  Real.  However,  when  Deleuze  and  Guattari  were  publishing  Anti-­Oedipus   in  
1972,  Lacan’s  work  gave  precedence  to   the   former  articulation.  For  more  on   the  opposing  
methodologies  of  Lacan  and  Deleuze,  see  Schuster  (2016,  98-­100).  
   156  






ii)  Molecular  processes  and  molar  histories                   
iii)  Anti-­production  and  the  ironic  history  of  capitalism                




     
   157  
i)  Introduction  
  
Following  the  discussion  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  reformulation  of  desire,  in  
this   chapter   I   will   explore   the   theory   of   history   and   of   political   change   put  
forward  in  Anti-­Oedipus.  We  have  now  seen  how  Deleuze  and  Guattari  rethink  
the  concept  of  the  unconscious  to  highlight  the  role  played  by  schizophrenic  
processes  and  by  lines  of  flight,  but  what  we  have  yet  to  cover  is  the  way  that  
such  a  theory  opens  onto  broader  political  and  historical  questions  concerning  
the  production  of   reality.  To  complete  our  analysis  of   the  role  played  by   the  
concept  of  the  line  of  flight  in  Anti-­Oedipus,  here  I  will  show  how  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  use  insights  from  Nietzsche,  Freud,  Marx,  and  others,  to  offer  a  new  
account   of   the   world-­historical   position   of   capitalism.   This   analysis   will  
introduce  us  to  the  distinction  between  the  molecular  and  the  molar  registers  
of   political   activity,   and   to   the   different   historical   stages   of   Deleuze   and  
Guattari’s  account  of  political  economy.  Finally,  by  bringing  together  Deleuze  
and  Guattari’s  theory  of  the  unconscious  with  their  theory  of  political  change,  I  
will  explain  why  the  pair  claim  that  it   is  only  via  the  revolutionary  practice  in  
which  the  schizoanalyst  “follows  lines  of  escape  (lignes  de  fuite)”  that  the  social  
structure  of  capitalist  relations  will  be  overcome.434  This  chapter  will  conclude  
with  a   review  of   the  various  ways   in  which  Deleuze  and  Guattari  utilise   the  
concept  of   the   line  of   flight   in  Anti-­Oedipus.  Here   I  will  pick  out   four  distinct  
uses  of  concept  and  will  explain  how  each  of  these  uses  relates  to  the  others.  
Before  reaching  this  point,  however,  it  will  be  necessary  to  get  a  handle  on  the  
mode  of  political  analysis  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  engaging  in.    
  
ii)  Molecular  processes  and  molar  histories  
  
Far  from  being  a  one-­dimensional  polemic  against  structural  psychoanalysis,  
Anti-­Oedipus   is  a  kind  of  political  manifesto   that   incorporates  an  analysis  of  
the   history   of   political   power.   In   this   respect,   Deleuze   and   Guattari   are   as  
indebted  to  Nietzsche  as  they  are  to  either  Freud  or  Marx.435  By  drawing  on  
                                                                                                                
434  AO  372  
435  For  an  account  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  theory  of  social  machines  that  does  justice  to  the  
influence  of  Nietzsche,  see  Widder  (2012,  113-­122).  
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Nietzsche’s  analysis  of  debt  and  guilt  in  the  second  essay  of  On  the  Genealogy  
of  Morality,  and  the  continuation  of  these  themes  in  The  Antichrist,  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  attempt  to  use  Freudian  and  Marxist  theory  to  bring  about  what  
Nietzsche  had  called  a  transvaluation  or  “revaluation  of  all  values”.436  In  order  
to   give   an   account   of   the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight   in   its   full   theoretical  
context,  in  this  section  I  will  explore  the  place  of  schizoanalytic  concepts  within  
Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   political   thought.   Schizoanalysis   is   not   intended   to  
simply  replace  psychoanalysis  as  a  method  of  cure,  but  is  designed  as  a  mode  
of  historical-­materialist  criticism,  capable  of  producing  revolutionary  modes  of  
subjectivity.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  argue  in  Anti-­Oedipus  that  Marxism  must  be  
reworked  in  order  to  account  for  the  problem  of  subjectivity,  and  that  this  can  
be  done  by  analysing  the  history  of  political-­economy  in  terms  of  desire.  Contra  
Marx,  and  drawing  on  insights  from  Reich,  Spinoza,  and  Nietzsche,  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  claim  that  it  is  not  ideology  that  tricks  people  into  working  against  
their  own  self-­interest,  but  that  people  become  enslaved  when  their  desire  is  
captured  by  an  organisation  of  force  that  they  cannot  resist.437  Deleuze  and  
Guattari’s   attempts   to   combine   a   theory   of   desire   and   a   theory   of   political  
economy  can  be  seen  clearly  in  their  use  of  the  previously  discussed  concepts  
of  desiring-­production  and  desiring-­machines,  which  each  attempt  to  combine  
the  category  of  labour-­power,  first  analysed  by  Adam  Smith  and  David  Ricardo  
and   later   utilised   so   effectively   by   Marx,   and   the   category   of   libido,   first  
analysed  by  Freud.    
  
However,   before  moving  on   to   explore   the   historical   account   given   in  Anti-­
Oedipus  of   the   development   of   different  modes  of   desiring-­production,   it   is  
important  to  show  how  Deleuze  and  Guattari  use  the  concept  of  history  here.  
First,  the  form  of  historical  materialism  put  forward  by  Deleuze  and  Guattari  is  
a   subtle   one   that   leads   them   to   claim   that   the   separate   discoveries   of   the  
category  of  labour-­power  and  the  category  of  desire  were  made  possible  by  a  
specific  set  of  historical  conditions.  This  historical  analysis  of  the  discovery  of  
                                                                                                                
436  Nietzsche,  2005,  11.  It   is  not  by  chance  that  the  title  of  Anti-­Oedipus  reflets  Nietzsche’s  
Antichrist.    
437  For  an  overview  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  Freudo-­Marxism,  and  the  place  of  Nietzsche,  
Spinoza  and  others  within  it,  see  Holland  (1999,  16-­19,  106).  
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labour-­power   and   of   desire   will   serve   to   cement   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s  
historical  critique  of  the  Oedipus  complex.  Simply  put,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
claim  that  it  is  only  with  the  rise  of  capitalism,  and  the  separation  of  the  public  
life  of  the  factory  and  the  private  life  of  the  family,  that  the  processes  of  social  
reproduction  and  human  reproduction  become  distinct.  Here,  “the  elements  of  
production  and  antiproduction  are  not  reproduced  in  the  same  way  as  humans  
themselves,   but   find   in   them   a   simple   material   that   the   form   of   economic  
reproduction  preorganizes  in  a  mode  that  is  entirely  distinct  from  the  form  this  
material  has  as  human  reproduction.”438  Only  once  the  two  domains  of  work  
and   family   have   been   divided,   and   thus   the   two   processes   of   social  
reproduction  and  human  reproduction  have  become  distinct,  is  it  possible  for  
Smith  and  Ricardo  to  set  up  a  science  of  the  former,  and  for  Freud  to  set  up  a  
science  of  the  latter.  What  makes  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  concept  of  history  so  
interesting  here  is  their  claim  that  while  the  concepts  of  labour-­power  and  libido  
only  arise  historically,  our  ability  to  think  this  moment  in  terms  of  its  place  in  
universal  or  world  history  also  relies  on  the  prior  existence  of  a  particular  form  
of  libidinal  economy.    Here  Deleuze  and  Guattari  follow  Marx  directly,  when  he  
writes:   “World  history  has  not  always  existed;;  history  as  world  history   [is]  a  
result.”439  In  order  to  understand  how  Deleuze  and  Guattari  can  simultaneously  
hold   what   seem   like   two   contrary   positions,   namely   that   the   categories   of  
labour-­power  and  libido  only  arise  historically  and  that  history  only  arises  due  
to  a  particular  combination  of  libido  and  labour-­power,  it  will  be  necessary  to  
introduce   the   distinction   that   Deleuze   and   Guattari  make   between   the   two  
regimes  of  the  molar  and  the  molecular.  This  distinction  will  allow  us  to  see  
how  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  account  of   the  unconscious   interacts  with   their  
political  claims  and  it  will  allow  us  to  see  where  the  concept  of  history  fits  within  
them.  
  
The  distinction  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  make  between  the  two  regimes  of  
the   molar   and   the   molecular   explains   why,   from   within   the   perspective   of  
capitalism,   social   reproduction   and   desiring-­production   appear   to   us   as  
separate,  and  why  the  Marxist  category  of  labour-­power  seems  distinct  from  
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the  Freudian  category  of  libido.  In  effect,  what  Deleuze  and  Guattari  argue  is  
that   while   “there   is   never   any   difference   in   nature   between   the   desiring-­
machines   and   the   technical   social  machines”   there   is   “a   certain   distinction  
between   them,   but   it   is  merely   a   distinction   of   regime,   depending   on   their  
relationships  of  size.”440  To  distinguish  between  the  two  regimes  of  desiring-­
production  and  social  production  Deleuze  and  Guattari  borrow  the  concepts  of  
the  molecular  and  the  molar  from  the  physical  sciences.  The  authors  call  these  
“the  two  directions  in  physics  —the  molar  direction  that  goes  toward  the  large  
numbers  and  the  mass  phenomena,  and  the  molecular  direction  that  on  the  
contrary  penetrates  into  singularities,  their   interactions  and  connections  at  a  
distance   or   between   different   orders.”441   While   a   physical   object   may   be  
constituted   at   one   level   by   a   collection   of  molecular   elements   that   obey  
particular  physical   laws   (such  as  attraction  and   repulsion),   certain  qualities,  
such  as  temperature  and  pressure  are  only  defined  by  the  interaction  of  a  large  
number  of  molecules  and  so  can  only  be  attributed   to  molar   formations.  To  
take  a  mundane  example,  while  the  table  in  front  of  me  appears  to  be  solid,  
dark  in  colour,  and  warm  to  the  touch,  at  the  molecular  level  the  table  is  mostly  
made  up  of  empty  space,  and   the  molecules   that  constitute   the   table  have  
neither   a   colour   nor   a   temperature.   Rigidity,   colour,   and   temperature   are  
nothing  other  than  effects  produced  by  statistical  aggregates  of  a  large  number  
of  molecules  that  possess  neither  rigidity,  colour,  nor  temperature.  As  there  is  
only  one  table,  there  is  no  material  distinction  between  the  molecular  and  the  
molar  constitutions  of   the   table,  and  yet   there  are  different   regimes  of   rules  
governing  these  two  aspects.  Similarly,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  want  to  claim,  
while   desiring-­production   is   the   “production   of   production”   and   is   therefore  
constitutive  of  all  matter,   this  unconscious   formulation  gives  rise   to  a  social  
reality   that   follows  a  different  set  of   rules.442  Just  as  we  must   look  past   the  
molar  formations  of  physical  bodies  to  discover  the  molecular  processes  that  
produce   them,   Deleuze   and   Guattari   argue   that   we   must   look   past   social  
formations  of  desire  to  the  unconscious  processes  that  produce  these  effects.  
For   Deleuze   and   Guattari,   “desiring-­machines   are   precisely   that:   the  
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microphysics  of   the  unconscious,  the  elements  of   the  microunconscious.”443  
One   of   the   factors   that   differentiates   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   use   of   this  
terminology   from   its   application   in   contemporary   physics,   and   which   also  
separates   them   from   the   traditional  empiricist   logics  of  corporeal  substance  
utilised  by  figures  such  as  Locke  and  Berkeley,  is  their  relative  use  of  these  
terms.   For   Deleuze   and   Guattari,   the   molar   and   the   molecular   are   not  
absolutely   distinct,   but   simply   offer   two   different   angles   from   which   any  
phenomenon  can  be  analysed.  Thus,  while   it  might  seem   that   the  personal  
realm  of   desire   forms   the  molecular   ground   for   the  molar   aggregate   of   the  
State,   it   is  also   the  case  that   the   individual  desiring  subject   is   itself  a  molar  
aggregate.  When  examining  any  particular  desiring  phenomenon  two  routes  
of   analysis   are   available;;   you   can   either   analyse   the  molecular   forces   that  
produce  the  phenomenon,  or  you  can  analyse  the  statistical  effects  produced  
at  the  level  of  molar  aggregates.444  
  
For  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  the  distinction  between  the  molar  and  the  molecular  
regimes  of  organisation  explains  the  genesis  of  history  as  an  emergent  quality  
of  molar  formations  of  desire.  According  to  20th  century  developments  in  the  
physical  sciences,  the  unidirectional  flow  of  time  is  explained  by  the  entropic  
tendency   of   heat   to   dissipate.   However,   this   phenomenon   is   based   on   a  
statistical  tendency  of  the  interaction  of  a  large  number  of  molecules  and  relies  
on  a   theory  of  probability  rather   than  a  relation  of  strict  causation.   It   follows  
from  this  that  the  ordering  of  time  is  unidirectional  only  according  to  a  molar  
regime  of  organisation,  while  at  the  level  of  the  molecular  regime  this  is  not  the  
case.445  Taking  once  again  our  prior  example  of  the  table,  the  physical   laws  
that  govern  the  molecules  that  produce  the  table  are  time-­symmetrical,  while  
the  laws  of  thermodynamics  that  govern  the  emergent  qualities  of  the  table,  
such  as  its  temperature,  are  time-­asymmetrical.  In  Anti-­Oedipus,  the  authors  
attempt  to  show  that  the  social  forms  of  political  economy  analysed  by  Marx,  
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444  The   relative  nature  of   the  molar  and  molecular   registers   is   transformed   in  A  Thousand  
Plateaus,  where  any  assemblage  is  said  to  open  itself  onto  both  a  plane  of  organisation  that  
stratifies  it  and  a  plane  of  consistency  that  destratifies  it  (ATP  77-­81).  
445  For  a  simple  overview  of  this  interpretation  of  molecular  physics  see  Rovelli  (2014,  60).  For  
a  more  in-­depth  look  at  the  role  of  statistical  probabilities  in  determining  the  directionality  of  
time,  see  Halliwell,  Pérez-­Mercader,  &  Zurek,  (1994,  108-­115).    
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such  as   feudalism  and   capitalism,  are   the  molar,   statistical   effects   of   large  
aggregates  of  desire  and   that  under   this  perspective   they  are  ordered  by  a  
“universal  history”.446  However,   they  also  aim  to  show  that   the  unconscious  
processes   that   produce   these   statistical   aggregates   are   not   ordered  
historically.447  To  put  this  another  way,  for  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  the  distinct  
forms  of  political  economy  analysed  by  Marx  are  a  series  of  group  fantasies  
and  their  historical  progression  is  only  an  effect  of  the  way  they  are  fantasised.  
  
iii)  Anti-­production  and  the  ironic  history  of  capitalism    
  
The  molecular  functioning  of  desire,  governed  as  it  is  by  the  three  syntheses  
of   the   unconscious   discussed   in   the   previous   chapter,   constitutes   a   pre-­
individual  realm  in  which  part-­signs  circulate  in  an  open  process  of  coding  and  
decoding,  but  the  effects  that  these  processes  create  when  taken  as  a  large  
group   form   a   series   of   molar   aggregates,   with   a   fixed   historical   order.  
Somewhat   counterintuitively,   this   does  not  mean   that   historical   analyses  of  
political  change  can  be  set  to  one  side,  but  instead  it  requires  a  new  technique  
by  which  schizoanalysis  can   reconstruct   the  way   in  which  history  has  been  
fantasised.  This   is  because  the  molar  effects  of  desire  act  back  on  desiring  
production  and  capture  it  in  organisations  that  work  against  the  very  interest  
of   desire.   While   Deleuze   and   Guattari   describe   the   relation   between   the  
molecular   and   the   molar   organisations   of   desire   as   a   broad   “parallelism  
between  social  production  and  desiring-­production”,   they  also  say   that   “this  
parallelism   was   in   no   way   meant   as   an   exhaustive   description   of   the  
relationship  between  the  two  systems  of  production”  because  “there  is  a  strong  
tendency  on  the  part  of  the  forces  of  antiproduction  to  operate  retroactively  on  
(se   rabattre   sur)   productive   forms   and   appropriate   them.”448   Large   social  
formations  such  as  feudalism  and  capitalism  are  thus  treated  not  as  modes  of  
production  in  their  own  right.  Instead  they  are  understood  as  representational  
or   phantasmatic   effects,   produced   by   the   productive   capacity   of   desiring-­
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Plateaus  when  they  clearly  distinguish  the  category  of  ‘becoming’  from  that  of  ‘history’.    
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production,  which   then  act  back   on   these  productive   forces   to   capture   and  
contain  them  under  a  certain  image.449  The  historical  narrative  that  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  offer  in  Anti-­Oedipus  of  the  development  of  capitalism,  is  thus  an  
ironic   account   of   the  way   that   production   has   been   fantasised   through   the  
categories  of  “Savages,  Barbarians,  [and]  Civilised  Men”.450    
  
There   are   two   things   to   note   here   concerning   the   relation   between   social  
machines  and  desiring-­machines.  First,  the  representation  of  production  in  the  
molar   aggregates   is   not   a   good   guide   to   the   real   functioning   of   desiring-­
machines.   This   is  mostly   because   “every   time   that   production,   rather   than  
being  apprehended  in  its  originality,  in  its  reality,  becomes  reduced  (rabattue)  
in  this  manner  to  a  representational  space,  it  can  no  longer  have  value  except  
by  its  own  absence,  and  it  appears  as  a  lack  within  this  space.”451  This  is  the  
reason  why  desire,  which  is  manifestly  productive  according  to  an  immanent  
mode  of  analysis,  appears  as  a  lack  in  social  formations.  Structural  forms  of  
analysis  constantly  fail  to  recognize  the  productive  capacity  of  desire,  always  
casting   it  back   into   the  net  of  Oedipus,  because  when   “a  structural  unity   is  
imposed   on   the   desiring-­machines”   it   “joins   them   together   in   a   molar  
aggregate”  in  which  “the  partial  objects  are  referred  to  a  totality  that  can  appear  
only  as  that  which  the  partial  objects  lack,  and  as  that  which  is  lacking  unto  
itself  while  being  lacking  in  them.”452  Second,  while  a  structural  analysis  of  the  
molar   formations   of   social  machines  may   seem   to   follow   a   necessary   and  
linear   path,   the   apparently   necessary   relations   between   each   of   the  molar  
formations  are  illusory.  In  direct  contrast  to  those  structuralist  Marxists,  such  
as  Althusser,  who  attempt   to   give   a   rigorous   scientific   account   of   historical  
materialist  history,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  argue   that   “universal  history   is   the  
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history   of   contingencies,   and   not   the   history   of   necessity.”453   Through   an  
analysis  of  the  molecular  forces  that  produce  molar  formations,  Deleuze  and  
Guattari   show   that   in   order   for   capitalism   to   have   been   produced   “great  
accidents  were  necessary,  and  amazing  encounters  that  could  have  happened  
elsewhere,  or  before,  or  might  never  have  happened”.454  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
are   cautious   in   Anti-­Oedipus   to   distance   themselves   from   the   traditional  
Marxist  practice  of  analysing  the  material  conditions  of  historical  progression,  
and  stress  that  in  order  to  understand  the  history  of  capitalism  it  is  important  
to  recognize  the  ways  in  which  the  apparent  historical  development  of  forms  
of  production  is  an  effect  of  group  fantasy  that  must  be  treated  as  such.  They  
clarify  this  point  succinctly  when  they  write:  “In  a  word,  universal  history  is  not  
only  retrospective,  it  is  also  contingent,  singular,  ironic,  and  critical.”455  
  
The  three  stages  of  historical  progression  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  name  as  
part   of   their   ironic   analysis   include   primitive   societies   of   savages,   despotic  
societies  of  barbarians,  and  capitalist  societies  of  civilised  men.  Each  of  these  
three  stages  is  not  primarily  defined  by  its  mode  of  production,  but  by  the  mode  
of   anti-­production   used   to   organise   the   socius.   In   his   introduction   to   Anti-­
Oedipus,   Eugene   Holland   defines   anti-­production   as   “the   conversion   of   a  
portion   of   the   superabundant   forces   of   production   into   a   counter-­force   that  
absorbs,   distributes,   or   consumes   already-­produced   products.”456   While  
desiring-­production   is   a   creative  and  productive   force,   it   appears   differently  
under  each  of  these  molar  formations  because  of  the  different  ways  in  which  
it  is  captured  by  a  structure  that  represents  it  as  a  lack.  Each  molar  formation  
of  anti-­production  is  understood  “as  the  controlled  expenditure  of  excess”  and  
for   Deleuze   and   Guattari   it   is   therefore   “co-­terminous   with   the   process   of  
organizing  social  relations  in  systems  of  debt  of  various  kinds.”457  In  parallel  
with  Deleuze   and  Guattari’s   decision   to   treat   the   unconscious   as   a   site   of  
                                                                                                                
453  AO  154.  Like  with  Lacan,  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s   relationship  with  Althusser   is  double-­
sided.  By  taking  a  Spinozist  reading  of  Marx  over  a  Hegelian  one,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  praise  
Althusser  for  opening  the  possibility  of  an  analysis  of  historical  materialism  that  does  not  rely  
the   negative.   However,   Deleuze   and  Guattari   break   from   Althusser   over   the   possibility   of  
producing  a  scientific  reading  of  this  process  and  its  structural  consistency.    
454  AO  154.  See  also  Lundy  2013.  
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coding,   rather  than  a  site  of  signification,   in  Anti-­Oedipus   the   three  different  
social  formations  are  considered  by  the  different  ways  in  which  they  encode  
society.   According   to   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   analysis,   primitive   societies  
organise  the  socius  through  a  process  of  coding  in  which  the  material  flows  in  
society   are   differentiated   and   kept   separate   from   one   another.   Here   the  
“primitive   territorial  machine”   is   “already  a  social  machine,  a  megamachine,  
that   codes   the   flows   of   production,   the   flows   of   means   of   production,   of  
producers   and   consumers.”458   Without   strict   social   hierarchies,   the   danger  
facing  primitive  societies   is   that  certain   individuals  may  take  up  positions  of  
control   by   hoarding   a   surplus   of   goods.   To   resist   this   possibility,   so-­called  
primitive  societies  destroy  any  excess  that  is  produced  in  rituals  of  sacrifice  or  
of  celebration  and  organise  the  remaining  flows  of  goods  in  areas  of  life  that  
are  qualitatively  distinct  from  one  another.  In  order  to  ward-­off  the  possibility  
of  a  social  hierarchy  forming,  it   is  important  that  the  different  areas  of  social  
life  are  coded  separately.  In  these  societies,  “[f]lows  of  women  and  children,  
flows  of  herds  and  of  seed,  sperm  flows,  flows  of  shit,  menstrual  flows:  nothing  
must  escape  coding.”459  
  
Primitive   societies   do  not   transform   into   barbarian   societies   via  any   kind  of  
necessary  progression,   in  which   the   internal  contradictions  of   their  mode  of  
production  collapses.  On  the  contrary,  primitive  societies  are  only  transformed  
due  to  a  contingent  set  of  circumstances  by  which  something  arrives  from  the  
outside  to  disrupt  their  mode  of  anti-­production.  Specifically,  primitive  societies  
are  colonised  by  despotic   regimes   that  come  over   the  horizon  and  capture  
them.  Here,  the  whole  organisation  of  production  and  anti-­production  is  altered  
according   to   the   desire   of   the   despot.   Rather   than   destroying   their   surplus  
products   in   ritual   celebrations   and   offerings,   when   primitive   societies   are  
colonised  by  external  powers  the  surplus  is  collected  by  the  despot  in  the  form  
of   taxes.   This   requires   a   vast   machinery   of   overcoding   by   which   value   is  
extracted  from  the  previous  codes  and  transferred  to  the  despot.  The  process  
by  which  a  despotic  society  captures  a  primitive  society  initiates  the  formation  
of   a   State.   In   this   way,   “[o]vercoding   is   the   operation   that   constitutes   the  
                                                                                                                
458  AO  156  
459  AO  156  
   166  
essence   of   the   State”,   while   the   role   of   the  State   is   nothing  other   than   “to  
overcode   all   the   existing   flows,   and   to   ensure   that   no   intrinsic   code,   no  
underlying   flow   escapes   the   overcoding   of   the   despotic   machine.”460   The  
precise  mode  by  which  despotic  regimes  manage  to  overcode  the  previously  
coded  flows  of  primitive  societies  is  of  great  interest  to  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  
because  these  same  methods  will  be  utilised   later  by   the  capitalist  mode  of  
anti-­production.  Of  primary  importance  here  is  the  emergence  of  writing  in  the  
form  of  the  written  decree  or  law,  which  must  be  translated  from  one  language  
to  another.  For,  while  “language  itself  does  not  presuppose  conquest”  it  is  the  
case   that   “the   levelling   operations   (les   operations   de   rabattement)   that  
constitute  written   language   indeed   presuppose   two   inscriptions   that   do   not  
speak   the   same   language:   two   languages   (langages),   one   of  masters,   the  
other   of   slaves.”461   The   requirement   for   the   colonised  people   to   be  able   to  
decode   the   written   decrees   issued   by   the   despot   means   that   the   act   of  
translation  cuts  across  all  of  the  previous  coded  flows  that  were  previously  kept  
separate.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write  that  the  “imperial  inscription  countersects  
all   the   alliances   and   filiations”   and   in   this   way   all   the   “coded   flows   of   the  
primitive   machine   are   now   forced   into   a   bottleneck,   where   the   despotic  
machine  overcodes  them.”462  According  to  this  analysis,  the  whole  operation  
of  signification  is  recast  as  a  kind  of  imperial  capture,  in  which  the  centrality  of  
a  Master  Signifier  allows  a  fixed  set  of  signifiers  to  dominate  that  which  they  
signify.  Speaking  of  the  defining  points  of  any  system  of  signification,  Deleuze  
and   Guattari   write   that   the   “arbitrary   nature   of   the   thing   designated,   the  
subordination  of  the  signified,  the  transcendence  of  the  despotic  signifier”  all  
point  to  the  fact  that  “writing  belongs  to  imperial  despotic  representation.”463    
  
The  central  example  of  how  the  despot  overcodes  the  previously  coded  flows  
of  primitive  societies  concerns  the  emergence  of  the  incest-­taboo,  which  will  
later  form  the  basis  of  the  Oedipus  complex  under  capitalism.464  According  to  
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464  Instead  of  relying  on  Freud’s  account  of  incest  in  Totem  and  Taboo,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
draw  on  Nietzsche’s  analysis  of  the  transformation  of  debt  into  guilt  in  the  second  essay  of  On  
   167  
Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   analysis,   within   primitive   societies   the   incest-­taboo  
does  not   function  as  a  constraint  or  a   limitation  on  desire,  but  only  as  a  “a  
prescription  to  form  or  strengthen  family  alliances,  to  share  or  distribute  wealth,  
to  knit  social  ties,  by  insisting  that  the  young  find  their  spouses  exogamously,  
outside  of  their  own  family  group  or  clan.”465  However,  under  the  form  of  the  
State,  the  colonised  peoples  are  considered  as  being  infinitely  indebted  to  the  
despot,  who  has  a  symbolic  right  to  procreate  with  all  women  in  the  society,  
regardless  of  the  pre-­existing  codes  of  lineage  and  affiliation.  Taking  on  the  
symbolic  position  of  the  father,  the  despot  must  reissue  the  prescription  of  the  
incest-­taboo  as  a  law  in  which  incest  “which  had  appeared  as  a  mere  after-­
image  of  positive  marriage-­inducements  under  savagery,  now  becomes  in  a  
sense  ubiquitous  and  inevitable,  if  only  symbolically,  with  the  new-­alliance  and  
direct-­filiation  relations  of  despotism.”466  This  act  of  overcoding  on  the  part  of  
the  despot,  inscribed  in  a  written  law,  forms  the  basis  of  the  Oedipus  complex  
because   it   is   the   first   moment   where   the   productive   capacity   of   desire   is  
misrepresented   as   a   lack   within   a   generalized   system   of   signification.   As  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  put  it  in  Anti-­Oedipus,  it  is  only  with  the  Oedipus  complex  
that   “desire   gets   displaced   onto   an   erroneous   signified   belonging   to   the  
prohibitive  system  of   representation  rather   than   to  desire   itself.”467   It   follows  
from   this   that   “[f]ar   from  being   repressed  by   the   incest   prohibition,  Oedipal  
desire  is  in  fact  produced  by  it.”468  Through  this  historical  analysis  of  the  modes  
of  capture  used  by  despotic  regimes,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  equate  the  State  
form  with  a  process  of  overcoding  and  aim  to  show  that  both  writing  and  the  
incest-­taboo  are  inherently  linked  with  despotism.    
  
Before  moving  on  to  an  analysis  of  capitalism,  we  must  consider  the  way  that  
escape  functions  in  both  primitive  and  despotic  regimes  of  production  and  anti-­
production.  As  we  saw  previously,  the  main  form  of  anti-­production  operative  
in  primitive  societies   is   the  use  of   the  rituals  to  encode  each  of   the  material  
                                                                                                                
the  Genealogy  of  Morality.  See  sections  21  and  22  of  this  essay,  where  Nietzsche  comments  
on  the  relation  between  Christian  morality  and  guilt  (2006,  62-­64).  
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flows   that   pass   through   society   in   order   to   keep   them   separate   from   one  
another.  It  is  of  primary  importance  here  that  “nothing  must  escape  coding.”469  
Despite   the   many   differences   between   the   primitive   and   the   despotic  
processes   of   coding   and   overcoding,   the   possibility   of   escape   is   also   a  
principal  threat  to  the  dissolution  of  despotic  regimes.  Put  in  material  terms,  
the  possibility  that  anyone  might  appropriate  the  full  products  of  their  labour,  
and  thus  build  up  a  personal  surplus,  is  as  much  a  threat  to  the  despot  as  it  is  
to  the  primitive  society.  What  makes  things  worse  is  the  fact  that  the  process  
of  overcoding  carried  out  by  the  State  disrupts  the  previous  system  of  coding  
and  opens  up  new  possibilities  for  desiring-­production  to  evade  capture  by  the  
social  machinery.  Guillaume  Sibertine-­Blanc,   in  his  analysis  of  Deleuze  and  
Guattari’s  political  philosophy,  emphasizes  this  point:  “The  archaic  State  does  
not  overcode  without  also  freeing  a  large  quantity  of  decoded  flows  that  escape  
from  it.”470  This  puts  the  colonisation  of  barbarian  societies  in  a  constant  state  
of  unrest,  in  which  the  process  of  overcoding  social  practices  always  releases  
the  possibility  of  a  breakdown.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
write   that,   by   definition,   “[t]he   despot   is   the   paranoiac.”471   This   process   is  
important   for  our  analysis  of   the  concept  of   the   line  of   flight  because,  while  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  use  that  term  to  designate  one  thing  in  their  analysis  of  
the   unconscious,   they   also   use   the   concept   in   their   historical   analysis   of  
political  economy.  For  example,  social  repression  functions  in  part  by  “choking  
off   the   flows'   lines   of   escape   (lignes   de   fuite).”472   For   both   primitive   and  
despotic  regimes  of  power,  which  organise  the  socius  via  a  process  of  coding,  
or  overcoding,  any  routes  by  which  the  flows  may  become  decoded,  and  may  
escape  from  the  body  of  the  socius,  must  be  blocked  off.  Defined  as  they  are  
by   their   respective   practices   for   coding   social   flows,   and   for   resisting   the  
possibility  of  decoding  and  escape,  we  can  now  say  that  the  lines  of  escape,  
or   the   lines  of   flight,  act  as   the  external   limit  of  both  primitive  and  despotic  
societies.    
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For  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  the  emergence  of  capitalism,  like  the  emergence  of  
despotism,  relies  on  a  series  of  contingent  factors.473  Using  a  similar  method  
here  as  with  their  analysis  of  both  savagery  and  despotism,  capitalism  is  seen  
first  and  foremost  as  a  mode  of  representation,  which  captures  the  productive  
forces  of  desire  within  a  particular  image,  rather  than  being  productive  itself.  
What  sets  capitalism  apart  from  the  previous  modes  of  social  organisation  is  
the  fact  that  rather  than  operating  by  a  process  of  coding,  or  of  overcoding,  in  
which  the  decoding  of  flows  presents  an  external  limit  to  the  socius,  capitalism  
operates   precisely   by   and   through   the   process   of   decoding.   Specifically,  
Deleuze   and  Guattari   aim   to   show   how   a   number   of   factors,   including   the  
increased   circulation   of   money   in   the   merchant   class   and   the   resulting  
disarticulation   of   feudal   power,   produce   a   situation   in   which   the   underlying  
codes   of   primitive   societies   and   the   overcoded   practices   of   despotism   are  
usurped  by  a  vast  and  generalised  process  of  decoding.  Drawing  directly  from  
Marx’s  work  in  Capital,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  see  the  emergence  of  capitalism  
as  involving  the  coming  together  of  two  distinct  processes:  “on  one  side,  the  
deterritorialized  worker  who  has  become   free  and  naked,  having   to  sell  his  
labor  capacity;;  and  on  the  other,  decoded  money  that  has  become  capital  and  
is  capable  of  buying  it.”474  While  the  twin  processes  of  coding  and  overcoding  
resisted  the  possibility  of  an  accumulation  of  power  via  strict  social  conventions  
that  ensure  the  circulation  of  goods,   the  process  of  decoding  carried  out  by  
capital  achieves  the  same  effect  by  the  reverse  means.  The  accumulation  of  
capital  is  not  forbidden,  but  the  constant  displacement  of  social  codes  resists  
the  possibility  of  any  one  hierarchy  becoming  static  and  ensures  that  goods  
continue   to  circulate.  The  decoding  carried  out  by  capitalism   is  not  a  single  
process,  but  the  convergence  of  a  number  of  related  processes,  including  “the  
deterritorialization  of  wealth  through  monetary  abstraction;;  the  decoding  of  the  
flows  of  production  through  merchant  capital;;  the  decoding  of  States  through  
financial   capital  and  public  debts;;   the  decoding  of   the  means  of  production  
through  the  formation  of  industrial  capital.”475  This  convergence  leads  Deleuze  
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and  Guattari   to   define   capitalism   primarily   as   “the   generalized   decoding   of  
flows”,  which   is  not  restricted   to  a  particular   field,  but  becomes  universal  by  
constantly  reaching  outside  of  itself  and  decoding  the  processes  it  finds  there.    
  
While   savagery   and   barbarism   both   rely   on  making   qualitative   distinctions  
between   flows,   capitalism   is   different   because   it   relates   the   flows   to   one  
another  and  decodes   them  via  a  series  of  quantitative  equivalences.   In   this  
sense,  capitalism  is  the  first  form  of  social  organisation  that  can  properly  be  
called  an  economy.  As  Holland  puts  it:  “Savagery  and  despotism  are  organized  
symbolically,   via   codes   and   over-­codes,   while   capitalism   is   organized  
economically,   via   axioms.”476   In   opposition   to   the   symbolic   nature   of   both  
primitive   and   despotic   methods   of   organisation   which   use   qualitative  
distinctions  to  discover  differences  in  kind  between  the  various  functions  within  
society,   the   axiomatization   carried   out   by   capital   conjoins   these  
heterogeneous   flows   and   extracts   the   excess   that   is   produced   there   by  
quantifying  them:  “Quantified  flows  under  capitalism  get  conjoined  solely  on  
the   estimation   that   this   or   that   conjunction  will   produce   surplus-­value;;   such  
estimation  involves  economic  calculation  rather  than  belief:  symbolic  meaning  
has  nothing  to  do  with  it.”477    
  
In  order  to  continue  functioning,  capitalism  must  never  fully  erase  the  social  
formations   that   proceeded   it,   but  must   incorporate   them   into   its  machinery.  
Generalised   processes  of   decoding   are   thus   kept   in   balance  with  massive  
projects   of   social   recoding   carried   out   by   the   primitive,   and   especially   the  
despotic,  tendencies  that  exist  within  capitalism.  In  the  wake  of  every  process  
of  decoding,  these  latent  forces  of  despotism  are  given  the  space  to  use  the  
despotic  machinery   of   the  State,   namely   the  written  word  and   the  Oedipus  
complex,  to  recode  the  socius.  In  this  way,  capitalist  processes  play  both  sides  
in  a  global   tug-­of-­war  of  decoding  and  recoding.   In   the  hands  of  capitalism,  
nation  states  work  to  “recode  with  all  their  might,  with  world-­wide  dictatorship,  
local   dictators,   and   an   all-­powerful   police,   while   decoding—or   allowing   the  
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decoding  of—the  fluent  quantities  of  their  capital  and  their  populations.”478  As  
a  quantitative  axiomatic,  the  “co-­opting  power  of  capitalism  can  be  explained  
by  the  fact  that  its  axiomatic  is  not  more  flexible,  but  wider  and  more  englobing”  
so  that  here,  “no  one  escapes  participation  in  the  activity  of  antiproduction  that  
drives   the   entire   productive   system.”479   The   quantitative   nature   of   the  
axiomatic  of  capital  means  that  the  socius  no  longer  experiences  decoding  as  
an  external  limit  to  be  warded-­off,  but  as  something  internal  to  capitalism  to  be  
constantly   surpassed.   Sibertine-­Blanc   explains   that   while   non-­capitalist  
formations  “encountered  decoded  flows  as  an  extrinsic,  accidental,  ‘real  limit,’  
capitalist   formations   made   it   their   internal   limit,   a   structural   limit   that   they  
continuously  destroy  to  rediscover  on  a  new  scale.”480  
  
The   decoding   power   of   lines   of   flight   plays   a   specific   role   within   the   anti-­
productive   capacity   of   capitalist   societies.   For   this   reason,   Deleuze   and  
Guattari   see  schizophrenia  as  having  a  different  strategic  and   revolutionary  
potential  under  capitalist  regimes.  In  both  primitive  and  despotic  societies,  the  
decoding  of  flows  was  synonymous  with  the  problem  of  over-­production;;  the  
productive   processes  of   society   had   to   be   coded   in   ritual,   or   overcoded  by  
taxes  in  order  to  ward-­off  the  possibility  of  a  constant  surplus.  In  the  case  of  
capitalism,  because  the  extraction  of  surplus  value  from  the  productive  work  
of  the  working-­class  through  the  commodity  form  leaves  the  workers  unable  to  
buy   back   the   fruits   of   their   labour   in   sufficient   quantities,   crises   of   over-­
production  still  occur  and  still  form  the  external  limit  of  capitalism.481  However,  
here  they  are  separated  from  the  process  of  decoding,  which  has  become  the  
internal  or  real  limit  of  capitalism.  While  the  despot  was  defined  as  inherently  
paranoiac  and  seen  as  constantly  warding-­off  the  possibility  of  decoding  that  
would   lead   to   schizophrenia,   the   processes   of   capitalism   are   paranoid-­
schizoid.  Switching  incessantly  between  processes  of  decoding  and  recoding.  
Capitalism  therefore  relies  on  schizophrenia  as  much  as  it  does  on  paranoia,  
while  it  carries  out  each  of  these  two  functions  in  turn.    
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iv)  The  revolutionary  line  of  flight  
  
In  Anti-­Oedipus,  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  is  used  in  a  clinical  sense  to  
designate   a   particular   function   of   the   unconscious,   but   it   is   also   used   in   a  
political  sense  to  designate  the  possibility  of  revolution.  To  understand  this  use  
of  the  concept  we  must  analyse  the  place  of  schizophrenia  within  capitalism.  
Given  the  claim  that  social  machines  are  defined  as  much  by  their  processes  
of  anti-­production  as  by  their  productive  capacities,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write  
that   “there   is   no   social   formation   that   does   not   foresee,   or   experience   a  
foreboding  of,  the  real  form  in  which  the  limit  threatens  to  arrive,  and  which  it  
wards  off  with  all  the  strength  it  can  command.”482  In  the  case  of  primitive  and  
despotic  regimes  of  power,  this  foreboding  explains  “the  obstinacy  with  which  
the  formations  preceding  capitalism  encaste  the  merchant  and  the  technician,  
preventing   flows   of   money   and   flows   of   production   from   assuming   an  
autonomy  that  would  destroy  their  codes.”483  As  we  have  seen,  for  capitalism,  
“[s]chizophrenia  is  the  absolute  limit”.484  This  means  that  we  should  be  able  to  
see   the   capitalist   processes   of   anti-­production   closing   off   the   possibility   of  
schizophrenia.  This  is  why  Deleuze  and  Guattari  take  such  a  strong  political  
stance  against  the  institutions  of  psychoanalysis,  even  while  they  hold  on  to  
some  of  its  conceptual   innovations.  For  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  the  institution  
of   psychoanalysis,   and   its   obsession   with   the   Oedipus   complex,   is   a   key  
implement   in   capitalism’s   toolbox   of   anti-­production.   Whenever   desire  
threatens  to  escape  the  structuring  forces  of  capital,  and  whenever  the  worker  
no  longer  desires  his  own  subjugation  –  in  short,  whenever  the  desire  of  the  
individual   is  no   longer  aligned  with   the  circulation  of  capital  –   the  priests  of  
psychoanalysis   are   on   hand   to   re-­oedipalize   the   subject.   For   Deleuze   and  
Guattari,   the   schizophrenic   process   is   revolutionary   and   the   schizophrenic  
subject   should   be   seen   as   “demonstrating   for   our   benefit   an   eminently  
psychotic   and   revolutionary   means   of   escape   (point   de   fuite).”485  
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Schizophrenia   is   seen   as   a   revolutionary   force   for   Deleuze   and   Guattari  
because  it  draws  lines  of  flight  which  point  the  way  to  an  escape  from  capitalist  
regimes  of  power.  Capitalism  would  rather  have  “a  society  of  neurotics  than  
one  successful  schizophrenic  who  has  not  been  made  autistic”,  and  in  order  
to  achieve  this  aim,  psychoanalysis  acts  as  a  counter-­revolutionary  force  that  
closes   off   these   lines   of   flight   and   covers   them   over   with   the   image   of  
Oedipus.486   To   clarify,   Deleuze   and   Guattari   claim   that   capitalism   will   only  
come  to  an  end  if  people  stop  desiring  their  own  subjugation  and  that  this  will  
only  happen  when  people  are  no  longer  oedipalised.  Because  schizophrenia  
is   a   process   that   resists   oedipalization,   the   institutions   of   psychiatry   and  
psychoanalysis  are  used  under  capitalism   to  capture  schizophrenics  and   to  
block  their  development.      
    
Some   caution   is   advised   here.   While   Deleuze   and   Guattari   pick   out  
schizophrenia   as   the   absolute   limit   of   capitalism,   they   do  not   claim   that   to  
become  schizophrenic  is  to  become  revolutionary.    As  we  have  seen,  unlike  
both  primitive  and  despotic  societies,  capitalism  does  not  rely  on  a  process  of  
qualitative  coding,  but  on  a  quantitative  axiomatic  of  continuous  decoding  and  
recoding.  This  means  that,  in  a  certain  sense,  capitalism  relies  as  much  on  a  
constant  production  of  schizophrenia,  on  the  side  of  the  decoding  of  flows,  as  
it  does  on  the  production  of  neurotics,  on  the  side  of  recoding.  While  it  is  one  
of   the   cornerstones   of   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   analysis   that   the   “oedipal  
alliance  is  capitalism's  molar  unit”,  it  is  also  the  case  that  schizophrenia  plays  
the  role  of  the  molecular  unit,  constantly  working  to  decode  flows,  to  connect  
heterogeneous   flows   together,   and   thus   to   open   up   new   arenas   for   the  
extraction  of  surplus  value.487   It   is  for   this  reason  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
write   that   capitalism   “produces   schizos   the   same   way   it   produces   Prell  
shampoo   or   Ford   cars,   the   only   difference   being   that   the   schizos   are   not  
saleable.”488  Capitalism  requires  schizophrenia  as  one  of  its  two  poles,  but  it  
also  requires  that  the  decoded  flows  released  in  schizophrenia  are  constantly  
recaptured.   The   power   of   the   capitalist   order   comes   from   the   function   of  
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“binding  the  schizophrenic  charges  and  energies  into  a  world  axiomatic  that  
always  opposes  the  revolutionary  potential  of  decoded  flows  with  new  interior  
limits.”489  According  to  this  analysis,  capitalism  is  constantly  walking  the  fine  
line   between   the   production   of   schizophrenia,   and   the   huge  
deterritorializations   of   the   social   field   that   come   with   it,   and   the   Oedipal  
production  of  neurotics  via  the  regressive  forces  of  the  family,  the  State,  and  
the   psychoanalytic   institution.   This   is   why,   despite   constantly   creating  
schizophrenics,  “capitalist  production  is  constantly  arresting  the  schizophrenic  
process  and  transforming   the  subject  of   the  process   into  a  confined  clinical  
entity,  as  though  it  saw  in  this  process  the  image  of  its  own  death  coming  from  
within.”490  The  revolutionary  claim  made  by  Deleuze  and  Guattari  relies  on  the  
possibility   that   the   decoded   flows  produced  by   the   capitalist   axiomatic  may  
resist,  or  escape,  the  regressive  forces  of  recoding  that  continually  block  the  
lines   of   flight   and   recapture   them   in   the   net   of   Oedipus.  What  makes   this  
possibility  difficult  to  see  is  the  fact  that  the  schizophrenic  process  is  constantly  
confused  with  the  clinical  schizophrenic.  Here  Deleuze  and  Guattari  bemoan  
the  fact  that  we  have  “the  same  word,  schizo,  to  designate  both  the  process  
insofar  as  it  goes  beyond  the  limit,  and  the  result  of  the  process  insofar  as  it  
runs  up  against  the  limit.”491  Much  of  the  confusion  surrounding  the  apparent  
revolutionary   force   of   schizophrenia   is   based  on  a  misapprehension  of   this  
distinction.  For  Deleuze  and  Guattari,   there   is  a  revolutionary  schizophrenic  
process  of  the  unconscious,  which  is  decoding  and  which  has  the  potential  to  
undo  capitalist  relations,  and  then  there  is  the  schizo  as  a  clinical  entity,  who  
has  been  captured  by  the  recoding  side  of  the  capitalist  axiomatic.    
  
In  our  earlier  analysis  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight,  as  it  related  to  desiring-­
machines,  we  found  that  there  were  two  different  senses  in  which  the  concept  
was  used.  First,  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  was  used  from  the  perspective  
of  the  machine,  where  it  designated  those  processes  of  transversal  connection  
and  inclusive  disjunction  in  which  partial  elements  escape  from  one  chain  of  
code  to  connect  with  another  chain  in  an  infinite  series  of  open  disjunctions.  
                                                                                                                
489  AO  267  
490  AO  266  
491  AO  147  
   175  
Second,  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  was  used  from  the  perspective  of  the  
structure,  where   it  pointed   to   the  excess  of  desire   that  could  never  be   fully  
captured  by  the  structural  articulation  of  desire.  In  this  second  sense,  lines  of  
flight  acted  as  a  kind  of  sign-­post  which  the  schizoanalyst  could  follow  “all  the  
way  to   the  desiring-­machines.”492  Given  the   fact   that  desiring-­machines  and  
social  machines  are  both  articulations  of  the  same  reality  but  under  different  
regimes,  it  is  not  surprising  that  we  will  also  find  two  senses  of  the  concept  of  
the   line  of   flight  at  play   in   the   latter.493   In   the  case  of  our  analysis  of  social  
machines,  and  of  the  history  of  capitalism,  the  first  sense  of  the  line  of  flight  
relates  to  the  decoding  of  the  flows  that  act  as  the  external   limit  of  primitive  
and  despotic  regimes  and  which  capitalism  internalises  as  the  limit  that  it  must  
always  transgress.  The  second  sense  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight,  on  the  
other   hand,   relates   to   the   schizophrenic   process   as   the   absolute   limit   of  
capitalism,  which  escapes   the  recoding  of   the  Oedipus  and   is  charged  with  
revolutionary  potential.  An  appreciation  of  this  distinction  leads  to  a  number  of  
important  points  for  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  especially  concerning  the  distinction  
between  the  schizophrenic  and  the  revolutionary.  In  Anti-­Oedipus  they  write  
that  the  “schizo  is  not  revolutionary,  but  the  schizophrenic  process—in  terms  
of  which  the  schizo  is  merely  the  interruption,  or  the  continuation  in  the  void—
is  the  potential  for  revolution.”494  The  role  of  the  schizoanalyst  is  thus  to  follow  
the   schizophrenic   process  without   being  blocked.  There   is   subsequently   “a  
whole   world   of   difference   between   the   schizo   and   the   revolutionary:   the  
difference  between   the  one  who  escapes,   and   the   one  who   knows  how   to  
make  what  he  is  escaping  escape.”495  To  put  it  simply,  the  imperative  of  Anti-­
Oedipus  is  not  to  follow  the  line  of  flight  into  madness,  but  to  follow  the  line  of  
flight  without  being  captured  and  thus  to  refuse  the  capitalist  axiomatic  while  
avoiding   the  danger  of  becoming  mad.  When  Deleuze  and  Guattari  use   the  
concept  of  the  line  of  flight  as  a  means  for  describing  a  way  of  escaping  the  
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social   machinery   of   capitalism,   they   present   two   distinct   options:   “the  
paranoiac   counterescape   (contre-­fuite)   that   motivates   all   the   conformist,  
reactionary,  and  fascisizing  investments,  and  the  schizophrenic  escape  (fuite)  
convertible  into  a  revolutionary  investment.”496  While  the  first  case  does  relate  
to  desire’s  ability  to  escape  the  axiomatic  of  capital,  the  latter  “has  the  capacity  
for   causing   the   flows   of   desire   to   circulate   following   their   positive   lines   of  
escape   (lignes   de   fuite),   and   for   breaking   them   again   following   breaks   of  
productive  breaks.”497  The  question  of  revolutionary  potential  is  thus  not  only  
a  question  of  how  to  produce   lines  of   flight,  but  how  to   follow  these   lines  of  
flight.    
  
The   practice   of   schizoanalysis   becomes   a   necessary   tool   for   revolutionary  
action  in  precisely  this  regard.  While  desire  is  constantly  finding  leaks  or  cracks  
through  which  it  can  escape  the  net  of  Oedipus,  and  by  which  it  momentarily  
escapes  the  social  machinery  of  capitalism,  these  escapes  are  not  sustained.  
In   order   for   the   many   schizophrenic   escapes   to   produce   “the   world   of  
transverse  communications”  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  refer  to  as  a  “new  earth  
where   desire   functions   according   to   its   molecular   elements   and   flows”   the  
various  lines  of  flight  must  meet  one  another  in  such  a  way  that  they  cannot  
be  recaptured  by  the  recoding  aspects  of  the  capitalist  machinery.498  In  order  
to   actively   work   towards   this   outcome,   the   schizoanalyst  must   analyse   the  
molecular   functioning   of   desire,   and   distinguish   the   legitimate   from   the  
illegitimate  uses  of  the  syntheses  of  the  unconscious.  For  this  reason,  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  write  that  “it  is  not  enough  to  construct  a  new  socius  as  full  body;;  
one   must   also   pass   to   the   other   side   of   this   social   full   body,   where   the  
molecular   formations   of   desire   that   must   master   the   new  molar   aggregate  
operate   and   are   inscribed.”499   The   first   way   in   which   the   revolutionary  
schizoanalyst  must   relate   to   lines   of   flight   is   therefore   by  working  with   the  
molecular  flows  of  desire.  The  best  way  to  do  this  is  to  work  on  the  project  of  
transforming  subjugated-­groups  into  subject-­groups,  as  they  were  previously  
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497  AO  381  
498  AO  350  
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defined  by  Guattari’s  work  in  Institutional  Psychotherapy.  In  the  final  pages  of  
Anti-­Oedipus,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  return  to  this  distinction  writing  that  “[i]n  
the  subjugated-­groups,  desire  is  still  defined  by  an  order  of  causes  and  aims”,  
however  “[s]ubject-­groups  on  the  other  hand  have  as  their  sole  cause  a  rupture  
with  causality,  a  revolutionary  line  of  escape  (ligne  de  fuite).”500  Once  these  
subject-­groups   have   been   created,   and   once   they   have   produced   their  
individual   lines  of   flight,   the   revolutionary   task   consists   in   following  each  of  
these  lines  of  flight,  which  cut  across  or  transect  social  relations,  to  make  them  
form  connections  with  one  another.  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  aim  is  therefore  to  
construct  a  molecular  revolution  by  connecting  heterogeneous   lines  of   flight  
together   in   a   non-­representational   continuous   multiplicity   of   desire.   This  
revolution   will   not   resemble   a   unified   revolution   of   molar   formations,   but   a  
multiplicity   of   schizophrenic   lines   of   flight,   all   initially   opened   up   by   the  
decoding  process  of  capitalism,  but  ultimately  escaping  both  the  recoding  of  
the  State  and  the  recoding  of  Oedipus.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  claim  that  if  you  
push  the  different  processes  of  decoding  so  far  that  they  cannot  be  recaptured,  
then  “the  movement  of  deterritorialization  creates  of  necessity  and  by  itself  a  
new  earth.”501  Only  in  this  case  will  the  flows  of  desire  “cross  the  threshold  of  
deterritorialization   and   produce   the   new   land”   in   which   “the   person   who  
escapes  (fuit)  causes  other  escapes  (faire  fuir),  and  marks  out  the  land  while  
deterritorializing  himself.”502  The  relationship  of  the  revolutionary  schizoanalyst  
to  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  is  thus  quite  subtle.  The  aim  of  schizoanalysis  
                                                                                                                
500  AO  412  
501  AO  353.  Contemporary  iterations  of  ‘accelerationism’  often  refer  to  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  
work,  and  to  their  comment  in  Anti-­Oedipus  that  “the  flows  are  not  yet  deterritorialized  enough,  
not  decoded  enough,  from  the  viewpoint  of  a  theory  and  a  practice  of  a  highly  schizophrenic  
character”   and   their   apparent   command   to   “[n]ot   to  withdraw   from   the   process,   but   to   go  
further,   to   "accelerate   the   process””   (AO   260).   Nick   Land’s   reference   to   this   passage   is  
especially  notable  in  this  regard  (2012,  449).  A  careful  analysis  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  work  
shows,  however,  that  they  never  simply  advocate  an  intensification  of  capitalist  forces.  On  the  
contrary,  they  continually  call  for  an  intensification  of  only  the  decoding  aspects  of  capital  to  
the  cost  of  its  regressive  practice  of  recoding.  This  practice  does  not  involve  a  bolstering  of  
market   forces,   for   example,   but   an   alternative   use   of   the  many  mechanisms   employed   by  
capital.  The  example  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  take  in  Anti-­Oedipus  is  telling:  “Psychoanalysis  
is   especially   satisfying   in   this   regard:   its   entire   perverted   practice   of   the   cure   consists   in  
transforming   familial   neurosis   into   artificial   neurosis   (of   transference),   and   in   exalting   the  
couch,  a  little  island  with  its  commander,  the  psychoanalyst,  as  an  autonomous  territoriality  of  
the  ultimate  artifice.  A  little  additional  effort  is  enough  to  overturn  everything,  and  to  lead  us  
finally   toward   other   far-­off   places”   (AO   353).   The   point   here   is   not   to   simply   push  
psychoanalysis  so   far   that   it   breaks,  but   to  select   those  aspects  of   the  process  capable  of  
transforming  psychoanalysis  from  within.    
502  AO  354  
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is  not  simply  to  produce  lines  of  flight,  as  it  is  definitely  not  the  aim  to  simply  
become  schizophrenic,  but   to  work  on   the  molecular  side  of  desire   to   form  
transverse   connections   between   a   number   of   lines   of   flight.   Through   the  
convergence  of  these  lines  of  flight  the  schizoanalyst  can  construct  an  “active  
point   of   escape   (point   de   fuite)”   in   which   a   number   of   desiring-­machines,  
including   “the   revolutionary   machine,   the   artistic   machine,   the   scientific  
machine,  and  the  (schizo)  analytic  machine”  can  become  “parts  and  pieces  of  
one   another”   in   a   multiplicity   of   desiring-­production   freed   from   the   anti-­
productive  forces  of  primitive  codings,  despotic  overcodings,  and  the  capitalist  
axiomatic  of  constant  decoding  and  recoding.503  
  
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  define  four  distinct  uses  of  the  concept  of  the  line  
of  flight  in  Anti-­Oedipus,  and  to  explain  how  each  of  these  uses  correlates  with  
the  political  project  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  articulate  in  the  book.  Of  the  four  
uses  of   the  concept  of   the   line  of   flight,   the   first   two  relate   to  an  analysis  of  
desiring-­machines  and  the  latter  two  relate  to  an  analysis  of  social  machines.  
The  four  senses  of  the  line  of  flight  are  as  follows:  i)  Those  processes  of  desire  
witnessed  by  the  psychoanalyst  that  refuse  to  be  captured  by  Oedipus;;  ii)  The  
lines  traced  by  the  legitimate  uses  of  the  syntheses  of  the  unconscious,  namely  
the  transverse  connections  and  inclusive  disjunctions  between  heterogeneous  
chains  of  code  that  form  the  multiplicity  of  desiring-­production;;  iii)  The  decoded  
social   flows   that   threaten   primitive   and   despotic   regimes   of   power   as   an  
external  limit  and  that  are  internalised  by  capitalism;;  iv)  The  absolute  limit  of  
capitalism  that  can  be  reached  when  the  decoded  flows  released  by  capital  
cannot  be  recaptured  and  reterritorialized  by  it.  Taking  these  four  senses  of  
the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight   in   turn,   the   schizoanalytic   project   can   be  
described   by   the   way   that   it   relates   to   each   of   them:   The   aim   of   the  
schizoanalyst   is   to  work  with   those  aspects  of   desire   that   escape   from   the  
traditional  psychoanalytic  domain  of  Oedipus  (the  first  sense),  in  order  to  reach  
a  direct  analysis  of  the  processes  of  desiring-­machines  as  they  function  in  the  
schizophrenic   unconscious   (the   second   sense).   This   understanding   of   the  
molecular  regime  of  desire  will  allow  the  schizoanalyst  to  conduct  an  analysis  
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of   the  way   in   which   formations   of   desire   are   decoded   in   society   (the   third  
sense)  and  to  understand  how  these  decoded  flows  of  desire  can  be  made  to  
escape   the   recoding  processes   of   capitalism   (the   fourth   sense)   in   order   to  
bring  about  a  post-­capitalist  future.  Taken  this  way,  the  concept  of  the  line  of  
flight  is  a  complex  one  which  runs  through  the  many  aspects  of  Anti-­Oedipus,  
both   psychoanalytic   and   revolutionary,   and   connects   them   together   in   a  
political  programme  for  the  construction  of  a  molecular  revolution.  
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i)  Introduction    
  
A  Thousand  Plateaus,  published  as  the  companion  volume  to  Anti-­Oedipus  in  
1980,   is  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  most  substantial  work.   It   is  also   the   text   in  
which  the  line  of  flight  emerges  as  a  philosophical  concept  in  its  own  right.  As  
we  have  seen,  in  Anti-­Oedipus  Deleuze  and  Guattari  marshal  a  wide  variety  
of   historical   theories,   developed   by   an   array   of   philosophical,   political,  
anthropological,   and   psychoanalytic   thinkers,   in   an   attack   against  
structuralism,  and  against  structural  psychoanalysis  in  particular.  They  do  this  
for  practical  and  political  purposes  and  their  aim  is  to  produce  a  new  activity  –  
schizoanalysis  –  that  would  be  able  to  work  directly  with  the  unconscious  in  
order   to  open  up   the  revolutionary  potential  of  desire.   In  doing   this,   the  pair  
also  begin  to  use  the  phrase  ‘line  of  flight’  in  at  least  four  different  ways.  While  
each  of  the  four  uses  we  covered  in  the  last  chapter  share  certain  features,  it  
would  nevertheless  be   incorrect   to  say  that   these   ‘lines  of   flight’  had  a  high  
enough   level  of  coherence  to  designate  a  concept   in   the  Deleuzoguattarian  
sense  of  the  term.  In  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  on  the  other  hand,  the  targets  of  
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  analysis  are  much  broader.  Not  only  do  they  aim  to  
combat   the  binarizing,  structuralist,  molar  tendencies  within   the  discipline  of  
psychoanalysis,   but   they   also   aim   to   dismantle   these   tendencies   in   almost  
every   other   arena   of   thought.   In   A   Thousand   Plateaus,   any   dealings   with  
psychoanalysis  proper  are  relegated  to  a  single  chapter,  while  other  sections  
are  given  over  to  similar  interruptions  in  linguistics,  literature,  political  action,  
music,   and   religion,   as   well   as   the   more   strictly   philosophical   domains   of  
metaphysics,   ontology,   and   ethics.   In   this   chapter,   I   will   show   how,   as   the  
aperture  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  machinery  of  analysis  continues  to  widen,  
and   as   more   and   more   disciplinary   discussions   are   enveloped   by   their  
discourse,   their  philosophical  concepts   take  on  a  higher  and  higher   level  of  
coherence.  Specifically,   I  will   show  how,  across   its  many  uses   in   the  book,  
Deleuze   and  Guattari  make   a   concept   out   of   the   line   of   flight.   Drawing   on  
certain  other  aspects  of  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  one  could  also  say  that  despite  
the  pluralism  of  epistemological  regions  over  which  the  concept  of  the  line  of  
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flight  ranges,  there  is  also  a  monism  put  forward  in  the  text  concerning  the  way  
in  which  the  concept  is  deployed  in  each  of  these  domains.    
  
My  analysis  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight,  as  it  appears  in  A  Thousand  
Plateaus,  will  be  split  across  this  chapter  and  the  one  that  follows  it.  To  begin,  
this  chapter  attempts   to  cover  much  of   the  philosophical   terminology  of   the  
book,  taking  in  the  distinctions  between  the  tree  and  the  rhizome,  the  plane  of  
organization  and  the  plane  of  consistency,  and  content  and  expression,  as  well  
as  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  theory  of  the  stratification  of  matter.  Here  I  will  show  
why  Deleuze  and  Guattari  articulate  their  thought  in  terms  of  ‘lines’  and  not  in  
‘points’,  and  will  offer  a  first  definition  of  the  ‘line  of  flight’  as  a  philosophical  
concept.  The  model  of   political   analysis   that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  develop  
alongside  and  within  this  philosophical  discourse,  with  its  focus  on  the  analysis  
of   regimes  of  signs  and   the  abstract  machines   that  effectuate   them,  will  be  
covered   in   the   following   chapter.   There   I   will   show   how   the   philosophical  
concept   of   the   line   of   flight   is   deployed   in   Deleuze   and  Guattari’s   updated  
political  analysis  of  the  State,  and  how  it  accompanies  a  form  of  pragmatism  
that  is  somewhat  more  cautious  than  the  schizoanalytic  practices  outlined  in  
Anti-­Oedipus.    
  
Before  moving  on  to  discuss  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  as  it  appears  in  A  
Thousand  Plateaus  however,  it  will  be  worth  pausing  to  briefly  restate  what  it  
means  to  say  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  make  a  concept  of  the  line  of  flight.  In  
What  is  Philosophy?  Deleuze  and  Guattari  famously  claim  that  "philosophy  is  
the  art  of  forming,  inventing,  and  fabricating  concepts".504  Philosophy  proceeds  
by   way   of   problems,   which   it   articulates   by   producing   new   concepts   that  
respond  to  them.  Under  this  interpretation,  a  philosophical  concept  does  not  
represent   the  world,  nor  does   it  define  an  abstract  component  of   the  world,  
instead  it  responds  to  the  world  by  expressing  a  problem.  Instead  of  following  
Plato’s   model   of   concepts   as   universal   forms,   Kant’s   a   priori   ideas,   or  
                                                                                                                
504  WP  2.  While  What  is  Philosophy?  was  co-­signed  by  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  the  case  has  
been  made  by  a  number  of  commentators  that  it  was  almost  exclusively  written  by  Deleuze  
(Stengers,  2006).  Stenger’s  comments  on  this  issue  were,  however,  removed  in  the  revised  
version  of  this  text  (Stengers,  2005,  151-­167).  
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Nietzsche’s   understanding   of   the   concept   as   a   captured   and   sedimented  
metaphor,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  treat  concepts  as  complex  bodies  made  up  
of  components  that  cohere  around  a  particular  problem.505  Concepts,  as  they  
are  defined  at  this  point  in  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  work,  are  not  the  same  as  
Ideas,  as  defined  in  Difference  and  Repetition.  It  would  be  most  accurate  to  
say  that,  at  the  point  of  writing  the  earlier  text,  Ideas  were  understood  as  virtual  
and   problematic   multiplicities,   whereas   at   the   point   of   writing   A   Thousand  
Plateaus,  concepts  are  understood  as  multiplicities  that  respond  to  a  problem.  
If  concepts  are  multiplicities,   then   the  elements   that  make  them  up  are  pre-­
individual   singularities.   A   concept   comes   into   existence   when   a   set   of  
singularities  combine  in  a  specific  way,  so  that  a  concept  can  be  understood  
strictly   as   nothing   other   than   “the   point   of   coincidence,   condensation,   or  
accumulation  of  its  own  components”.506  When  asked  in  an  interview  in  1991  
what  concepts  they  had  created,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  pick  out  the  concept  of  
the  refrain,  or  the  ritornello.  This  concept  is  nothing  other  than  a  response  to  
the  problem  of  the  grounding,  or  ungrounding,  of  thought  and  is  composed  by  
a  condensation  or  coincidence  of  a  series  of  singularities,  including  ‘a’  tune,  ‘a’  
territory,  and  ‘a’  home.  To  say  that  the  line  of  flight  becomes  a  concept  in  A  
Thousand  Plateaus  is  to  say  that  it  responds  to,  or  expresses,  a  problem  and  
that  it  does  so  by  combining  a  series  of  singularities  in  a  novel  way.  In  what  
follows,  we  will  see  that  the  problem  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  responding  to  
concerns  the  possibility  of  transformation,  and  the  singularities  that  compose  
the   concept   include,   among   others,   ‘an’   assemblage,   ‘an’   escape,   and   ‘a’  
regime  of  signs.    
  
ii)  The  vegetal  image  of  thought  
  
The  first  chapter  of  this  thesis  showed  how  Deleuze’s  work  in  Difference  and  
Repetition   challenged   the   very   core   of   traditional   philosophical   thinking   by  
arguing  for  the  logical  priority  of  difference  over  identity.  The  consequence  of  
this   challenge  was   a   new  mode   of   philosophical   analysis   that   took   neither  
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identity  nor  negation  as  its  ground,  but  actively  took  part  in  the  ungrounding  of  
thought  via  an  analysis  of  the  way  that  experience  is  produced  by  the  interplay  
between   difference-­in-­itself   and   repetition-­for-­itself.   In   that   text,   Deleuze   is  
explicitly   concerned   with   overturning   the   “dogmatic   image   of   thought”   that  
plagues   philosophy,   one   based   not   only   on   identity,   but   on   its   corollaries,  
especially  the  false  goals  of  representation  and  resemblance.  Deleuze  argues  
in  Difference   and   Repetition   that   this   image   of   thought   supports   itself   with  
“psychologically  puerile  and  socially  reactionary  examples”  that  can  only  deal  
with  the  relatively  simple  cases  of  “recognition,  error,  simple  propositions  and  
solutions  or  responses”  and  can  never  do  justice  to  “what  should  be  the  most  
valued  in  regard  to  thought  -­  namely,  the  genesis  of  the  act  of  thinking  and  the  
sense   of   truth   and   falsehood”.507   At   the   point   of   writing   Difference   and  
Repetition,  Deleuze  takes  this  image  of  thought  to  be  a  kind  of  illusory  surface  
effect,  which  appears  in  experience  due  to  the  individual  thinker’s  inability  to  
think   his   or   her   own   pre-­individual   and   pre-­representational   production.   As  
Somers-­Hall  puts  it,  the  dogmatic  image  of  thought  is  “a  paralogism  created  
by  the  reflection  of  thinking  on  itself  that  is  at  the  heart  of  philosophy’s  inability  
to   think  depth  appropriately”.508  What  separates  A  Thousand  Plateaus   from  
Difference  and  Repetition,  and  arguably  from  all  of  Deleuze’s  work  with  and  
without   Guattari   up   until   this   point,   is   its   move   away   from   the   somewhat  
detached   and   cerebral   activity   of   attempting   to   produce   a   thought-­without-­
image  and  a  move  towards  the  creative  and  active  process  of  producing  an  
alternative  image  of  thought.509  In  Deleuze’s  preface  for  the  English  translation  
of  Difference  and  Repetition,  he  suggests   that   the   third  chapter,  concerning  
the  image  of  thought,  can  be  read  as  an  introduction  to  A  Thousand  Plateaus.  
While  the  former  tackles  the  dogmatism  of  the  traditional  image  of  thought,  it  
is  in  the  latter  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  develop  the  concept  of  the  rhizome  
and  inaugurate  a  new  “vegetal  model  of  thought”.510  
  
                                                                                                                
507  DR  197  
508  Somers-­Hall,  2018,  4  
509   For   the  many   stances   that   Deleuze   takes   towards   the   image   of   thought,   see   Lambert  
(2012).  
510  DR  xvii  
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The   vegetal   and   rhizomatic   image   of   thought   elaborated   in   A   Thousand  
Plateaus  is  contrasted  with  an  arborescent  or  tree-­like  image  of  thought.  This  
arborescent   image   is  a  structural  model   that  gives  determinate   identities   to  
things   by   using   predicates   to   relate   them   negatively   to   one   another,   by  
extracting   essential   properties   that   determine   essences   of   things,   and   by  
organizing  all  things  into  a  hierarchy  of  genera  and  species  based  on  these  
essences.  This  arborescent  model  of  thought  can  be  traced  back  to  Aristotle’s  
logic  of  definitions  and  can  be  seen  in  the  many  forms  of  classification  that  run  
through  the  social  and  natural  sciences,  most  obviously  in  genealogical  family  
trees   and   in   phylogenetic   trees.  As  we  might   expect   from   their   critiques  of  
structural  psychoanalysis,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  criticize  this  model  for  relying  
on  a  binary  logic  of  exclusive  disjunction  that  creates  nothing  but  a  series  of  
identities.  They  write:  “Binary  logic  is  the  spiritual  reality  of  the  root-­tree…  this  
system  of  thought  has  never  reached  an  understanding  of  multiplicity.”511  If  the  
concepts   ‘predicate’,   ‘subject’,   ‘object’,   ‘genus’,   and   ‘species’   all   define   an  
image  of  thought  that  is  fundamentally  unable  to  think  about  the  dynamics  of  
change,  then  Deleuze  and  Guattari  aim  to  do  away  with  these  concepts  and  
replace   them  with   a   selection   of   new   concepts.   Consequently,   all   of   these  
concepts  are  dismissed   in   the   introduction   to   the  book,  where  Deleuze  and  
Guattari   write:   “All   we   talk   about   are   multiplicities,   lines,   strata   and  
segmentarities,  lines  of  flight  and  intensities,  machinic  assemblages  and  their  
various  types,  bodies  without  organs  and  their  construction  and  selection,  the  
plane   of   consistency,   and   in   each   case   the   units   of   measure.”512   This  
alternative  list  of  concepts  should  be  understood  as  the  toolbox  required  for  
producing  and  then  utilizing  the  vegetal  image  of  thought.    
  
In  the  first  plateau,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  introduce  the  rhizome  by  way  of  six  
principles.  These  principles  do  not  offer  a  definition,  in  the  sense  of  picking  out  
essential  and  stable  traits  of  the  rhizome,  but  instead  outline  the  different  ways  
in  which  it  is  possible  to  interact  with  the  rhizomatic  image  of  thought.  The  first  
two  principles  concern  the  connectivity  and  heterogeneity  of  the  rhizome  and  
come  with   the   following   practical   directive:   “any   point   of   a   rhizome   can   be  
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connected  to  anything  other,  and  must  be.”513  These  two  principles  state  that  
rhizomatic   thought   operates   not   only   by   making   connections,   but   by  
connecting  heterogeneous  elements  of  different  orders  and  kinds.  In  fact,  it  is  
the  connections  that  constitute  the  rhizome  and  not  the  other  way  around.  As  
we  have  already  noted,  these  two  principles  recall  the  transversal  connections  
and   inclusive   disjunctions   of   the   schizophrenic   unconscious   as   it   was  
discussed   in   Anti-­Oedipus,   and   in   many   ways   the   act   of   schizophrenizing  
psychoanalysis  can  be  understood  as  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  first  undertaking  
in  rhizomatic  analysis.  The  third  principle  of  the  rhizomatic  image  of  thought  
concerns  the  category  of  the  multiplicity  and  recalls  Deleuze’s  earlier  attempts  
via   Riemann   to   dismantle   the   binary   between   the   Many   and   the   One.  
According   to   this   principle,   when   “the   multiple   is   effectively   treated   as   a  
substantive”   then   thought   becomes   rhizomatic   and   “ceases   to   have   any  
relation  to  the  One  as  subject  or  object”.514  The  fourth  principle  concerns  what  
Deleuze  and  Guattari   call   ‘asignifying   ruptures’.  Here  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
develop   the  analysis  of  Louis  Hjelmslev’s  semiotics   that   they  began   in  Anti-­
Oedipus  and  claim  that  because  the  rhizomatic  image  of  thought  does  not  rely  
on  the  biunivocal  relations  of  signification  it  has  neither  a  master  signifier  nor  
a  centre  of  meaning.  Consequently   it  may   “be  broken,  shattered  at  a  given  
spot,   but   it   will   start   up   again   on   one   of   its   old   lines,   or   on   new   lines.”515  
According   to   the   fifth  and  sixth  principles,   the  rhizomatic  model  operates  by  
“cartography  and  decalcomania”  so  that  it  is  “not  amenable  to  any  structural  or  
generative  model.”516  This  means  that,  due  to  the  rhizomatic  model’s  ability  to  
pick  out  transformations  over  identities,  it  is  not  possible  to  use  it  to  create  a  
representation   of   the   world.   Instead,   rhizomatics   operates   by   mapping  
connections   that   co-­create   the   world   via   their   organization.   These   final  
principles  are  perhaps  the  most  difficult  to  comprehend  and  I  will  return  to  them  
shortly.  For  now,  we  can  summarize  by  stating  that  the  arborescent  model  of  
                                                                                                                
513  ATP  7  
514  ATP  8  
515  ATP  10  
516  ATP  13.  Decalcomania  can  refer  to  either  the  process  of  transferring  a  pattern  onto  glass  
or  porcelain  by  using  a  design  on  paper  as  a  mould,  or   the  process  of  creating   images  on  
paper  by  pressing  paint  between  two  sheets.  It  seems   likely   that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  
referring  to  the  latter  process,  in  which  there  is  neither  a  model  nor  a  copy,  but  only  the  mutual  
production  of  two  images.      
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thought  relies  on  the  attribution  of  predicates  to  things  and  the  subsequent  split  
of  subjects  from  objects,  but  with  the  vegetal  model  the  basis  of  determinations  
“are  not  predicates  of  the  thing  but  dimensions  of  multiplicities”,517  and  these  
multiplicities   entertain   “neither   object   nor   subject…   [but]   variously   formed  
matters,  and  very  different  dates  and  speeds”.518  
  
In  order  to  understand  the  role  that  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  plays  in  the  
rhizomatic  image  of  thought,  we  must  first  explore  the  way  that  Deleuze  and  
Guattari   explain   the   differing   perspectives   that   arborescent   and   rhizomatic  
models  take  on  the  relation  between  points  and  lines.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
write:  “There  are  no  points  or  positions  in  a  rhizome,  such  as  those  found  in  a  
structure,  tree,  or  root.  There  are  only  lines.”519  To  understand  how  the  image  
of   the   tree   operates,   it  will   be   useful   to   turn   to  Aristotle’s  Categories.  Here  
Aristotle  argues  that  the  essence  of  any  species  consists  in  its  genus,  together  
with   the  differentia   that  define   the  species.  Some  species  can  also  become  
genera,  when  they  can  be  further  differentiated  into  additional  species,  while  
an  individual  is  simply  a  species  that  cannot  be  further  differentiated,  as  the  
requisite  differentia  only  pick  out  a  single  particular.  Consequently,  Aristotle  
will  write  that  “the  individual  man  belongs  in  a  species,  man,  and  animal  is  a  
genus  of  the  species”.520  The  tradition  of  representing  these  definitions  using  
the   image   of   a   tree   begins   with   Porphyry’s   introduction   to   Aristotle’s  
Categories.  According  to  this  method,  we  can  define  ‘man’  by  starting  with  a  
general  category  such  as  ‘substance’.  We  then  differentiate  this  category  into  
its  different  kinds,  here  they  are  ‘thinking  substance’  and  ‘extended  substance’.  
Taking  the  differentia  ‘extended  substance’  as  the  genus  ‘body’,  we  can  then  
differentiate   this   genus   into   ‘inanimate   bodies’   and   ‘animate   bodies’.  
Continuing  this  procedure  of  binary  distinction,  we  can  name  ‘animate  bodies’  
as   ‘animal’   and   then   differentiate   this   genus   into   the   differentiae   ‘rational  
animal’  and  ‘irrational  animal’.  Finally,  the  differentia  of  ‘rational  animal’  can  be  
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520  Categories,  2a13.  Aristotle  comments  on  the  implications  of  this  schema  in  Book  III  of  his  
Metaphysics  (998b).  Deleuze  offers  his  own  analysis  of  the  metaphysical  problems  
generated  by  Aristotle’s  theory  in  Difference  and  Repetition  (DR  40).    
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named  as  the  genus  ‘man’.521  As  an  image  of  thought,  this  model  for  definition  
sets  up  a  number  of  points,  namely  the  genera  ‘substance’,   ‘body’,   ‘animal’,  
and  ‘man’,  and  shows  the  connections  between  these  terms  by  using  a  series  
of   lines   to   designate   the   relations   between   them.   However,   the   rhizomatic  
model  does  away  with   these  points  altogether,   relying  on   the   lines  alone  to  
determine   the   image.  This  means   that   the   rhizomatic  model   allows   for   the  
analysis  of  connections,  without  the  use  of  the  subjects  and  objects  that  would  
otherwise  act  as  nodal  points   in  the   tree  of  definition.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
describe  it  in  the  following  way:  “Unlike  a  structure,  which  is  defined  by  a  set  
of  points  and  positions,  with  binary  relations  between  the  points  and  biunivocal  
relationships  between  the  positions,  the  rhizome  is  made  only  of  lines.”522  The  
lines  that  make  up  the  rhizome  are  not  all  alike,  and  Deleuze  and  Guattari  list  
at   least   two   kinds   of   lines.   Any   rhizome   has   “lines   of   segmentarity   and  
stratification   as   its   dimensions”   on   the   one   hand   “and   the   line   of   flight   or  
deterritorialization   as   the   maximum   dimension   after   which   the   multiplicity  
undergoes  metamorphosis”  on   the  other.523  The  role  of   these  different   lines  
will  become  more  apparent  when,  in  the  next  chapter,  we  take  up  the  example  
of  political  formations  and  their  transformations.  At  this  point  it  will  be  sufficient  
to   say   that   any   rhizome   is   constituted   by   transversal   connections   between  
heterogeneous  elements  and  that  there  are  at  least  two  kinds  of  connections;;  
there  are  those  connections  that  are  internal  to  the  rhizome  and  that  serve  to  
give   it   some  consistency,  and   there  are   those  connections   that  escape   the  
bounds  of  the  rhizome  and  connect  it  to  something  else.  The  former  can  be  
said  to  stratify  or  segment  the  rhizome,  whereas  the  latter,  which  we  can  call  
lines  of  flight,  serve  to  destratify  it.        
  
It  is  important  to  clarify  at  this  point  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  do  not  claim  that  
the  world  is  made  of  rhizomes,  or  that  there  are  some  things  that  are  rhizomatic  
and  others  that  are  not.524  Instead,  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  substantive  use  of  
                                                                                                                
521  For  more  on  Aristotle’s  logic  and  the  use  of  Porphyrian  trees,  see  Eco  (1984,  57-­67).  
522  ATP  23  
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524  Claims  that  the  internet  is  a  rhizome,  or  that  the  brain  is  a  rhizome,  miss  the  point  that,  as  
a  model  for  thought,  the  rhizome  does  not  define  the  nature  of  things,  but  only  a  methodology  
for   thinking   (Young,   Genosko,   &  Watson,   2013,   262-­263).   Many   critiques   of   Deleuze   and  
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the   concept   of   the   multiplicity   will   allow   them   to   show   that   the   world   is  
populated   by   assemblages.   Assemblages   have   tendencies   towards   both  
relative   stasis   and   relative   change   and   while   the   arborescent   or   dogmatic  
image  of  thought  is  only  capable  of  seeing  the  stratified  and  relatively  static  
aspects   of   these   assemblages,   the   rhizomatic   image   of   thought   allows   the  
assemblage’s  tendencies  towards  change  to  be  analysed  and  exploited.  Brent  
Adkins  picks  up  on  the  fact  that  the  concept  of  the  rhizome  is  used  as  an  image  
and  a  directive  for  thinking  rather  than  as  a  substantive  when  he  argues  for  the  
central  role  of  “perceptual  semiotics”  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus.525  The  point  to  
stress  here  is  that  the  rhizome  –  and  therefore  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  
that   serves   to   explain   the   threshold   of   transformation   for   the   rhizome   –   is  
directly  related  to  a  process  of  thought.  As  de  Beistegui  notes,  for  Deleuze  and  
Guattari,   “thought   consists   not   in   applying   universal   concepts   to   a   given  
situation,   but   in   a   pragmatics   that   will   identify   and   exploit   its   rhizomatic  
resources.”526  The  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  is  one  part  of  the  vegetal  image  
of  thought  that  allows  for  such  a  pragmatics.    
  
iii)  Assembling  the  line  of  flight  
  
If  the  line  of  flight  is  the  maximum  number  of  dimensions  of  the  multiplicity  after  
which  a  transformation  occurs,  then  what  is  undergoing  transformation  here?  
To  put   this  question  another  way,  what   is   rhizomatic   thought   thinking  about  
when  connections  are  made  that  constitute  lines  of  flight?  The  short  answer  it  
that   rhizomatic   thought   engages   directly   with   material   reality,   including  
physical   and   organic   matter,   as   well   as   semiotic   systems.   However,   it   is  
important  to  remember  that,  according  to  a  rhizomatic  mode  of  thought,  matter  
does  not   compose  objects  with   a  pre-­given   identity,   but  what  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  call  assemblages.  To  take  one  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  examples,  
which  we  have  mentioned  before,  an  orchid  is  not  formed  by  the  imposition  of  
the  form  of  an  orchid  onto  inert  matter  in  order  to  create  an  individual  object  
                                                                                                                
Guattari  often  fail  to  differentiate  between  the  rhizome  as  a  pragmatic  model  and  the  rhizome  
as  substantive  entity.  See,  for  example,  Badiou’s  polemic  ‘The  Fascism  of  the  Potato’,  (2012).    
525  Adkins,  2015,  13.  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  use  the  phrase  at  ATP  25  &  215.  
526  De  Beistegui,  2018,  25  
   190  
that   possesses   predicates   and   on   which   a   thinking   subject   can   pass  
judgement.   Instead,  an  orchid   is  nothing  other   than  a  series  of  connections  
and  relations  that  maintain  a  sufficient  level  of  stability.  There  are  the  spatial  
relations  between  its  parts,  such  as  its  petals  and  its  stamen.  There  are  the  
connections  it  forms  with  the  insects  that  pollinate  it.  There  are  the  connections  
it  makes  with  other  plants  and  with  oceans  and  seas  through  the  global  cycle  
of  water  and  of  nitrogen.  To  say  that  rhizomatic  thought  engages  with  matter  
is  not   to  say   that   it   takes   inert  matter  as   its  object,  onto  which   it   imposes  a  
form.   On   the   contrary,   rhizomatic   thought   is   a   method   for   mapping   the  
connections   that   constitute  material   assemblages.   In   this   case,   it  would   be  
more  accurate   to  say   that  rhizomatic   thought   thinks  with  matter,  rather   than  
saying  that  it  thinks  about  matter.  As  Holland  clarifies,  this  thinking  with  has  
two  senses:  we  think  with  the  material  world  in  the  sense  that  we  use  matter  
as  a  “tool  to  think”,  but  we  also  think  with  the  material  world  in  the  sense  that  
we   think   “along   with   the   world   the   way   it   itself   thinks.”527   By   setting   up   A  
Thousand   Plateaus   as   an   exercise   in   rhizomatic   thinking,   Deleuze   and  
Guattari  claim  to  have  written  a  book  that  overcomes  the  dogmatic  tendency  
for  thought  to  impose  itself  on  the  world  from  the  outside.  They  write  that,  with  
the  rhizomatic  image,  there  is  “no  longer  a  tripartite  division  between  a  field  of  
reality   (the   world)   and   a   field   of   representation   (the   book)   and   a   field   of  
subjectivity   (the   author)”,   but   that   instead   “an   assemblage   establishes  
connections  between  certain  multiplicities  drawn  from  each  of  these  orders.”528  
So,  rhizomatic  thought  thinks  with  matter  by  mapping  the  connections  or  the  
lines  that  constitute  an  assemblage.  These  assemblages  are  material  and  by  
mapping   the   lines  of   flight,  which  escape   the  bounds  of   the  assemblage   in  
order   to   connect   it   to   its   outside,   rhizomatic   analysis   is   able   bring   about  
transformations   that   take   place   in   between   a   field   of   reality,   a   field   of  
representation,  and  a  field  of  subjectivity.529  
                                                                                                                
527  Holland,  2013,  37  
528  ATP  25  
529  Deleuze  and  Guattari  distinguish  between  the  processes  of  tracing  and  mapping,  where  
the  former  is  representational  and  the  latter  is  vegetal.  Rhizomatic  thought  operates  by  
mapping  the  multiple  exits  and  entryways  that  connect  an  assemblage  to  its  outside,  rather  
than  by  tracing  an  outline  of  its  form  (ATP  13)  The  two  practices  are  not  simply  opposed  as  
good  and  bad,  with  Deleuze  and  Guattari  stating  that  “[i]t  is  a  question  of  method:  the  tracing  
should  always  be  put  back  on  the  map”  (ATP  14).  Deleuze  and  Guattari  connect  this  idea  to  
Deligny’s  therapeutic  practice  of  mapping  (ATP  224;;  Deligny  2015;;  De  Toledo,  2013).  I  have  
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While  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  decision  to  conceptualise  this  form  of  thinking  as  
rhizomatic  only  arrives  fully  formed  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  it  is  clear  that  the  
relation  they  articulate  between  matter  and  thought  follows  from  a  continuation  
of   many   of   the   ideas   in   Anti-­Oedipus.   Specifically,   Deleuze   and   Guattari  
develop  the  idea  of  matter  as  a  “matter-­movement,  matter-­energy,  and  matter-­
flow”  from  Hjelmslev’s  semiotic  concept  of  ‘matière’.530  As  in  Anti-­Oedipus,  this  
allows   them   to   describe   material   systems   that   are   neither   vitalist   nor  
mechanist,   but   operate   by   machinic   processes.   A   rhizomatic   analysis   of  
assemblages  relies  on  a  philosophy  that  “is  not  animism,  any  more  than  it  is  
mechanism;;  rather  it  is  universal  machinism.”531  Another  way  in  which  Deleuze  
and  Guattari’s   understanding  of   the   assemblage   follows   from  Anti-­Oedipus  
concerns  its  relation  to  desire.  They  write  that  “[a]ssemblages  are  passional,  
they   are   compositions   of   desire”,   and   that   there   are   “no   internal   drives   in  
desire,  only  assemblages.”532  Speaking  of   these  “drives  of  desire”,  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  also  comment  that  “[t]he  assemblage  that  draws  lines  of  flight  is  
on  the  same  level  as  they  are.”533  The  reason  for  highlighting  these  points  here  
is  to  clarify  how  Deleuze  and  Guattari  conceptualize  the  line  of  flight  from  the  
point  of  view  of  ontology.  When  we  try  to  ascertain  whether  lines  of  flight  are  
movements  of  thought  alone,  or  whether  they  are  movements  about  which  one  
can  think,  we  quickly  realize  that  they  do  not  sit  comfortably  in  either  of  these  
camps.  Assemblages  are  described  as  material  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus  in  the  
same  sense  that  the  unconscious  was  understood  as  material  in  Anti-­Oedipus,  
namely  they  are  both  machinic.  This  materiality  is  neither  inside  nor  outside  of  
thought.   Assemblages   are   not   contained   in   a   field   of   reality,   a   field   of  
representation,  or  a  field  of  subjectivity,  but  produce  these  different  fields  by  
drawing   transversal   connections   between   them.   By   thinking   with   material  
assemblages,  rhizomatics  can  think  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  so  that  it  
                                                                                                                
described  the  methodology  of  this  thesis  as  an  attempt  to  map  the  individuation  of  the  
concept  of  the  line  of  flight.  This  means  that  I  have  attempted  to  carry  out  a  machinic  
analysis  of  the  forces  that  cross  into  and  escape  from  the  concept,  rather  than  attempting  to  
trace  its  outline.  
530  Bogue,  2018,  47  
531  ATP  283  
532  ATP  440,  234.    
533  ATP  234  
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occupies  neither  side  of  a  traditional  mind/body  dualism.  Lines  of  flight  are  not  
just  in  your  head,  but  they  are  not  simply  pre-­given  in  the  world  and  waiting  to  
be   found  by   thought.  The  transformations   that   they  bring  about  can   thus  be  
deemed   “incorporeal”.534   The   two   points   made   here   –   namely   that  
assemblages  are  material  only  by  way  of  being  machinic  and  desiring,  and  that  
lines  of  flight  operate  at  this  primary  level  of  the  assemblage  –  are  important  
because   they   show   how  Deleuze   and  Guattari’s   way   of   thinking   about   the  
assemblage  separates  them  from  Foucault.  In  a  footnote  to  the  fifth  plateau,  
Deleuze   and   Guattari   write   that   their   “only   points   of   disagreement   with  
Foucault”  are  that  “assemblages  seem  fundamentally  to  be  assemblages  not  
of   power   but   of   desire   (desire   is   always  assembled)”   and   that  within   these  
assemblages   there   are   “lines   of   flight   that   are   primary,   which   are   not  
phenomena   of   resistance   or   counterattack   in   an   assemblage,   but   cutting  
edges  of  creation”.535  I  will  return  to  this  footnote  in  my  conclusion,  once  the  
philosophical  and  political  context  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  have  been  
explained  in  more  detail.    
  
iv)  Refrains,  lines  of  flight,  and  absolute  deterritorializations  
  
Like  many   of   the   conceptual   innovations   of  Anti-­Oedipus,   the   language   of  
territorialization  returns   in  A  Thousand  Plateaus  with  renewed  specificity.   In  
the  eleventh  plateau  ‘1837:  Of  The  Refrain’,  Deleuze  and  Guattari   introduce  
the  novel  concept  of  the  refrain,  or  the  ‘ritournello’,  to  explain  how  territories  
are   constituted   and   how   they   effectively   produce   assemblages.536   To  
                                                                                                                
534   This   means   that   a   change   is   brought   about   in   a   state   of   affairs   not   through   the  
transformation  of  bodies,  but  through  a  transformation  of  the  relations  that  constitute  bodies.  
Deleuze   and   Guattari   discuss   incorporeal   transformations   at   length   in   the   ‘Postulates   of  
Linguistics’  plateau  (ATP  83-­121).  Their  analysis  follows  from  Deleuze’s  Logic  of  Sense,  and  
conceptualises  performative  linguistic  acts  as  a  kind  of  ‘event’  that  both  connect  bodies  with  
language  and  divide  them  from  one  another  (LS  7-­15,  108-­125).  Incorporeal  transformations  
play  an  important  role  throughout  A  Thousand  Plateaus  and  the  dates  preceding  each  plateau  
denote  an  incorporeal  transformation  around  which  the  chapter  is  organised  (Holland  2013,  
79).  
535  ATP  585.  
536  Throughout  this  chapter  I  have  retained  Massumi’s  translation  of  the  French  ritournelle  as  
the  ‘refrain’.  Others  have  argued  for  the  use  of  the  original  Italian  word  ‘ritornello’  instead  (TRM  
377-­380).  While  ‘ritornello’  retains  some  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  allusion  to  the  French  for  
Nietzsche’s   eternal   return,   namely   the   retour   éternel,   I   have   kept   Massumi’s   translation  
because   it   provides   consistency   with   the   English   translations   of   Guattari’s   writings   on   the  
concept  (MU  107).  
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understand  the  importance  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight,  we  must  give  a  
brief  account  of   the  role  of   the  refrain  and  of   the  different  kinds  of   territorial  
effects  that  it  produces.  To  first  introduce  the  concept  within  the  language  of  
Difference  and  Repetition,  we  could  say  that  the  refrain  is  the  pure  repetition  
of   difference,   and   that   it   is   what   provides   the   ground   (or   unground)   for  
experience  by  giving  it  an  orientation.  Speaking  of  the  context  of  experience  
as  a  ‘milieu’,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write  that  experience  is  produced  by  virtue  
of  “a  periodic  repetition,  but  one  whose  only  effect  is  to  produce  a  difference  
by   which   the  milieu   passes   into   another   milieu.”537   For   the   concept   of   the  
refrain,  it  is  key  that  it  is  “the  difference  that  is  rhythmic,  not  the  repetition.”538  
The  plateau  on  the  refrain  begins  with  the  example  of  a  child  lost  in  the  dark  
and  examines  the  way  that  such  a  child  can  make  a  home  for  themselves  and  
orientate  themselves  in  an  otherwise  undifferentiated  chaos  by  “singing  under  
[their]   breath”.539   The   process   by   which   the   child   guards   against   the  
disorientating  darkness  is  given  in  three  stages:  first  the  child  uses  the  sound  
of   its  own  voice   to  make   itself   feel  at  home  and   to   find  a   “calm  and  stable,  
centre  in  the  heart  of  chaos”;;  next  the  child  effectively  uses  the  refrain,  and  its  
relations  with  other  points  in  the  slowly  appearing  landscape,  to  draw  a  circle  
around  the  centre  and  to  “organise  a  limited  space”  where  the  “forces  of  chaos  
are  kept  outside”  so  that  “the  interior  space  protects  the  germinal  forces  of  a  
task  to  fulfill”;;  finally,  the  child  “opens  the  circle  a  crack,  opens  it  all  the  way,  
lets  someone  in,  calls  someone,  or  else  goes  out  oneself,  launches  forth.”540  
This  three-­stage  process  –  of  creating  a  centre,  determining  an  inside  and  an  
outside,  and  using  this  orientation  to  explore  the  world  –  creates  what  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  call  a  territory.  Territories  are  the  assemblages  that  we  inhabit.  It  
is  via  the  refrain’s  repetition  of  difference  that  a  determinable  territory  can  be  
produced  in  the  chaos,  and  this  territory  is  the  first  assemblage  with  which  one  
                                                                                                                
537  ATP  346  
538  ATP  346  
539   ATP   343.  Deleuze   and  Guattari’s   discussion   of   the   refrain   contrasts  with   the   Freudian  
example  of  the  Fort-­Da  game.  In  both  cases  the  child  repeats  an  action  in  order  to  overcome  
a  fear,  however  in  the  Freudian  example  this  repetition  only  comes  after  the  loss  of  the  mother  
and  is  designed  to  overcome  the  loss  felt  for  the  presence  of  the  mother;;  it  is  an  allegory  for  
Freud’s  basic  understanding  of   repetition  as  a  symptom.  For  Deleuze  and  Guattari  on   the  
other  hand,  the  repetitive  act  of  the  child  is  originary,  does  not  refer  to  any  pre-­existing  lack,  
and   is   inherently   creative.  The  concept  of   the   refrain   thus  extends  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  
positive  account  of  desiring-­production  offered  in  Anti-­Oedipus.    
540  ATP  343  
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can  think:  “The  territory  is  the  first  assemblage,  the  first  thing  to  constitute  an  
assemblage;;   the   assemblage   is   fundamentally   territorial.”541   To   put   this  
another  way,  we  can  say  that  it   is  only  via  the  territorialization  of  chaos  that  
thought  is  able  to  find  its  object.  Thought  requires  an  assemblage  with  which  
to  think  and  “[t]he  territory  makes  the  assemblage.”542  
  
The  concept  of  the  refrain  is  central  to  A  Thousand  Plateaus  because  it  is  what  
accounts   for   the   possibility   of   ‘consistency’   without   relying   on   any   form   of  
externally  imposed  order  or  ‘organisation’.  According  to  Eugene  Holland,  the  
task  of  “maintaining  or  creating  consistency  without  imposing  unity,  identity,  or  
organization…  might  be  said   to  constitute   the  holy  grail  of  all  of  Deleuze  &  
Guattari’s  work.”543  Here,  we  see  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  account  for  such  
consistency  in  terms  of  the  relation  between  processes  of  deterritorialization  
and  reterritorialization:   the  relative   level  of  consistency  of  an  assemblage   is  
determined  by  the  processes  of  deterritorialization  and  reterritorialization  that  
cross  it.  The  rhizomatic  image  of  thought  that  we  explored  at  the  beginning  of  
this  chapter  now  comes  into  its  own.  It  is  only  via  rhizomatic  thinking  that  it  is  
possible  to  map  the  different  kinds  of  connections  and  processes  that  create  
territorial   assemblages   and   those   that   cut   across   them.   Simply   put,   it   is  
possible  to  define  three  different  kinds  of  lines  in  an  assemblage  that  relate  to  
the  three  stages  of  the  refrain  outlined  above.  First,  we  go  “from  chaos  to  the  
threshold  of  a   territorial  assemblage”  by  way  of   lines  that  run  between  pure  
repetitions   of   difference.   These   lines   are   called   “infra-­assemblage”   lines  
because   they   exist   ‘below’   the   assemblage.   Then   one   “organizes   the  
assemblage”   via   the   use   of   “intra-­assemblage”   lines   which   determine   an  
interior   and   separate   it   from   an   exterior.   Finally,   “one   leaves   the   territorial  
assemblage  for  other  assemblages”  by  way  of  “inter-­assemblage”  lines,  which  
are  passages  of  “escape”.544  This  final  set  of  lines  that  escape  the  assemblage  
are  what  Deleuze  and  Guattari  will  call  lines  of  flight.  
  
                                                                                                                
541  ATP  356  
542  ATP  555  
543  Holland,  2013,  9  
544  ATP  344-­345  
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There   are   two   important   points   to  make  here   concerning   the   line   of   flight’s  
relation  to  territorial  assemblages.  First,  despite  the  order  in  which  the  three  
stages   of   the   refrain   are   presented,   the   lines   that   escape   the   territorial  
assemblage  do  not  come  after  the  lines  that  constitute  it.  Second,  lines  of  flight  
do   not   simply   refer   to   those   lines   that   bring   about   processes   of  
deterritorialization,   but   specifically   those   that   lead   to   absolute  
deterritorialization.  The  reasoning  behind  the  first  point  becomes  clear  when  
we   recognize   that   assemblages   are   never   individual,   but   are   always   in  
constant  interaction  with  other  assemblages.  While  the  problem  of  consistency  
was  just  discussed  in  terms  of  a  single  assemblage,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  also  
write  that  this  problem  “concerns  the  manner  in  which  different  assemblages  
hold  together,  with  components  of  passage  and  relay”  and  that  “consistency  
finds  the  totality  of  its  conditions  only  on  a  properly  cosmic  plane,  where  all  the  
disparate   and   heterogeneous   elements   are   convoked.”545   This   constant  
interaction   and   presupposition   of   assemblages   explains   why   Deleuze   and  
Guattari  shift  towards  a  language  of  deterritorialization  and  reterritorialization  
without   maintaining   a   place   for   an   originary   territorialization.   All   territorial  
processes  must  take  a  territorial  context  for  granted,  so  that  infra-­assemblage  
lines,  intra-­assemblage  lines,  and  inter-­assemblage  lines  are  not  progressions  
in  a  series,  but  “all  confront  each  other  and  converge  in  the  territorial  refrain.”546  
To   put   this   another   way,   in   the   case   of   the   child’s   refrain,   the   apparently  
originary   chaos   that   surrounds   the   child   must   have   been   produced   by   a  
previous   process   of   deterritorialization.547   This  means   that,   in   cases   of   the  
refrain  and  the  construction  of  territorial  assemblages,  it  is  the  line  of  absolute  
deterritorialization   that   must   be   taken   as   primary.   Deleuze   and   Guattari  
explicitly  warn  that  “under  no  circumstances  must  it  be  thought  that  absolute  
deterritorialization  comes  suddenly,  as  an  excess,  afterward,  or  beyond…  In  
fact,   what   is   primary   is   an   absolute   deterritorialization   an   absolute   line   of  
flight.”548  This  comment,  however,  leads  us  to  a  discussion  of  the  relationship  
                                                                                                                
545  ATP  361.  Viewed   from  a  certain  perspective,  assemblages  are  not   really  distinct  at  all.  
Deleuze   and  Guattari   write:   “There   are   only  multiplicities   of   multiplicities   forming   a   single  
assemblage,  operating  in  the  same  assemblage.”  ATP  38  
546  ATP  345  
547  For  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  chaos  and  territoriality  are  not  necessarily  incompatible.    
548  ATP  63  (translation  modified).    
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between  relative  and  absolute  deterritorializations.  What  does  it  mean  to  say  
that  the  line  of  flight  brings  about  deterritorializations  that  are  absolute?  In  what  
sense  is  it  the  case  that  these  absolute  deterritorializations  are  primary?  The  
important   distinction   here   is   between   those   inter-­assemblage   lines   whose  
connections   serve   to   modify   one   assemblage   so   that   it   can   maintain  
homeostatic   relations  with   other   assemblages,   and   those   inter-­assemblage  
lines   whose   connections   with   the   outside   bring   about   a   complete  
transformation  of   the  assemblage.549  The   former  connections  can  be  called  
relative   deterritorializations   because   in   these   cases   the   assemblage   only  
changes  in  relation  to  a  given  form  of  stability  that  it  maintains  over  time,  while  
the  latter  can  be  called  absolute  deterritorializations  because  they  effectively  
destroy  the  assemblage  in  the  process  of  transforming  it  into  something  else.  
In  these  cases,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  state:  “It   is  no  longer  adequate  to  say  
that  there  is  interassemblage,  passage  from  a  territorial  assemblage  to  another  
type  of  assemblage;;  rather,  we  should  say  that  one  leaves  all  assemblages  
behind,  that  one  exceeds  the  capacities  of  any  possible  assemblage,  entering  
another  plane.”550  While  there  are  multiple  different  inter-­assemblage  lines  that  
escape   from   an   assemblage,   it   is   only   those   that   bring   about   absolute  
deterritorializations  that  are  named  as  lines  of  flight.  These  lines  can  be  taken  
as  primary,  because  it  is  only  in  these  cases  that  all  prior  organisations  of  the  
assemblage  are  destroyed,  allowing   for   the  development  of  an  assemblage  
that  is  unconstrained  by  its  previous  territorializations.    
  
So  far,  by  exploring  the  ways  in  which  a  rhizomatic  or  vegetal  image  of  thought  
is  able  to  map  the  territorial  connections  that  produce  assemblages  and  define  
their   interactions,   I   have   been   able   to   show   that   assemblages   face   in   two  
directions   simultaneously,   with   one   deterritorializing   edge   facing   towards  
consistency  and  the  other  reterritorializing  edge  facing  towards  organization.  I  
have  also  been  able  to  show  what  role  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  plays  in  
determining   the   power   relations   of   this   bivalence.   However,   Deleuze   and  
                                                                                                                
549  We  will  see  shortly  that  political  or  social  formations  can  be  distinguished  by  their  relation  
to  absolute  or  relative  lines  of  flight.    
550   ATP   359.   See   ATP   62   for   more   on   the   relation   between   relative   and   absolute  
deterritorializations  and  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight.  
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Guattari  also  write  of  lines  of  relative  and  absolute  deterritorialization  that:  “The  
former   are   stratic   or   interstratic,   whereas   the   latter   concern   the   plane   of  
consistency   and   its   destratification”   and   that   “absolute   deterritorialization  
becomes  relative  only  after  stratification  occurs  on  that  plane  or  body.”551  To  
understand   this   point   we  must   recognise   that   assemblages   are   not   in   fact  
bivalent,  but  tetravalent.  While  they  have  a  vertical  axis  determined  by  the  two  
poles  of  deterritorialization  and  reterritorialization,  they  also  have  a  horizontal  
axis  determined  by  what  Deleuze  and  Guattari  call  the  double  articulation  of  
content  and  expression.  The  stratifications  mentioned  here,  which  relativize  
deterritorializations  and  organise  the  assemblage  according  to  a  hierarchy  of  
strata,   are   produced   by   this   double   articulation.   In   order   to   give   a  
comprehensive  account  of  the  role  played  by  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  in  
A  Thousand  Plateaus,  it  will  be  important  to  see  how  lines  of  flight  cut  across  
the  stratifications  of  an  assemblage  as  well  as  its  territorial  boundaries.  
  
v)  Content,  expression,  and  stratification  
  
The  concepts  of  the  refrain  and  the  territory  help  to  explain  how  the  world  is  
composed   of   material   assemblages   that   have   no   identity,   but   manage   to  
maintain  a  certain  level  of  stability  as  they  go  through  constant  modifications  
and  occasional  transformations.  The  rhizomatic  image  of  thought  gives  us  a  
way  of  thinking  with  these  material  assemblages  to  map  the  connections  that  
they  make,  and  to  explore   the  different  possibilities   for  change  within   them.  
However,  it  is  also  the  case  that  material  assemblages  come  in  different  kinds,  
and   embody   different   forms.   Most   importantly,   physical   matter   differs   from  
organic   matter,   and   both   differ   from   the  material   of   linguistics.   In   order   to  
understand   the   differences   between   the   physical,   the   organic,   and   the  
linguistic,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  must   introduce   the  processes   that   they  call  
stratification  and  coding.  In  the  previous  sections,  we  saw  how  “[s]ubstances  
as  formed  matters  refer  to  territorialities  and  degrees  of  territorialization  and  
deterritorialization.”  In  this  section  I  am  going  to  look  at  how  “[f]orms  imply  a  
code,  modes  of  coding  and  decoding.”552  By  combining  the  two  processes  of  
                                                                                                                
551  ATP  62-­63  
552  ATP  46  
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de/re-­territorialization  and  de/re-­coding  together,  we  will  eventually  be  able  to  
give  a  comprehensive  account  of  the  philosophy  of  matter  that  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  put  forward  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus.  Ultimately,  this  will  allow  us  to  
offer  a  more  nuanced  definition  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  as  it  appears  
in  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  one  which  shows  the  role  that  the  concept  plays  on  
the  vertical  axis  of  de/re-­territorializations  and  on  the  horizontal  axis  of  content  
and  expression.    
  
Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   discussion   of   the   relation   between   content   and  
expression,   and   their   accompanying   exploration   of   the   processes   of  
stratification  and  coding,  are  intended  “to  account  for  basic  differences  among  
things  as  diverse  as  rocks,  animals,  and  language”,  but    “without  resorting  to  
a  metaphysics  of  discontinuity,  or  to  any  kind  of  hylomorphism.”553  This  means  
that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  trying  to  show  how  the  real  differences  between  
physical,  organic,  and  linguistic  materials  are  created,  without  relying  on  any  
essential   difference   between   these   registers,   without   blocking   off   the  
possibility   of   their   communication,   and   without   relying   on   the   arborescent  
philosophical  image  of  an  inert  substance  that  is  given  form  by  an  intelligent  
and  willing  subject.  In  contrast  to  this  traditional  image,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
claim  that   the  differentiation  of  matter   into   these  kinds  relies  on   the   ‘double  
articulation’  of  content  and  expression.  We  saw  in  the  previous  two  chapters  
how  Hjelmslev’s  categories  of  a-­signifying  semiotics  and  a-­semiotic  encodings  
were  so  important  for  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  attack  on  structural   linguistics.  
This   analysis   is   generalized   in  A   Thousand   Plateaus,   so   that   the  material  
content  of  all  assemblages  does  not  preclude   the  possibility  of   it  becoming  
signifying.   Here   Deleuze   and   Guattari   argue   that   it   is   one   and   the   same  
material-­semiotic  content  that  is  expressed  as  physical  matter,  organic  matter,  
and  linguistic  matter.554  The  difference  between  these  categories  relies  not  on  
any  essential  difference  between  these  orders,  but  simply  on  the  process  of  
                                                                                                                
553  Adkins,  2015,  51  
554  It  could  be  argued  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  general  ontology  relies  on  the  schema  of  
general  semiology  put  forward  by  Hjelmslev.  It  is  also  the  case  that  their  concept  of  matter  is  
derived   from  Hjelmslev’s   concept   of   ‘matière’   (Hjelmslev,   1969,   47-­60;;   Bogue,   2018,   47).  
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  use  of  the  concept  does  not  refer  to  brute  or  inert  matter,  but  to  “the  
unformed,   unorganised,   nonstratified   or   destratified   body   and   all   its   flows;;   subatomic   and  
submolecular  particles,  pure  intensities,  prevital  and  preindividual  free  singularities”  (ATP  49).  
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articulation  by  which  any  material-­semiotic  content  comes  to  be  expressed.555  
In  order   to  explain   the  double  articulation  by  which  contents  are  expressed,  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  will  also  utilize  the  traditional  philosophical  categories  of  
‘substance’  and  ‘form’,  but  in  a  non-­traditional  way.  Specifically,  they  will  argue  
that  every  assemblage  combines  both  a  content  and  its  expression,  and  each  
of  these  will  have  its  own  substance  and  its  own  form,  so  that  the  distinction  
between  substance  and  form  relates  not  to  the  different  categories  of  unformed  
substance  and   ideal   form,  but  to   the  different  moments   in   the  articulation  of  
matter.    
  
Deleuze   and   Guattari   introduce   their   theory   of   double   articulation   with   the  
example  of  the  formation  of  sedimentary  rock.  According  to  this  analysis  there  
are  four  distinct  moments  in  the  formation  of  any  such  rock:  first,  a  number  of  
particles  are  selected  by  a   flow  of  water,  as   in  a  river;;  second,   the  particles  
become  ordered  by  their  size  and  weight  to  form  levels  of  silt;;  third,  processes  
of   calcification   cause   the   levels   of   silt   to   become   fixed;;   and   fourth,   this  
calcification  results  in  a  solid  mass  with  relatively  static  relations  between  its  
extensive   parts.556   The   first   two   stages   in   this   process   relate   to   the   first  
articulation   of   content,   while   the   latter   two   stages   relate   to   the   second  
articulation   of   expression.   Each   of   these   two   articulations   have   both   a  
substance  and  a  form.  In  the  first  articulation,  the  substance  is  constituted  by  
the   particles   and   the   process   of   formation   is   determined   by   the   way   the  
intensive  relations  between  the  weight  and  speed  of  these  particles  creates  
distinct  layers.  Generalizing  this  process,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write:  “The  first  
articulation   chooses   or   deducts,   from   unstable   particle-­flows,   metastable  
molecular   or   quasi-­molecular   units   (substances)   upon   which   it   imposes   a  
statistical   order   of   connections   and   successions   (forms).”557   The   second  
articulation  of  the  sedimentary  rock  in  this  example  also  has  both  a  form  and  
a   substance.   Here,   the   process   of   calcification   provides   the   form   and   the  
solidified  rock  gives  us  the  substance.  Once  again,  moving  from  the  specifics  
                                                                                                                
555  This  understanding  of  the  relation  between  matter  and  semiotics  resonates  with  Deleuze  
and  Guattari’s  analysis  of  the  material  unconscious  in  Anti-­Oedipus,  where  the  schizophrenic  
unconscious  makes  no  distinction  between  words  and  bodies.    
556  ATP  46  
557  ATP  46  
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of  the  rock  towards  a  general  theory  of  articulation,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write:  
“The   second   articulation   establishes   functional,   compact,   stable   structures  
(forms),  and  constructs   the  molar  compounds   in  which   these  structures  are  
simultaneously  actualized   (substances).”558   It   is   important   to   note   here   that  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  use  their  theory  of  double  articulation  to  show  that  the  
respective   relations  between   intensity   and  extensity,   the  molecular   and   the  
molar,  and  content  and  expression  do  not  map  onto  one  another.  While  it   is  
the  case  that  the  first  articulation  relies  on  the  intensive  relations  between  its  
parts   to   provide   the   form,   and   the   second   articulation   results   in   extensive  
relations  between  the  parts  of  an  object,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  warn   that   “it  
cannot  be  taken  for  granted  that  the  distinction  between  the  two  articulations  
is  always  that  of  the  molecular  and  the  molar.”559  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  
distinction   between   content   and   expression   is   always   relative,   so   that   the  
substance  produced  by  the  second  articulation  in  one  case  can  also  play  the  
role  of  the  substance  of  the  first  articulation  in  another.  To  illustrate  this  point  
we  only  need  to  recognize  that  the  grains  of  sand  that  provided  the  substance  
to  the  first  articulation  in  the  example  above  must  have  been  produced  by  a  
previous  process  of  double  articulation  at  a  lower  level.  The  final  point  to  make  
here  concerns  the  relationship  between  de/reterritorialization  on  the  one  hand,  
and  de/coding  on  the  other.  According  to  the  schema  of  double  articulation  laid  
out  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  the  processes  of  de/reterritorialization  relate  only  
to   the   substances   of   both   content   and   expression,   while   the   processes   of  
de/coding  relate  to  the  forms  of  both  content  and  expression.  To  return  to  the  
case   of   the   sedimentary   rock,   the   substance   of   content   is   composed   of  
deterritorialized   flows  of   particles,   the   form  of   content   is  determined  by   the  
coding  of  these  flows  into  layers,  the  form  of  expression  is  provided  by  the  way  
that  calcification  overcodes  the  first  coding  into  something  rigid  and  fixed,  and  
the  substance  of  expression  is  the  reterritorialized  stone.  This  differentiation  of  
the  two  processes  of  de/reterritorialization  and  de/coding  also  allows  Deleuze  
and   Guattari   to   strengthen   their   previous   arguments   against   structuralism.  
While   the   binary   relations   between   substance   and   form  may   seem   to   lend  
themselves  to  a  structuralist  analysis,  the  fact  that  the  substance  of  content  
                                                                                                                
558  ATP  46  
559  ATP  46  
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and  the  substance  of  expression  have  their  own  mode  of  interaction,  while  the  
form  of  content  and  the  form  of  expression  have  another,  makes  it  impossible  
for  any  structural  analysis   to  become  complete.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write  
that   both   articulations   “establish   binary   relations   between   their   respective  
segments”,  so  that  between  the  segments  of  the  two  articulations  “there  are  
biunivocal  relationships  obeying  far  more  complex  laws.”  On  the  basis  of  this,  
the  authors  then  claim  that  “it  is  an  illusion  to  believe  that  structure  is  the  earth's  
last  word.”560  Simply  put,  the  biunivocal  relations  between  substances  and  the  
biunivocal   relations   between   forms   cannot   be   given   a   structuralist  
interpretation   because   each   is   interrupted   by   the   binary   relations   between  
substance  and  form  at  their  respective  levels  of  articulation.  
  
Before  returning  to  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight,  it  will  be  important  to  see  
how   different   processes   of   double   articulation   can   produce   organic   and  
linguistic  assemblages  and  not  only  physical  ones.  Once  we  have  explored  the  
differences  between   these   three   strata,   and   once  we   have   seen   how   they  
interact   to   form   both   machinic   assemblages   of   bodies   and   collective  
assemblages  of  enunciation,  then  we  will  be  in  a  better  position  to  show  exactly  
what   it   means   to   draw   a   line   of   flight,   and   exactly   how   the   absolute  
deterritorializations   that   result   are   distinguished   from   relative  
deterritorializations.  The  physical,  organic,  and  linguistic  are  not,  according  to  
Deleuze  and  Guattari,  different  kinds  of  entities,  but  different  modes  of  double  
articulation.  Each  of  these  modes  of  articulation  is  supported  by  an  ‘abstract  
machine’  and  each  proceeds  in  a  different  way.  On  the  physical  stratum  the  
double   articulation   proceeds   by   way   of   what   Deleuze   and   Guattari   call  
‘induction’.561   This   is   the   process   by  which   a   slow   buildup   of   the   intensive  
relations  between  molecules  brings  about  a  change  in  the  extended  nature  of  
a   molar   aggregate.   The   sedimentary   rock   we   considered   above   is   a   good  
example  of  this:  it  is  by  a  slow  reduction  in  the  relative  speed  of  the  particles  
that  they  take  on  a  relatively  static  form.  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  other  example  
here,   borrowed   from   Gilbert   Simondon’s   analysis   of   the   processes   of  
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individuation,  is  that  of  the  crystal.562  What  interests  Deleuze  and  Guattari  in  
this  case  is  that  because  it  proceeds  by  way  of  induction,  a  crystal  is  formed,  
and   continues   to   grow,   only   at   the   limit   where   it   interacts   with   its   outside.  
Simply  put,  one  crystal  cannot  create  another  crystal,  but  can  only  develop  by  
expanding  at  its  surface.  The  crystal  “expands  in  all  directions,  but  always  as  
a   function  of   the  surface   layer  of   the  substance”,  so   that   it   is   “incapable  of  
formally   reproducing  and  expressing   itself;;   only   the   accessible   surface   can  
reproduce   itself,   since   it   is   the   only   deterritorializable   part.”563   While   the  
physical   abstract   machine   operates   by   induction   and   can   only   develop   by  
expanding   at   its   surface,   the   abstract   machine   that   carries   out   organic  
stratifications  operates  by  ‘transduction’.  Transduction  is  a  complex  term  that  
is  used  differently  at  different  moments  in  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  work.564  In  
this  context,  transduction  refers  to  the  process  by  which  material  is  transferred  
from  the  interior  of  one  assemblage  to  the  interior  of  another.  In  the  case  of  
organic  matter  this  transduction  is  carried  out  by  genetic  material,  which  allows  
organisms   to  develop  not  only   through  growth,  but  also  via   reproduction.565  
The  third  stratum,  which  Deleuze  and  Guattari  variously  refer  to  as  ‘linguistic’  
and   ‘alloplastic’,   operates   neither   by   induction   nor   by   transduction,   but   by  
translation.  The  first  thing  to  note  here  is  that  what  defines  the  linguistic  stratum  
is  not  its  use  of  signs.  According  to  this  analysis,  all  matter  goes  by  way  of  the  
double  articulation  of  content  and  expression  and   is  governed  by  a  general  
semiotics   of   signs.  What   distinguishes   the   linguistic   stratum   is   its   ability   to  
translate  “all  of  the  flows,  particles,  codes,  and  territorialities  of  the  other  strata  
into   a   sufficiently   deterritorialized   system   of   signs.”566   This   process   of  
translation  does  not  refer  to  the  ability  for  one  language  to  be  translated  into  
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clear  discussion  of  this  process  in  English,  see  Sauvanargues  (2012).  
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564  In  biology,  transduction  refers  to  the  process  by  which  a  virus  can  transfer  genetic  material  
from  one  organism  to  another.  Simondon  uses  it  to  describe  any  process  whereby  “a  disparity  
or   a   difference   is   topologically   and   temporally   restructured   across   some   interface”  
(MacKenzie,  2002,  25).  The  concept  is  also  used  by  Guattari,  who  defines  it  as  a  process  that  
“is  simultaneously  representation  and  production”  (AOP  258),  and  describes  it  rather  loosely  
in  an  interview  as  “the  idea  that,  in  essence,  something  conducts  itself,  something  happens  
between  chains  of  semiotic  expression,  and  material  chains”  (Seem  &  Guattari,  1974,  39).  
565  Deleuze  and  Guattari  have  a  very  particular  reading  of  genetics  that  relies  heavily  on  the  
work  of  the  French  biologists  François  Jacob  and  Jacques  Monod.  For  more  on  Deleuze  and  
Guattari’s  use  of  biological  terms,  see  Marks  (2006,  81-­97).  
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another,  but  “the  ability  of  language,  with  its  own  givens  on  its  own  stratum,  to  
represent  all  the  other  strata.”567    
  
In  order  to  understand  the  uses  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  in  A  Thousand  
Plateaus   it   is  not  vital   to  explicate   the  exact  mechanisms  by  which  each  of  
these  three  processes  of  double  articulation  operate.  It  will,  however,  be  useful  
to  recognize   two  general  points  concerning   their  effects.  First,  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  argue  that,  in  the  case  of  the  physical  strata,  expression  is  dependent  
on  content,  but  due  to  the  way  in  which  the  organic  stratum  organizes  physical  
matter,  in  the  organic  articulation  expression  becomes  independent  of  content.  
This   means   that   organisms   are   able   to   vary   their   modes   of   expression   in  
relation   to   their  milieu,   in  order   to  carry  out   tasks  such  as   the  marking  of  a  
territory.  Because  of  the  way  that  the  abstract  machine  of  the  linguistic  stratum  
is  able  to  translate  the  components  of  the  other  strata,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
argue   that   “in   language,  not  only   is  expression   independent  of  content,  but  
form  of  expression  is  independent  of  substance.”568  This  simply  means  that  a  
single   form  of  expression   in   language  can  relate   to  substances   that  are  not  
linguistic,  but  organic  or  physical.  The  second  general  point  to  be  made  here  
follows   from   the   first:   because   of   the   way   that   expression   becomes   more  
detached  from  content  as  we  move  from  the  physical,  to  the  organic,  to  the  
linguistic,   it   is  also   the  case  that   the   level  of  deterritorialization  available  on  
each  stratum  increases.  To  name  this  phenomenon,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  say  
that   on   the   physical   strata   deterritorialization   is   superficial,   on   the   organic  
strata  it  is  linear,  while  on  the  linguistic  strata  it  is  superlinear.  This  means  that  
language  has  a  higher   tendency   towards  variability  and  change   than  either  
organic  or  physical  matter.      
  
The  three  processes  of  double  articulation  described  here  are  not  intended  to  
be  thought  independently  of  one  another.  In  reality,  each  of  these  processes  
interacts  with  the  others,  and  it  is  possible  for  the  substance  of  expression  of  
one   articulation   to   be   taken   up   as   the   substance   of   content   for   another  
articulation  of  a  different  order.  What   this  means   is   that   the   intermingling  of  
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various   physical,   organic,   and   linguistic   assemblages   form   larger  
assemblages.  In  practice,  we  are  never  able  to  distinguish  multiplicities  of  one  
order  from  those  of  another  and  must  accept  that  there  are  “only  multiplicities  
of   multiplicities   forming   a   single   assemblage,   operating   in   the   same  
assemblage.”569  Deleuze  and  Guattari  build   on   their   theory  of   the  machinic  
capacities   of   matter,   previously   developed   in  Anti-­Oedipus,   to   explain   how  
these   amalgamations   of   the   assemblages   formed   by   the   three   different  
abstract  machines  of  double  articulation  create  both  machinic  assemblages  of  
bodies  and  collective  assemblages  of  enunciation.  Assemblages   interact  so  
that   the  contents   that  produce  physical,  organic  and   linguistic  assemblages  
are  all  machined   together   in  an   intensive  set  of   relations.  This  collection  of  
contents   is   called   a  machinic   assemblage  of   bodies   and   relates   to   the   first  
articulation   of   content.   All   of   the   different   expressions   of   each   of   these  
interacting  contents  are  also  machined   together   in  an  extensive  expression  
that  Deleuze  and  Guattari   call  a  collective  assemblage  of  enunciation.  This  
means   that   every   assemblage   has   both   “its   segment   of   expression,   the  
collective  assemblage  of  enunciation  as  the  set  of  incorporeal  transformations”  
as   well   as   “the   segment   of  material   content   where   bodies   intermingle   and  
interact   with   one   another.”570   The   importance   of   this   distinction   becomes  
apparent  at  a  pragmatic  level.  We  will  see  in  the  next  chapter,  for  example,  
that  these  terms  are  essential  for  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  analysis  of  political  
formations.  In  fact,  while  each  political  form  is  defined  in  part  by  the  machinic  
assemblage  of  bodies  that  defines  its  content,  our  ability  to  recognize  it  as  a  
specific   political   form   is   determined   by   the   level   of   stability   of   its   collective  
assemblage   of   enunciation.   Specifically,   when   a   collective   assemblage   of  
enunciation   reaches  a  high  enough   level  of  stability   it   is  called  a   regime  of  
signs.  We  will  return  to  the  importance  of  these  regimes  in  the  next  chapter  
when  we  examine  the  pragmatic  role  that  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  plays  
in  bringing  about  political  change.    
  
Before  we  go  any  further,  however,  we  are  now  in  a  position  to  show  how  the  
line  of  flight  relates  to  the  stratification  of  assemblages.  We  have  seen  here  
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that   rather   than   being   defined   merely   by   the   interactions   between  
deterritorialization  and  reterritorialization  on  a  single  axis,  any  assemblage  is  
also  stratified  on  a  horizontal  axis  that  splits  its  content  from  its  expression  via  
a  double  articulation  of  matter.  It   is  because  of  the  two  directions  of  each  of  
these  two  axes  that  we  can  say  that  assemblages  are  tetravalent.  In  the  last  
section,  we  saw  that   the  concept  of   the   line  of   flight   is  used  to  name  those  
interassemblage   connections   that   bring   about   absolute   deterritorializations,  
but  now  we  must  ask  how  the  line  of  flight  relates  to  stratification  as  well.  The  
first  thing  to  note  here  is  that  while  de/reterritorialization  and  stratification  are  
distinct  processes  that  operate  on  different  axes  of  the  assemblage,  they  also  
interact   with   each   other.571   We   can   take   as   a   starting   point   Deleuze   and  
Guattari’s  claim  that  “absolute  deterritorialization  becomes  relative  only  after  
stratification   occurs.”572   This   comment   reflects   our   earlier   discussion   of   the  
primacy  of  the  line  of  flight,  but  adds  that  it  is  the  process  of  stratification  that  
relativizes   the   deterritorializations   that   the   line   of   flight   brings   about.  What  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  saying  here  is  that  processes  of  deterritorialization  
are  not  only  working  against  the  processes  of  reterritorialization  on  the  vertical  
axis,  but  also  that  they  must  cross  the  physical,  organic,  and  linguistic  strata  
that   segment   the   assemblage   on   the   horizontal   axis.   Processes   of  
deterritorialization  become  relative  when  they  must  proceed  in  segments  from  
one   strata   to   another.   Speaking   of   what   qualifies   a   process   of  
deterritorialization  as  either   relative  or  absolute,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write  
that   it   “is   not   its   speed   (some   are   very   slow)   but   its   nature,   whether   it  
constitutes  epistrata  and  parastrata  and  proceeds  by  articulated  segments  or,  
on   the   contrary,   jumps   from   one   singularity   to   another   following   a  
nondecomposable,   nonsegmentary   line   drawing   a   metastratum.”573   If   we  
recognize  that  epistrata  and  parastrata  refer  to  the  spaces  above  and  to  the  
side  of  the  stratifications,  then  we  can  see  that  what  defines  the  line  of  flight,  
and  allows   it   to  bring  about  absolute  deterritorializations,   is   its  ability   to  cut  
across   the   strata   that   would   otherwise   segment   the   assemblage   into   the  
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physical,   the   organic,   and   the   linguistic.   This   is   why   Deleuze   and   Guattari  
speak  of  “a  line  of  flight  enabling  one  to  blow  apart  strata.”574    
  
In   practice,   assemblages   are   not   distinct,   but   always   interacting   so   that   in  
reality   the   physical,   the   organic   and   the   linguistic   are   always   machined  
together.  Now  we  can  see  that  what  separates  the  absolute  deterritorialization  
of   the   line   of   flight   from   relative   deterritoriatizations   is   that   the   former  
deterritorialize   specifically   by   cutting   across   the   strata.   In   these   cases,   an  
assemblage  is  transformed  because  a  connection  is  made  not  only  between  
two   assemblages   on   the   same   physical,   organic,   or   linguistic   stratum,   but  
between  assemblages  on  different  strata  and  thus  between  different  levels  of  
the   collective   assemblage.   A   connection   is   made   between   an   object,   an  
organism,  and  a  word  that  brings  about  an  incorporeal  transformation  in  which  
everything   changes.   Using  Guattari’s   concept   of   the   transversal,   which  we  
discussed  in  an  earlier  chapter,  it  would  be  possible  to  say  that  a  line  of  flight  
is  like  a  diagonal  line  that  cuts  across  both  the  horizontal  axis  of  the  strata  and  
the  vertical  axis  of  de/re-­territorializations.  In  this  sense,  it   is  also  the  line  of  
flight  which  puts  these  two  different  axes  into  relation  with  each  other.  
  
vi)  The  plane  of  consistency  and  the  question  of  dimensions  
  
We  have  now  seen  how  the  rhizomatic  image  of  thought  allows  us  to  map  the  
many  connections  that  make  up  an  assemblage  and  how,  on  top  of  the  relative  
deterritorializations  that  enact  alterations  in  the  assemblage,  the  line  of  flight  
can   bring   about   absolute   deterritorializations   of   the   assemblage   by   cutting  
across  the  strata.  One  point  that  we  have  not  yet  explored  is  the  question  of  
what  is  reached  when  an  assemblage  is  absolutely  deterritorialized.  According  
to  the  terminology  of  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  the  answer  to  this  question  is  the  
plane  of  immanence,  or  the  plane  of  consistency.575  The  plane  of  consistency  
is  the  plane  on  which  stratifications  emerge.  In  fact,  the  strata  are  nothing  other  
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than  “thickenings  on  a  plane  of  consistency”,  which  does  not  rely  on  the  strata  
but   “is   everywhere,   always   primary   and   always   immanent.”576  
Deterritorializations   are   also   drawn   on   this   plane.   Given   the   fact   that   the  
process   of   stratification   operates   by   giving   form   to   the   substance   of   both  
content  and  expression,  we  might  think  that  the  plane  of  consistency  would  be  
composed  of  a  completely  unformed  mass,  but  Deleuze  and  Guattari   claim  
that   it   is   “in  no  way  an  undifferentiated  aggregate  of  unformed  matters,  but  
neither  is  it  a  chaos  of  formed  matters  of  every  kind.”577  Instead,  Deleuze  and  
Guattari   argue   that   the   plane   of   consistency   “constructs   continuums   of  
intensity:  it  creates  continuity  for  intensities  that  it  extracts  from  distinct  forms  
and   substances.”578   As   a   field   of   intensities,   the   concept   of   the   plane   of  
consistency   plays   a   similar   role   to   that   of   the   depths   in   Difference   and  
Repetition   and   Logic   of   Sense,   as   well   as   the   intensive   field   of   desiring-­
production   in   Anti-­Oedipus.   In   both   volumes   of   the   Capitalism   and  
Schizophrenia   series   the   plane   of   consistency   is   also   the   site   of   the   direct  
investment  of  desire.579  One  difference  is  that  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  given  
the  application  of  the  rhizomatic  image  of  thought,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  
able  to  offer  more  insight  into  the  various  different  processes  that  happen  on  
this  plane.  Specifically,  and  as  we  have  already  seen,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
are  able   to  define   the  plane  of  consistency  as  a  “[c]ontinuum  of   intensities”  
consisting  of  a  pre-­signifying  semiotic  matter  “of  particles  or  signs-­particles”,  
and   produced   by   a   “conjunction   of   deterritorialized   flows”.580   Deleuze   and  
Guattari  name  these  characteristics  as  “the  three  factors  proper  to  the  plane  
of  consistency.”581  
  
The  plane  of  consistency   is  said   to  account   for  all   the  dimensions  of  all   the  
multiplicities  drawn  on  it.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write  that  “multiplicities  are  flat,  
in  the  sense  that  they  fill  or  occupy  all  of  their  dimensions:  we  will  therefore  
speak  of  a  plane  of  consistency  of  multiplicities,  even  though  the  dimensions  
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of  this  "plane"  increase  with  the  number  of  connections  that  are  made  on  it.”582  
This  insistence  that  all  multiplicities  are  drawn  on  a  single  plane  is  a  way  of  
accounting  for  the  univocity  of  being  and  for  the  immanence  of  a  philosophy  
able   to   think   this  univocity.583  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  comments  concerning  
the  fact  that  the  plane  of  consistency  fills  all  of  its  dimensions  also  show  that  
Deleuze’s   reading   of   Riemannian   differential   geometry   remains   central   to  
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  updated  theory  of  multiplicities.584  In  the  first  chapter  
of  this  thesis  we  saw  how  Riemann  had  used  differential  calculus  to  develop  a  
geometry   that   was   applicable   for   all   curved   and   non-­curved   spaces.   As  
Deleuze  writes  in  Difference  and  Repetition,  this  geometry  allows  us  to  think  
“an   n-­dimensional,   continuous,   defined  multiplicity”   immanently.585   Deleuze  
and  Guattari  hold  on  to  this  point  when  they  write  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus  that  
the  multiple  must   be  made,   “not   by   always  adding  a   higher  dimension,   but  
rather   in   the   simplest   of   ways,   by   dint   of   sobriety,   with   the   number   of  
dimensions  one  already  has  available—  always  n  –  1”.586  In  these  cases,  we  
have  no  external  measure  of  distance  and  no  static  grid  of  orientation  against  
which  to  judge  the  position  of  a  line,  so  that  each  new  connection  must  provide  
its  own  measure  and   its  own  dimension.  What   this  means   for  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  at  the  point  of  writing  A  Thousand  Plateaus  is  that  any  new  connection  
drawn  in  a  multiplicity  will  bring  about  a  change  in  the  nature  of  that  multiplicity.  
This   alteration   of   a   multiplicity   via   the  making   of   new   connections   is   what  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  have  been  calling  an  assemblage:  “An  assemblage  is  
precisely   this   increase   in   the   dimensions   of   a   multiplicity   that   necessarily  
changes   in   nature   as   it   expands   its   connections.”587   This   way   of  
conceptualising  the  assemblage  also  helps  to  clarify  why  it  is  said  that  the  line  
of  flight  is  primary  in  an  assemblage,  namely  because  it  is  only  by  drawing  a  
line  of  flight  that  the  necessary  interassemblage  connection  can  be  made,  the  
                                                                                                                
582  ATP  9  
583  For  more  on   the  univocity  of  being,  and  Deleuze’s  refusal  of   the  Oneness  of  being,  see  
Widder  (2001,  437-­453).  
584  Here  I  refer  to  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  comments  on  Riemann’s  geometry  as  they  appear  
in   the   introduction   to  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  and   in  the   tenth  plateau.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
also  discuss  Riemann’s  work  extensively   in   the   fourteenth  plateau,  where   they  pay  special  
attention  to  the  question  of  fractals,  and  their  fractional  number  of  dimensions.    
585  DR  230  
586  ATP  7  
587  ATP  9  
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added  dimension  can  be  produced,  and  the  assemblage  can  come  into  being.  
In  order  to  explain  this  reconceptualization  of  the  relationship  between  the  line  
of   flight,   the   multiplicity,   the   assemblage,   and   the   plane   of   consistency,  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  write  the  following:  
  
“The  line  of  flight  marks:  the  reality  of  a  finite  number  of  dimensions  that  the  
multiplicity   effectively   fills;;   the   impossibility   of   a   supplementary   dimension,  
unless   the  multiplicity   is   transformed  by   the   line  of   flight;;   the  possibility  and  
necessity  of  flattening  all  of  the  multiplicities  on  a  single  plane  of  consistency  
or  exteriority,  regardless  of  their  number  of  dimensions.”588  
  
The  fact  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  insist  on  the  primacy  of  the  line  of  flight  also  
helps  to  explain  how  they  hope  to  produce  a  philosophy  that  can  account  for  
the   nature   of   change   in   general.   In   short,   the   theory   of  multiplicities   given  
above  shows  that  thought  can  never  begin  with  something  static  and  produce  
change,   but   that   change   is   always   a   prerequisite   for   what   is   static.   In   the  
terminology  of  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  this  is  summed  up  in  the  comment  that  
all   stratifications   are   nothing   other   than   “thickenings   on   a   plane   of  
consistency.”589   It  might   be   the   case   that   lines   of   flight   are   defined  as   “the  
maximum  dimension  after  which   the  multiplicity  undergoes  metamorphosis”,  
but  it  is  also  the  case  that  multiplicities  are  composed  of  these  lines,  and  are  
therefore   always   changing   in   nature.590   Because   the   variations   and  
dimensions  of  any  multiplicity  are  immanent  to  it,  “it  amounts  to  the  same  thing  
to  say  that  each  multiplicity  is  already  composed  of  heterogeneous  terms  in  
symbiosis,  and  that  a  multiplicity  is  continually  transforming  itself  into  a  string  
of   other  multiplicities,   according   to   its   thresholds   and  doors.”591  To  put   this  
another  way,  we  can  say  that  because  assemblages  are  only  produced  when  
the  maximum  dimension  of  a  multiplicity  is  reached,  “becoming  and  multiplicity  
are   the  same  thing”.592  Just  as  the  absolute  deterritorialization  of   the   line  of  
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flight  is  primary  in  the  assemblage,  so  change  and  transformation  are  primary  
on  the  plane  of  consistency.    
  
In  the  next  section  of  this  chapter  we  will  push  our  exploration  of  the  nature  of  
the  plane  of  consistency  a   little   further  by   looking  at  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  
analysis  of  painting  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus.  However,  before  moving  on,  it  
will  be  instructive  to  pause  and  consider  why  Deleuze  and  Guattari  claim  that  
philosophers   have   previously   misrecognised   the   plane   of   consistency   and  
therefore  why  the  nature  of  change  has  remained  so  elusive  to  thought.  In  the  
tenth   plateau,   ‘1730:   Becoming-­Intense,   Becoming-­Animal,   Becoming-­
Imperceptible…’,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  compare  “two  planes,  or  two  ways  of  
conceptualizing  the  plane.”593  One  of  which  is  the  plane  of  consistency  that  we  
have   just   been   considering.   The   other   is   the   “plan(e)   of   organization   or  
development.”594  The  plane  of  organisation  is  that  “hidden  structure  necessary  
for  forms”  which  the  dogmatic  image  of  thought  takes  as  the  precondition  for  
good   sense   in   thought.   This   ‘hidden   structure’   is   perhaps   most   clearly  
exemplified  by  Plato’s  famous  analogy  between  the  thinker  and  the  butcher,  
both  of  whom  are  required  to  work  by  “dividing  things  again  by  classes,  where  
the  natural  joints  are.”595  What  Deleuze  and  Guattari  take  issue  with  is  the  idea  
that   there   are   any   hidden   but   necessary   ‘natural   joints’   at   all.   Such   an  
assumption,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  argue,   is  always  “inferred”  or   “concluded  
from  its  own  effects.”596  The  assumption  of  an  always  hidden  plane  that  sits  
behind   reality   and  provides   it  with   a   structure   is   at   the   core   of   arborescent  
thinking.   Deleuze   and   Guattari   say   that   the   plane   of   organization   is   both  
‘teleological’  and  ‘structural’  because  the  apparent  design  of  such  a  plane  –  
the   placement   of   the   joints   –   “establishes   the   proportional   relations   of   a  
structure”  and  must  be  posited  by  “the  mind  of  a  god,  or  in  the  unconscious  of  
life,  of  the  soul,  or  of  language.”597  Deleuze  and  Guatari  also  use  the  language  
of   dimensions   to   argue   that   the   plane   of   organization   introduces  
transcendence   into   thought.   Once   again,   Deleuze’s   previous   analysis   of  
                                                                                                                
593  ATP  292  
594  ATP  297  
595  Plato,  2002,  265e  
596  ATP  293  
597  ATP  293  
   211  
Riemannian  geometry  will  be  useful  here.  Before   the  advent  of  Riemannian  
geometry,   it  was  only   possible   to  work  with  curved   spaces   in   geometry   by  
representing  these  spaces  in  a  non-­curved  space  of  a  higher  dimension.  As  
we  saw  earlier,  the  problem  with  this  practice  is  that  it  must  take  for  granted  
the  existence  of  a  supplementary  space  used  for  analysis  alone,  which  must  
also  be  assumed  to  be  flat.598  In  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
condemn  the  dogmatic  image  of  thought  on  the  same  grounds,  claiming  that  
the   plane   of   organization   is   always   assumed   to   exist   “in   a   supplementary  
dimension  to  that  to  which  it  gives  rise  (n  +1).”599  The  plane  of  consistency,  on  
the  other  hand,  “is  necessarily  a  plane  of  immanence”  because  the  rhizomatic  
thought  that  thinks  with  the  plane  of  consistency  never  allows  for  the  existence  
of   a   supplementary   dimension   and   recognises   that   dimension   added   to   a  
multiplicity  brings  about  a  change  in  nature.    
  
The  purpose  of  raising  this  point  here,  concerning  the  difference  between  the  
plane  of  consistency  and  the  plane  of  organisation,  is  to  show  how  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  can  claim  that  the  line  of  flight  is  not  simply  an  activity  of  thought.  
While   the   arborescent   model   for   thought   always   embeds   its   object   in   an  
abstract  space,  where  it  is  cut  off  from  the  rest  of  reality  and  made  static  and  
unchanging,   in   order   to   pass   judgement   upon   it,   the   rhizomatic   model   for  
thought   thinks   with   assemblages   as   they   are   changing   and   as   they   are  
interacting  with  other  assemblages.  What  this  means  is  that  the  concepts  that  
relate   to   the   rhizomatic   image   of   thought,   such   as   deterritorialization,  
stratification,  and  the   line  of   flight,  do  not  exist  within   thought,  waiting   to  be  
imposed  on  matter  in  an  act  of   judgement.  Instead,  these  concepts  concern  
an  immanent  thought  that  cannot  be  detached  from  that  which  it  thinks.  The  
line  of  flight  is  therefore  not  simply  in  the  head  of  the  subject  who  thinks  it,  or  
in  the  object  about  which  it  is  thought,  but  on  the  plane  of  consistency  which  
refuses  to  separate  the  subject  from  the  object,  and  on  which  there  is  only  a  
“continuum  of  intensities”.600  
                                                                                                                
598   Greenberg,   1980,   373-­374.   See   Deleuze’s   comments   on   philosophies   that   require   a  
“fictitious  third  dimension”  (DR  61).  
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vii)  Multilinear  systems  and  the  example  of  linear  perspective  (again)  
  
Throughout  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  develop  their  many  
conceptual   inventions   through   analyses   of   artistic   forms.601   In   the   tenth  
plateau,   Deleuze   and   Guattari   elaborate   on   the   dynamics   of   the   plane   of  
consistency  and  the  plane  of  organisation  by  discussing  the  many  ways  that  
they  operate  in  both  music  and  in  painting.  In  each  case,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
aim  to  differentiate  those  forms  of  music,  or  of  painting,  that  face  towards  the  
plane  of  organisation  from  those  that  face  towards  the  plane  of  consistency.  
According  to  their  analysis  here,  the  forms  of  music  and  of  painting  that  face  
the   plane   of   organisation   are   those   that   form   punctual   systems.   Punctual  
systems  are  those  that  create  order  through  the  use  of  vertical  and  horizontal  
lines,  which  create  a  grid  for  determining  the  location  of  points  (i.e.  punctual).  
In   these   cases,   vertical   and   horizontal   lines   provide   a   structure,   while  
diagonals  “play  the  role  of  connectors  between  points.”602  In  these  cases:  “The  
line  and   the  diagonal   remain   totally  subordinated   to   the  point  because   they  
serve  as  coordinates  for  a  point  or  as  localizable  connections  for  two  points,  
running  from  one  point  to  another.”603  Deleuze  and  Guattari  state  that  these  
systems  are  “arborescent,  mnemonic,  molar,  structural;;   they  are  systems  of  
territorialization  or  reterritorialization.”604  Punctual  systems  are  also  defined  as  
being  representational.605  
  
According  to  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  the  forms  of  music  and  of  painting  that  face  
towards  the  plane  of  consistency  are  not  punctual  but  multilinear:  “Opposed  to  
                                                                                                                
601  Perhaps  the  most  comprehensive  example  of  this  comes  with  their  analysis  of  the  form  of  
the  novella  in  the  eighth  plateau,  where  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  plays  an  integral  role.  
Paul   Patton   uses   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   analysis   of   Fitzgerald’s   novella   to   define   one  
outcome  of  the  line  of  flight  as  a  “kind  of  shift  towards  another  quality  of  life”  (Patton,  2000,  
87).    
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605  By  defining  these  systems  as  representational,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  not  saying  that  
they  are  figurative,  or  that  they  produce  an  image  of  something  that  they  represent,  but  that  
they   have   a   systematic   way   of   organising   sensation.   For   Deleuze,   artistic   forms   such   as  
abstract  painting  escape  from  figuration,  but  not  from  representation  (FB  8-­12).  
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the  punctual  system  are   linear,  or   rather  multilinear,  systems.”606  Multilinear  
systems  do  not  rely  on  an  orientating  grid  of  horizontal  and  vertical  lines,  they  
do  not  define  the  location  of  individual  points,  and  thus  they  do  not  subordinate  
lines  to  points.    In  this  plateau,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  suggest  that  creativity  in  
the  arts  is  always  linked  to  the  development  of  multilinear  systems  that  oppose  
the  historical   imposition  of  punctual  systems.  They  write:  “Free  the  line,  free  
the  diagonal:  every  musician  or  painter  has  this  intention.”607  
  
However,   much   like   the   similar   distinction   between   the   arborescent   and  
rhizomatic  images  of  thought,  the  distinction  between  punctual  and  multilinear  
systems  is  not  simply  an  opposition.  Multilinear  systems  are  never  separated  
from   punctual   ones,   but   are   like   methodologies   for   undoing   the   stratified  
relations  between  points  that  punctual  systems  set  up.  Punctual  systems  are  
not  taken  as  failed  attempts  at  creativity,  but  as  sites,  or  contexts,  waiting  to  
be  opened  up  by  an  act  of  creative  deformation.  In  certain  cases,  artists  require  
a  punctual  system  as  the  backdrop  to  their  activity.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write  
that:  “One  elaborates  a  punctual  system  or  a  didactic  representation,  but  with  
the  aim  of  making  it  snap,  of  sending  a  tremor  through  it.  A  punctual  system  is  
most   interesting   when   there   is   a   musician,   painter,   writer,   philosopher   to  
oppose   it,  who  even  fabricates   it   in  order  to  oppose   it,   like  a  springboard   to  
jump  from.”608  Given  this  relation  between  punctual  and  multilinear  systems,  
we  are  now  in  a  position  to  explore  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  comments  on  linear  
perspective  and  their  analysis  of  the  role  of  the  line  of  flight  in  this  context.  This  
is  what  they  write:    
  
“There   is   no   falser   problem   in   painting   than   depth   and,   in   particular,  
perspective.  For  perspective  is  only  a  historical  manner  of  occupying  diagonals  
or   transversals,   lines  of   flight   in  other  words,  of   reterritorializing   the  moving  
visual  block…  But   the   lines  of   flight,   the   transversals,  are  suitable   for  many  
other  functions  besides  this  molar  function.  Lines  of  flight  as  perspective  lines,  
far  from  being  made  to  represent  depth,  themselves  invent  the  possibility  of  
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such  a   representation,  which   occupies   them  only   for   an   instant,   at  a   given  
moment.  Perspective,  and  even  depth,  are   the   reterritorialization  of   lines  of  
flight,  which  alone  created  painting  by  carrying  it  farther.”609  
  
First,  this  quotation  suggests  that  linear  perspective,  as  a  technique  for  dealing  
with   the   false   problem   of   depth   in   painting,   should   be   considered   as   an  
archetypal   punctual   system.   It   takes   the   vertical   and   horizontal   axis   of   the  
canvas  as  a  grid  for  determining  the  location  of  points,  and  uses  diagonals,  or  
converging  lines,  to  connect  these  points  in  an  attempt  to  simulate  depth.  The  
second   thing   that   this   quotation   suggests,   however,   is   that   despite   the  
stratifying  capacity  of  linear  perspective,  it  is  possible  to  use  this  system  as  a  
springboard  towards  the  multilinear,  and  towards  the  plane  of  consistency.  The  
shift   we   can   see   here   from   Deleuze’s   earlier   comments   in  Difference   and  
Repetition  concerns  the  potentials  for  creativity,  or  for  transformation  that  lie  
within  linear  perspective.  Rather  than  being  simply  an  example  of  the  dangers  
of  representation,  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  aim  to  show  
how  this  punctual  system  can  be  opposed,  namely  by  recognising  the  primacy  
of   the   line   of   flight   over   the   perspectival   system   that   captures   it.   Linear  
perspective   may   be   a   punctual   system,   which   tends   towards   the   plane   of  
organisation,  but  it   is  the  line  of  flight  –  resisting  representation  and  running  
between   indiscernible  points  –  which   is  also   the   internal  point  of  escape  of  
linear  perspective.  It  is  by  following  lines  of  flight  that  linear  perspective  can  be  
made  into  a  springboard  with  which  to  oppose  the  representational  history  of  
painting.    
  
In  the  first  chapter  of  this  thesis  we  saw  how  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  concept  
of  the  line  of  flight  relates  to  the  concept  of  the  ligne  de  fuite  in  the  terminology  
of  linear  perspective.  Briefly  put,  these  are  the  lines  that  run  between  vanishing  
points   and   determine   the   abstract   line   towards   which   two   parallel   planes  
converge   if   extended   to   infinity.   However,   contrary   to   this   definition,   in   a  
translator’s  note  to  the  long  quotation  given  above,  Massumi  adds  the  following  
comment:   “lignes   de   fuite:   here,   the   lines   in   a   painting  moving   toward   the  
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vanishing  point,  or  point  de  fuite.”610  From  our  analysis,  we  now  know  that  this  
note  is  incorrect.  Lignes  de  fuite  are  not  the  lines  that  converge  towards  the  
vanishing  point,  but  are  instead  the  lines  that  run  between  the  vanishing  points.  
This   is   important   because   of   what   it   means   for   the   kind   of   creativity   that  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  attempting  to  call  for.  If  the  line  of  flight  were  like  the  
line  that  runs  towards  the  vanishing  point,  then  to  follow  a  line  of  flight  would  
be  a  kind  of  ‘heading  off  into  the  distance’,  a  movement  over  the  horizon.  But  
this  is  not  how  the  term  is  used.  Rather  than  being  a  line  that  escapes  over  the  
horizon,  the  line  of  flight  is  the  horizon.  To  draw  a  new  line  of  flight  is  therefore  
an   activity   of   creating   a   new  horizon,   or   of   detaching   the   horizon   from   the  
representational   space   of   the   painting.   Not   of   escaping   the   current  
organisation  of  relations  by  getting  outside,  or  beyond  them,  but  escaping  them  
by  reorganising  them  from  within.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write  that  “Creations  
are  like  mutant  abstract  lines  that  have  detached  themselves  from  the  task  of  
representing  a  world.”611  However,   they  also  clarify   that   they  do  not  detach  
themselves   from   representation  by   escaping   reality,   but   “precisely  because  
they  assemble  a  new  type  of  reality.”612  It  will  be  important  to  keep  this  form  of  
creative  action  in  mind  when  we  turn  to  the  question  of  political  transformations  
in  the  following  chapter.    
  
viii)  The  BwO  and  the  ethics  of  the  line  of  flight  
  
Drawing  lines  of  flight  can  lead  to  absolute  deterritorialization  on  the  plane  of  
consistency.  But  is  this  a  politically  expedient,  or  ethically  favourable  outcome?  
Or,   more   to   the   point,   is   it   always   favourable,   and   if   not,   then   when   is   it  
favourable,   and   for   whom?   Despite   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   regular  
prescriptions  to  their  readers  that  they  should  aim  to  “extend  the  line  of  flight  
to  the  point  where  it  becomes  an  abstract  machine  covering  the  entire  plane  
of  consistency”   they  also  pepper   the  book  with  words  of  caution.613  We  are  
told,   for   example,   that   absolute   deterritorialization   may   be   “overlaid   by   a  
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compensatory  reterritorialization”  that  would  be  more  despotic  than  what  was  
deterritorialized.614  On  top  of  the  possibility  of  the  line  of  flight  turning  into  a  
segmentary  line,  we  are  also  warned  that  the  line  of  flight  is  “imbued  with  such  
singular  despair”  relating  to  the  immanent  possibility  of  “a  death,  a  demolition”  
that  it  may  bring  about.615  In  this  final  section  of  this  chapter,  I  want  to  explore  
some  of  these  dangers  by  looking  at  the  concept  of  the  Body  without  Organs  
(BwO).  I  will  argue  here  that  it  is  a  mistake  to  assume  that  it  is  ethically  positive  
to  draw  lines  of  flight.  However,  by  looking  at  the  extent  to  which  Deleuze  and  
Guattari’s  work  builds  on  the  possibility  of  a  Spinozist  ethics,  I  will  argue  that,  
while  it  is  not  ethically  positive  to  draw  a  line  of  flight,  ethics  is  only  possible  
when  an  adequate  knowledge  of  causes  is  attained,  and  that  to  reach  such  a  
form  of  knowledge  it  is  vital  to  think  rhizomatically  and  to  map  the  many  lines  
of  flight  that  are  primary  in  the  assemblage  under  consideration.  We  will  see  
here  that  there  is  nothing  inherently  ethical  about  drawing  lines  of  flight,  but  
that  a  true  ethics  requires  the  mapping  of  such  lines.    
  
In   Anti-­Oedipus,   Deleuze   and   Guattari   used   the   concept   of   the   BwO   to  
designate  the  unformed  and  unorganized  state  of  the  body,  against  which  the  
desiring  machines  worked  to  form  connections,  disjunctions,  and  conjunctions.  
We  saw  in  the  last  chapter  how  the  BwO  was  given  as  one  end  of  a  continuum,  
along  which  bodies  become  more  or  less  organized.  At  the  other  pole  of  this  
continuum   is   the   organism.   Using   the   conceptual   framework   laid   out   in   A  
Thousand  Plateaus,  we  can  now  say  that  the  BwO  plays  the  role  of  the  plane  
of   consistency   specifically   for   the   double   articulation   and   stratification   of  
organic  matter.  While  organisms  are  created  via  the  selection  and  formation  
of  an  intensive  substance  of  content,  which,  by  way  of  transduction,  results  in  
the   formation   of   an   extensive   substance   of   expression,   the   processes   of  
deterritorialization  that  cut  across  these  stratifications  lead  the  organism  back  
towards   the  BwO.  Speaking  of  such  cases,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write:   “In  
effect,  the  body  without  organs  is  itself  the  plane  of  consistency.”616  We  might  
think,  given  the  apparently  despotic  nature  of  the  organization  of  the  body,  that  
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Deleuze   and   Guattari   would   take   the   BwO   as   a   goal   –   and,   indeed,   they  
dedicate  a  whole  plateau  to  the  question,  ‘How  do  you  make  yourself  a  Body  
without  Organs?’  –  however,  this  is  the  section  of  the  book  that  contains  the  
highest  level  of  caution.  We  are  told  that  making  oneself  a  BwO  is  not  easy,  
that   “you   can   botch   it”,   and   that   “it   can  be   terrifying,   and   lead   you   to   your  
death.”617  
  
The  main  technique  offered  for  the  deterritorialization  of  the  body  is  the  act  of  
resisting  the  normal  function  of  the  organs.  Instead  of  “seeing  with  your  eyes,  
breathing  with  your  lungs,  swallowing  with  your  mouth,”  the  aim  will  be  to  “walk  
on  your  head,  sing  with  your  sinuses,  see  through  your  skin,  breathe  with  your  
belly.”618  This  demand  might  not  be  quite  as  impossible  as  it  first  sounds,  as  
the  aim  of  disorganizing   the  body   is  not  simply   to  use   the  wrong  organs   for  
each  task,  but  to  experiment  with  the  possibilities  offered  by  the  body.  The  idea  
is  not  to  stop  breathing  through  your  mouth  and  start  breathing  through  your  
belly,  but  to  experiment  with  the  different  possibilities  of  breathing.  In  Deleuze’s  
book   on   the   paintings   of   Francis   Bacon,   written   at   the   same   time   as   A  
Thousand  Plateaus  and  covering  many  of  the  same  themes,  Deleuze  clarifies  
that  in  making  oneself  a  BwO  the  aim  is  not  simply  to  destroy  the  organs,  but  
to   create   “transitory   organs”.619   Taking   the   act   of   viewing   one   of   Bacon’s  
paintings  as  his  primary  example,  Deleuze  explains  how  the  eye  “ceases  to  be  
organic   in   order   to   become  a   polyvalent   and   transitory   organ”   because   the  
possibilities   contained   in   the   eye   are   freed   from   the   prescribed   function   of  
feeding  visual  information  to  the  brain.620  In  the  act  of  the  encounter  with  the  
intensity  of  the  painting,  we  also  feel  the  painting  with  organs  other  than  the  
eye.  It  affects  us  in  other  ways  than  the  purely  visual  and  “gives  us  eyes  all  
over:  in  the  ear,  in  the  stomach,  in  the  lungs.”621  In  the  previous  section  on  the  
role  of  the  line  of  flight  in  linear  perspective,  we  saw  that  to  escape  from  the  
restrictions  of  the  organised  space  of  perspectival  painting  the  aim  was  not  to  
draw  a  line  that  flees  over  the  horizon,  but  to  detach  the  horizon  from  its  fixed  
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position,  in  order  to  put  the  whole  space  in  variation.  Similarly  here,  in  making  
oneself  a  BwO  the  aim  is  not  to  escape  the  body  by  getting  outside  of  it,  but  to  
detach  an  organ  from  its  fixed  function  and  put  it  into  variation  with  the  other  
organs  of  the  body.    
  
Understandably,   this   process   is   not  without   its   dangers.  When   speaking  of  
composing  the  BwO,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write  that  “[t]here  is  no  assurance  
that  two  lines  of  flight  will  prove  compatible,  compossible”,  and  that  as  a  result  
of   this   “[t]here   is  no  assurance  that  the  body  without  organs  will  be  easy   to  
compose.”622   Drug   addicts,   sexual   fetishists,   and   anorexics   are   given   as  
examples   of   people   who   have   tried   to   make   themselves   into   a   BwO   by  
experimenting  with  the  possibilities  of  the  body,  but  who  have  ended  up  with  
“[e]mptied   bodies   instead   of   full   ones”.623   By   detaching   one   organ   from   its  
assumed  function  and  putting  it  into  variation  with  the  other  organs,  your  new  
internal   relations   may   become   unstable   or   incompatible,   you   may   empty  
yourself   out.   In   order   to   avoid   falling   into   the   danger  of   joining   this   “dreary  
parade  of  sucked-­dry,  catatonicized,  vitrified,  sewn-­up  bodies”  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  council  caution.624  It  is  due  to  the  very  nature  of  experimentation  that  
we   cannot   know   in   advance   what   will   happen.   This   is   why   Deleuze   and  
Guattari   like   to   quote   Spinoza’s   famous   claim   that   “nobody   as   yet   has  
determined   the   limits   of   the   body's   capabilities:   that   is,   nobody   as   yet   has  
learned   from   experience   what   the   body   can   and   cannot   do.”625    
Experimentation  is  dangerous  and  always  proceeds  in  small  steps.  It  is  also  
the  case  that  experimentation  is  never  complete.  For  this  reason  the  BwO  is  
never  simply  attained,  but  is  always  a  limit  that  one  approaches.626  It  is  a  skill  
that   is   learned   through  practice,   and   in   context,   rather   than   in   theory.   You  
cannot   reach   the   BwO   “by   wildly   destratifying”   because   you   must   “keep  
enough  of  the  organism  for  it  to  reform  each  dawn.”627  What  this  means  is  that  
if  all  of  the  organizations  of  the  body  are  dismantled  simultaneously,  then  there  
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will  not  be  any  ground  on  which  to  base  the  reorganization  of  its  organs.  In  one  
of  the  most  telling  passages  of  the  book,  given  towards  the  end  of  the  plateau  
on  the  BwO,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  give  the  following  answer  to  the  question  
of  how  to  make  oneself  a  body  without  organs:  
  
“Lodge  yourself  on  a  stratum,  experiment  with  the  opportunities  it  offers,  find  
an  advantageous  place  on  it,  find  potential  movements  of  deterritorialization,  
possible  lines  of  flight,  experience  them,  produce  flow  conjunctions  here  and  
there,  try  out  continuums  of  intensities  segment  by  segment,  have  a  small  plot  
of  new  land  at  all  times.  It  is  through  a  meticulous  relation  with  the  strata  that  
one  succeeds  in  freeing  lines  of  flight,  causing  conjugated  flows  to  pass  and  
escape  and  bringing  forth  continuous  intensities  for  a  BwO.”628  
  
This  quote  brings  together  many  of  the  practical  points  we  have  just  explored.  
First,  the  process  always  proceeds  by  experimentation.  You  do  not  yet  know  
what  your  lines  of  flight  are,  or  what  your  possibilities  of  deterritorialization  are,  
so  it  will  take  some  trial  and  error  to  find  out.  Crucially,  throughout  this  process,  
you  must  also  keep  some  of  the  body  organized.  Without  a  small  area  to  come  
back  to  after  each  experimentation,  it  is  more  likely  that  the  experiments  will  
fail.  This  quote  is  also  useful  for  the  way  that  it  ties  together  some  of  the  themes  
we  have  already  explored  in  both  Anti-­Oedipus  and  A  Thousand  Plateaus.  Just  
as   it  was   the  schizoanalysts’   task   in  Anti-­Oedipus   to  seek  out  and   follow  a  
subject’s  lines  of  flight,  to  find  their  desiring  machines,  and  to  experiment  with  
their  possibilities,  here  one  makes  oneself  a  BwO  in  much  the  same  way.  This  
quote  is  also  useful  because  it  brings  back  some  of  the  terminology  that  was  
related  to  the  concept  of  the  refrain.  Specifically,  given  the  practical  case  of  
experimenting  with  the  BwO,  we  can  see  why  the  first  two  stages  of  the  refrain,  
in  which  an   inside   is  separated   from  the  outside  and  becomes  a  home,  are  
necessary  for  the  third  stage  of  the  refrain,  in  which  explorations  can  be  made  
into   the  outside.  What   remains  surprising   is   the   fact   that,  despite   the  many  
words  of  caution  in  the  text,  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight,  and  the  state  of  
absolute  deterritorialization  that  it  apparently  brings  about,  are  often  read  as  
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being  ultimately  desirable.629  This   is  especially  confusing  given   the   fact   that  
Deleuze   and  Guattari  make   it   explicit   that   remaining   “stratified—organized,  
signified,  subjected—  is  not   the  worst  that  can  happen.”   Instead,   they  claim  
that   “the  worst   that  can  happen   is   if   you   throw   the  strata   into  demented  or  
suicidal  collapse,  which  brings  them  back  down  on  us  heavier  than  ever.”630  
We  will   return   to   this  danger   in   the  next  chapter,  when  we  discuss  Deleuze  
and  Guattari’s  political  pragmatism.  However,  in  order  to  understand  the  ethics  
of  the  line  of  flight,  and  the  ethical  framework  of  the  whole  book,  it  is  important  
to  note  here  how  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  ethics  draws  on  the  work  of  Spinoza,  
and  to  a  lesser  extent  Nietzsche,  and  how  the  ethical  principles  that  it  develops  
are  distinct  from  a  morality.    
  
In  his  earlier  work,  Deleuze  had  paid  much  attention  to  the  distinction  between  
morality   and  ethics.631   Through   the  work   of  Spinoza,  Deleuze  had   found  a  
methodology  for  determining  what  is  ethically  good  or  bad,  without  any  need  
to  rely  on  an  additional  category  distinction  between  what  is  good  and  what  is  
evil.  For  Spinoza,  what  is  good  in  the  ethical  sense  for  any  specific  body  is  just  
that  which  increases  that  body’s  capacity  to  act.  If  two  bodies  interact  in  such  
a  way  that  they  increase  each  other’s  capacity  to  act,  then  the  interaction  is  
good  and  it  produces  the  positive  affect  of  joy.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  two  bodies  
interact  in  such  a  way  that  they  reduce  each  other’s  capacity  to  act  then  the  
interaction   is   ethically   bad   and  produces   the   affect   of   sadness.  These   two  
affects  are  ultimately  distinguished  on   the  basis  of   their  activity  or  passivity:  
that  which   is  good  and  produces   joy   is   active,  while   that  which   is   bad  and  
produces  sadness  is  passive.  What  is  good  and  what  is  bad,  according  to  this  
simple   schema,   is   not   determined   by   any   transcendent   moral   law,   but   is  
discovered  on  a  case-­by-­case  basis  depending  on  the  compatibility  of  bodies  
and  the  power  contained  in  them.  Consequently,  Deleuze  writes  of  Spinoza’s  
philosophy   that   in   it   there   is   “neither   Good   nor   Evil,   there   is   no   moral  
opposition,   but   there   is   an   ethical   difference.”632   The   question   of   how   to  
                                                                                                                
629  Holland,  2013,  56  
630  ATP  178  
631  “This  is  how  good  and  evil  are  born:  ethical  determination,  that  of  good  and  bad,  gives  way  
to  moral  judgement”  (NP  121-­122).  Also,  EP  255-­257.    
632  EP  261.  See  also  SPP  17-­30.  
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become  an  ethical  individual  now  becomes  something  very  distinct  from  any  
social   or   religious   obligations   to   follow   a   particular  moral   code.   Instead,   to  
become  ethical  requires  the  development  of  a  special  kind  of  knowledge  that  
will  be  able  to  understand  the  interaction  of  bodies,  that  will  be  able  to  explain  
what  causes  the  affects  of   joy  and  sadness,  and  ultimately  will  allow  for  the  
selection  of  those  interactions  that  will  bring  about  active  encounters.  Spinoza  
defines  this  kind  of  understanding  as  the  acquisition  of  “adequate  ideas”,  and  
distinguishes   it   from   those   ideas   that   remain   “inadequate”.633   While   a   full  
description  of  Spinoza’s  ethics   is  beyond   the   reach  of   this  chapter,  what   is  
most  important  here  is  the  thought  that  while  inadequate  ideas  only  relate  to  
effects,   adequate   ideas  enable  us   to   understand   causes.  Summarizing   this  
point   in   Spinoza,   Deleuze   writes   that   with   inadequate   ideas   “we   have  
knowledge  of  effects  only;;  or  to  put  it  differently,  we  know  only  properties  of  
things.   Only   adequate   ideas,   as   expressive,   give   us   knowledge   through  
causes,   or   through   a   thing's   essence.”634   Adding   in   clarification   that   an  
adequate  idea  “is  just  an  idea  that  expresses  its  cause.”635  What  is  important  
for  our  discussion,  and  what  is  carried  over  into  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  is  the  
idea  that  ethical  action  is  not  determined  by  any  pre-­given,  transcendent  law,  
and   that   to   act   ethically   one  must   attain   knowledge   of   the   kinds   of   affects  
produced  when  bodies   interact  so   that  positive  and   joyous  relations  can  be  
selected  over  those  that  produce  the  sad  passions.    
  
In  order  to  understand  the  ethical  implications  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight,  
as  it  appears  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  we  must  recognize  that  it  is  operating  
within  this  form  of  Spinozist  ethics.  Using  distinctly  Spinozist  terminology,  in  A  
Thousand  Plateaus  Deleuze  and  Guattari  give  the  following  response  to  the  
question  of  how  to  produce  an  Ethics:  “We  know  nothing  about  a  body  until  we  
know  what   it   can  do,   in  other  words,  what   its   affects   are,   how   they   can  or  
cannot  enter   into  composition  with  other  affects,  with   the  affects  of  another  
                                                                                                                
633  For  an  overview  of  the  relation  between  ideas  and  the  passions  see  LeBuffe’s  (2009,  188-­
233).   For   a   discussion   of   the   difference   between   adequate   and   inadequate   ideas   see  
McAllister  (2014).    
634  EP  133-­134  
635   EP   133.   For   Spinoza,   this   cause   will   be   God.   However,   following   more   closely   from  
Nietzsche’s  understanding  of  the  Will  to  Power  as  ultimate  cause,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  will  
take  desire  to  be  the  cause  in  need  of  expression.    
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body,  either  to  destroy  that  body  or  to  be  destroyed  by  it,  either  to  exchange  
actions  and  passions  with   it  or   to   join  with   it   in  composing  a  more  powerful  
body.”636  The  rhizomatic  model  of  thought  employed  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus  
is  selected  precisely  because  it  is  able  to  map  the  connections  that  produce  
bodies   and   determine   their   interactions.   While   the   arborescent   image   of  
thought   remains   at   the   level   of   effects,   seeing   only   subjects,   objects,   and  
predicates,   it   is   the   rhizomatic   image  of   thought   that   is   able   to   analyze   the  
forces   that  cause  these  effects   to  be  produced.   In  short,   it   is   the  rhizomatic  
model  of  thought  alone  that  can  provide  us  with  adequate  ideas.    
  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  make  such  a  connection  between  Spinoza’s  ethics  and  
their  concept  of  the  BwO  that  they  are  happy  to  ask:  “is  not  Spinoza's  Ethics  
the  great  book  of  the  BwO?”637  Given  this  Spinozist  context,  it  is  now  possible  
to  rephrase  the  question  posed  at  the  beginning  of  this  section:  Is  it  ethically  
positive   to   draw   lines   of   flight?   Do   lines   of   flight,   and   the   absolute  
deterritorialization   of   the   body   that   they   bring   about,   increase   that   body’s  
capacity   to   act?   This   is   not   a   straightforward   question   to   answer.   While  
deterritorialization  does  increase  the  capacities  of  the  body,  this  relies  on  the  
body  not  becoming  emptied  of   the   intensive  flows  that  cross   it.  As  we  have  
seen,  the  line  of  flight  can  lead  to  death,  which  inevitably  leads  to  a  decrease  
in  the  body’s  capacity  to  act.  It  seems  then  that  it  is  not  necessarily  ethically  
positive  to  draw  lines  of  flight.  However,  our  discussion  of  Spinoza’s  ethics  also  
allows  us  to  ask  different  kinds  of  questions  of  the  line  of  flight.  If  it  is  the  case  
that   the  distinction  between  what   is  good  and  what   is  bad   is  not  given  by  a  
transcendent   moral   law,   and   is   therefore   unknowable   except   by  
experimentation,  then  it  is  not  meaningful  to  ask  whether  lines  of  flight  will  be  
ethical  actions  in  all  cases.  It  is  more  reasonable  to  pose  the  question  from  the  
perspective  of  knowledge.  If  it  is  only  via  the  acquisition  of  adequate  ideas  that  
we  are  able  to  understand  causes,  and  if  it  is  only  through  an  understanding  
of  causes  that  ethical  actions  may  be  selected,  then  the  question  we  should  
ask  is:  does  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  help  us  to  attain  adequate  ideas?  
The  answer  to  this  question  is  much  more  positive.  As  primary  elements  of  any  
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assemblage,  lines  of  flight  are  necessary  components  of  the  vegetal  image  of  
thought.   Without   this   concept   at   hand,   we   are   unable   to   understand   the  
dynamics   that  condition   the   interaction  and  production  of  bodies.  While   the  
drawing  of  lines  of  flight  is  not  necessarily  ethical,  the  ability  to  map  the  various  
lines  of  flight  that  produce  our  bodies,  and  the  bodies  that  we  are  surrounded  
by,   is   certainly   a   necessary   conceptual   component   for   acquiring   adequate  
ideas.  After  providing  their  instructions  for  the  process  of  experimentation  that  
is  required  to  make  oneself  a  Body  without  Organs,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  claim  
that  if  you  follow  these  instructions  you  will  have  “constructed  your  own  little  
machine,  ready  when  needed  to  be  plugged  into  other  collective  machines.”638  
What  is  interesting  about  this  comment  is  that  it  is  forward-­looking.  Mapping  
the  lines  of  flight  that  surround  you,  and  exploring  the  deterritorializations  that  
pass  through  you,  may  not  bring  about  ethical  outcomes  in  and  of  themselves,  
but  this  process  provides  you  with  an  understanding  of  your  causes,  so  that  
you  will  be  able  to  proceed  by  selecting  those  connections  that  will  increase  
your  capacity  to  act.    
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i)  Introduction  
  
Following  the  analysis  of  the  conceptual  positioning  of  the  concept  of  the  line  
of  flight  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  in  this  chapter  I  will  turn  my  attention  to  the  
theory  of  political  economy  put  forward  in  the  text,  and  ask  what  role  the  newly  
defined  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  plays  in  this  analysis.  Ultimately,  I  will  show  
that   the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight   is   central   to   the   political   pragmatics   of  
experimentation  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  advocate  in  the  book,  but  first  I  will  
need  to  answer  some  general  questions  about  the  theory  of  political  dynamics  
that   this  pragmatism   is  based  on.   In   the   first  section  below,   I  will  show  how  
Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   new   theory   of   a   general   semiotics   of   content   and  
expression   challenges   structural   accounts   of   both   linguistics   and  
anthropology,  and  lays  out  a  novel  account  of  the  difference  between  historical  
forms  of  political  economy  in  terms  of  regimes  of  signs,  along  with  their  order-­
words  and  the  incorporeal  transformations  that  these  bring  about.  In  the  next  
section  I  will  give  an  account  of  the  four  different  regimes  of  signs  that  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  discuss  in  the  text  and  analyse  the  role  that  the  line  of  flight  plays  
in  each  of   these   four   regimes.  Third,   I  will   show  how   this  move   towards  an  
analysis  of  the  power  dynamics  of  regimes  of  signs  leads  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
first   to   a   reformulation   of   the   molar/molecular   dyad   and   then   on   to   a  
reconceptualization  of  their  political  analysis  as  a  practice  of  diagrammatics,  
or  machinic  analysis.  After  returning  to  the  role  that  the  concept  of  the  refrain  
plays   here,   and   after   making   some   brief   comments   on   the   way   in   which  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  draw  on  the  history  of  Institutional  Analysis  to  guide  their  
political  proclamations,  I  will  end  the  chapter  with  a  final  overview  in  which  I  
explain  where  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  fits  in  the  political  pragmatics  of  
A  Thousand  Plateaus.  By  the  end  of  this  chapter  we  should  therefore  have  not  
only  a  clear  understanding  of  how  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  functions,  but  
we  will  also  have  used  it  to  explore  the  practical  and  political  consequences  of  
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  major  work.  
  
ii)  Linguistic  Pragmatism  
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We   must   begin   here   by   asking   how   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   theory   of  
stratification  –  which  explains   the  difference  between  physical,  organic,  and  
linguistic  matter   as  a   difference   in   the  mode  of   stratification   of   content   into  
expression  –  impacts  on  their  understanding  of  the  different  forms  of  political  
economy   that   they   studied   in   Anti-­Oedipus.   If   it   is   the   case   that   physical,  
organic,   and   linguistic   matter   are   all   stratifications   on   the   same   plane   of  
consistency,  and  are  all  combined  in  assemblages  of  power,  then  we  should  
be  able  to  use  this  framework  to  explore  some  fundamental  political  questions.  
For   example,   how   does   the   arrangement   of   physical   land   and   physical  
apparatuses  of  production  relate  to  the  arrangement  of  the  organic  bodies  that  
it  supports?  How  does  an  arrangement  of  organic  bodies  relate  to  what  is  said,  
and   vice   versa?   How   do   each   of   these   interact   with   the   arrangement   of  
physical   matter?   First,   it   is   important   to   remember   that   these   three  
stratifications  are  not  organized  hierarchically.639  It  is  not  the  case  that  physical  
stratifications  lead  to  organic  and  then  alloplastic,  or  linguistic  stratification.  As  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  put  it:  “The  different  figures  of  content  and  expression  
are  not  stages.  There  is  no  biosphere  or  noosphere,  but  everywhere  the  same  
Mechanosphere.”640  Second,  we  must  remember  that  in  the  double  articulation  
of   translation   that   defines   the   alloplastic   strata,   content   and   expression  
become  detached  in  such  a  way  that  the  form  of  expression  of  the  alloplastic  
strata  can  take  the  form  of  content  of  any  other  strata  as  its  object.  What  this  
means  is  that  language  operates  by  overcoding  physical  and  organic  bodies  
and  rearranging  their  respective  forms  of  content.    
  
Because  of  this  power  of  overcoding,  it  is  only  linguistic  strata  that  can  properly  
be  said  to  have  signs.  However,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  argue  that  these  signs  
are   not   necessarily   “endowed   with   signifiance”.641   All   physical   and   organic  
matter  has  its  own  semiotic  form  of  expression  and  has  its  own  sense;;  what  
separates  linguistic  signs  from  the  other  strata  must  then  be  understood  not  in  
terms  of  what  they  mean,  but  in  what  they  can  do.  Taking  the  example  of  the  
way  that  children  learn  the  rules  of  language  in  primary  school,  Deleuze  and  
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Guattari  argue  that  the  “compulsory  education  machine  does  not  communicate  
information”,   but   instead   “imposes   upon   the   child   semiotic   coordinates  
possessing   all   of   the   dual   functions   of   grammar”,   including   the   ordering  
distinctions  between  “masculine-­feminine,  singular-­plural,  noun-­verb,  subject  
of  the  statement-­subject  of  enunciation”.642  Language  takes  the  form  of  orders  
given   by   the   teacher,   which   overcode   the   bodies   of   the   students   and  
subsequently  determine   the  set  of  possible  ways   that   they  can   interact  with  
physical  matter.  In  a  telling  comparison,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write  that  words  
are  not  tools,  but  that  “we  give  children  language,  pens,  and  notebooks  as  we  
give  workers  shovels  and  pickaxes.”643  Just  as  mining  tools  organize  the  body  
of  workers  to  provide  them  with  a  very  specific  horizon  of  possibility  for  acting,  
the   orders   of   the   teacher   organize   the   children   into   a  predetermined   set   of  
social  practices.  Following  this  practical  analysis  of  the  power  of  language  to  
overcode  bodies,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  argue  that  language  is  fundamentally  
illocutionary.  This  means   that   it  operates  not  by   the   representative   function  
assumed   in   theories   of   signification   or   communication,   but   by   performative  
acts,  such  as  those  of  promising,  ordering,  decreeing,  and  commanding.  The  
terminology  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  introduce  to  describe  these  processes  
include   both   ‘order-­words’   and   ‘incorporeal   transformations’.   In   short,  
language   operates   by   the   issuing   of   order-­words   which   overcode   an  
assemblage  via  the  double  articulation  of   translation,  which  brings  about  an  
incorporeal   transformation   in   the   semiotic   relations   of   the   assemblage,   and  
ultimately  determines  what  that  assemblage  can  do.  To  take  another  example,  
when  the  officiator  of  a  wedding  states  ‘I  now  pronounce  you  man  and  wife’  he  
or   she   brings   about   an   incorporeal   transformation   in   the   semiotic   relations  
between  the  couple.  The  statements  of  the  officiator  intervene  in  the  circulation  
of  order-­words,  such  that  the  couple  are  transformed  from  being  engaged  to  
being  married,  and  the  powers  open  to  them  are  also  transformed:  they  can  
adopt  a  child,  apply  for  a  joint  mortgage,  or  share  their  material  wealth  without  
the  intervention  of  state  taxation.    
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For   Deleuze   and   Guattari,   order-­words   are   not   simply   a   particular   set   of  
statements  given   in   the   imperative,  but   “the  relation  of  every  word  or  every  
statement  to  implicit  presuppositions.”644  What  this  statement  points  out  is  that  
incorporeal  transformations  rely  on  a  particular  arrangement  of  bodies  to  be  
effective.  In  the  example  above,  the  priest  can  only  bring  about  the  incorporeal  
transformation   of   the   wedding   given   a   set   of   underlying   material   relations  
defined  by  the  history  of  the  church.  Subsequently,  “the  meaning  and  syntax  
of  language  can  no  longer  be  defined  independently  of  the  speech  acts  they  
presuppose”,  and  because  of   this,   “pragmatics  becomes  the  presupposition  
behind  all  of  the  other  dimensions”  of  language.645  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  line  
of  argument  here  begins  with   their   theory  of  stratification,   it  moves   from  the  
overcoding  nature  of  language,  through  an  analysis  of  the  pragmatics  of  that  
overcoding,   to  a  definition  of   language  that  highlights   the  constantly  varying  
relations  between  a  set  of  order-­words  and   the  arrangement  of  bodies   that  
these  order-­words  take  for  granted.  They  write  that  “the  only  possible  definition  
of  language  is  the  set  of  all  order-­words,  implicit  presuppositions,  or  speech  
acts  current   in  a   language  at  a  given  moment.”646   It   is  with   this  definition   in  
mind  that  we  will  be  able  to  see  how  Deleuze  and  Guattari  rework  the  theory  
of  political  economy  that  they  first  articulated  in  Anti-­Oedipus.    
  
The  first   thing  we  notice  about  this  definition  of   language,  and  the   theory  of  
political   economy   that   it   accompanies,   is   that   both   are   distinctly   anti-­
structuralist.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  take  great  pains  to  emphasize  that  a  form  
of  content  “is  not  a  signified,  any  more  than  a  form  of  expression  is  a  signifier”  
and   that   this   is   true  “for  all  of   the  strata,   including   those  on  which   language  
plays   a   role.”647  What   this   means   is   that   the   relation   between   the   form   of  
expression  of  the  alloplastic  strata  and  the  form  of  content  of  the  other  strata  
that  it  overcodes  do  not  form  a  series  of  exclusive  disjunctions  that  determine  
one-­to-­one  relations  between  a  series  of  signifiers  and  a  series  of  signifieds.648  
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648   This   insight   follows   directly   from   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   arguments   in   Anti-­Oedipus  
concerning  the  inclusive  disjunctions  and  transversal  connections  made  between  the  elements  
of  the  code  of  the  unconscious.  
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Subsequently,  it  is  not  possible  to  give  an  account  of  the  political  relations  of  
a  society  simply  by  assuming  that  the  structural  relations  of  language  offer  a  
representation  of  these  interactions.  The  most  obvious  example  here  comes  
directly  from  Anti-­Oedipus:  while  the  despotic  overcoding  of  the  signifier  does  
in   fact   structure   desire   into   oedipal   relations   of   lack   and   castration,   this  
organization   is   contingent   on   the   material   forms   of   the   capitalist   mode   of  
production.  What  is  more,  desire  itself  always  finds  a  way  to  escape  this  form  
of  capture.  At  this  point  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  recast  
what   they   had   called   the   transcendental   illusions   that   accompany   the  
illegitimate  use  of  the  three  syntheses  of  the  unconscious  in  Anti-­Oedipus  as  
“the  illusion  constitutive  of  man”,  which  “derives  from  the  overcoding  immanent  
to  language  itself.”649  They  speak  here  of  the  “imperialist  pretentions  on  behalf  
of  language”,  which  derive  from  the  mistaken  assumption  by  which  we  jump  
directly   from  the   fact  that   the   linguistic  strata  can  overcode  any  of   the  other  
strata  to  the  conclusion  that  it  does  in  fact  overcode  all  of  the  strata.650  On  the  
contrary,  while  order-­words  may  intervene  in  any  state  of  affairs,  this  state  of  
affairs  must  necessarily  contain  physical  and  organic  articulations  of  matter  
that  remain  outside  of  the  linguistic  strata.      
  
Unlike  some  of  Guattari’s  claims   in  Psychoanalysis  and  Transversality,  and  
some  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  claims  in  Anti-­Oedipus,  what  marks  out  this  
theory  of  illocutionary  language  put  forward  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus  is  that  it  
no   longer  subjugates   linguistics   to  a  more  basic   realm  of   intensive  material  
processes.  In  previous  chapters   I  showed  how,  based  on  Guattari’s  Marxist  
reformulation  of  Lacanian  structuralism,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  had  begun  to  
map   the   distinction   between   the   machinic   and   intensive   process   of   the  
unconscious   and   the   linguistic   structure   of   conscious   thought   onto   the  
distinction  that  Marx  formulates  between  the  material  base  of  a  society  and  the  
legal  and  cultural  superstructure  to  which  it  gives  rise.651  However,  given  their  
new   analysis   of   the  way   in   which   order-­words   can   bring   about   incorporeal  
transformations  in  assemblages  composed  of  physical  and  organic  strata  as  
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651  See  the  second  chapter  of  this  thesis.  
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well  as  linguistic  ones,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  now  claim  not  only  that  “content  
and  expression  are  never  reducible  to  signified-­signifier”,  but  that  “neither  are  
they  reducible  to  base-­superstructure.”652  Crucially,  this  means  that  one  can  
“no  more  posit  a  primacy  of  content  as  the  determining  factor  than  a  primacy  
of  expression  as  a  signifying  system.”653  If  it  is  the  case  that  the  only  difference  
between   physical,   organic,   and   linguistic   matter   is   the   form   of   double  
articulation   by   which   content   relates   to   expression,   then   all   of   these  
articulations  share  the  same  plane  of  consistency.  This  means  that  linguistic  
expressions   are   not   simply   molar   statistical   aggregates   arising   from  
unconscious  molecular  processes.654  In  a  practical  sense,  what  this  means  is  
that  organizations  of  power  are  “in  no  way  located  within  a  State  apparatus  but  
rather  are  everywhere,  effecting  formalizations  of  content  and  expression,  the  
segments   of   which   they   intertwine.”655   At   the   point   of   writing  Anti-­Oedipus,  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  had  defined  each  of  the   three  major   forms  of  political  
economy   in   their   systematic   analysis   in   relation   to   the   State.   So-­called  
‘primitive’  societies  were  said   to  ward-­off   the  State  via  a  process  of  coding,  
‘despotic’  regimes  were  said  to  institute  the  State  via  process  of  overcoding,  
while   ‘capitalist’   societies   were   supposedly   defined   by   the   way   that   they  
constantly  decoded  and  recoded  social  strata  in  relation  to  the  power  of  the  
State.  Given  the  flat  plane  of  consistency  which  linguistic  strata  share  with  the  
physical  and  the  organic,  it  will  no  longer  be  possible  to  define  each  of  these  
modes  of  political  economy  purely  in  terms  of  their  relation  to  the  State,  neither  
will  it  be  possible  to  see  them  each  as  molar  products  of  underlying  molecular  
processes.    
  
According  to  the  theory  of  content  and  expression  put  forward  in  A  Thousand  
Plateaus,  each  form  of  political  economy  is  defined  not  simply  by  its  mode  of  
production,  nor  by  its  relation  to  the  State  (although  these  are  still   important  
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654  Deleuze  and  Guattari  explicitly  state  that  the  molar/molecular  distinction  only  corresponds  
to  the  expression/content  distinction  for  the  physical  articulation  of  induction.  In  the  case  of  the  
organic   articulation   of   transduction   or   the   alloplastic   articulation   of   translation   molar  
aggregates  may  be  taken  as  contents:  “The  double  articulation  sometimes  coincides  with  the  
molecular  and  the  molar,  and  sometimes  not”  (ATP  49).  
655  ATP  76  
   231  
factors),  but  by  the  relative  stability  of  a  particular  organization  of  order-­words.  
If  any  semiotic   field,  comprising   the   forms  of  expression  of  all  contents   in  a  
given   assemblage,   is   normally   composed   of   a   constant   variation   of   order-­
words   and   collective   assemblages   of   enunciation   then,   to   quote   from   A  
Thousand  Plateaus:  “To  the  extent  these  variables  enter  at  a  given  moment  
into  determinable  relations,  the  assemblages  combine  in  a  regime  of  signs.”656  
Each   regime  of   signs   then   is   simply   a   relative   stabilization   of   the   dynamic  
interplay  of  order-­words  in  a  given  situation.  As  Deleuze  and  Guattari  clarify:  
“We   call   any   specific   formalization   of   expression   a   regime   of   signs”,   and  
therefore  a  “regime  of  signs  constitutes  a  semiotic  system.”657  It  is  important  
to  note  here  that  a  regime  of  signs  is  not  simply  a  collection  of  words,  even  a  
collection  of  order-­words.   Instead,  a  regime  of  signs   is   “a  set  of  statements  
arising  in  a  social  field  considered  as  a  stratum.”658  According  to  the  theory  of  
the  double  articulation  of  content  and  expression,   the  physical,   the  organic,  
and   the  alloplastic  are  each  stratifications  on   the  plane  of  consistency.  The  
world  is  composed  of  physical  stratifications,  organic  stratifications,  and  social  
stratifications.  A  form  of  political  economy  is  nothing  other  than  a  form  of  social  
stratification,   namely   an   organisation   of   asymmetric   power   relations   in   a  
society.   Here   Deleuze   and   Guattari   draw   heavily   on   Foucault’s   work   in  
Discipline   and   Punish,   which   had   analysed   the   particular   relation   between  
content  and  expression  in  a  prison.659  As  Ronald  Bogue  notes,  it  is  Foucault’s  
work   that   “makes   evident   that   alloplastic   stratification   not   only   codes,  
territorialises,   controls,   restricts   and   rigidifies,   but   also   effectuates  
asymmetrical  power  relations.”660  It  is  these  asymmetrical  power  relations  that  
become  relatively  solidified  in  a  regime  of  signs,  and  it  is  these  asymmetrical  
power   relations   that   define   a   form   of   political   economy.   Each   of   these  
determinable  forms  is  not  defined  “in  the  last  instance”  by  either  its  content  or  
its   expression,   but   it   is   determined   by   the  way   in   which   a   regime   of   signs  
captures  the  relations  of  content  and  expression  in  a  regular  and  repeatable  
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system  of  relations.661  In  the  next  section  we  will  see  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
discuss  four  different  regimes  of  signs  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus.  Each  of  these  
regimes  will  have  its  own,  distinct  set  of  power  relations  and  will  also  have  its  
own  use  for  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight.    
  
iii)  The  four  regimes  and  their  lines  of  flight  
  
The   four   different   regimes  of   signs   that  Deleuze  and  Guattari   discuss   in  A  
Thousand   Plateaus   are   each   defined   by   their   respective   relations   to  
signification.  These  four  are,  the  presignifying  regime,  the  signifying  regime,  
the   countersignifying   regime,   and   the   postsignifying   regime.   This   list   is   not  
intended  to  be  exhaustive,  and  Deleuze  and  Guattari  explicitly  state  that  there  
are  undoubtedly  many  others.662  Given  the  fact  that  these  four  regimes  are  not  
supposed  to  correspond  with  a  historical  progression,  and  given   the  central  
importance   of   the   regime   of   signification,   it   will   be   easiest   to   begin   with   a  
characterization  of   this   regime.  The  signifying   regime  of  signs  refers   to  any  
case  in  which  there  is  a  despotic  takeover  of  all   linguistic  functioning  by  the  
role  of  the  signifier.  The  “simple  general  formula”  by  which  we  may  recognise  
the  signifying  regime  is  that  here,  “every  sign  refers  to  another  sign,  and  only  
to  another  sign,  ad  infinitum.”663  Signifying  regimes  of  signs  are  those  in  which  
there   is   a  master   signifier   of   excess   and   lack   and   in   which   all  meaning   is  
captured   by   a   constant   process   of   sliding   from   signifier   to   signifier   in   an  
enclosed  semiotic  field.    
  
What   Deleuze   and   Guattari   are   describing   here   is   quite   simply   structural  
linguistics,  and  they  make  this  clear  by  stating  that  signifying  regimes  of  signs  
relate   to   “the   situation   Levi-­Strauss   describes”   in   his   structuralist  
anthropology.664  By  describing  the  signifying  regime  of  signs  in  these  terms,  
Deleuze  and  Guattari   do   not   completely   jettison   structuralism,   but   give   it   a  
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662  The  plateau  in  which  the  regimes  are  discussed  is  titled  ‘On  Several  Regimes  of  Signs’.  
For  more  on  the  selection  of  the  four  regimes  see  Adkins  (2015,  83).    
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designated  and  delineated  space  within  a  much  larger  theory  of  semiotics.665  
Rather  than  being  an  absolute  condition  for  meaning,  the  signifying  regime  of  
signs  is  only  instantiated  in  situations  where  the  social  stratification  of  power  
is   despotic   or   imperialist.   Because   of   the   dynamics   of   signification,   in   the  
signifying   regime   “the   network   of   signs   is   infinitely   circular”   leading   to   a  
semiotics  based  on  a  “multiplicity  of  the  circles  or  chains”,  in  which  the  centre  
of   the   circle   becomes   an   always-­implicit   centre   of   power.666   According   to  
Deleuze  and  Guattari,  the  signifying  regime  upholds  this  circular  asymmetry  of  
power  relations  through  the  use  of  paranoia.  Because  of  the  constant  slippage  
of  the  signifier,  and  because  every  sign  will  always  refer  to  yet  another  sign,  
meaning   is   constantly   held   one   step   out   of   reach,   creating   a   situation   of  
generalised   anxiety.   In   brief,   a   signifying   regime   of   signs   can   be   found  
wherever  there  is  a  despotic  capture  of  all  semiotic  functions,  and  wherever  
this  despotism  operates  via  a  generalized  sense  of  paranoia.  
  
As  each  regime   is  nothing  other   than   the  semiotic  expression  of  a  concrete  
assemblage,  and  as  every  assemblage  is  partially  composed  of  lines  of  flight,  
we   can   ask   how   each   of   the   different   regimes   relates   to   its   lines   of   flight.    
Because   the   signifying   regime   is   a   form   of   capture,   in   which   all   semiotic  
functions  are  organised  in  concentric  circles  around  the  body  of  the  despot,  
lines  that  escape  this  circular  format  will  pose  a  great  danger  to  the  regime.  
Deleuze   and  Guattari   write   that   where   a   semiotic   system   is   signifying   “the  
system’s  line  of  flight  is  assigned  a  negative  value,  condemned  as  that  which  
exceeds   the  signifying  regime’s  power.”667  Put  simply,  when  social   relations  
are  all  defined  in  relation  to  a  despot,  any  social  connections  that  escape  the  
despotic   interior   and   connect   with   an   outside   pose   a   threat   to   the   ultimate  
power   of   the   ruler   and   will   therefore   be   deemed   intolerable.   Because   all  
movements   of   deterritorialization   and   reterritorialization   within   a   signifying  
regime  are  measured   in  relation   to   the  position  of   the  despot,  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  also  state  that  the  line  of  flight  in  signifying  regimes  is  a  relative  line.  
                                                                                                                
665  This  is  similar  to  the  move  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  make  in  Anti-­Oedipus  when  they  show  
how  signification  sits  alongside  a  number  of  other  processes  of  a-­signifying  semiotics  and  a-­
semiotic  encodings.    
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The  stock  example  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus  of  a  negative  and  relative  line  of  
flight   in   a   signifying   regime   of   signs   is   that   of   a   scapegoat.   A   scapegoat  
escapes  the  interiority  of  a  despotic  society,  but  only  relative  to  the  despot,  and  
this  escape  is  considered  a  negative  casting-­out,  not  a  positive  exploration  of  
the  outside.    
  
In  contrast  to  the  signifying  regime,  the  presignifying  regime  is  defined  as  the  
expression  of  a  social  stratification  that  actively  wards-­off  the  possibility  of  a  
despotic  and  signifying  regime  taking  hold.  In  presignifying  regimes  there  are  
multiple   forms   of   expression,   including   “corporeality,   gesturality,   rhythm,  
dance,  and  rite”,  which  “coexist  heterogeneously  with  the  vocal  form.”668  This  
pluralism,   or   polyvocality,   is   designed   to   prevent   the   power   takeover   by   a  
despotic   form   of   signification   that   would   reduce   all   expression   to   linguistic  
expression.  In  presignifying  regimes,  the  different  semiotic  orders,  or  different  
forms  of  expression,  are  actively  kept  separate  from  one  another  through  the  
use   of   ritual   and   tradition.   This   process   of   coding   the   different   forms   of  
expression  in  a  society  is  key  to  the  presignifying  regime.  Despite  the  fact  that  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  refer  to  this  regime  as  “primitive”,  they  are  keen  to  note  
that   it   does   not   operate   “by   ignorance,   repression,   or   foreclosure   of   the  
signifier”,  but  “is  animated  by  a  keen  presentiment  of  what  is  to  come”,  namely  
the  “already-­present  threat”  of  the  power  of  the  signifier.  One  of  the  ways  that  
the  presignifying   regime  wards-­off   the  possibility  of  despotism   is  by  making  
sure   that  chains  of  signification  can  come   to  an  end,   rather   than  becoming  
infinite  and  circular.669  As  a  result  of  this,  the  presignifying  regime  is  composed  
of   multiple   lines   of   decent   that   cross   one   another,   stop,   or   begin   again  
according   to   the   rites   of   social   life.   Due   to   the   different   forms   of   social  
stratification  that  the  signifying  and  presignifying  regimes  bring  about,  they  also  
have  different  relationships  with  their  respective  lines  of  flight.  Much  like  in  the  
signifying   regime,   lines   of   flight   that   escape   the   presignifying   regime   are  
deemed  negative,  because  they  threaten  the  coding  of  the  different  forms  of  
expression  that  serve  to  ward-­off  signification,  and  thus  threaten  the  collapse  
                                                                                                                
668  ATP  130  
669  Deleuze  and  Guattari  take  the  example  of  cannibalism,  in  which  the  name  that  defines  the  
line  of  decent  of  the  one  who  is  eaten  comes  to  an  end.  
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of   the   regime.   However,   unlike   in   signifying   regimes,   where   all  
deterritorialization  is  measured  relative  to  the  position  of  the  despot,  here  the  
line  of  flight  is  an  absolute  line.  What  this  means  is  that  the  escape  of  the  line  
is  not  an  escape  from  a  specified  centre,  but  an  escape  which  cuts  across  all  
the  multilinear  systems  of  polyvocality  used  to  ward  off  the  emergence  of  a  
centre.    
  
It  should  be  obvious  by   this  point   that   the  presentations  of   the  presignifying  
regime   and   the   signifying   regime   in   A   Thousand   Plateaus   are   basic  
reformulations  of  the  primitive  and  despotic  social  machines  that  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  discussed  in  Anti-­Oedipus.  The  only  real  difference  between  the  way  
that   these   societies  are   characterised  across   the   two  books   is   that   in  Anti-­
Oedipus  the  central  concern  was  the  material  apparatus  of  the  State,  and  the  
use  of  signifying  language  was  seen  as  a  secondary  effect  of  the  State  itself.  
Here,   on   the   other   hand,   Deleuze   and   Guattari   reverse   the   direction   of  
importance:  it  is  signification  itself  that  institutes  the  State  and  not  the  reverse.  
Following  the  schema  of  Anti-­Oedipus,  we  might  expect  there  to  be  only  one  
final  regime  of  signs  to  act  as  the  correlate  of  the  ‘civilized’  capitalist  form  of  
society  discussed  in  that  text.  However,  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  discuss  two  more  regimes  of  signs,  neither  of  which  correlate  directly  
with  capitalism.670  
  
The   first   of   these   is   the   countersignifying   regime   of   signs.   This   regime   is  
defined  by  its  use  of  a  mixed  semiotic  based  on  “arithmetic  and  numeration”.671  
While   numbers   are   used   in   the   signifying   regime   in   order   to   organise   the  
interior  space  of  the  State,  the  countersignifying  regime  is  based  on  the  use  of  
a   special   kind   of   number   that   Deleuze   and   Guattari   call   the   “numbering  
number.”672  What  makes  this  semiotic  specific  is  that  it  uses  number  to  mark  
                                                                                                                
670  While  Deleuze  and  Guattari  do  not  define  capitalism  as  a  particular  regime  of  signs,  they  
do  define  it  as  the  conjunction  of  three  different  strata,  two  of  which  correlate  with  the  signifying  
and  post-­signifying   regimes  of   signs.  The   third   is   the  organic  stratification  of   the   individual  
person.    
671  ATP  131  
672  ATP  131.  The  concept  of  the  numbering  number  comes  from  Aristotle  and  Deleuze  first  
uses  it  in  a  text  on  Bergson,  to  whom  he  credits  the  idea  that  “difference  itself  has  a  number,  
a  virtual  number,  a  numbering  number”  (DI  34).  Deleuze  and  Guattari  develop  this  concept  
further  in  the  twelfth  plateau,  ATP  429-­430.  
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“a   mobile   and   plural   distribution,   which   itself   determines   functions   and  
relations,  which  arrives  at  arrangements  rather  than  totals,  distributions  rather  
than  collections,  which  operates  more  by  breaks,   transitions,  migration,  and  
accumulation  than  by  combining  units.”673  It  will  be  easier  to  understand  what  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  aim  to  conceptualise  here  by  looking  at  the  form  of  social  
stratification  that  accompanies  the  countersignifying  regime.  In  contrast  to  the  
sedentary  nature  of  the  State  form  defined  by  the  signifying  regime,  the  social  
form  that  relates  to  the  countersignifying  regime  is  said  to  be  nomadic.674  The  
animal-­raising  nomads  of  the  steppe  are  said  to  use  numerical  signs  to  create  
an  open  and  distributed  space  that  is  in  constant  variation.  To  do  this  they  use  
numerical   signs   in   a   way   that   is   “not   produced   by   something   outside   the  
system   of   marking   it   institutes”.675   What   this   means   is   that   they   utilise   an  
ordinal,  and  not  a  cardinal,  number  system  in  order  to  define  the  space  that  
they   inhabit  as  a  continuous,   rather   than  a  discrete,  spatial  multiplicity.  The  
countersignifying   regime   is   therefore   the   expression   of   a   nomadic   form   of  
social   stratification,   defined   by   its   process   of   smoothing   space.   Under   this  
interpretation,  nomadism   is  not  defined  as  a  process  of  moving   through  an  
otherwise  fixed  space,  but  of  constructing  a  space  that  is  in  constant  variation.  
What   is   key   here,   is   the   recognition   that   this   activity   is   based   on   a  
countersignifying   semiotic,   in   which   signs   are   used   to   create   variable  
distributions  of  matter,  rather  than  to  represent  matter  in  a  fixed,  or  striated,  
space.    
  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  give  over  the  twelfth  plateau  to  a  detailed  description  of  
the  functioning  of  this  countersignifying,  nomadic  semiotic,  which  they  name  
nomadology.  They  are  particularly  interested  here  in  the  way  in  which  nomadic  
social  forms  utilise  their  lines  of  flight  to  expand  their  territories.  They  are  also  
interested   in   showing   what   happens   when   this   deterritorializing   activity   of  
nomadic  societies  comes  up  against  the  reterritorializing  effects  of  the  State.    
According   to   the  analysis  carried  out  here,  Deleuze  and  Guattari   claim   that  
                                                                                                                
673  ATP  131  
674  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  more  specific  than  this:  while  the  presignifying  regime  relates  to  
nomads  of  the  “hunter”  type,  the  countersignifying  regime  relates  to  nomads  of  the  “fearsome,  
warlike,  and  animal-­raising”  type.  ATP  131  
675  ATP  131  
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nomadic  societies  operate  by  assembling  their  many  lines  of  flight  into  special  
assemblages  known  as  ‘war  machines’.676  War  machines  do  not  necessarily  
have  war  as  their  object,  but  simply  operate  by  overcoming  spatial  boundaries  
and   creating   smooth   spaces   out   of   striated   space.   Only   when   these   war  
machines  come  up  against   the  stratifying  power  of   the  signifying   regime  of  
signs,  and  the  State  form  that  it  expresses,  do  they  take  war  as  their  object  
and  become  destructive.677  With  their  analysis  of  the  war  machine,  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  can  show  that  in  countersignifying  regimes  of  signs  lines  of  flight  
can  be  understood  as  positive,   in   the  sense  that   they  are  active   in  creating  
smooth   spaces,   but   that   they   can   become   relative   when   they   are   turned  
against  the  State,  or  are  appropriated  by  the  State.678  Summarising  the  role  
played  by   the   line  of  flight   in   the  countersignifying  regime  of  signs,  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  write  that  “the  imperial  despotic  line  of  flight  is  replaced  by  a  line  
of  abolition  that  turns  back  against  the  great  empires,  cuts  across  them  and  
destroys  them,  or  else  conquers  them  and  integrates  with  them  to  form  a  mixed  
semiotic.”679  In  this  sense,  it  is  not  only  that  countersignifying  regimes  utilise  
their  lines  of  flight  in  a  different  way,  but  that  they  are  specifically  defined  by  
their  uses  of  lines  of  flight.    
  
The  fourth  and  final   regime  of  signs  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  discuss   in  A  
Thousand  Plateaus  is  the  postsignifying  regime.  This  regime  of  signs  is  said  
to   operate   by   a   “passional   or   subjective”   semiotics   in   which   signs   operate  
primarily  via  processes  of  subjectification.680  The  postsignifying  regime  is  said  
to  arise  from  the  signifying  regime  in  the  following  way:  a  line  of  flight  escapes  
from   the   circular   signifying   semiotic,   however,   unlike   in   the   case   of   the  
scapegoat,  this  line  is  no  longer  taken  to  be  negative,  but  instead  “receives  a  
positive  sign”,  and  becomes  “occupied  and  followed  by  a  people  who  find  in  it  
their   reason   for   being   or   destiny.”681   The   most   salient   example   given   by  
                                                                                                                
676  This  term  is  borrowed  from  Kleist  (ATP  27).  
677  ATP  460  
678  Deleuze  and  Guattari  give  a  detailed  description  of  how  war  machines  are  co-­opted  by  the  
State  to  create  armies:  “What  we  call  a  military  institution,  or  army,  is  not  at  all  the  war  machine  
in  itself,  but  the  form  under  which  it  is  appropriated  by  the  State”  (ATP  461).  
679  ATP  131  
680  ATP  134  
681  ATP  134  
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Deleuze  and  Guattari   of   this   form  of   regime   is   the   story   of   the   birth   of   the  
Jewish  people.  Expelled   from  the  despotic  State   formation  of  Egypt,  Moses  
accepts  this  line  of  flight  as  his  destiny  and  follows  the  line  into  the  desert.682  
The  negative   line   is   transformed   into   a   positive   line   in   relation   to   a   people  
defined  by  their  passion.  Describing  the  way  that  this  acceptance  of  the  line  of  
flight   acts   as   a   form   of   subjectification,   Deleuze   and   Guattari   explain   the  
defining  experience  of  the  Jewish  people  in  the  following  way:  “It   is  we  who  
must  follow  the  most  deterritorialized  line,  the  line  of  the  scapegoat,  but  we  will  
change   its   sign,   we  will   turn   it   into   the   positive   line   of   our   subjectivity,   our  
Passion,  our  proceeding  or  grievance.”683  While  Deleuze  and  Guattari  claim  
that   the  social   stratification  of  postsignifying  regimes   is  defined  by  a   line  of  
flight,  this  line  is  said  to  be  segmented.  After  the  initial  break  from  the  signifying  
regime  is  affirmed  and  accepted  as  a  subjectifying  trait,  the  linear  proceeding  
taken   up   by   the   society   eventually   “runs   its   course,   at   which   point   a   new  
proceeding   begins.”684   Eventually,   the   postsignifying   regime   becomes   a  
regularly   segmented   line   of   flight   that   is   nothing   other   than   a   “linear   and  
temporal  succession  of  finite  proceedings.”685  In  the  case  of  the  history  of  the  
Jewish   people,   Deleuze   and   Guattari   note   that   the   two   stages   of   the  
destruction  of  the  Temple  form  the  first  two  segments  of  the  social  formation.686    
  
The  postsignifying  regime  of  signs  is  particularly  interesting  for  our  study  of  the  
role  of  the  line  of  flight  in  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  political  philosophy  because  
                                                                                                                
682   It   is   unclear   here   whether   societies   defined   by   the   postsignifying   regime   should   be  
considered   as   nomadic.   While   they   are   not   sedentary,   they   do   create   a   form   of   mobile  
interiority  which  preserves  the  power  of  the  State.  By  transporting  the  arc  through  the  desert,  
the  Jewish  people  maintained  their  covenant  with  God  and  thus  upheld  the  law  of  interiority  
which   gives   the   State   its   power.   It   would   therefore   be   more   accurate   to   conceptualise  
postsignifying  regimes  as  a  combination  of  the  forces  in  the  signifying  and  countersignifying  
regimes,  but  with  an  anti-­nomadic  intention.  Perhaps  the  best  way  to  explain  this  situation  is  
to   say   that   both   presignifying   and   countersignifying   regimes   of   signs   rely   on   multilinear  
systems,  while  both  signifying  and  postsignifying   regimes   rely  on  punctual   systems.  When  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  state  that  “[s]mooth  or  nomad  space  lies  between  two  striated  spaces:  
that   of   the   forest,   with   its   gravitational   verticals,   and   that   of   agriculture,   with   its   grids   and  
generalized   parallels”   (ATP   424),   the   latter   of   these   striations   can   be   understood   as   the  
farmland  of  the  signifying  regimes,  while  the  forests  can  be  understood  as  the  wilderness  of  
the  postsignifying  regimes.  
683  ATP  135  
684  ATP  133  
685  ATP  133  
686  The  title  of  the  fifth  plateau  contains  two  dates,  587  B.C.  and  70  A.D.,  which  refer  to  these  
two  incorporeal  transformations.    
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it  is  a  concrete  example  of  one  of  the  explicit  dangers  of  lines  of  flight.  While  
lines  of  flight  can  be  blocked  by  signifying  regimes  of  signs,  and  can  therefore  
fail  to  escape  at  all,  they  can  also  succeed  in  their  attempt  to  escape,  but  only  
to  fall  into  the  subsequent  danger  of  segmentation.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  refer  
to  the  first  danger  as  that  of  running  up  against  a  “white  wall”,  and  they  refer  
to  the  second  danger  as  that  of  being  sucked  into  a  “black  hole”.687  The  first  
danger   is   that  of  signification  and   relates   to   the   instantiation  of  a  signifying  
regime  of  signs,  while  the  second  danger  is  that  of  subjectification  and  relates  
to   the   instantiation   of   a   postsignifying   regime  of   signs.  One  of   the   clearest  
examples  given  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus  of  this  second  danger  is  that  of  the  
drug  addict.  While  drugs  can,   theoretically,  be  used  as  a   line  of   flight  along  
which  the  body  can  escape  the  despotic  organisation  to  which  it  is  continually  
subjected,   this  escape  becomes  segmented  and  ultimately  gets  sucked   into  
the  black  hole  of  addiction:   “the   line  of   flight…  of  drugs   is  constantly  being  
segmentarized  under  the  most  rigid  of  forms,  that  of  dependency,  the  hit  and  
the   dose,   the   dealer.”688   Contrary   to   what   we   might   have   expected,   the  
postsignifying   regime   of   signs   is   therefore   not   a   viable   alternative   to   the  
domination   of   the   signifying   regime  of   signs.  Both   have   their   own  dangers.  
Ultimately,  despite  the  fact  that  the  postsignifying  regime  of  signs  begins  with  
a   positive   affirmation  of   a   line   of   flight,   it   is  also   defined  by   the  way   that   it  
controls  this  line.  In  the  postsignifying  regime  the  line  of  flight  is  positive,  and  
even   considered   absolute   in   its   full   escape   from   signification,   and   yet   it   is  
constantly  segmented  and  therefore  sucked  into  the  black  hole  of  subjectivity.    
  
The  four  regimes  of  signs  discussed  here  are  given  as  examples  of  different  
ways   in   which   the   expression   of   a   linguistic,   or   alloplastic,   stratification   of  
                                                                                                                
687  These   two  dangers  are  explored   in  some  depth   in   the  Faciality  Plateau  (ATP  185).  The  
transformation  of  the  head  into  a  face,  and  therefore  the  transformation  of  the  body  into  a  point  
of  signification,  is  the  central  power  structure  that  upholds  the  signifying  regime  of  signs.  In  
signifying  regimes  of  signs   the   face   is  always  seen  from  the   front  as  a  flat  white  space  on  
which   all   signification   is   inscribed.   In   the   postsignifying   regime   “[f]aciality   undergoes   a  
profound   transformation”  because   “averted   faces,   in  profile,   replace   the   frontal   view  of   the  
radiant  face.”  It   is  this  “double  turning  away  that  draws  the  positive  line  of  flight”  (ATP  136).  
The  subsequent,  authoritarian  tendency  of  the  passional  and  subjective  line  of  flight  is  thus  
defined  not  by  the  surface  of  the  white  face,  but  by  the  black  hole  of  the  eye.  The  different  
forms  of  faciality  discussed  in  the  seventh  plateau  can  thus  be  read  as  the  ways  in  which  the  
signifying  and  postsignifying  regimes  interact.    
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matter  can   reformulate   the  contents  of   the  physical  and  organic  strata  with  
which  it  forms  a  concrete  assemblage.    As  each  of  these  regimes  is  nothing  
other  than  the  semiotic  expression  of  a  concrete  assemblage,  and  as  every  
assemblage  is,  by  definition,  partially  composed  of  lines  of  flight,  it  is  possible  
to   define   these   four   regimes   as   different   ways   in   which   lines   of   flight   are  
controlled.  In  both  presignifying  regimes  and  signifying  regimes,  lines  of  flight  
are  characterised  as  negative  and  are  systematically  blocked  because  of  the  
way  they  threaten  to  bring  down  the  whole  social  structure  of  which  they  are  a  
part.  In  the  case  of  presignifying  regimes,  this  occurs  when  a  line  of  flight  cuts  
across  the  different,  polyvocal  forms  of  expression  and  reduces  everything  to  
linguistic  signification.  In  the  case  of  signifying  regimes,  this  occurs  when  a  line  
of   flight  escapes   the  absolute  centre  and  connects  with  an  outside   that  can  
challenge  the  ultimate  power  of  the  despot.  With  countersignifying  regimes  of  
signs,  lines  of  flight  run  into  a  different  set  of  dangers.  They  are  arranged  into  
a  war  machine   that  deterritorializes   the   land,  but   this  machine  can  become  
appropriated  by  the  State,  whereupon  it  takes  war  as  its  object  and  becomes  
a   kind   of   death   machine.   Postsignifying   regimes   are   also   defined   by   their  
relation  to  a  line  of  flight,  which  in  this  instance  is  made  positive.  However,  as  
we  have  seen,  this  positive  line  is  prone  to  segmentation,  in  which  the  subject  
defined  by  the  line  is  sucked  into  a  black  hole  of  abolition.  In  the  next  section,  
we  will  see  how  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  positive  political  project  in  A  Thousand  
Plateaus  is  not  attached  to  any  of  these  four  regimes.  Instead,  via  an  analysis  
of   the   way   that   regimes   of   signs   can   interact   and   can   transform   into   one  
another,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  hope  to  find  a  way  of  freeing  lines  of  flight  that  
will  not  be  captured,  relativized,  or  segmented  by  any  of  these  four  regimes.    
  
iv)  Becoming  molecular  
  
After  having  completed  their  analysis  of  the  three  modes  of  double  articulation,  
and  after  having  completed  their  analysis  of  the  four  regimes  of  signs,  Deleuze  
and  Guattari   are   now   in   a   position   to   use   these   categories   to  describe   the  
contemporary   context   of   power   which   we   inhabit.   They   name   the   three  
“principle   strata   binding   human   beings”   as   “the   organism,   signifiance   and  
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interpretation,  and  subjectification  and  subjection.”689  The  first  of  these  relates  
to   the   specific   double   articulation  of   organic  matter   by  which   the   organs  of  
human  bodies  are  arranged  into  the  human  organism.  The  second  relates  to  
the  way  in  which  the  signifying  regime  of  signs  raises  the  signifier  to  the  level  
of  an  abstract  universal  and  arranges  all  linguistic  acts  in  a  circle  around  the  
face  of   the  despot.  The   third   relates   to   the  post-­signifying   regime  of   signs,  
which  makes  passional  subjects  of  us  all,  each  heading  towards  his  or  her  own  
black   hole.   Taken   together,   these   three   stratifications,   the   first   of   which   is  
organic  the  second  and  third  of  which  are  alloplastic,  “are  what  separates  us  
from   the  plane  of  consistency  and   the  abstract  machine,  where   there   is  no  
longer  any  regime  of  signs,  where  the  line  of  flight  effectuates  its  own  potential  
positivity   and  deterritorialization   its   absolute  power.”690  At   this   point   in   their  
work,  having  named  these  three  strata,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  shift  their  mode  
of  analysis.  The  methods   they  have  used  up  until   this  point  have  only  been  
able  to  name  these  strata,  but  if  we  want  to  understand  how  they  are  produced,  
and  how  we  may  be  able  to  escape  from  them,  we  will  need  to  begin  our  whole  
process  of  analysis  again,  from  a  different  perspective.  One  way  to  explain  the  
limitations  of  the  technique  used  so  far  would  be  to  say  that,  while  our  previous  
analysis  has  shown  the  ways  in  which  society  has  historically  tended  towards  
particular  planes  of  organization,  we  have  not  yet  analyzed  the  processes  of  
becoming  that  effectuated  these  tendencies.  Even  while  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
have  repeatedly  stated   that   regimes  of  signs  are  not  related   to  one  another  
historically,  and  even  while   they  have  maintained   that   regimes  of  signs  are  
never  completely  distinct  from  one  another,  the  analysis  up  to  this  point  has  
treated   these  regimes  as   if   they  were  historical  and  as   if   they  were  distinct.  
What   we   need   instead,   is   to   conduct   our   analysis   from   the   perspective   of  
becoming.    
  
Perhaps  the  clearest  way  to  distinguish  becoming  from  history  is  based  on  the  
observation  that  historical  thinking  is  a  way  of  relating  different  events  together  
and   ordering   them   in   a   series,   while   thinking   with   becoming   is   a   way   of  
explaining   the  production  of  events.  As  Deleuze  and  Guattari  put   it,   “history  
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can   think   only   in   terms  of   relationships   (between  A  and  B),  not   in   terms  of  
production   (from   A   to   x).”691   The   concept   of   becoming,   first   developed   by  
Deleuze  in  his  books  on  Nietzsche  and  on  Bergson,  attempts  to  grasp  the  kind  
of  movement  that  occurs  in  processes  of  change.  Rather  than  assuming  that  
becoming   is  somehow  secondary   to  being,  because   it  only  occurs  between  
one  being  and  another,  Deleuze  and  Guattari   take  becoming  to  be  primary,  
with  any  being  fulfilling  the  role  of  an  interruption  in  the  process  of  becoming.692  
At  the  end  of  the  fifth  plateau,  ‘On  Several  Regimes  of  Signs’,  Deleuze  and  
Guattari   lay  out  a  four-­stage  process  for  the  analysis  of  political  power.  The  
first  two  stages  of  which  take  a  historical  perspective,  whereas  the  latter  two  
take   the   perspective   of   becoming.   These   four   stages   are   the   generative,  
transformational,   diagrammatic,   and  machinic   components   of   any   analysis.  
The  generative  component  involves  a  practice  of  tracing,  specifically  it  is  the  
tracing  of  the  different  regimes  of  signs  in  a  concrete,  mixed  semiotic.  Deleuze  
and  Guattari’s  naming  of   the   four   different   regimes  of   signs   completed   this  
task.  The  transformational  component  traces  the  lines  of  flight  in  each  of  these  
regimes  of  signs   to  show  how  they  relate  to  one  another  and  how  they  can  
pass  into  one  another.  We  saw  this  in  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  analysis  of  the  
different   kinds   of   lines   of   flight   that   exist   in   each   regime  of   signs.   The   two  
components  of  analysis  that  we  have  not  yet  touched  on  are  the  diagrammatic  
and  the  machinic.  Because  each  regime  of  signs  only  exists  as  a  stratification  
of   matter   into   content,   expression,   substance   and   form,   the   diagrammatic  
component  of  analysis  goes  beyond  the  representation  of  regimes  of  signs  in  
their  particular  expressions,  to  the  continuums  of  intensity  and  the  tensors  that  
effectuate  these  stratifications.  These  continuums  of  intensity  and  tensors  on  
the  plane  of  consistency  are  said   to  diagram  the  abstract  machines.693  The  
fourth  and  final  stage  of  analysis  suggested  by  Deleuze  and  Guattari   is   the  
machinic   component   of   analysis.   The  machinic   component   consists   in   “the  
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692  Becoming  is  one  of  the  central  concepts  that  connects  Deleuze’s  earlier  work  to  his  work  
with  Guattari  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus.  See  Deleuze’s  essay  ‘Control  and  Becoming’  (N  169-­
174).  
693  For  a  full  description  of  the  role  of  tensors  and  flows  of  intensity  in  relation  to  diagrams,  see  
ATP  156.  Brent  Adkins  also  gives  a  clear  explication  of  this  stage  of  political  analysis  (Adkins,  
2015,  92).  
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study   of   the   assemblages   that   effectuate   abstract   machines.”694  What   this  
means  is  that  the  fourth  component  looks  at  how  abstract  machines  produce  
events.695  
  
In  a  moment,  I  will  turn  to  the  final  two  stages  of  this  four-­part  analysis  in  a  little  
more  detail,  and  explain  the  role  that  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  plays  here.  
However,   it  will  be  worth  pausing  briefly   to  clarify   two   things.  First,   that   the  
difference   between   the   historical   approach   of   the   first   two   stages   and   the  
approach   of   becoming   used   in   the   second   two   stages   is   aligned   with   the  
difference  between  the  molar  and  the  molecular  regimes  of  analysis  that  we  
explored  in  our  analysis  of  Anti-­Oedipus.  Second,  that  the  difference  between  
the  first  two  stages  and  the  second  two  stages  is  also  said  to  correspond  to  
the   distinction   between   the   quantitative   and   the   qualitative.   In   previous  
chapters,  we  saw  how  Deleuze  and  Guattari  argued   in  Anti-­Oedipus   that   is  
was  possible  to  analyze  political  formations  according  to  two  distinct  regimes.  
When   taken   from   the   perspective   of   its   molecular   elements,   any   political  
formation   is   made   up   of   ahistorical   flows   of   desire.   When   taken   from   the  
perspective   of   the   large   statistical   molar   aggregates   that   these   molecules  
compose,   the  same  political   formation   is  made  up  of  structures   that   form  a  
linear  history.696  In  A  Thousand  Plateaus  this  schema  is  made  more  complex  
by  the  introduction  of  the  theory  of  stratification.  While  the  distinction  between  
the  molecular  and  the  molar  only  aligns  with  the  distinction  between  content  
and   expression   in   the   case   of   the   double   articulation   of   the   induction   of  
physical  matter,  and  not   in   the  cases  of   the   transduction  and   translation  of  
organic   and   alloplastic   matter,   it   is   still   the   case   that   on   the   plane   of  
consistency,  on  which  each  of  these  stratifications  is  nothing  but  a  coagulation,  
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695  A  Thousand  Plateaus  can  be  read  as  a  movement  through  these  four  stages:  the  first  five  
plateaus  are  generational  because  they  trace  the  different  regimes  and  explain  how  they  are  
produced;;  plateaus  six,  seven,  and  eight  then  carry  out  the  transformational  component,  using  
the  BwO,  faciality,  and  the  three  lines  of  signification  to  show  how  regimes  of  signs  can  be  
transformed;;  plateaus  nine,  ten  and  eleven  then  move  to  the  diagrammatic  moment  and  use  
the  concepts  of  micropolitics,  becoming,  and  the  refrain  to  map  the  abstract  machines;;  finally,  
in   plateaus   twelve,   thirteen,   and   fourteen,   Deleuze   and   Guattari   complete   the  machinic  
analysis  by  looking  at  how  these  abstract  machines  are  effectuated  by  different  assemblages  
of  power,  namely  the  nomads  and  the  State.    
696  The  direction  of  the  flow  of  time  is  reversible  in  the  modelling  of  molecular  physics,  but  is  
unidirectional  in  the  modelling  of  thermodynamic  systems  at  a  molar  scale.    
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there  are  only  molecular  flows.  In  short,  the  plane  of  consistency  has  no  history  
and   thus   it   is   molecular,   while   each   of   the   three   stratifications   of   matter  
produces  a  history  and  is  therefore  connected  to  the  molar.  With  this  in  mind,  
we   can   also   see   the   movement   from   the   generational   and   transformative  
components  of  analysis  to  the  diagrammatic  and  machinic  components  as  a  
move  from  a  molar  to  a  molecular  analysis.  Finally,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  
clear  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus  that  the  molar  relates  to  what  is  qualitative,  what  
can  be  sensed,  while  the  molecular  relates  precisely  to  the  quantitative.  For  
this  reason,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  will  say  that  the  diagrammatic  and  machinic  
components  of  analysis  must  move  from  an  analysis  of  qualitative  elements  to  
their  underlying  “quanta”.697  Echoing  their  work  in  Anti-­Oedipus,  they  write  in  
A  Thousand  Plateaus:   “Beliefs   and   desires   are   the   basis   of   every   society,  
because  they  are  flows  and  as  such  are  "quantifiable";;  they  are  veritable  social  
Quantities,  whereas  sensations  are  qualitative  and  representations  are  simple  
resultants.”698  To  summarize  then,  we  can  say  that,  by  concentrating  on  the  
three  stratifications  of  matter  and  the  four  regimes  of  signs,  the  generational  
and  transformative  components  of  political  analysis  concentrated  too  much  on  
the   molar   aggregates   of   politics   and   their   historical   relationships.   The  
diagrammatic  and  machinic  components  of  analysis,  on   the  other  hand,  will  
make  the  shift  from  history  to  becoming,  will  find  the  molecular  flows  of  quanta  
below  the  qualitative  molar  aggregates,  and  will  enable  us  to  think  becoming.    
  
v)  Diagrammatics,  machinic  analysis,  and  micropolitics  
  
What  does  it  mean  to  say  that  after  we  have  analyzed  the  different  regimes  of  
signs,   and   after   we   have   looked   at   how   they   can   be   transformed   into   one  
another,  we  must  locate  their  abstract  machines?  As  we  have  just  seen,  what  
distinguishes   an   abstract   machine   from   the   regime   of   signs   is   that   for   an  
abstract  machine  there  is  no  distinction  between  content  and  expression  and  
no  distinction  between  form  and  substance.  What  then  can  we  say  about  an  
abstract   machine?   Deleuze   and   Guattari   state   that   an   abstract   machine  
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“operates  by  matter,  not  by  substance;;  by  function,  not  by  form.”699  What  this  
means  is  that  below  the  extended  representation  of  a  regime  of  signs,  or  even  
a   mixed   semiotic   of   multiple   regimes   of   signs,   it   is   possible   to   find   the  
intensities  that  produce  this  extension.  Crucially,  this  site  of  intensity  will  make  
no  distinction  between  bodies  and  words  and  is  therefore  both  proto-­material  
and  proto-­semiotic.  Because  the  abstract  machine  does  not  have  extensive  
parts,  it  is  not  possible  to  trace  its  outline,  however,  it  is  possible  to  diagram  
the  productive  capacities  of  its  intensities.  As  Ray  Brassier  notes,  the  process  
of  diagramming  is  a  “cognitive  operation  carried  out  with  a  view  to  effectuating  
certain  practical  imperatives  under  specific  material  constraints.”700  It  is  “akin  
to  engineering”  in  that  it  “lets  us  see  to  what  extent  a  line  of  flight  is  liberatory  
for  us.”701  What  this  looks  like  in  practice  is  a  shift  towards  abstraction.702  While  
regimes   of   signs   cannot   be   understood   as   completely   detached   from   the  
historical  context   in  which   they  are  effectuated,  abstract  machines  have  no  
relation  to  history  and  can  thus  be  understood  completely  in  the  abstract.    
  
In  order  to  make  this  stage  of  the  analysis  slightly  more  comprehensible,  let  us  
take  one  example.  We  saw  previously  that  any  regime  of  signs  is  defined  by  
its   order-­words.   However,   Deleuze   and  Guattari   will   also   say   that   the   only  
reason  we  have   for  studying   linguistics,  and   for  analyzing   the  circulation  of  
order-­words   is   “to   transform   the   compositions   of   order   into   components   of  
passage.”703  Because  any  assemblage  is  tetravalent,  each  order-­word  has  its  
own  degree  of  deterritorialization.  Each  word  has  a  “twofold  nature”  by  which  
it  can  either  order  or  pass.704  While   the  generational  analysis  of   regimes  of  
signs  picks  out  the  ordering  components  of  words  within  a  regime,  it   is  also  
possible   to   “push   the   order-­words   themselves   to   the   point   of  
deterritorialisation,  to  the  point  of  becoming  musical”705  and  to  find  the  “pass-­
words  beneath  order-­words.”706  What  this  means  is  that  regimes  of  signs  are  
                                                                                                                
699  ATP  156  
700  Brassier,  2018,  270  
701  Brassier,  2018,  270  
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not  overcome  simply  through  an  analysis  of  their  order  words.  They  are  also  
not  overcome  by  finding  ways  of  transforming  one  regime  of  signs  into  another.  
Instead,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  claim  that  we  must  act  “not  by  fleeing,  but  by  
making  flight  act  and  create”.707  We  must  not  only  look  at  the  ways  in  which  
lines  of  flight  are  blocked  in  regimes  of  signs,  we  must  also  not  only  look  at  the  
ways   that   lines  of   flight  are   relativized  or  segmented   in   the   transformations  
between  regimes.  Instead,  we  must  diagram  the  lines  of  flight  that  work  at  the  
level  of  the  abstract  machine,  we  must  intervene  here  and  experiment  with  the  
possibilities  for  creation  that  these  lines  contain.    
  
The  many  different  kinds  of  becoming  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  study   in  A  
Thousand  Plateaus,  such  as  the  becoming-­woman  and  the  becoming-­animal,  
are  simply  various  ways  of  diagramming  the  abstract  machines  that  effectuate  
the  regimes  of  signs  that  we  find  ourselves  within.  The  process  of  becoming-­
woman   is  not   the  same  as   the  activity  of  altering   the  relation  between  your  
extensive  parts  in  order  to  move  from  the  molar  formation  of  ‘man’  to  the  molar  
formation  of  ‘woman’.  Instead,  it  is  about  finding  the  molecular  and  intensive  
flows   that  escape   from   the  binary  gender  opposition   in  order   to  experiment  
with  new  possibilities  of  the  body  that  would  not  be  defined  by  their  relation  to  
the   universal   category   of   ‘man’.   Ultimately,   in   order   to   combat   the   three  
principal   strata   –   namely   those   of   the   organism,   signifiance,   and  
subjectification   –   Deleuze   and   Guattari   advocate   three   corresponding  
processes   of   becoming,   namely   becoming-­imperceptible,   becoming-­
indiscernible,   and   becoming-­impersonal.   The   process   of   becoming-­
imperceptible  is  a  technique  for  overcoming  the  primary  activity  of  the  organic  
mode  of  stratification,  which   is   the  constant   regulation  of   the   inside  and  the  
outside   via   processes   of   transduction.708   Becoming-­indiscernible   works   to  
undercut  the  signifying  regime  of  signs  by  detaching  signs  from  their  stratum  
and   making   them   escape   from   their   capture   by   the   face   of   the   despot.709  
Finally,   becoming-­impersonal   is   a   process   of   combatting   the   subjectifiying  
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708  The  example  given  is  the  camouflage  fish  and  its  capacity  to  “world”  with  its  environment  
(ATP  308-­309).  
709  The  example  given  is  the  Ostragoths,  those  barbarians  who  shifted  away  from  the  State  
towards  the  nomads  (ATP  245).  See  also  Adkins  (2015,  162).  
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capacities  of  the  postsignifying  regime  of  signs  through  the  dissolution  of  the  
subject  into  a  collective  assemblage  of  enunciation.  By  analyzing  “the  relation  
between  the  (anorganic)  imperceptible,  the  (asignifying)  indiscernible,  and  the  
(asubjective)  impersonal”,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  aim  to  equip  the  reader  of  A  
Thousand  Plateaus  with  the  tools  to  escape  from  the  three  principle  strata  that  
bind  the  contemporary  lives  of  humans.710  
  
This   diagrammatic   moment   of   abstraction   would,   however,   be   completely  
useless  for  any  political  analysis  if  it  was  not  accompanied  by  the  final  stage  
of  machinic  analysis.  While  the  diagrammatic  component  allows  us  to  reach  
the  molecular  flows  that  remain  uncaptured  by  the  strata,  there  would  be  no  
reason  to  find  these  flows  if  we  were  not  able  to  use  them  to  restructure  the  
molar  aggregates  that  we  inhabit:  “molecular  escapes  and  movements  would  
be  nothing   if   they  did  not   return  to   the  molar  organizations   to  reshuffle   their  
segments,   their  binary  distributions  of  sexes,  classes,  and  parties.”711   If   the  
first  two  components  of  analysis  allowed  us  to  analyze  the  molar  formations  of  
the  strata  that  bind  us,  and  if  the  third  component  allowed  us  to  diagram  the  
molecular  flows  of  the  abstract  machine  that  produces  such  molar  formations,  
then  the  fourth,  machinic  component  of  analysis  allows  us  to  “locate  a  ‘power  
center’  at  the  border  between  the  two”.712  This  power  center  is  defined  “by  the  
relative   adaptations   and   conversions   it   effects   between   the   line   and   the  
flow.”713   The   point   that   Deleuze   and   Guattari   are   making   here   is   that   the  
relationship  between  molecular   flows  and  molar  aggregates   is  not  a  natural  
relationship,  neither  is  it  one  of  representation.  The  molar  aggregates  on  the  
strata  need  to  be  extracted  from  the  molecular  flows  by  assemblages  of  power.  
The  two  examples  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  give  of  such  power  centers  are  
financial  capital  and  the  Church.  Each  of  these  institutions  of  power  manages  
the   formation   of   molar   aggregates   by   taking   up   the   task   of   “making   the  
segments   correspond   to   the   quanta,   of   adjusting   the   segments   to   the  
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quanta.”714   It   is   by   locating   these   power-­centers,   and   intervening   in   their  
operation,  that  it  will  be  possible  to  extract  different  molar  organizations  from  
the  many  potentialities  of  the  molecular  abstract  machines  that  underpin  them.    
  
According  to  their  analysis  of  such  power-­centers,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  state  
that  every  central  power  has  three  different  aspects  or  zones.  The  first  of  which  
is  its  “zone  of  power”,  or  its  ability  to  organize  a  “solid  rigid  line”,  the  second  of  
which  is  its  “zone  of  indiscernibility”  by  which  it  is  diffused  in  a  micropolitical  or  
molecular  context,  and   the   third   is   its   “zone  of   impotence”,  which  relates   to  
those   flows   and   quanta   that   it   cannot   “control   or   define”.715   We   have   to  
remember  here  that  these  power  centers,  including  the  institutions  of  financial  
capital  and  religion,  are  not  omnipotent  powers,  but  are  assemblages  of  power.  
Just  like  all  other  assemblages  they  are  defined  as  much  by  their  lines  of  flight  
as   by  what   they   capture.   The  purpose   of   the   fourth  moment   of   analysis   is  
therefore   to   experiment   with   these   power-­centers   to   find   their   zones   of  
impotence.  Each  of   these  zones  of   impotence  will  be  nothing  other   than  an  
“abstract  machine  of  mutation”  operating  within  the  power-­center,  where  it  has  
the  power  to  completely  alter  the  way  in  which  molar  segments  are  arranged  
out  of  molecular  flows.  With  this  conceptualization  of  analysis  in  mind,  we  can  
now  understand  the  political  analysis  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  conducted  in  
Anti-­Oedipus   in  new  terms.   In  Anti-­Oedipus,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  aimed  to  
show  how  the  power-­center  of  capitalism  is  made  up  of  different  zones,  one  of  
which  operates  by  a  process  of  decoding.  This  decoding  aspect  of  capital  is  
its  zone  of  impotence  which,  if  properly  utilized,  could  push  capitalism  beyond  
the  internal  limit  that  it  constantly  tries  to  push  outside  of  itself,  and  ultimately  
bring  about  a  post-­capitalist  future.  In  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  on  the  other  hand,  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  have  shifted  their  point  of  attack  away  from  capitalism  
towards  the  two  major  regimes  of  signs  that  define  and  constrict  contemporary  
life,  namely  the  signifying  and  the  postsignifying  regimes.  The  analyses  that  
Deleuze   and   Guattari   carry   out   in   plateau   twelve   and   plateau   thirteen,   of  
nomadism  and  of  apparatuses  of  capture  respectively,  can  be  read  precisely  
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as   attempts   to   find   the   zones   of   impotence   within   the   power-­centers   that  
produce  these  two  regimes.716  
  
It   is   important   to  recognize   the  changing  role   that   the  concept  of  the   line  of  
flight  plays  in  the  political  analysis  of  power-­centers.  While  it   is  true  that  the  
zones  of  impotence  in  each  power-­center  are  composed  of  lines  of  flight,  the  
concept  is  being  used  here  in  a  slightly  different  way  than  it  was  in  our  previous  
analysis  of  the  four  different  regimes  of  signs.  From  the  perspective  of  a  regime  
of  signs,  a  line  of  flight  can  never  be  anything  other  than  an  escape  and  can  
never   appear   as   anything  other   than  a   threat   from   the  outside,   even   if   the  
regime   operates   precisely   by   relativizing   or   by   segmenting   this   threat.   The  
reason   that   lines   of   flight   held   this   ephemeral   position   in   our   discussion   of  
regimes   of   signs   is   that   this   discussion   was   still   in   the   generative   and  
transformational  stages  of  analysis  and  was  still  treating  these  regimes  from  
the  position   of   the  molar   aggregates   that   they   form.   In  our  movement   to   a  
diagrammatic  and  machinic  analysis  of  abstract  machines,  on  the  other  hand,  
we  are  now  able  to  conceptualize  lines  of  flight  not  only  as  fleeting  escapes,  
but  as  integral  components  of  an  abstract  machine  of  consistency.    
  
Finally,  it  is  also  important  to  reiterate  that  this  analysis  does  not  simply  treat  
lines  of  flight  as  ethically  positive  or  as  politically  expedient.  Speaking  of  the  
different  kinds  of  lines  drawn  by  the  three  different  zones  of  the  power-­centers,  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  write:   “We  cannot  say  that  one  of   these  three   lines   is  
bad  and  another  good,  by  nature  and  necessarily.  The  study  of  the  dangers  of  
each   line   is   the   object   of   pragmatics   or   schizoanalysis.”717   In   the   previous  
chapter  we  saw  how  lines  of  flight  are  not  ethically  positive  in  themselves,  but  
that   the  rhizomatic  model  of   thought,  which  has  brought  us   to   this  machinic  
                                                                                                                
716  One  of  the  major  changes  that  accompanies  this  shift  towards  a  machinic  analysis  of  power-­
centres   is   a   recognition   that   the   language   of   the   ‘plane   of   consistency’   and   the   ‘plane   of  
organisation’   can   only   take   us   so   far.   In   their   analysis   of   abstract  machines,  Deleuze   and  
Guattari  will  see  that  these  were  only  “two  ways  of  conceptualizing  the  plane”  (ATP  292)  and  
that  the  difference  is  between  three  different  abstract  machines:  “There  are  different  types  of  
abstract   machines   that   overlap   in   their   operations   and   qualify   the   assemblages:   abstract  
machines  of  consistency,  singular  and  mutant,  with  multiplied  connections;;  abstract  machines  
of  stratification   that  surround  the  plane  of  consistency  with  another  plane;;  and  axiomatic  or  
overcoding  and  abstract  machines  that  perform  totalizations,  homogenizations,  conjunctions  
of  closure”  (ATP  566).  
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analysis  of  power  and  has  allowed  us  to  conceptualize  the  line  of  flight,  does  
have   its   own   ethical   value.   The   analysis   of   lines   of   flight   allows   us   to  
experiment  with  new  possible  assemblages  of  bodies  and  thus  to  increase  our  
potential   to   act,   this   experimentation   is   therefore   ethical   in   itself.   However,  
such  experimentation   is  accompanied  by   its  own  dangers.  Speaking  of   the  
different  dangers  that  accompany  the  three  different  kinds  of  lines  drawn  by  
the  three  zones  of  the  power-­centers,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  identify  the  most  
dangerous  possibility  with  the  line  of  flight,  which  they  say  is  like  “a  war  one  
risks  coming  back  from  defeated,  destroyed,  after  having  destroyed  everything  
one  could.”718  Unlike  with  the  other  dangers,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  careful  
to  give  a  clear  definition  of  this  danger,  which  is  associated  only  with  the  line  
of  flight.  They  define  this  danger  in  the  following  way:  “the  line  of  flight  crossing  
the  wall,  getting  out  of   the  black  holes,  but   instead  of  connecting  with  other  
lines  and  each  time  augmenting   its  valence,  turning   to  destruction,  abolition  
pure  and  simple,  the  passion  of  abolition.”719  In  the  next  section  of  this  chapter  
I  will  explore  exactly  what  this  danger  consists  in  and  will  also  explain  the  way  
in  which  A  Thousand  Plateaus  goes  beyond  Anti-­Oedipus  in  its  attempt  to  find  
a  pragmatic  solution  to  this  ultimate  danger.    
vi)  Abolition,  self-­conservation  and  the  creation  of  a  refrain  
  
The   danger   of   the   line   of   flight   “turning   to   destruction,   abolition   pure   and  
simple”  is  a  very  specific  kind  of  danger  and  it  will  be  useful  to  differentiate  it  
from  some  of  the  other  political  dangers  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  discuss.  720  
First,  it  is  important  to  note  that  this  danger  is  not  associated  with  any  of  the  
regimes  of  signs  that  we  have  previously  explored.  The  two  social  regimes  that  
stratify  us  to  the  highest  degree,  namely  the  signifying  and  the  post-­signifying,  
or  subjectifying  regimes,  each  have  their  own  dangers  associated  with  them:  
the   signifying   regime   threatens   the   line   of   flight   with   the   white   wall   of  
signification,  and  the  post-­signifying  regime  directs  the  line  of  flight  towards  a  
black  hole  of  subjectification.  However,  the  specific  danger  discussed  here  is  
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explicitly  differentiated   from  these  previous  problems.   In   this  case,  we  have  
“the  line  of  flight  crossing  the  wall,  getting  out  of  the  black  holes”,  only  to  turn  
to   its   own   destruction.721   Simply   put,   this   is   the   danger   of   the   line   of   flight  
detaching  itself  completely  from  all  of  the  regimes  of  signs,  losing  its  relation  
to  the  territorial  context  of  a  milieu,  and  resulting  in  the  dissolution  of  a  life.  In  
these   cases,   the   line   of   flight   does  not   reach   the  plane  of   consistency,  but  
simply  produces  an  undifferentiated  abyss.  As  Deleuze  and  Guattari  put  it  in  
relation  to  the  stratification  of  the  body:  “You  don't  reach  the  BwO,  and  its  plane  
of   consistency,   by  wildly   destratifying.”722   Similarly,   speaking   of   the  way   in  
which   the   line   of   flight   can   be   used   to   blow   apart   the   strata,   they   council  
restraint:  “And  how  necessary  caution  is,  the  art  of  dosages,  since  overdose  is  
a  danger.”723  It  is  important  to  note  here  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  ability  to  
distinguish  this  danger  relies  on  their  rhizomatic  model  of  thinking  and  on  the  
shift  that  we  have  witnessed  from  the  generative  and  transformative  aspects  
of   analysis   to   the   diagrammatic   and  machinic   aspects.   The  danger  of   pure  
abolition  is  not  faced  by  the  regimes  of  signs,  seen  from  the  perspective  of  a  
generative  or  transformative  analysis,  instead,  it  is  a  danger  recognized  by  the  
diagrammatic  and  machinic  analysis  of  the  abstract  machines  that  effectuate  
these  regimes  of  signs.  Because  of  this,  it  may  not  be  surprising  to  discover  
that   the   discussion   of   this   danger   only   appears   in   earnest   in  A   Thousand  
Plateaus.  In  Anti-­Oedipus,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write  that  the  “schizo  is  not  
revolutionary,  but  the  schizophrenic  process—in  terms  of  which  the  schizo  is  
merely   the   interruption,   or   the   continuation   in   the   void—is   the   potential   for  
revolution.”724   In   A   Thousand   Plateaus,   via   their   diagrammatic   analysis   of  
abstract  machines  of  power,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  now  able  to  assess  the  
specific   danger   of   the   schizo   in   abstract   terms.   In   A   Thousand   Plateaus,  
Deleuze   and   Guattari   speak   of   “the   paradox   of   those   emptied   and   dreary  
bodies”  who  had  “emptied  themselves  of  their  organs  instead  of  looking  for  the  
point  at  which  they  could  patiently  and  momentarily  dismantle  the  organization  
of  the  organs  we  call  the  organism.”725  This  is  what  happens  when  you  escape  
                                                                                                                
721  ATP  253  
722  ATP  178  
723  ATP  177  
724  AO  374  
725  ATP  178  
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too   fast,  you  do  not  reach  the  plane  of  consistency,  but  simply   the  plane  of  
pure  abolition.    
  
In  response  to  this  problem,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  offer  two  different  solutions,  
the  first  conservative  and  the  other  creative.  The  conservative  response  is  that  
in   the   destratification   of   the   organic   strata,   you  must   “keep   enough   of   the  
organism  for  it  to  reform  each  dawn”.726  The  same  caution  is  required  with  the  
two  strata  of   the  signifying  and  post-­signifying  regimes,  where  “you  have  to  
keep   small   supplies   of   signifiance   and   subjectification,   if   only   to   turn   them  
against   their   own   systems   when   the   circumstances   demand   it.”727   This  
comment  comes  in  direct  contrast  to  the  destructive  and  revolutionary  tone  of  
Anti-­Oedipus,  where  we  were  told  that  we  must  destroy  the  individuality  of  the  
subject  at  all  costs,  and  that  “when  engaged  in  this  task  no  activity  will  be  too  
malevolent”  because  schizoanalysis  works  by  “brutally  intervening  each  time  
the  subject  strikes  up  the  song  of  myth.”728  In  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  however,  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  have  changed  their  mind:  “Staying  stratified…  is  not  the  
worst  that  can  happen;;  the  worst  that  can  happen  is  if  you  throw  the  strata  into  
demented  or  suicidal  collapse.”729   It   is   important   to  note  here   that   this  shift  
towards  a  more  cautious  pragmatism,  in  relation  to  the  art  of  drawing  lines  of  
flight,   is   accompanied   by   a   positive   and   creative   response   as   well.   Quite  
simply,  the  positive  response  to  this  problem  is  the  creation  of  the  concept  of  
the  refrain.    
  
As  we  saw  previously,  the  concept  of  the  refrain  allows  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
to  explain  the  creation  of  territorial  assemblages,  and  it  is  these  assemblages  
that   allow   us   to   avoid   the   specific   danger   of   the   line   of   flight   “turning   to  
destruction,   abolition   pure   and   simple.”730   Neither   thought   nor   action   are  
possible  outside  of  a  territorial  assemblage,  which  provides  the  orientation,  or  
sense,  for  both  of  these  categories.731  The  construction  of  a  refrain  operates  
                                                                                                                
726  ATP  178  
727  ATP  178  
728  AO  345  
729  ATP  178  
730  ATP  253  
731  Deleuze  and  Guattari  do  not  directly  explore  the  relationship  between  the  line  of  flight,  the  
refrain,  and  sense  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus.  However,  they  give  a  very  considered  account  of  
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by  finding  resonances  in  chaos  and  using  them  to  define  an  inside,  or  a  plot  of  
land.  The  refrain  “jumps  from  chaos  to  the  beginnings  of  order  in  chaos”  and  
is  what  provides  consistency  to  the  plane  of  consistency.732  Via  the  repetition  
of   a   rhythmic   difference,   the   refrain   produces   an   inside,   from   which   it   is  
possible  to  experiment.  In  the  most  abstract  terms,  we  can  say  that  the  project  
of  A  Thousand  Plateaus  attempts   to  provide  us  with   the   tools   to  produce  a  
BwO  on  the  plane  of  consistency,  and  that  the  refrain  and  the  line  of  flight  are  
two  of  the  central  tools  in  such  an  endeavor.  In  one  of  the  most  prescriptive  
remarks  in  the  book,  which  I  quoted  at  the  end  of  the  previous  chapter,  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  give  a  summary  of  how  one  is  to  carry  out  such  a  task:  
  
“This  is  how  it  should  be  done:  Lodge  yourself  on  a  stratum,  experiment  with  
the   opportunities   it   offers,   find   an   advantageous   place   on   it,   find   potential  
movements   of   deterritorialization,   possible   lines   of   flight,   experience   them,  
produce   flow   conjunctions   here  and   there,   try   out   continuums  of   intensities  
segment  by  segment,  have  a  small  plot  of  new  land  at  all  times.  It  is  through  a  
meticulous  relation  with  the  strata  that  one  succeeds  in  freeing  lines  of  flight,  
causing  conjugated   flows  to  pass  and  escape  and  bringing   forth  continuous  
intensities  for  a  BwO.”733  
  
This   quotation   brings   together   some  of   the   central  aspects  of  Deleuze  and  
Guattari’s  political  program  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus.  It  makes  evident  that  fact  
that,   in   any   attempt   to   reach   the  BwO,   caution   is   required.  The  practice  of  
experimenting  with  lines  of  flight,  which  leads  to  the  production  of  a  BwO  on  
the  plane  of  consistency,  must  be  balanced  by  the  retention  of  a  residuum  of  
the  strata  and  the  production  of  a  territorial  assemblage,  by  way  of  a  refrain.  
Unfortunately,  this  prescription  is  given  in  purely  abstract  terms  and  it  is  difficult  
                                                                                                                
this   relationship   in  Kafka:   Towards   a   Minor   Literature.  Here,   in   an   attempt   to   outline   the  
difference  between  a  minor  and  a  major  literature,  but  using  terms  that  could  equally  well  be  
used  to  define  the  difference  between  a  subject-­group  and  a  subjugated-­group,  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  write  that  with  minor  literature:  “Of  sense  there  remains  only  enough  to  direct  the  lines  
of  escape”  (K  21).  Interestingly,  given  the  argument  that  I  make  in  the  next  section  for  the  role  
of  the  line  of  flight  plays  in  producing  subject-­groups,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  also  note  that  in  
these  cases  there  is  “no  longer  a  designation  of  something  by  means  of  a  proper  name”  but  
“the  thing  no  longer  forms  anything  but  a  sequence  of  intensive  states”  (K  21).  
732  ATP  343  
733  ATP  178  (my  italics)    
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to   know   what   such   a   practice   would   look   like   in   any   given,   concrete  
assemblage.   In  what   follows,   I  will   try   to   give   an   indication  of  what   such  a  
practice  would  look  like  in  concrete  terms,  by  situating  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  
comments  within  both  the  political  climate  in  which  the  book  was  published,  
and  the  working  context  of  Institutional  Psychotherapy.    
  
vii)  Institutional  Analysis,  and  the  art  of  drawing  lines  of  flight  
  
In  his  translator’s  introduction  to  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  Brian  Massumi  notes  
that  the  Capitalism  and  Schizophrenia  series  was  produced,  at   least  in  part,  
as  a  response  to  the  “disintegration  of  the  Left  into  dogmatic  ‘groupuscules’.”734  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  were  aware  that  such  an  “amoeba-­like  proliferation”  of  
different  schools  of  thought  was  politically  problematic  as  it  resulted  in  inactivity  
–   each   small,   leftist   cult  working   for   its   own  ends   like   a  group  of  miniature  
Stalinist   parties.735   The   need   to   produce   a   discourse   that   escaped   the  
dominant  regimes  of  signification  and  subjectification  was  palpable,  but  it  was  
also  the  case  that  these  escapes  were  not  enough  on  their  own  because  they  
had  no  way  of  dealing  with  the  danger  of  abolition  that  we  have  just  explored.  
Fleeing  from  the  State  and  fleeing  from  capitalism  is  one  thing,  but  producing  
a  creative,  productive,  and  collaborative  practice  outside  of  these  regimes  is  
another.736  In  Anti-­Oedipus  Deleuze  and  Guattari  had  put  forward  a  political  
programme   of   molecular   politics   that   would   connect   various   minoritarian  
struggles,  each  seen  as  a  line  of  flight  from  contemporary  capitalism,  without  
totalizing  them.  It  is  my  contention  that  the  concept  of  the  refrain  is  introduced  
in  A  Thousand  Plateaus  specifically  to  allow  for  the  possibility  of  constructing  
the  shared  territorial  assemblage  reuired  for  such  a  molecular  revolution.  The  
concept  of  the  refrain,  designed  to  combat  the  specific  danger  of  the  complete  
dissolution  of  the  ground  for  political  action,  is  therefore  not  only  an  abstract  
                                                                                                                
734  ATP  568  
735  ATP  568  
736  Another  way  to  describe  this  problem  is  in  relation  to  sense:  if  a  practice  becomes  totally  
detached  from  the  orienting  context  of  a  social  life,  then  there  is  no  longer  any  sense  to  that  
which  a  group  is  fighting  for.  The  dissolution  of  sense  could  otherwise  be  called  melancholy,  
or  postmodern  malaise,  a  regular  enemy  of  leftist  politics.  For  more  on  this  problem  as  it  relates  
to  the  French  context  in  the  second  half  of  the  20th  Century,  see  Mathy  (2011).  
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term   that   relates   to   the  diagrammatic   analyses  of   abstract  machines,   but  a  
heavily  politicized  concept.    
  
In   The   Machinic   Unconscious,   which   contains   many   of   Guattari’s   first  
experiments  with   concepts   that  would   later  become  central   to  A  Thousand  
Plateaus,  the  concept  of  the  refrain  is  provided  as  a  tool  for  political  cohesion.  
There  Guattari  argues   that   “[e]very   individual,  every  group,  every  nation”   is  
“‘equipped’  with  a  basic  range  of   incantatory  refrains.”737  These  refrains  are  
used  by  political  groups  to  “affirm  their  social  identity,  their  territory,  and  their  
internal  cohesion.”738  The  example  that  Guattari  takes  here  is  also  telling.  He  
writes  of  the  trade  corporations  of  ancient  Greece  who  “possessed  their  own  
kind  of  sonorous  seal,  a  short  melodic  formula  called  ‘nomos’.”739  This  passage  
is   particularly   interesting   because   it   allows   us   to   link   together   the   largely  
theoretical   project  of  A  Thousand  Plateaus  with  Guattari’s   practical  work   in  
Institutional   Psychotherapy   and   Institutional   Analysis.   To   summarize   this  
connection,   we   could   say   that   every   political   project   requires   a   refrain   to  
determine  the  cohesion  or  consistency  of  a  group.  In  the  specific  case  of  the  
anti-­capitalist  struggle  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  saw  their  work  as  a  part  of,  
this  refrain  should  take  the  form  of  a  nomos.  Such  a  nomos,  or  nomadic  refrain,  
is  a  like  a  “customary,  unwritten  law”  that  is  “inseparable  from  a  distribution  of  
space.”740   The   reason   that   the   use   of   a   nomadic   refrain   is   distinctly   anti-­
capitalist   is   explained  by  Guattari   in  The  Machinic  Unconscious.  He   claims  
there  that  capitalistic  societies  rely  on  the  “pure”  separation  and  specialisation  
of  different  activities  of  production  and  that  it  is  “the  heterogeneous,  mixed,  the  
fuzzy,  and  the  dissymmetrical”  that  challenge  this  purity.741  In  contrast  to  this,  
it  is  the  refrain  that  provides  “the  consistency  of  a  fuzzy  aggregate”.742  In  order  
to  combat   the   tendency   towards  abstraction  here,  and  to  bring  our  analysis  
back  to  a  concrete  political  situation,  it  will  be  useful  to  take  the  publication  of  
A  Thousand  Plateaus  as  an  example  of  a  political  act.  By  using  the  tools  of  
                                                                                                                
737  MU  107  
738  MU  107  
739  MU  107  
740  ATP  344  
741  MU  108  
742  ATP  420  
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Institutional  Analysis  to  examine  the  act  of  writing  and  publishing  this  book,  we  
will  be  able  to  see  what  it  might  mean  in  practice  to  draw  lines  of  flight,  and  we  
will  also  be  able  to  see  how  the  use  of  a  refrain  can  provide  the  consistency  
required  to  stop  these  lines  of  flight  “turning  to  destruction”  and  thus  leading  to  
the  death  of  any  budding  molecular  revolution.743  
  
In   the  second  chapter  of   this   thesis  we  saw  how   the  production  of  subject-­
groups  was  a  central  activity   in   the  work  of   Institutional  Psychotherapy   that  
Guattari  developed  at  La  Borde.  We  also  saw  how,  outside  of  the  psychiatric  
hospital,   Guattari   applied   the   same   process   of   subject-­group   formation   in  
political  contexts  through  the  discipline  of  Institutional  Analysis.  The  defining  
factor  of  a  subject-­group,  which  differentiated  it  from  a  subjugated-­group,  was  
that   its   consistency   was   produced   internally,   via   the   relation   between   its  
members,  rather  than  being  determined  by  a  shared  relation  with  an  external  
factor.  At  the  point  of  writing  Psychoanalysis  and  Transversality,  Guattari  was  
clear  that  subject-­groups  are  able  to  take  up  a  praxis  and  are  able  to  speak.  In  
his  preparatory  work  for  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  however,  Guattari  will  write  that  
it   is   the   refrain   that   produces   “the   collective   and   asignifying   subject   of   the  
enunciation.”744  What  this  means  is  that  it   is  the  resonance  produced  by  the  
repetition  of  a  rhythmic  difference  among  a  group  of  elements  that  creates  a  
group  and  allows  it  a  voice.  We  also  saw  in  our  previous  analysis  that  Guattari  
aimed  to  produce  the  conditions  for  such  a  group  by  increasing  the  “coefficient  
of  transversality”  among  its  members.745  By  drawing  a  transversal,  or  diagonal  
line  across  the  different  discourses  that  would  otherwise  stratify  a  group  into  a  
social  hierarchy,  Guattari  aimed  to  produce  a  shared  language  for  a  group  so  
that  they  could  work  towards  a  shared  goal.  What  I  want  to  suggest  here  is  
that,   armed  with   the   framework   of   Institutional  Analysis,   along  with   the   two  
concepts  of  the  line  of  flight  and  the  refrain,  it  is  possible  to  read  A  Thousand  
Plateaus  as  an  attempt  to  produce  a  subject-­group.  
  
                                                                                                                
743  ATP  253  
744  MU  107  
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A  Thousand  Plateaus  is  a  book  which  uses  “a  complex  technical  vocabulary  
drawn  from  a  wide  range  of  disciplines  in  the  sciences,  mathematics,  and  the  
humanities”  and  yet  Deleuze  suggests  that  one  should  read  it  “as  you  would  
listen  to  a  record.”746  The  apparent  oddity  of  trying  to  read  a  technical  book  as  
if  it  were  a  record  can  come  to  sound  very  reasonable  if  we  recognize  that  the  
different  plateaus  in  the  text  do  not  relate  to  one  another  like  the  chapters  of  a  
normal  book.  Instead  of  treating  each  chapter  of  the  book  as  an  argumentative  
step  that  builds  on  the  previous  chapters  and  is  governed  by  an  external  logic  
which  relates  them  all  together,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  make  it  clear  that  their  
book,  like  any  other,  is  “made  of  variously  formed  matters”,  such  that  there  are  
“lines   of   articulation   or   segmentarity,   strata  and   territories;;   but   also   lines   of  
flight.”747  What  Deleuze  and  Guattari  do  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus  is  threefold:  
first,  they  map  the  lines  of  flight  that  escape  from  any  number  of  discourses;;  
second,  through  the  repetition  of  differences  they  produce  a  refrain  that  puts  
each  of   these   lines   into   resonance  with   one  another;;   and   third,   they  make  
these  various  lines  of  flight  connect  to  form  a  transversal  line  that  cuts  across  
all  of  the  various  discourses  and  opens  the  possibility  of  the  formation  of  an  
interdisciplinary  subject-­group.  Let  us  quickly  take  each  of  these  three  steps  in  
turn.  Initially,  using  the  technique  of  tracing,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  carry  out  a  
generational  and  transformative  analysis  of  a  whole  range  of  different  regimes  
of  speech.  In  the  fields  of  biology,  art,  literature,  linguistics,  politics,  and  history,  
among  others,  Deleuze  and  Guattari   find   the  powers   that  are  escaping   the  
traditional  bounds  of  the  discourse.  Next,  in  order  to  avoid  the  possibility  that  
each   of   these   lines   of   flight   could   become   a   line   of   pure   abolition   and   do  
nothing  but  ‘turn  in  the  void’,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  shift  to  a  diagrammatic  and  
machinic   analysis   which   uses   a   technique   of   mapping.   Here   Deleuze   and  
Guattari  are  able  to  find  resonances  between  the  different  lines  of  flight.  From  
the  chaos  of  these  various  escapes,  a  refrain  provides  “the  beginnings  of  order  
in  chaos”  in  the  form  of  a  plane  of  consistency  on  which  the  different  lines  of  
flight  can  meet.748  Finally,  by  connecting  these  lines  of  flight  on  the  plane  of  
consistency,  a  transversal  line  is  produced  which  connects  biologists,  artists,  
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novelists,  linguists,  political  theorists,  and  historians  in  a  single  group.  These  
different  disciplinary  activities  are  no  longer  related  to  one  another  negatively,  
through   their   opposition   or   through   their   shared   relation   to   some   higher  
organizing  power.  Instead,  they  relate  to  one  another  via  an  internal  resonance  
and  take  on  the  consistency  of  a  subject-­group.749  
  
In  what  sense  can  it  be  said  that  this  is  a  political  activity?  To  see  how  this  is  
not  merely  an  intellectual  project,  but  a  practical  one,  it  is  enough  to  recognize  
that  the  difference  between  academic  disciplines  is  not  only  produced  by  their  
different  methodologies  or  their  different  subject  matters,  but  by  the  very  real  
fact  that  they  do  not  speak  the  same  language,  and  as  such  they  do  not  speak  
to   one   another.   This   is  manifested   practically   in   the   physical   separation   of  
schools.   This   is   true   for   different   academic   groupings   just   as   it   is   true   for  
different  political  groups:  despite  the  possibility  for  fruitful  collaboration,  groups  
are  stratified  by  the  different  languages  that  they  speak  and  therefore  cannot  
take   on   the   consistency   of   a   subject-­group.   In  Anti-­Oedipus,  Deleuze   and  
Guattari  speak  of  the  possibility  of  finding  an  “active  point  of  escape  where  the  
revolutionary  machine,   the   artistic  machine,   the   scientific  machine,   and   the  
(schizo)  analytic  machine  become  parts  and  pieces  of  one  another.”750  They  
state  here  that  by  putting  these  different  machines  in  contact  with  one  another  
it  will  be  possible  to  produce  a  “new  land”.751  In  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  Deleuze  
and  Guattari  attempt  to  fulfil  this  promise  via  the  dual  use  of  the  concept  of  the  
line  of  flight  and  the  concept  of  the  refrain.  First  we  must  map  the  lines  of  flight  
that  escape  each  of  these  domains,  then  we  must  use  the  refrain  to  create  a  
resonance  between  them.  The  ‘new  land’  that  is  produced  is  not  intended  to  
be  a  final,  utopian  resting  point,  but  is  precisely  the  “small  plot  of  land”  that  we  
are   told   to   hold   “at   all   times”,   in   order   to   continue   experimenting   without  
producing  a  complete  dissolution  of  the  self.752  
                                                                                                                
749  One  of  the  things  that  makes  A  Thousand  Plateaus  such  a  complex  book  is  that  it  is  both  
explains  the  process  by  which  philosophy  can  become  a  project  of  diagrammatics  that  works  
to   draw   transversal   lines   that   cut   across   different   domains   of   speech   and   simultaneously  
enacts   this  process.  For  most  of  this  chapter   I  have   focussed  on   the  way   in  which   the   text  
describes  this  possibility.  Here,  I  am  attempting  to  show  how  it  enacts  it.    
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Before   closing   this   chapter,   I  want   to  make  one   final   point   about   the   art   of  
drawing  lines  of  flight,  as  it  is  put  forward  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  in  relation  
to  the  way  that  the  concept  was  used  in  Anti-­Oedipus.  In  chapters  three  and  
four  of  this  thesis  I  argued  for  a  reading  of  Anti-­Oedipus  in  which  there  are  four  
distinct  uses  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight.  Of  these  four  uses,  the  first  two  
were  said  to  relate  to  an  analysis  of  desiring-­machines  and  the  latter  two  to  an  
analysis  of  social  machines.  The  four  senses  of  the  line  of  flight  were  given  as  
follows:   i)   Those   processes   of   desire   witnessed   by   the   psychoanalyst   that  
refuse  to  be  captured  by  Oedipus;;  ii)  The  lines  traced  by  the  legitimate  uses  of  
the   syntheses   of   the   unconscious,   namely   the   transverse   connections   and  
inclusive   disjunctions   between  heterogeneous   chains   of   code   that   form   the  
multiplicity  of  desiring-­production;;  iii)  The  decoded  social  flows  that  threaten  
primitive   and   despotic   regimes   of   power   as   an   external   limit   and   that   are  
internalised   by   capitalism;;   iv)   The   absolute   limit   of   capitalism   that   can   be  
reached  when  the  decoded  flows  released  by  capital  cannot  be  recaptured  and  
reterritorialized  by  it.  In  this  case,  the  first  and  third  uses  of  the  concept  of  the  
line   of   flight   both   focus   on   the   fact   that   these   lines   escape   from   a   given  
assemblage,  seen  from  a  molar  standpoint.  Whether  it  is  through  the  analysis  
of  an  individual  on  the  psychoanalyst’s  couch,  or  the  analysis  of  a  particular  
form  of  political  economy,  the  line  of  flight  is  seen  in  these  cases  as  something  
that  flees.  The  second  and  fourth  uses  of  the  line  of  flight  begin  from  a  different  
perspective.  Here,  through  an  analysis  of  the  molecular  flows  that  produce  any  
molar  aggregate,  the  lines  of  flight  are  seen  as  primary  and  as  integral  to  the  
constitution  of  the  assemblage  under  consideration.  The  uses  of  the  concept  
of  the  line  of  flight  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus  follow  a  similar  trajectory.  Deleuze  
and  Guattari   begin   by  mapping   the   lines  of   flight   that   escape   from  a  given  
assemblage.  In  the  cases  of  the  four  regimes  of  signs  under  consideration,  this  
mode  of  analysis  involves  finding  the  ways  in  which  each  regime  relates  to  that  
which  escapes  from  it.  Presignifying  regimes  treat  lines  of  flight  as  absolute  
and  negative,  and  continually  work  to  block  the  possibility  of  these  escapes.  
Signifying   regimes   take   their   lines   of   flight   to   be  negative,   but   relative,   and  
always  assess  the  danger  of  such  a  line  in  relation  to  the  body,  or  face,  of  the  
despot.   Countersignifying   regimes   use   their   lines   of   flight   to   build   a   war-­
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machine  that  is  positive,  but  still  taken  as  relative  in  relation  to  the  State  against  
which   such   a   machine   would   react.   Finally,   postsignifying   regimes   lodge  
themselves  directly  on  a  line  of  flight  that  is  positive  and  absolute,  but  proceed  
to  segment  that  line.  In  all  of  these  cases,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  begin  with  the  
molar  aggregates  of  the  regime  and  then  explore  the  lines  of  flight  that  escape  
them.  At  this  stage  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  analysis  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  
the  concept  of   the   line  of   flight   is  being  used  as   it  was   in   the   first  and   third  
sense  given  in  Anti-­Oedipus.  After  such  an  analysis  is  complete,  Deleuze  and  
Guattari  make  a  shift  towards  a  diagrammatic  mode  of  analysis  in  which  they  
aim  to  explore  the  abstract  machines  that  effectuate  these  regimes  of  signs.  
Here,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  find  that  “[f]rom  the  viewpoint  of  micropolitics,  a  
society  is  defined  by  its  lines  of  flight,  which  are  molecular.”753  This  is,  in  many  
ways,  equivalent  to  the  shift  from  the  molar  to  the  molecular  moments  of  their  
analysis   in  Anti-­Oedipus.  Here,  Deleuze  and  Guattari   discover   the   “lines   of  
flight  that  are  primary”  in  an  assemblage  and  constitute  its  “cutting  edges  of  
creation”.754  It  is  with  this  move  to  the  diagrammatic  and  machinic  analysis  of  
regimes  of  signs  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  able  to  bring  together  the  many  
lines  of  flight  they  have  previously  discovered  and  produce  a  refrain  that  puts  
them  into  contact  with  one  another.  In  this  way,  the  many  lines  of  flight  form  a  
transversal  line  that  cuts  across  the  different  plateaus  of  the  text  to  open  the  
possibility  of  a  new  and  revolutionary  mode  of  philosophical  analysis  taken  up  
by   an   interdisciplinary   subject-­group.   The   perspective   that   Deleuze   and  
Guattari  take  here  in  relation  to  the  line  of  flight  is  equivalent  to  the  second  and  
fourth  uses  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  as  it  appears  in  Anti-­Oedipus.  
The  fact   that  Deleuze  and  Guattari   take   these  different  perspectives  across  
different  sections  of  their  Capitalism  and  Schizophrenia  project  does  not  lead  
them   into   self-­contradiction   because   each   of   the   perspectives   is   taken   up  
within  a  broader  pragmatism.  The  molar  analysis  and  the  molecular  analysis  
are   both   required   if   we   are   to   think   the   possibility   of   change.   Following   a  
rhizomatic  model  of  thought  leads  us  through  a  number  of  stages  of  analysis  
which  are  related  to  one  another  pragmatically,  and  while  the  concept  of  the  
line  of  flight  is  utilized  in  a  different  way  at  each  of  these  stages,  it  retains  a  
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level  of  consistency  of  its  own,  and  is  a  key  element  that  links  each  stage  of  
this  pragmatism  to  the  next.    
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ii)  The  primacy  of  lines  of  flight  in  assemblages  of  desire  
iii)  One  or  many  lines  of  flight?  
     





The  purpose  of  this  thesis  has  been  to  explore  the  individuation  of  the  concept  
of  the  line  of  flight.  My  aim  has  been  to  show  the  philosophical  and  political  
dimensions  of  the  concept,  and  to  gain  an  understanding  of  the  role  it  plays  in  
Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   intellectual   work.   To   do   this,   I   have   followed   the  
development  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  through  a  selection  of  Deleuze  
and   Guattari’s   texts   and   have   mapped   out   the   connections   that   it   draws  
between  these  works.    
  
In  this  conclusion,  I  wish  to  supplement  this  study  in  two  ways.  First,  I  will  offer  
a  close  reading  of  a  long  footnote  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  add  to  a  section  
of   the   fifth   chapter   of  A  Thousand  Plateaus.   In   this   footnote,   Deleuze   and  
Guattari   give   a   concise   overview   of   their   own   philosophical   position   by  
comparing  and  contrasting  it  with  the  work  of  Foucault.  Here  they  differentiate  
themselves  from  Foucault  on  two  points,  namely  that  in  place  of  “power”  they  
understand   assemblages   as   being   composed   of   “desire”,   and   that   where  
Foucault  sees  “resistance  or  counterattack  in  an  assemblage”  they  see  “lines  
of  flight  that  are  primary”.755  An  analysis  of  this  footnote  will  help  us  to  clarify  
the  precise  role  that  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  plays  in  the  Capitalism  and  
Schizophrenia  series,  and  will  show  how  the  concept  responds   to  problems  
that   both   Deleuze   and   Guattari   had   been   addressing   before   their  
collaborations.  For  these  reasons,  this  footnote  will  be  taken  as  a  useful  point  
at  which  to  end  the  substantive  work  included  in  this  study.    
  
This  thesis  attempts  to  map  the  individuation  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight:  
It  recognizes  that  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  is  not  the  individual  result,  or  
final  product,  of  a  process  of  individuation,  but  a  process  in  itself.  As  such,  the  
task   of   mapping   the   individuation   of   a   concept   can   never   be   complete.  
Therefore,  in  the  final  section  of  this  conclusion,  I  will  offer  an  analysis  of  those  
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fields  of  individuation  which  I  have  not  been  able  to  study  in  any  depth  in  this  
project.  Specifically,  I  will  offer  some  brief  comments  on  the  use  of  the  concept  
in   Kafka:   Towards   a   Minor   Literature   and   on   its   further   use   in   What   is  
Philosophy?   I   hope   that   this   section   will   serve   the   dual   purpose   of  
contextualizing   the  work   that   has   been   completed   in   this   thesis,  while   also  
pointing  to  possible  directions  for  further  research.    
  
ii)  The  primacy  of  lines  of  flight  in  assemblages  of  desire  
  
In  the  fifth  chapter  of  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  clearly  state  
that  every  assemblage  has  two  sides,  one  composed  of  “forms  of  expression  
or  regimes  of  signs  (semiotic  systems)”  and  the  other  composed  of  “forms  of  
content  or   regimes  of  bodies   (physical  systems)”.  They  also  state  here   that  
these  two  sides  of  an  assemblage  are  “in  reciprocal  presupposition”  and  that  
there  must  be  “something  in  the  assemblage  itself  that  is  still  more  profound  
than  these  sides  and  can  account  for  both”.756  As  we  have  already  seen,  the  
profound  element  which  carries  out  this  task  is  what  Deleuze  and  Guattari  call  
an   “abstract  machine”.757  As   I  noted   in   the   ‘Becoming  molecular’   section  of  
Chapter   6   of   this   thesis,   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   shift   at   this   point   of   A  
Thousand  Plateaus  from  an  analysis  of  regimes  of  signs  and  regimes  of  bodies  
to   an   analysis   of   the   abstract  machines   that   relate   them.   According   to   the  
schema  they  set  up  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  this  is  a  move  from  a  generative  
and  transformational  form  of  analysis  to  a  diagrammatic  and  machinic  form  of  
analysis.  Going  back   to   the  distinction   first  made  by  Guattari  when  he  read  
Difference  and  Repetition  and  Logic  of  Sense  –  discussed  in  the  ‘Machine  and  
structure’  section  of  Chapter  2  of  this  thesis  –  we  could  say  that  this  is  a  shift  
from  an  analysis   of   the  structural   relations   of   expression  and   the  structural  
relations  of   bodies,   to   the  machinic   forces   that   can  offer   an  account   of   the  
genesis  of  both  of  these  structures.  The  reason  I  have  returned  to  a  discussion  
of  these  themes  here  is  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  add  a  fascinating  footnote  
to  this  section  in  which  they  claim  that  Foucault’s  work  goes  through  a  similar  
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series  of  stages.  Specifically,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  claim  that  Foucault   first  
distinguishes   between   contents   and   expressions   within   social   formations  
before  moving  on  to  a  diagrammatic  and  a  machinic  analysis  of  the  articulation  
of  these  two  multiplicities  in  his  bio-­political  work.758    The  relevant  section  of  
the  footnote  in  question  reads  as  follows:    
“Michel  Foucault  has  developed,  in  successive  levels,  a  theory  of  statements  
addressing   all   of   these   problems.   (1)   In  The   Archaeology   of   Knowledge…  
Foucault   distinguishes   two   kinds   of   "multiplicities,"   of   content   and   of  
expression,   which   are   not   reducible   to   relations   of   correspondence   or  
causality,  but  are  in  reciprocal  presupposition.  (2)  In  Discipline  and  Punish…  
he   looks   for   an   agency   capable   of   accounting   for   the   two   imbricated,  
heterogeneous  forms,  and  finds  it  in  assemblages  of  power,  or  micropowers.  
(3)  But  these  collective  assemblages  (school,  army,  factory,  hospital,  prison,  
etc.)  are  only  degrees  or  singularities   in  an  abstract  "diagram,"  which   for   its  
part  has  only  matter  and  function  (the  unspecified  multiplicity  of  human  beings  
to   be   controlled).   (4)  The  History   of   Sexuality.   Vol.   l.  …   takes   yet   another  
direction  since  assemblages  are  no   longer  related   to  and  contrasted  with  a  
diagram,  but  rather  to  a  "biopolitics  of  population"  as  an  abstract  machine.”759  
There  is  not  enough  space  in  this  conclusion  to  discuss  whether  or  not  Deleuze  
and  Guattari’s  brief  summary  of  Foucault’s  complex  academic  development  
captures  something  substantial.760  The  reason  I  have  turned  to  this  footnote  
here   is   that   Deleuze   and   Guattari   go   on   to   differentiate   themselves   from  
                                                                                                                
758  Deleuze  will  reiterate  this  claim  in  his  book  on  Foucault,  in  which  the  three  sections  
contained  under  the  general  header  of  ‘Topology’  fulfil  the  same  roles  as  the  three  stages  
noted  here,  namely  ‘Strata  or  Historical  Formations’,  ‘Strategies  or  the  Non-­stratified’,  and  
‘Foldings,  or  the  Inside  of  Thought’  (F  39-­100).  
759  ATP  585  
760  For  a  more  comprehensive  analysis  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  characterization  of  
Foucault,  see  Dan  W  Smith’s  article  on  the  topic  (Smith,  2016).  Smith  broadly  agrees  with  
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  characterisation  and  argues  that  Foucault  is  faced  with  the  problem  
of  the  primacy  of  resistance  because  “he  begins  with  the  question  of  knowledge”  and  only  
latterly  comes  to  analyse  resistance  (2016,  278).  According  to  Smith’s  argument,  Foucault  
attempts  to  solve  this  problem  by  developing  an  “active  type  of  resistance”  that  occurs  when  
power  is  directed  “not  against  another  exercise  of  power,  but  against  itself”  (2016,  268),  
while  Deleuze  does  not  have  this  problem  because  “[r]esistance,  in  a  sense,  is  built  into  
Deleuze's  ontology”  (2016,  278).  
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Foucault  on  two  distinct  points.  The  second  section  of  the  footnote  in  question  
reads  as  follows:  
“Our  only  points  of  disagreement  with  Foucault  are  the  following:  (1)  to  us  the  
assemblages   seem   fundamentally   to   be   assemblages   not   of   power   but   of  
desire   (desire   is   always   assembled),   and   power   seems   to   be   a   stratified  
dimension  of  the  assemblage;;  (2)  the  diagram  and  abstract  machine  have  lines  
of   flight   that   are   primary,   which   are   not   phenomena   of   resistance   or  
counterattack   in   an   assemblage,   but   cutting   edges   of   creation   and  
deterritorialization.”761  
Let  us  take  each  of  these  two  points  of  disagreement  in  turn.  To  begin  with,  
we   might   think   that   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   claim   that   assemblages   are  
composed  of  desire  and  not  of  power  is  simply  a  reiteration  of  one  of  the  central  
conclusions  of  Anti-­Oedipus,  namely  that  the  necessary  precondition  for  the  
genesis   of   our   social   reality   is   the   multiplicity   of   desiring-­production.   I  
discussed  this  argument  in  the  section  of  Chapter  3  of  this  thesis  titled  ‘Positive  
psychoanalytic   task:   Defining   desiring-­production’   and   in   the   section   of  
Chapter  4  titled  ‘Molecular  processes  and  molar  histories’.  However,  Deleuze  
and  Guattari’s  additional  comment  that  assemblages  cannot  be  composed  of  
power   alone   because   “power   seems   to   be   a   stratified   dimension   of   the  
assemblage”   can   help   us   to   add   some   complexity   to   this   account.762   In  A  
Thousand  Plateaus  Deleuze  and  Guattari  explore  three  different  stratifications  
of  matter,  namely  the  physical,  the  organic,  and  the  alloplastic,  where  the  first  
of  these  is  a  result  of   induction,  the  second  of  transduction,  and  the  third  of  
translation.   These   three   stratifications   were   discussed   in   the   section   titled  
‘Content,   expression,   and   stratification’   in   Chapter   5   of   this   thesis.   When  
Deleuze   and  Guattari   claim   that   power   is   only   a   stratified   dimension   of   an  
assemblage  essentially  composed  of  desire,  they  seem  to  be  suggesting  that  
power  –  understood  in  the  Foucauldian  sense  of  the  knowledge-­power  which  
pervades  all  social  and  political  relations  –  is  only  operative  on  the  alloplastic  
                                                                                                                
761  ATP  585.  The  second  point  of  differentiation  given  here  reiterates  an  argument  Deleuze  
had  previously  included  in  a  letter  he  sent  to  Foucault  in  1977  which  aimed  to  distinguish  his  
own  concept  of  desire  from  Foucault’s  concept  of  pleasure  (Deleuze,  1997).  
762  Deleuze  and  Guattari  do  discuss  “very  specific  assemblages  of  power”  that  connect  
regimes  of  signs,  however  these  are  only  one  kind  of  assemblage  (ATP  200).    
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strata.763  While  power  relations  on  this  stratum  will  inevitably  interact  with  the  
physical  and  organic  contents  and  expressions  of  the  other  strata,  the  genesis  
of  physical  and  organic  assemblages  cannot  be  understood  in  terms  of  power  
alone.  For  this  reason,  assemblages  must  be  composed  not  of  power,  but  of  
desire,   understood   as   an   abstract   and   machinic   collective   drive.   Desire   is  
therefore   the   more   general   term,   while   power   only   concerns   particular  
articulations   of  desire.   To  put   this   another  way,  we   can   say   that   discursive  
power  relations  rely  on   the  operation  of   translation.  Translation,   in   turn,  can  
only   operate   on   the   alloplastic,   or   linguistic,   strata,   where,   the   “form   of  
expression  is  independent  of  substance”.764  The  central  claim  in  Deleuze  and  
Guattari’s  first  point  of  disagreement  with  Foucault  therefore  seems  to  be  that,  
because  they  see  assemblages  as  being  composed  of  desire,  rather  than  of  
power,   they   are   able   to   provide  an  account  of   the   genesis   of   physical   and  
organic  systems,  as  well  as  socio-­political  ones.765  
The   second   point   of   disagreement   that   Deleuze   and   Guattari   bring   up  
concerns   lines   of   flight.   Here   they   contrast   Foucault’s   understanding   of  
resistance  with  their  concept  of  the  line  of  flight.  For  Foucault,  resistance  is  a  
necessary   corollary   of   power.   In   his  History   of   Sexuality,   Vol   1,   he   writes:  
“Where   there   is  power,   there   is   resistance”,  adding   that  power  relationships  
depend   on   a   “multiplicity   of   points   of   resistance:   these   play   the   role   of  
adversary,   target,   support,   or   handle   in   power   relations.   These   points   of  
resistance  are  present  everywhere  in  the  power  network.”766  For  Foucault,  the  
necessary   relation  between  power  and   resistance   results   from   the   fact   that  
power  can  only  be  understood  as  a  conditioning  force  working  on  free  subjects.  
He  writes  that  “power  relations  are  possible  only  insofar  as  the  subjects  are  
                                                                                                                
763  We  could  say  that  when  Deleuze  and  Guattari  speak  of  ‘power’  in  a  Foucauldian  sense,  
they  are  referring  to  what  they  elsewhere  speak  of  as  ‘capture’  (ATP  468-­520).  ‘Power’  
would  then  be  a  name  for  the  ways  in  which  desire  is  captured  by  social  machines,  which  
stratify  desire  through  the  use  of  translation.  
764  ATP  70  
765  My  analysis  diverges  from  Smith’s  at  this  point.  While  he  concentrates  on  the  way  in  
which  Deleuze’s  engagements  with  Nietzsche’s  theory  of  the  drives  and  Kant’s  theory  of  
practical  reason  lead  to  the  political  question  of  “how  any  social  formation  manages  to  
capture”  the  lines  of  flight  that  are  constantly  escaping,  I  have  chosen  to  emphasise  the  fact  
that  it  is  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  materialist  semiotics  that  allows  them  to  answer  this  
question  by  conducting  their  analysis  outside  of  the  realm  of  ‘knowledge-­power’  (Smith,  
2016,  279).  
766  Foucault,  1978,  95;;  See  also  Foucault,  1980,  142  
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free.”767   The   subject   is   created   through   a   set   of   power   relations,   which   it  
necessarily  resists  to  a  certain  degree,  thus  power  and  resistance  are  always  
intertwined.  In  much  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  writing  on  the  concept  of  the  
line  of  flight,   it  may  look  as  if  this  concept  plays  a  very  similar  role  to  that  of  
‘resistance’   for   Foucault.   For   example,   Guattari’s   early   work   on   group  
subjectivity  –  discussed  in  the  section  titled  ‘Subject-­groups’   in  Chapter  2  of  
this   thesis  –  argues   that  subjectivity   is  always  produced  at  a  crossroads  of  
power   and   resistance.   In  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  Deleuze  and  Guattari   also  
show  how  the  four  different  regimes  of  signs  they  have  identified  in  historical  
power  relations  can  all  be  defined  by  the  differing  relations  they  take  up  with  
their  lines  of  flight.  In  short,  any  assemblage  necessarily  has  something  that  
escapes   it.  Because  assemblages  are  assemblages  of  desire,  whatever   the  
organization  of  the  assemblage,  no  matter  how  rigid  its  molar  lines,  there  will  
always  be  lines  that  escape  the  assemblage  and  connect  it  with  its  outside.  
For   Foucault,   the   necessary   relation   of   resistance   to   power   keeps   the  
possibility  of  socio-­political  change  open  at  all  times,  and  in  a  similar  way  for  
Deleuze  and  Guattari,  the  lines  of  flight  that  escape  an  assemblage  maintain  
the  immanent  possibility  for  transformation.    
In  order  to  understand  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  claim  that  lines  of  flight  “are  not  
phenomena  of  resistance  or  counterattack”  and  that  they  are  instead  “primary”  
in   an   assemblage,   we   must   pay   attention   to   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s  
conditioning  clause.  They  do  not  only  state  that  lines  of  flight  are  primary,  but  
that  “the  diagram  and  abstract  machine”  have  lines  of  flight  that  are  primary.  
Once  again,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  are  making  a  distinction  between  generative  
and  transformational  modes  of  analysis  on  the  one  hand,  and  diagrammatic  
and  machinic  modes  of  analysis  on  the  other.  It  is  true  that  when  we  analyse  
regimes  of  signs  we  see  that  the  molar  lines,  the  molecular  lines,  and  the  lines  
of   flight   in   an   assemblage   seem   to   be   intertwined   and  mutually   upholding.  
However,  when  we  move  to  an  analysis  of  the  abstract  machines  that  connect  
regimes  of  signs  with  regimes  of  bodies,  or  “semiotic  systems”  with  “physical  
systems”,  we  see  that  lines  of  flight  are  not  simply  coextensive  with  the  other  
                                                                                                                
767  Foucault,  1994,  720;;  quoted  in  Lynch,  2016,  191  
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lines,  but  necessarily  precede  them.768  There  are  many  moments  in  both  Anti-­
Oedipus   and   A   Thousand   Plateaus   where   Deleuze   and   Guattari   seem  
ambivalent  about  the  question  of  the  respective  priority  of  the  different  lines  in  
an   assemblage.   For   example,   in   the   eighth   plateau,   they   discuss   “the  
respective   importance   of   the   lines”   stating   that   “you   can   begin   with   rigid  
segmentarity,  it’s  the  easiest,  it’s  pregiven;;  and  then  you  can  look  at  how  and  
to  what  extent  it  is  crosscut  by  a  supple  segmentarity…  then  you  can  look  at  
how  the  line  of  flight  enters  in.”769  This  is,  in  effect,  what  they  do  in  their  analysis  
of  the  four  regimes  of  signs.  First  they  offer  an  analysis  of  the  rigid  elements  
of   their   structure,  and   then   they  show  how   this   rigidity   relates   to   that  which  
escapes  it.  However,  they  continue  in  the  eighth  plateau  by  writing  that  “it  is  
also  possible  to  begin  with  the  line  of  flight:  perhaps  this  is  the  primary  line,  
with   its  absolute  deterritorialization.   It   is  clear   that   the   line  of   flight  does  not  
come  afterward;;  it  is  there  from  the  beginning.”770  The  question  of  the  primacy  
of   the   line   of   flight   therefore   seems   to   involve   a   question   of   perceptual  
semiotics.  It  is,  in  effect,  both  a  philosophical  and  an  ethical  question  regarding  
how  we  choose  to  proceed.  While  it   is  possible  to  give  an  account  of  social  
formations  via  a  description  of  their  consistencies,  it  is  also  possible  to  begin  
with  the  cutting  edges  of  deterritorialization.  The  philosophical  problem  here  is  
akin   to   the   problem   of   depth   that   Deleuze   discusses   in   Difference   and  
Repetition  –  and  which   I  outlined   in   the  section   titled   ‘Intensity  contra   linear  
perspective’  in  Chapter  1  of  this  thesis  –  where  a  recognition  of  the  primacy  of  
the  dimension  of  depth,  understood  as  intensive,  allows  one  to  recognise  how  
the  identity  of  the  here  and  now  are  transcendentally  conditioned  by  a  form  of  
difference  that  necessarily  precedes  them.  The  ethical  question  concerns  the  
efficacy  of  different  images  of  thought.  As  I  discussed  in  the  section  titled  ‘The  
BwO  and  the  ethics  of  the  line  of  flight’  in  Chapter  5  of  this  thesis,  while  it  is  
not   necessarily   ethical   to   draw   lines   of   flight,   moving   from   a   traditional   or  
‘dogmatic’  image  of  thought  to  a  vegetal  or  rhizomatic  image  in  which  lines  of  
                                                                                                                
768  ATP  155  
769  ATP  226  
770  ATP  226  
   270  
flight  are  taken  to  be  primary,  will  allow  for  a  new  kind  of  ethics,  based  on  an  
understanding  of  causes.    
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  second  point  of  contention  with  Foucault,  as  it   is  put  
forward  in  the  footnote  under  consideration,  therefore  seems  to  depend  on  the  
question  of  perceptual  semiotics.  While  it  is  perfectly  possible  to  see  lines  of  
flight  as  necessary  corollaries  to  assemblages  of  desire,  and  while  it  is  possible  
to  see  resistance  as  a  necessary  corollary  to  power,  it  is  also  possible  to  go  
one  step  further,  to  take  up  a  vegetal  image  of  thought,  and  to  recognise  the  
primacy  of   lines  of   flight   in   the  abstract  machines   that  condition   regimes  of  
signs  and  regimes  of  bodies.  With  this  analysis  in  mind,  we  can  now  return  to  
the  four  different  senses  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  attribute  to  the  concept  of  
the   line   of   flight   in   Anti-­Oedipus   and   relate   them   to   the   two   different  
perspectives  that  the  pair  take  on  lines  of  flight  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus.  The  
first  and  third  senses  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  that  I  discussed  in  my  
two  chapters  on  Anti-­Oedipus,  in  which  psychoanalysts  and  political  militants  
pick  out  those  flows  of  desire  that  escape  from  oedipal  relations  and  capitalist  
relations   respectively,   are   akin   to   what   Deleuze   and   Guattari   take   to   be  
Foucault’s  concept  of  resistance.  However,  the  second  and  fourth  senses  of  
the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight   in  Anti-­Oedipus,   concerning   the   transverse  
connections  and  inclusive  disjunctions  between  heterogeneous  chains  of  code  
that   form   the   multiplicity   of   desiring-­production   and   the   absolute   limit   of  
capitalism  that  can  be  reached  when  the  decoded  flows  released  by  capital  
cannot   be   recaptured   and   reterritorialized   by   it,   go   beyond   this   apparently  
Foucauldian  perspective  by  recognizing  the  fact  that  “the  diagram  and  abstract  
machine  have   lines   of   flight   that   are   primary,  which   are   not   phenomena  of  
resistance  or  counterattack   in  an  assemblage,  but  cutting  edges  of  creation  
and  deterritorialization.”771  The  footnote  I  have  been  discussing  is  not  strictly  
of  interest  to  us  here  because  of  its  analysis  of  Foucault,  but  because  it  gives  
us  a  clear   insight   into   the   importance  of   the  concept  of   the   line  of   flight   for  
Deleuze  and  Guattari.  Every  assemblage  contains  its  own  lines  of  flight  and,  
depending  on   the  mode  of  analysis  you   take,   these   lines  of   flight  are  either  
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mutually  intertwined  with  the  other  lines,  or  they  are  the  primary  conditions  for  
the   genesis   and   transformation   of   the   assemblage   itself.   For   Deleuze   and  
Guattari’s   political   philosophy,   it   is   their   concept   of   the   line   of   flight   which  
separates  them  from  more  traditional  approaches  to  power.  By  recognising  the  
logical  primacy  of  difference  over  identity,  by  recognising  the  logical  primacy  
of  group  relations  of  desire  over  individual  desires,  and  by  developing  a  vegetal  
image   of   thought   that   allows   them   to   think   through   the   dynamics   of   the  
necessary  preconditions  for  any  assemblage  of  power,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
are  able   to  show   that  what   they  call   the  Body  without  Organs   is  primary   in  
relation   to   any   organisation   of   the   body,   that   absolute   deterritorialization   is  
primary  in  relation  to  all  other  de/reterritorializations,  and  that  lines  of  flight  are  
primary  in  relation  to  either  molar  lines  of  rigid  segmentarity  or  molecular  lines  
of  supple  segmentarity.    
  
iii)  One  or  many  lines  of  flight?  
  
This  thesis  has  concentrated  on  an  analysis  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  
as  it  appears  in  the  Capitalism  and  Schizophrenia  series.  In  doing  so,  it  has  
distinguished  a  number  of  different  senses  in  which  the  concept  is  used.  This  
analysis   is,  however,   inevitably   incomplete  and  there  are  a  number  of  other  
senses  in  which  the  concept  can  be  deployed.  The  two  most  obvious  places  
to  seek  out  alternative  senses  of  the  concept  would  be  the  two  other  full-­length  
philosophical  works  Deleuze  and  Guattari  completed  together,  namely  Kafka:  
Towards  a  Minor  Literature  and  What  is  Philosophy?  To  close,  I  would  like  to  
look  at  some  of  the  paths  that  such  an  analysis  may  lead  us  down.    
  
In  their  analysis  of  Kafka,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  develop  some  of  the  themes  
from  their  previous  book,  especially   the  possibilities  of  escaping   the  oedipal  
triangle  and  the  state  apparatus,  while  prefiguring  some  of  the  themes  that  will  
emerge  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  especially  in  their  assessment  of  the  relation  
between  content  and  expression.772  The  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  emerges  
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here  specifically  in  an  analysis  of  Kafka’s  use  of  the  becoming-­animal  in  his  
short   stories.   Here,   to   escape   the   family   or   the   bureaucracy   of   official  
structures,   Kafka’s   writing   machine   finds   escape   routes   through   animal  
transformations:   “for   Kafka,   the   animal   essence   is   the  way   out,   the   line   of  
escape.”773   In   a   passage   that   beautifully   mirrors   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s  
distinction  between  the  schizophrenic  and  the  revolutionary  in  Anti-­Oedipus  –  
namely  “the  difference  between  the  one  who  escapes,  and  the  one  who  knows  
how  to  make  what  he  is  escaping  escape”774  –  in  their  analysis  of  his  “animal  
stories”  they  claim  that  “Kafka  was  drawing  lines  of  escape;;  but  he  didn't  ‘flee  
the  world.’  Rather,  it  was  the  world  and  its  representation  that  he  made  take  
flight  and  that  he  made  follow  these  lines.”775  It  would  be  particularly  interesting  
to   compare   the   lines   of   flight   that   Deleuze   and   Guattari   discuss   as   routes  
towards   a   becoming-­animal   in   Kafka:   Towards   a   Minor   Literature   and   the  
modes  of  becoming-­minoritarian  put  forward  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus.  One  of  
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  major  literary  references  for  the  concept  of  the  line  of  
flight  in  the  latter  text  is  Soledad  Brother  in  which  George  Jackson  describes  
fleeing  from  the  police  while  looking  for  a  weapon.776  Jackson’s  literary  style  
of   resistance   is   a   form   of   black   revolutionary   becoming-­minoritarian.      He  
describes  a  very  literal  line  of  flight  in  a  text  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  treat  as  
an  example  of  minor  literature.777  By  reading  Jackson  and  Kafka  alongside  one  
another,  the  sense  of  the  line  of  flight  as  an  act  of  human  or  animal  fleeing,  
and   the   connotations   of   predation   that   it   assumes,   could   be   made   more  
explicit.  My  analysis  of  the  many  uses  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  in  Anti-­
Oedipus   and   A   Thousand   Plateaus   has   highlighted   the   position   that   the  
concept  takes  in  the  pair’s  philosophical  architecture  and  the  possible  uses  for  
this  concept  in  escaping  from  socio-­political  modes  of  capture.  We  could  say  
that   these   escapes   relate   primarily   to   those   alloplastic   stratifications   that  
operate  by   translation,  and  which  produce  regimes  of  signs  and  regimes  of  
bodies.  Through  a  closer  assessment  of  the  modes  of  becoming-­minoritarian  
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that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  develop   in   their  book  on  Kafka  and  elsewhere,   it  
would  also  be  possible  to  see  how  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  is  operative  
in  the  escape  routes  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  identify  from  the  physical  and  
the  organic   stratifications   that  organise  our  bodies  and   interrupt   the   flow  of  
desire  on  the  BwO.    
  
If  we  take  Deleuze  at  his  word,  then  Difference  and  Repetition  is  “a  liberation  
of   thought   from  those   images  which   imprison   it”  –   those   images  collectively  
known  as   the   ‘dogmatic’   or   ‘arborescent’   image  –  while   the  Capitalism  and  
Schizophrenia  series  is  an  experiment  in  which  Deleuze  and  Guattari  “invoked  
a  vegetal  model  of  thought.”778  Continuing  along  this  trajectory,  we  can  then  
take  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s   final   book  as   an  attempt   to   ask   not   only  what  
philosophy  is,  but  what  philosophy  is  now.  That  is  to  say,  once  the  dogmatic  
image   has   been   torn   down,   and   once   the   creative   process   of   producing  
alternative  models   for   thought   has   begun,   what   is   left   for   the   discipline   of  
philosophy?   In   answer   to   this   question,   and   in   an   attempt   to   map   the  
connections   between   philosophy,   science   and   art,   Deleuze   and   Guattari  
rename   their   intellectual   practice   once   again,   now   coining   the   term  
‘geophilosophy’.779   Here  Deleuze  and  Guattari   attempt   to   differentiate   their  
methodology   of   thought   from   the   history   of   philosophy   –   both   from   those  
thinkers  who  came  before  them  and  from  the  constitution  of  philosophy  as  a  
history.    
Instead  of   thinking  of   the   discipline   of   philosophy  as   a   series   of   questions,  
organised  along  a  historical  line  of  descent  running  from  the  ancient  Greeks  to  
the  present,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  claim  that  philosophy   is  composed  of  an  
assemblage  of  problems,  each  of  which  inhabits  the  plane  of  consistency,  and  
each  of  which  produces   its  own   ‘universe’.  Each  concept   is  created  on   the  
plane  of  consistency   in  response  to  a  philosophical  problem.  Universes  are  
multiple,  yet  they  connect  with  one  another  on  the  plane  of  consistency.  Within  
this   geophilosophical   practice,   the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight   takes   on   a  
specific  role:  “Universes  are  linked  together  or  separated  on  their  lines  of  flight,  
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so  that  the  plane  may  be  single  at  the  same  time  as  universes  are  irreducibly  
multiple.”780  What  this  means  is  that  it  is  lines  of  flight  that  allow  philosophical  
problems  to  relate  to  one  another  and  ultimately  to  form  a  shared  plane,  which  
we  can  call  philosophy   itself.  As  each  assemblage   is  defined  by   its   lines  of  
flight,  as  much  as   it   is  defined  by   its   lines  of   rigid  and  supple  segmentarity,  
here  Deleuze  and  Guattari  define   the  discipline  of  philosophy  by   that  which  
escapes   it.   In   this   context,   the   concept   of   the   line   of   flight   takes   on   a  
metaphilosophical  as  well  as  a  philosophical  role.  In  short,  if  Anti-­Oedipus  and  
A  Thousand  Plateaus  each  provided  their  own  senses  of  the  concept  of  the  
line  of  flight  –  be  they  generative,  transformational,  diagrammatic,  or  machinic  
–   an   analysis   of  What   is   Philosophy?   would   allow   us   to   define   a   further  
metaphilosophical,  or  geophilosophical,  sense  as  well.    
Despite  having  to  stop  short  of  a  full  analysis  of  the  concept  of  the  line  of  flight  
in  all  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  writings,  this  thesis  has  aimed  to  show  both  
how   central   the   concept   is   to   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   project   and   how   it  
develops  across  the  trajectory  of  their  work  together.  I  hope  that  the  analysis  
that  has  been  completed  here  may  be  of  some  use  to  those  attempting  to  draw  
from  the  fertile  ground  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  collaboration  in  order  to  think  
the  possibility  of  both  philosophical  and  political  transformations.    
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